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Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action

Proceedings of a Panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1st–5th 2009

Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser

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VINCENT ELTSCHINGER, HELMUT KRASSER

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Foreword

The present volume deals with the questioning, challenging, evaluating and legitimatizing of revealed or inspired speech in connection with its authority in practically relevant matters (ritual, morals, soteriology, etc.). In other words, this book examines scriptural authorization as it has been dealt with in various media (political as well as philosophical discourse, myths, images, objects), in rhetorical strategies, and in finalities (doctrinal, apologetic, "heresiological," political, etc.). From very early times, India found itself in the situation of having a "market" of religions that had competing truth-claims and – could it be otherwise? – mutual rivalry with regard to sociopolitical legitimacy, economic support, and confessional predominance. As early as 400 BCE, the Buddhists, Jains and Ājīvikas (to name only three) had begun to contest the validity of the Vedic religion, as well as its soteriological relevance and normativity. Yet to come were numerous other groups that would challenge already existing denominations and attempt to negotiate or enforce positions of power both within and outside their own milieu of origin: Mahāyānists, Sāṅkhyas, Śaiva Pāśupatas and Kāpālikas, Vaiṣṇava Pañcarātras, Buddhist and non-Buddhist Tāntrikas, etc. All of them tried to create new space – space for rediscovered truths, space for conversion, space for power. And they all developed artistic, institutional and rhetorical means for enhancing their visibility and legitimizing their claims of truth. In ancient India maybe more than anywhere else, to exist and survive as a philosophic-religious denomination meant both defending oneself against external criticism and advertising one's monopoly on salvation.

We do not claim, however, to be providing a comprehensive analysis of these matters in this volume. Indeed, even if we limit our

scope to about 1,500 years of Indic history (c. 500 BCE–1,000 CE), it will only be possible to deal with the issue of scriptural authority and authorization in a manner that might be described as impressionistic. We have no illusions that to be all-inclusive or to offer overall theoretical relevance would be an unfeasible task. Nonetheless, when organizing the panel "Scriptural Authority and Apologetics in the Indian Religio-Philosophical Environment" for the XIVth World Sanskrit Conference (University of Kyōto, 1–5 September 2009, "Buddhist Studies" section), the conveners and now editors chose to invite specialists in as many Indic religio-philosophical traditions as possible. They were solicited with the following text:

> "**1a.** ***Scriptural/religious authority as a philosophical and epistemological issue.*** – Which epistemological status can scripture/religious authority claim in the system of human knowledge? Is there a distinct jurisdiction (e.g., the *acintya*, or the *atīndriya*) for scripture, or does/can it overlap with other, empirical sources of knowledge? How can the truth or reliability of a given textual tradition be assessed? Is a concept of scripturally based rationality available? Can reason(ing) and scripture contradict each other? Can reason(ing) alone shape morals and goal-oriented practice? **1b.** ***Scriptural/religious authority as a hermeneutical and exegetical issue.*** – What does scripture consist of? What may lay claim to authority/canonicity, and on which basis? Does the issue of scriptural authenticity/authentication become a philosophical question? To what extent is exegesis (e.g., varying levels of interpretation) involved in settling philosophical questions? **2a.** ***Apologetics and/in Indian philosophy.*** – How developed is the apologetic concern in a given philosophical tradition or even a single text/author? In which way(s) does philosophy provide apologetics with methods, techniques or doctrinal agenda? How do philosophers and dogmaticians claim rationality for the scriptural tradition which they defend or promote? Are there forms of apologetic rhetoric other than appeals to credibility and claims of rationality? Can Indian philosophy (and philosophy in general) be easily dissociated from apologetic concerns? **2b.** ***Apologetics and/in Indian history.*** – Can non-philosophical, historical (social, political, economic, institutional) circumstances be interpreted as having been instrumental in the development of apologetic endeavours within a tradition? Have, e.g., the practice of debate, scho-

larly institutions, internal and external hostility, economic pressure or political events had a share in shaping certain apologetic agenda?"

As a result of these questions, the panel's programme, held on a long, hot and humid day (2 September 2009), was the following (excluding lunch and coffee breaks):

11^{00}–11^{30}	P. Skilling	Invoking the Buddha: The power of *buddhavacana* in *sūtra* and *dhāraṇī*
11^{30}–12^{00}	J. Walser	*sūtra* vs. *śāstra*: a sociological perspective
12^{00}–12^{30}	T. Horiuchi	Mahāyāna and Vaipulya: Focusing on the proof of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna
14^{00}–14^{30}	P. Balcerowicz	Omniscience of the Jina and the truth of Jainism
14^{30}–15^{00}	K. Kataoka	Transmission of scripture: Exegetical problems for Kumārila and Dharmakīrti
15^{00}–15^{30}	V. Eltschinger	Towards a genealogy of the Buddhist epistemologists' apologetics
15^{50}–16^{20}	H. Krasser	Dharmakīrti on the unreliability of scripture
16^{20}–16^{50}	S. Moriyama	On the relationship between scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*) and the fallacious thesis contradicted by scripture (*āgamavirodha*)
16^{50}–17^{20}	S. McClintock	Kamalaśīla on scripture and reason: The limits and extent of 'practical rationality' in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*
17^{40}–18^{10}	H. Marui	Examination of the meaning of '*prāmāṇya*' with special reference to its use for the Veda or 'verbal testimony' (*śabda*) in the *codanāsūtrādhikaraṇa* of the *Ślokavārttika* and some Nyāya texts
18^{10}–18^{40}	R. Torella	*prasiddhi* and *pratibhā*

In the end, however, the contents of the present volume diverge from this list of presentations. For various reasons, Hiroshi Marui and Toshio Horiuchi unfortunately had to withdraw their stimulating contributions, thus depriving us of important insights into Nyāya

philosophy and Mahāyāna exegesis and apologetics. It was of course not possible to replace the papers of these outstanding Japanese scholars with work by others covering similar areas. But luckily, it was the editors' good fortune to have been able to recruit contributions from two of the *fine fleur* of French specialists on Indian philosophy, namely, Isabelle Ratié, whose remarkable work on Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta needs no further introduction, and Hugo David, an expert on Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The editors asked them (in July 2010 and December 2011, respectively) whether they would be willing to write papers on the topic in question despite deadlines that were threatening if not already passed. Thus, while the editors could not include examinations of the Brahmanical Nyāya and the Buddhist *Vyākhyāyukti*, they gained a significant work on early Vedānta and a second study on the Pratyabhijñā School. Since this school is regrettably quite an understudied field, the editors are especially happy to offer two outstanding papers dedicated to the Pratyabhijñā's highly original way of dealing with authority, competing religio-philosophical traditions, and the relationship between reason and scripture.

*

The present volume opens with contributions focusing on two Buddhist strategies, in part narrative, that are designed to authorize (Buddhist) speech and speakers, namely, the Buddha's "long tongue of truth" (Peter Skilling) and the Buddhists' appropriation of high seats and daises as authorizing devices (Joseph Walser). Like the lion's roar, the Buddha's "exceptional, stupendous, and spectacular tongue," which belongs to the thirty-two marks of a "great man" (*mahāpuruṣa*), is "an outstanding and unique engine of authority in Buddhist narrative." As Skilling remarks, "the authority of the Buddha is established physically" by "extraordinary bodily features." The narrative device of the two hidden marks (the long tongue and the sheathed male organ) being verified by sceptical brahmins reflects a phase in the early social context of Buddhism, a period in which there was a need to demonstrate the superiority of the Buddha vis à vis the brahmins and other religious systems." In other narratives, "the display of the tongue" works "as a guarantee of truth, again to brahmins." Gradually, the preachers developed new priorities in

response to changing contexts: "The display of the tongue was no longer used to impress and convert brahmins; it came to figure in fully Buddhist contexts, and to be used for dramatic effect within Buddhist circles." In a similar way, the preaching chair or dais (Buddhism knows of at least three of these "important part[s] of the everyday furniture of the monastery": the *uccāsana* or "high chair," the *siṃhāsana* or "lion throne," and the *dharmāsana* or "dharma seat") is one of the "the physical props that frame and authorize a particular scripture *as Buddhist*." According to Walser, "the connection of the preaching seat with sovereign authority" represents "a sectarian iteration of a pan-Indian phenomenon," since "the trope of the throne and enthronement remains a fairly stable index of authority within the Indic cultural sphere." This, of course, is especially true of the lion throne, which was "designed to meld religious power to widely established images of political power." The author's thesis here is that "there was a culturally understood reciprocal authorization between the *sūtra* as a genre and the fact that its salient instantiation would have been framed by such a dais." In other words, "to have access to the dais becomes the best route to authorize a given message as legitimately 'Buddhist,' and for that reason one of the more important stakes in any ideological struggle."

The next group of papers are variously related to the so-called epistemological school, one of the most outstanding intellectual phenomena of late Indian Buddhism (500–1300 CE). At some point during the sixth century, Dharmakīrti laid the foundations of an exhaustive system of human rationality designed to cover both human judgement (the proper use of the *pramāṇa*s or "means of valid cognition") and human practice (successful purposive action), or equivalently, both *yukti*, "reason(ing)" (the realm of ascertained valid cognition as opposed to belief and faith) and *prekṣā*, *prudentia* (according to which religious belief *can* be rational provided certain conditions are fulfilled). In a genealogical vein, Vincent Eltschinger attempts to show how and why earlier Yogācāra notions in the areas of exegetics and soteriology came to coalesce around an apologetically relevant concept of human reason that broke with the aims and methods of earlier scholasticism. As has long been recognized, Dharmakīrti's ideas

concerning scriptural authority are strongly indebted to a short passage in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (2.5ab and *Vṛtti*). Nonetheless, two generations of scholars have puzzled over the meaning and original Sanskrit wording of this passage. In his paper, Helmut Krasser suggests that a close comparison with Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya* provides an important key to understanding Dignāga's ideas. But how is it that the two extant Tibetan translations of Dignāga's work as well as Jinendrabuddhi's commentary thereon have resisted all attempts at reconstructing a Sanskrit *wording* that is philologically satisfactory? According to Krasser, Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* lends itself to the same conclusions as Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*: far from being (or reflecting) different exemplars of one and the same original (and duly published) composition, the texts we possess today are nothing but (more or less carefully edited) notes taken by these masters' *students*. Needless to say, such a conclusion has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of Indian philosophy as well as the very nature of textual criticism when applied to philosophical texts. As Eltschinger's and Krasser's essays make clear, the Buddhist epistemologists' approach to scriptural authority is chiefly evaluative. Evaluating what a given treatise has to say about empirical things is not particularly problematic. But how can one assess a scripture's discourse on transempirical matters, which are *ipso facto* unverifiable and unfalsifiable? This is the focus of the Buddhist philosophers' "scripturally based inference" (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*), the subject matter of Shinya Moriyama's and Sara McClintock's contributions. The nature and the function of this type of inference, which these Buddhist philosophers regard as the only *rational* way of dealing with supersensible things, have long been misunderstood. Moriyama's paper clearly settles the matter by providing ample textual evidence showing that this type of inference, far from letting scriptural statements inform us absolutely about supersensible states of affairs, merely consists in the search for internal contradictions or inconsistencies in a given treatise or scripture. This search is based on one's provisional acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of a treatise's description of a certain subject as being this or that. According to Moriyama, this and other features of this type of inference (which looks like "an updated version of the fallacious

thesis called *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*" in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*) make it structurally very similar to the Buddhist epistemologists' antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) and the Nyāya's "hypothetical tenet" (*abhyupagamasiddhānta*) and "incoherency" (*viruddha*). In other words, the Buddhist logicians' scripturally based inference, anchored as it is in the Indian dialectical tradition, serves purely evaluational and polemical purposes and was *never* designed as a means for increasing one's knowledge of (definitionally) unascertainable states of affairs. McClintock's contribution examines the same inference within the general context of "practical rationality" as defined and elaborated by the two eighth-century philosophers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in their *Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā)*. As McClintock rightly emphasizes, the reason for their insistence on this rhetorical device is that "one of the most important tasks of rational discourse is […] to provide rational persons with rational justifications for seeking this soteriological goal [= perfect buddhahood or omniscience]." But how does this epistemologically neglected (and formally obscure) inference function? What is its place in the general economy of human knowledge? To what extent can human beings deal with religiously relevant things (such as the relation between acts and their results) without resorting to any scripturally based knowledge of supersensible states of affairs? What are the limits of human (practical) rationality? McClintock attempts to answer these questions by translating and discussing some of the most relevant excerpts from these two Nālandā scholars' important work. It is indeed a fascinating thing to see how these champions of rationality dealt with traditionally handed down and at times mythical accounts of cosmology, moral retribution, spiritual attainments and soteriology.

This was of course not the exclusive concern of Buddhist intellectuals, for all Indic religio-philosophical traditions faced the same theoretical problems. The same topic was no less hotly debated among the Jainas in connection to both the Jina's omniscience (which supposedly legitimizes authority of the Jaina scriptures) and the plurality of the competing truth-claims (which questions this very authoritativeness, at least as far as exclusivity is concerned).

According to Piotr Balcerowicz, the early medieval period marked, also for the Jainas, the "transition from a phase when the acceptance of the reliability of the original teachers was based primarily on belief to a phase when belief was either replaced or accompanied by the work of reason." And thus it is that the most outstanding Jaina logicians and philosophers (Siddhasena, Haribhadra, Akalaṅka, etc.) developed numerous strategies to authorize their scriptures and to demonstrate the Jina's exceptionality in cognitional, ethical and salvational matters. Balcerowicz's taxonomical approach to the many arguments devised by the Jains to demonstrate the validity of their scriptures does more than simply provide a list (the argument based on scripture, the argument based on the efficacy of the teaching, the argument based on progression, the argument based on potentiality, etc.). He also compares them to Western (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Berkeley) and Buddhist (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara) validity arguments and attempts to show, in a somewhat pessimistic vein, that "as it is usually the case in apologetic and religious literature, all the arguments to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and the Jina's teaching" suffer from logical flaws and inconsistencies (circularity, quantifier-shift fallacy, equivocation, confusion of modalities, etc.).

From the early sixth century onwards, the Mīmāṃsā, a school of Vedic hermeneutics with a strong apologetic leaning, was Buddhism's (and to a lesser extent, Jainism's) mortal enemy. The struggle between Vedic orthodoxy (or one should rather say "orthopraxy") and Buddhism involved much more than a disagreement about harmless philosophical technicalities. As Kei Kataoka's contribution shows, what most concerned the two major representatives of these traditions (Kumārila and Dharmakīrti) was defending their respective scriptures' authoritativeness and normativity. Authorizing the Vedic *smṛti*s, the normative works of *human* origin, without *ipso facto* providing the Buddhist or Jaina scriptures with the same kind of legitimation was one of the most serious hermeneutic problems faced by the Mīmāṃsā. Was one to postulate – as done also by the Buddhist Vaibhāṣikas and Mahāyānists – that there were lost Vedic recensions? Was one to make authority and normativity depend on

the legislators' personal motivations and/or social status? Kataoka's familiarity with these two traditions allows him to create a dialogue between Kumārila's and Dharmakīrti's most relevant texts, which allows him to give a penetrating account of the proper religious background and motivations of this philosophical rivalry.

But the sixth- to seventh-century Mīmāṃsā not only had to rebuke the Buddhist objections against Vedic authority. Within Brahmanism itself, and probably also within Mīmāṃsā circles, there were challenges to this school's nearly exclusive concern with Vedic injunctions (*codanā*, *vidhi*) and the modification of the "great" Upaniṣadic statements into mere explanatory sentences (*arthavāda*) devoid of any independent validity (*prāmāṇya*). The Mīmāṃsaka (a direct disciple of Kumārila?) and early Vedāntin Maṇḍana Miśra seems to have played a major role in this context. His contribution to these discussions is the subject matter of a concentrated and insightful essay by Hugo David. According to David, Maṇḍana Miśra's doctrine of injunctive discourse exhibits two features that "directly served an *apologetic* as well as *exegetical* purpose" and resulted in a "radical subversion" of the Grammarians' (especially Bhartṛhari's) analysis of *liṅ*, etc. The first characteristic, a strong move towards "depersonalization," was meant to "reconcile linguistic analysis with the possibility of an injunction by the authorless Veda," that is, "to provide a linguistic basis for one of Mīmāṃsā's most fundamental assumptions, the Veda's impersonality." In order to do so, Maṇḍana added a fourth element to the Grammarians' threefold analysis of injunctive speech. To command, request and permission, where the speaker apparently prevails, Maṇḍana added instruction (*upadeśa*). The specific content or import of instruction is (the knowledge of) *iṣṭasādhanatā*, "being a means for realizing a desired end." In other words, the "instruction" aspect of injunctive discourse exhausts itself by indicating an object that suits the pragmatic expectations of the hearer. In this innovative analysis, "the role of the speaker uttering an injunction (*vidhātṛ*) is reduced […] to the mere transmission of a piece of information about a means of realization and its relationship to an expected result." Maṇḍana did not only add this fourth "meaning," but also universalized it so that the four meanings

turn out to be nothing other than "different modes of presentation of a single, universal meaning, which does not always appear with the same degree of clarity." In other words, "*all* (Vedic and worldly) injunctions" have an identical content. We thus see how Maṇḍana Miśra achieved his second ambition, reducing prescription to description and injunctive speech to declarative discourse. But in doing this, Maṇḍana "paved the way for a specifically Vedāntic interpretation of the nature and object of the Vedic *corpus* as a whole" by providing the "distinction between 'injunctions' (*vidhi*, such as 'Let him who desires heaven sacrifice!'), 'explanatory statements' (*arthavāda*) and 'sentences of the Vedānta' (*vedāntavākya*, such as 'Brahman is consciousness, bliss')" with an exegetical foundation. According to Maṇḍana Miśra's view of injunctive discourse, the Vedic injunction and the Upaniṣadic assertion ultimately amount to the same thing (and are endowed with the same independent validity): an *upadeśa*, that is, a statement indicating an existing object (the sacrifice, Brahman) which is desirable inasmuch as it is beneficial.

In tenth-century Kashmir, the Śaiva philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta were the promoters of the non-dualist Pratyabhijñā ("Recognition") School – an allegedly "new path" that resorted to rational enquiry alone and confined the Śaiva scriptures to a purely corroborative role. But, asks Isabelle Ratié, how can such autonomy be claimed for human reason by authors who, like Bhartṛhari and the Naiyāyikas before them, regard perception and inference as ultimately resting on, subordinate to, and made possible by *āgama* itself? Here as elsewhere, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers introduce subtle semantic and conceptual distinctions. What they have in mind in this regard is *āgama* in the sense of *prasiddhi* (literally, "common knowledge/usage"), a "kind of a priori certainty" that is anterior to reasoning and experience and conditions both. It is not simply a "speech or text considered authoritative by a certain religious tradition" – which would make their initial claim contradictory. According to them, *āgama* is, first and foremost, a "strong, nonperceptual and noninferential realization (*vimarśa*)," that is, Śiva's own self-realization or self-awareness, of which the various religious traditions are ultimately nothing but more or less adequate expressions. Inter-

estingly enough, these philosophers consider these allodox and alloprax scriptures unobjectionably authoritative for the practitioner who puts faith in them, and *as long as* (s)he does put faith in them. Does this amount to a relativistic or perspectivistic approach to religious authority? Certainly not, according to Ratié, provided one regards the empirically existing scriptures as "included within an Ur-*āgama*" representing Śiva's self-realization and as hierarchically ordained according to their relative faithfulness to this self-realization. Not surprisingly, the hierarchy "culminates in the Śaiva non-dualistic all-encompassing scriptures," a feature that clearly ensures the system's inclusivistic stand and makes any contradiction between scriptures impossible. Indeed, "hierarchy ensures non-contradiction because lower scriptures can be seen as partial or incomplete aspects of the ultimate *āgama*." In other words, "all scriptures can be considered valid means of knowledge" for those who believe in them, "and yet all scriptures but the Śaivas' are ultimately erroneous because they are partial aspects of Śiva's self-awareness." Thus it is that Ratié's masterful study allows us to fully appreciate the true meaning and function of autonomous reasoning in the Pratyabhijñā system: "The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus present reason's power as merely cathartic: reason can only *eliminate* wrong opinions that distract the individual from his or her own most inner and undeniable experience, and it can do so by *purifying* experience from wrong philosophical theses."

This is reminiscent of the Buddhist understanding of philosophy as a critical examination (*parīkṣā*). According to Raffaele Torella, Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's doctrine of *prasiddhi* ≈ *āgama* likely targeted, above all, the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, who vehemently dismissed any form of *prasiddhi* as a criterion of *dharma* and *adharma*: "Kumārila must have seen the 'universalistic' approach to revealed scripture as upheld by Bhartṛhari as being very dangerous. It is true that Bhartṛhari focuses on the Veda, but, apart from the corpus of texts in which the Veda is embodied, he envisages a higher level, a kind of subtle Veda made of *pratibhā* and *śabdatattva* which lies in the depths of all men, or even of all living creatures." Defending Bhartṛhari's views against Kumārila's, while using a term unknown

to Bhartṛhari and discarded by the great Mīmāṃsaka, might have been the purpose of the Pratyabhijñā philosophers. Whatever the case may be, *prasiddhi/āgama* is an "open structure" siding with "action" rather than "cognition," something that is "not bound to remain an inner belief, but enacts specific practical behaviours." As already pointed out above, there is "a single ultimate source for all *prasiddhi*s," in which they are all contained, viz. Parameśvara or Bhairava. And indeed, *prasiddhi* "coincides with the very voice of the Lord," while the Lord constitutes the innermost essence of all creatures. In other words, "[t]his active divine presence […] has the form of the innate language principle which imbues all cognitions and actions. It is the Voice (*vāc*) of the Lord that speaks in living beings." As we have already seen, all *prasiddhi*s are equally authoritative, but "of the totality of *prasiddhi*s that are contained in the creature, those that gradually appear or 'emerge' match the spiritual level reached by the individual subject, or […] are in accordance with its specific ends." As Torella nicely puts it, "[a] continuous line runs from the individually oriented *prasiddhi*s which are at work in the everyday experience of living beings and the progressively higher *prasiddhi*s, which give shape to the various world views, that is, the various *āgama*s – from the Veda to the Bauddha, the Pañcarātra, the Śaiva – culminating in the all-encompassing *eka āgama*."

*

Let it be noted, finally, that the editors may – and actually do – disagree with some of the views expressed in the present volume. In their opinion, however, censure of any sort is worse than possible erroneous views (of course as long as such views do not threaten either society or individuals – which is no real danger in the case of classical Indology and Buddhist Studies). As a consequence, they have opted for a fairly liberal and non-invasive approach to editing their friends' and colleagues' papers – not requesting additional arguments or textual evidence despite sometimes feeling that the offered evidence is insufficient, refraining from regarding a given philosophical tradition (say… analytical philosophy) as owning property rights over words and concepts, and accepting that English is a second (and sometimes even a third or a fourth) language for many of

us. (Publication deadlines and financial restrictions made it impossible to have all the papers written by non-native English speakers systematically checked by native speakers.) In the same spirit, the editors have decided not to unify the authors' styles, bibliographical conventions and editorial practices as long as these have been consistent.

It is the editors' pleasant duty to express their heartfelt gratitude to all those who participated, actively or otherwise, in the Kyōto panel, and to those who, by taking on the enormous task of organizing an event as large as the Kyōto conference and by shaping its specific sections, made both this panel and this book possible. In this we are thinking especially of Akihiko Akamatsu, Akira Saito and Kazunobu Matsuda.

Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser

Vienna, October 2012

The *tathāgata* and the long tongue of truth

The authority of the Buddha in *sūtra* and narrrative literature

Peter Skilling

Many in this world claim to be teachers,
And though many say they've presented bondage and freedom,
All they've done is show, as the path to peace,
A method that strengthens the root of cyclic existence.
Whose teaching, for those desiring liberation,
Is the supreme and nondeceptive entryway?
Only the Sugata's teaching,
So the Buddha alone is an authority.[1]

The Buddha is the sole authority – he is the *pramāṇapuruṣa*, a term about which much has been written.[2] In his *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti (seventh century) states that,

> The discerning proclaim that the word of the Blessed Buddhas alone is a *pramāṇa*, because it is reliable inasmuch as it is supported by argu-

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[1] *Grub mtha' shel gyi me long*, p. 14.7: *'jig rten 'di na ston par khas 'che zhing*, *'ching grol rnam bzhag smra ba mang mchis kyang*, *srid pa'i rtsa ba brtan par byed pa'i thabs*, *zhi ba'i lam du ston pa sha stag ste*, *gang gi bstan pa thar pa 'dod rnams la*, *bslu ba med pa'i 'jug ngogs mchog gyur pa*, *bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa kho na'i phyir*, *sangs rgyas nyag gcig tshad ma'i skyes bu yin*. Translation Sopa/Chávez/Jackson 2009: 45.

[2] See most recently, with reference to earlier studies, Eltschinger 2010: 426–428 (= § 13b).

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 1–47.

> ments (*sopapattika*). And therefore, it is established that only the word of the perfectly awakened ones is a [nondeceptive] scripture (*āgama*). [It is scripture first] because it comes (*āgata*) from credible [persons] who have eliminated all defilements; [second,] because it ascertains (*āgamayati*) in that it causes one to thoroughly understand the true reality; [third,] because it goes in the direction [of the goal] (*abhimukhād gamanāt*) in that it is by relying on it that the world reaches nirvana. On the contrary, it is established that the doctrines that differ from it are not a *pramāṇa* and [just] pseudo-scriptures because they lack any arguments.[3]

The epistemologies of authenticity and authority have been debated for centuries in India and Tibet; this is a fascinating and inexhaustible (*akṣaya*) topic in itself, but I do not intend to recapitulate it here. Rather, I will sketch some of the ways in which *sūtra* literature seeks to establish the Buddha's authority. It seems to me that the early *sūtra*s – those collected in the Āgamas and the Nikāyas – establish authority in a variety of ways, which include dialogue, debate, narrative, panegyric, and assertion. The configuration of authority depends, self-evidently, on intended audience, on context. There are many examples of dogmatic or logical demonstration, for example the *Caṅgīsutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* No. 95), but this is not the only or even the primary method.[4] The relation between dogma and authority is multifaceted, and there is a continuity between the Buddha's authority as a Teacher (*śāstṛ*) and as a locus of power (*ānubhāva*), energy (*tejas*), and protection (*paritrāṇa*), that is, between didac-

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[3] *Prasannapadā*, p. 268.1–269.3: *buddhānām eva bhagavatāṃ vacanaṃ pramāṇam ity upavarṇayanti vicakṣaṇāḥ sopapattikatvenāvisaṃvādakatvāt. ata eva cāptebhyaḥ prahīṇāśeṣadoṣebhya āgatatvāt*, *āgamayatīti samantāt tattvaṃ gamayatīti vā*, *abhimukhād* [em.: *ābhimukhyād* ed.] *gamanād vā tadāśrayeṇa lokasya nirvāṇagamanāt sambuddhavacanasyaivāgamatvaṃ vyavasthāpyate*, *tadanyamatānāṃ tūpapattiviyuktatvān na prāmāṇyam āgamābhāsatvaṃ ca vyavasthāpyate.* See La Vallée Poussin's detailed notes and cross-references. I thank Vincent Eltschinger for his help with this difficult passage.

[4] For fragments of a Sanskrit counterpart of undetermined school affiliation in the Schøyen collection, see Braarvig/Liland 2010: 2–5.

tic and apotropaic functions.[5] We cannot easily or neatly divide the Buddha's authority into the philosophical/rational versus magical/majestic/narrative without clumsily rumpling and shredding the fabric of the Buddhist thought-world.

The question of authority revolves around the figure of the Buddha and the transmission of his word. The tension of transmission is central to both traditional and contemporary understandings of the Buddha's legacy. Transmission of "Dharma-Vinaya" descends through a series of councils, which guarantee authenticity within a school or lineage. There were two "universal" councils in the century that followed the Buddha's death; after this the expanding Saṃgha solidified into several lines of transmission.[6] What we have today are *some* of the end-products of *some* (by no means all) of these lines of transmission.

Tathāgata and truth

What can one say about "the figure of the Buddha"? The Buddha is presented as a person who sought, who realized, and who taught the truth. One of his central epithets is *tathāgata*, and by definition *tathāgata*s speak the truth.[7] In the Sanskrit *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, King Ajātaśatru (ruler of Magadha, a younger contemporary of the Buddha) enunciates this principle as "*tathāgata*s, worthy ones, truly and fully awakened Buddhas are speakers of what is not false."[8]

[5] This may be seen from the nature and use of the texts in the various Paritta collections: the texts are memorized and recited in order to teach and to protect and bless.

[6] For the councils and other aspects of the question of authenticity, see Skilling 2009 and Skilling 2010.

[7] For Pali sources (*Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā* and *Ṭīkā*) on the meaning of *tathāgata*, see Bodhi 1978: 50–53 and 331–344. See also *Traité* I 126 (with a survey of the variety of interpretation up to *ca.* 1944); *Traité* III 1340–1341; Endo 1997: 195–206; Manda 2005.

[8] *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* §1.7: *avitathavādino* [em.: *avitathāvādino* ed.] *hi bhavanti tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhāḥ*. Waldschmidt restores the fragment by comparing the Tibetan: *de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas rnams ni log par gsungs pa*

The Pali version states more simply, "*tathāgata*s do not speak falsehood."[9] The theme of *tathāgata* runs through Buddhist literature, for example in the "Discourse on the World" (*Lokasutta*), a short *sutta* in prose and verse on the nature of the world, which in Pali is included in both the *Aṅguttaranikāya* and the *Itivuttaka*.[10] Associated terms with *tathā* elaborate on this epithet and the truths and realities that the Buddha discovered, as for example in the *Vajracchedikā*:

> A *tathāgata*, O Subhūti, is one who speaks what is real; he is one who speaks the truth, he is one who speaks what is. A *tathāgata* does not speak what is not; a *tathāgata* does not speak falsely.[11]

The Buddha's teaching is the Dharma, and his authority lies in the Dharma. Dharma is a multivalent term fundamental to Indian thought, religion and statecraft.[12] It is invoked in our earliest documents, for example in Aśoka's Pillar Edict II:

> Dhamma is good. And what is Dhamma? It is diminution of sin,[13] abundance of good deeds, mercy, liberality, truth, and purity.[14]

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ma yin no. For a translation, see Weber 1999: 106.

[9] *Dīghanikāya* II, p. 73.3: *na hi tathāgatā vitathaṃ bhaṇanti*.

[10] *Aṅguttaranikāya*, *Paṭhamapaṇṇāsake Uruvelavaggo Tatiyo*, pp. 30.5–31, antepenult.; *Itivuttaka*, *Itivuttake Catukkanipātassa Paṭhamavaggassa Terasamasuttaṃ*, pp. 321.8–323.2 (last *sutta* in the collection). The keyword of the *uddāna*s is *loka*. Cf. also *Pāsādikasutta*, *Dīghanikāya* III, pp. 134.11–135.22.

[11] *Vajracchedikā* §14f: *bhūtavādī subhūte tathāgataḥ satyavādī tathāvādy ananyathāvādī tathāgataḥ*, *na vitathavādī tathāgataḥ*.

[12] For a recent collection of essays on Dharma, with contributions on Buddhism by Rupert Gethin and Collett Cox, see Olivelle 2009. Most recently see Hiltebeitel 2012, which deals specifically with Aśoka's Dharma.

[13] A century ago, Smith (1909: 62) remarked that "Scholars differ concerning the derivation and precise meaning of this word *āsinave*," which also occurs in Pillar Edict III. See further Woolner 1993: 64, s.v. *apāsinave*; Basak 1959: 86. The meaning and derivation remain obscure, and my translation is a guess.

[14] Text from Bloch 1950: 162: *dhaṃme sādhū. kiyaṃ cu dhaṃme ti. appāsinave bahukayyāne dayā dāne sacce socaye*.

Aśoka lived between one hundred and two hundred years after the Buddha (depending on whether one favours the short or the long chronology). Aśoka's Dharma is a programme of ethics and principles. As ruler, he uses his authority to foster and promote Dharma, but his authority does not, as such, *derive* from Dharma, except insofar as he rules righteously (*dhaṃmena*).[15] Ethics is one of the primary acceptations of Dharma in Buddhist texts, but prominent also are the senses of "reality" and "true nature," which bear directly upon the person and authority of the Buddha (Aśoka's ethical or socio-political Dharma does not, at least explicitly, carry these senses).[16] A Buddha's authority comes from truth (*satya*) and *dharmatā* (true nature). Neither the Buddhas nor anyone else created the world or the laws of nature.[17] The nature and principle of reality (*dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā dharmayathātathā / avitathatā ananya-*

[15] Cf. Pillar Edict VII, in Bloch 1950: 161: *esā hi vidhi yā iyaṃ dhaṃmena pālanā dhaṃmena vidhāne dhaṃmena sukhiyanā dhaṃmena gotti*. The admonition to rule righteously is, not unexpectedly, recurrent in Buddhist literature, and the trope of the righteous king or ruler remains potent up to the present.

[16] In his *Vyākhyāyukti* (21.9–22.8), Vasubandhu gives ten meanings for *dharma*. The passage is cited by Bu ston in his long treatment of the term *dharma* (Tib. *chos*): see Obermiller 1931: 18–24.

[17] *Nidānasaṃyukta*, *sūtra* 17.3, *na bhikṣo mayā pratītyasamutpādaḥ kṛto nāpy anyaiḥ*; Tibetan version cited by Śamathadeva (Zhi gnas lha) in his *Upāyikāṭīkā* (Otani Cat. No. 5595, Repr. Vol. 118, *mngon pa'i bstan bcos*, *tu*, 162a2). The Chinese *Saṃyuktāgama* version (*sūtra* No. 299) is translated in Choong Mun-keat (Wei-keat) 2010: 49–50, and summarized in Kalupahana 1975: 91–92. This short *sūtra*, which does not have a Pali counterpart, was well known in the Sarvāstivādin tradition and is regularly cited. Pūrṇavardhana and Sthiramati call it the **Buddha-sūtra* (Sangs rgyas kyi mdo). It is invoked, for example, in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (229.7); by Vasubandhu (Dbyig gnyen), *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa* (Otani Cat. No. 5496, Repr. Vol. 104, *mdo tshogs 'grel pa*, *chi*, 69a8); by Pūrṇavardhana (Gang ba spel ba), *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā-lakṣaṇānusāriṇī-nāma* (Otani Cat. No. 5594, Repr. Vol. 117, *mgnon pa'i bstan bcos*, *ju*, 349a4, *sangs rgyas kyi mdo las*); and by Sthiramati (Blo gros brtan pa), *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā-tattvārtha-nāma* (Otani Cat. No. 5875, Repr. Vol. 147, *ngo mtshar bstan bcos*, *tho*, 54b5, *sangs rgyas kyi mdo las*).

thā bhūtaṃ satyatā tattvatā yathātathā aviparītatā aviparyastatā) is nothing other than the fact of conditionality, conditioned arising, *idaṃpratyayatā pratītyasamutpādānulomatā*.[18] Whether or not *tathāgata*s arise, this true nature abides, the element of the principles of reality; having known and understood this directly by himself, the *tathāgata* declares and teaches it.[19]

Buddhas come and go, but Dharma remains; Buddhas realize Dharma and reveal Dharma. In this hierarchy, a Buddha is subordinate to the Dharma. And even in contexts where, by metaphysical sleight of hand, the Buddha rebounds and recovers ultimate authority, this is because he is the Dharmakāya. The *Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* asserts that Buddhahood alone is the refuge for the world, because of the Sage's Dharmakāya.[20] Tibetan scholars return to this theme repeatedly; an early example is Gampopa (1079–1153) in his "Jewel Ornament of Liberation."[21]

Dharmatā and *pratītyasamutpāda* have remained touchstones of authenticity over the millennia. Tibetan scholasticism has followed Indian exegesis – not only in the Madhyamaka but also in the

[18] A classical source for these terms is the *Nidānasaṃyukta*, *sūtra* 14.6 (Tibetan version cited by Śamathadeva in his *Upāyikāṭīkā*, *mngon pa'i bstan bcos*, *tu*, 157a6); see also the citation in Yaśomitra's *Kośavyākhyā* 452.20 ad *Kośa* 3:28ab.

[19] *Nidānasaṃyukta*, *sūtra* 17.4–5: *api tūtpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā shtitaiveyaṃ dharmatā dharmasthitaye dhātuḥ*, *taṃ tathāgataḥ svayam abhijñāyābhisambuddhyākhyāti prajñapayati* …; partial citation in the *Kośabhāṣya* (137.15). The formula "Whether *tathāgata*s arise or whether they do not arise" (*utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānām*) is deployed in a variety of contexts, including Mahāyāna *sūtra*s, to authenticate a subordinated statement. For examples see *Traité* I 157, n. 1.

[20] *Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* 1:21: *jagaccharaṇam ekatra buddhatvaṃ pāramārthikam*, *muner dharmaśarīratvāt tanniṣṭhatvād gaṇasya ca* (*dam pa'i don du 'gro ba yi*, *skyabs ni sangs rgyas nyag gcig yin*; *thub pa chos kyi sku can phyir*, *tshogs kyang de yi mthar thug phyir*).

[21] See Sgam po pa Bsod nams rin chen's *Dam chos yid bzhin gyi nor bu thar pa rin po che'i rgyan*. See Guenther 1970: 99–111; Khenpo Konchog Gyaltsen Rinpoche/Ani K. Trinlay Chödron 1998: 137–146.

Yogācāra/Cittamātra schools of philosophy[22] – in emphasizing dependent arising up to the present. Recent Thai teachers like Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu (1906–1993) and Phra Prayudh Payutto (1939–) have highlighted it as well, each in his own way. Buddhadāsa emphasizes the fact of conditionality, *idapaccayatā*. This term had not received much attention in mainstream Thai teaching, or even in the mediaeval Pali exegesis and manuals of the Theravādin tradition, which developed a distinctive and complex theory of causality based on twenty-four conditions (*paccaya*), which in certain contexts eclipsed the old *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulary.[23] Buddhadāsa's book *Paṭiccasammuppāda* has two parts, (1), "What is dependent arising?" and (2), "Conditionality as the highest thing in the Buddha's teaching."[24] In the second part, Buddhadāsa writes that:

> If you reflect, you will see that we [the Thai] have never been interested in the subject of conditionality (*idapaccayatā*), even though it is the heart of the Buddha's teaching … To Thai ears, "conditionality" is an unfamiliar word, a foreign sound – even if we are members of the Buddhist community, we are members of a Buddhist community which does not yet understand the heart of the Buddha's teaching.[25]

Payutto's magnum opus is *Buddhadhamma* (*Phutthatham*).[26] It contains a long section on dependent origination called "How did life

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[22] See Skilling 2007.

[23] See Karunadasa 2010: Chap. 18, "Conditional Relations."

[24] Teaching here is *śāsanā*. *Buddhaśāsanā* is also translated as "Buddhism."

[25] Buddhadāsa, n.d., pp. 130–131. This short book is abridged – I do not know the circumstances or principles – from *Idapaccayatā*, BE 2515 [CE 1972], Dhammadan Munlanithi, Sixth printing, 2549 [2006], 529 pages. The importance accorded to dependent arising by Buddhadāsa may be seen from the publication *Paṭiccasamuppāda chak Phra Ot* [Dependent Arising from the Holy Lips (*phra oṣṭha*)], Sixth Printing, 2553 [2010], a collection of *sūtra*s on dependent arising translated from Pali into Thai, which is 941 pages long (including detailed indexes).

[26] *Phutthatham* is the Thai pronunciation of what is written in Pali as *buddhadhamma*. The original edition, published in Thai 2514 [1971], was 206 pages long. I use here the revised and expanded version, originally published in 2525 [1982], third printing (Bangkok: Mahachulalongkorn

come to be?"[27] As in all of P. Payutto's works, his treatment is grounded in a profound understanding of Pali literature, especially the *Suttapiṭaka*, although it also offers insights into later strata of Pali exegesis. Payutto's lucid explanation of the topic in Thai relates dependent origination to ethical and practical behaviour in daily life. He opens (p. 79) by stating that dependent origination is one of the principles which the Buddha taught as a law of nature (*kot thammachat*, *kaṭ-dhammajāti*), or a principle of reality which exists by nature, independently of whether a Buddha arises. He equates dependent origination and conditionality, defining the latter with the formula "when this exists, that is; from the arising of this, that arises" (p. 81, *imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti*, *imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati*). He relates this to one method of thought – thought according to conditionality, which means to examine processes or to find solutions to problems by finding the relations and causes from which they have developed (p. 676). This means to see the reality that things do not arise independently and do not exist on their own: they arise dependently on causes and conditions, and they cease, or can be stopped, through the cessation of causes and conditions (p. 711).

Korean Master Seongcheol (1912–1993), drawing on entirely different sources through the medium of Chinese translations (although with comparison of Pali and other sources), taught that:

> Although dependent origination is much taught by the Buddha, he did not invent it. Whether the Buddha lived in this world or not, dependent origination is there to be discovered. The causal relatedness of "this" to "that" denotes mutual interdependence. That is to say, birth depends on death, while death depends on birth … The nature of dependent origination seems to be encapsulated in the expression "it just continues and exists within the world of Dharma" [cited from the *Pratyayasūtra* in the Chinese *Saṃyuktāgama*]. In other words, dependent origination is closely associated with the *dharma-dhātu*, which implies the Mahāyāna idea of the world of Dharma (*dharma-dhātu*) as the state of being as it is (*bhūta-tathatā*). By "things just continue" is meant the existence of

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Ratchawitthayalay 2529 = 1986), which is 1,145 pages long. 11,010 copies were printed.

[27] Payutto 2529: 79–222.

> things in accordance with dependent origination, while the qualification that things are "empty" explains that things arising in this way lack inherent existence.[28]

It may be incautious to assert that *pratītyasamutpāda* has been important in all periods and through all transformations of Buddhism, but it is worthwhile to investigate the degree to which this might be the case. Certainly, conditioned arising has had an enduring epigraphic, ritual, liturgical, and metaphysical presence.

Truth and communication

Is truth an inner affair? Does truth exist in itself, in its own right? Many would say so. Can it be communicated? And if so, how can it be communicated? A straightforward answer is that the truth *can* be communicated, and that it is communicated by speaking the truth. "Having known and understood that directly by himself, the *tathāgata* declares and teaches it …"[29] The use of terms may seem not a little circular, but the associations of the thick terminology and the very circularity reinforce the logic of ideas.

Truth, the true nature, is beyond words, beyond the work of thought. Ultimately it is inexpressible. How, then, can truth be taught? One answer to this dilemma is to posit two truths or levels of reality, worldly conventional truth, and ultimate truth. The former can be expressed, the latter is beyond words. "Without resorting to everyday usage, the ultimate meaning is not taught; without reaching the ultimate meaning, nirvana is not realized."[30]

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[28] Hwang Soon-il/Covill 2010: 45–46.

[29] *Nidānasaṃyukta*, *sūtra* 17.4 *taṃ tathāgataḥ svayam abhijñāyābhisambuddhyākhyāti prajñapayati*…

[30] Nāgārjuna's famous maxim, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.10: *vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate*, *paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate*.

Royal endorsement, hierarchical templates

But on the highroad of ideas, truth is a product, and it needs endorsement. Textual tradition agrees that the Awakened One's first patron was King Bimbisāra at Rājagṛha, the capital of Magadha. A range of texts, especially *Vinaya*s, promote this notion. The narrative of the Buddha's post-awakening meeting with Bimbisāra is central to the Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition, which places it in the "Chapter on the Division of the Order" (*Saṃghabhedavastu*) of the *Vinayavastu*. In *sūtra* literature, the narrative is incorporated, in virtually the same words, into the "Sūtra on the Four Assemblies" (*Catuṣpariṣatsūtra*) of the *Dīrghāgama*, the "Sūtra on Bimbisāra's Reception of the Buddha" (*Bimbisārapratyudgamanasūtra*) of the *Madhyamāgama*, and the "Sūtra on the Going Forth" (*Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra*), a long and apparently independent or extra-*Āgama sūtra*. The "Sūtra on Bimbisāra's Reception of the Buddha" circulated as one of a liturgical/didactic group of "Great Sūtras" (*mahāsūtra*), and the story is related in the narrative collection *Karmaśataka* (No. 122, *Khyab 'jug*),[31] and Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* (Chapter XVI) seems mainly to follow a Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition for this event.

The story might be described as the first charter or the blueprint of relations between the Buddha – and the Saṃgha – and royal or temporal power.[32] In summary, it runs as follows:

> Having heard that the Buddha had arrived, King Bimbisāra left Rājagṛha in a grand procession and went to see the Buddha at Yaṣṭivana in the outskirts of the city. When he came near, he alit from his carriage and continued on foot; as soon as he saw the Buddha from afar, he left his regalia behind, and went before the Blessed One. The king and the leading citizens of Rājagṛha – the brahmins and *gṛhapati*s – all assembled before the Buddha. At that time, the matted-hair ascetic Urubilvā Kāśyapa, who had recently been converted and had achieved the state of arhat, was seated beside the Buddha. The assembly could not decide: which one is Master, which one is disciple? In order to show who was

[31] See Feer 1901: 479–482.

[32] For texts and references see Skilling 1994: 58–245 and Skilling 1997: 267–333.

who, the Blessed One asked Kāśyapa to "amaze the assembly;" Kāśyapa did this by entering concentration, flying up into space, and performing miracles including the "miracle of fire and water," the *yamaka-prātihārya*. After this, through a carefully crafted dialogue, the Buddha led King Bimbisāra to understand impermanence, suffering, non-self, karma and rebirth, conditioned arising and nirvana.

The discourse led the king, 80,000 deities, and many hundreds of thousands of brahmins and *gṛhapati*s to stream-entry. The king then took refuge in the Three Gems for the rest of his life, invited the Buddha and the community of monks to Rājagṛha, and offered to support them with requisites for the rest of his life. The Buddha accepted in silence.

Some time afterwards, the Buddha went to Rājagṛha, and King Bimbisāra invited him with the monks to a meal at the palace. After the meal, King Bimbisāra took a golden pitcher in hand, and offered the Kalandakanivāpa of the Veṇuvana to the Buddha. The Saṃgha was now a landed institution.

We cannot know exactly what happened – what protocols were acted out – when Bimbisāra met the Buddha. Are our texts *describing* an event, or are they *prescribing* a hierarchy, an etiquette? Whatever the case, they established a format, or fashioned a template, for the relations between the Buddha and rulers: a leading king of the period came publicly to the Buddha, accepted his teachings, offered support, and granted land. The hierarchy encoded by the gift of the Veṇuvana was successfully promoted and elaborated by Buddhist monastics across Asia for over two thousand years.

Aśoka: *intersection of legend and history*

According to general Buddhist tradition, Bimbisāra's successor, his patricide son Ajātaśatru, first fell under the influence of Śākyamuni's cousin Devadatta, but in the end he maintained his father's patronage of the Buddha and his order. A later Pali tradition credits Ajātaśatru with the sponsorship of the first council – that is, he becomes a key figure in the lineage of textual authenticity. Although the detail of his patronage of the council does not seem to be substantiated in the texts of other schools, the figure of Ajātaśatru remains a potent source for moral, metaphysical, and narrative elaboration. Perhaps

the best examples of this are the long Mahāyāna *sūtra* "Dispelling Ajātaśatru's Guilt" and the so-called **Amitāyurdhyānasūtra*, preserved only in Chinese.[33]

After Ajātaśatru, the lines of patronage are unclear, until we arrive at the time of the Mauryan king, Aśoka. The *Buddhacarita* (XVIII, 59–61) – the oldest surviving biography of the Buddha – passes over the interval between the first council and the rise of Aśoka in silence. Aśoka needs no introduction.[34] The first historical evidence for the exaltation of the Buddha – we can even say of Buddhas, when we take the Niglīvā pillar inscription into account[35] – by a ruler is in the epigraphic and archaeological records of Aśoka's rule. Textbooks old and new tell us that it was Aśoka who inspired the spread of Buddhism across India and beyond. Sircar writes that "Asoka was a patron of the Buddha's doctrine and was responsible for raising Buddhism from the status of a local sectarian creed of eastern India to that of one of the principal religions of the world."[36] Deeg cites Lamotte to similar effect: "Buddhism probably would have stayed an insignificant and unknown sect like many other communities had it not benefited from the support of the great emperor Aśoka."[37]

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[33] For Sanskrit fragments of the former, see Harrison/Hartmann 2000 (with an Addendum, "Two additional fragments of the Ajātaśatru-kaukṛtyavinodanāsūtra," pp. 301–302); Harrison/Hartmann 2002. For a translation of excerpts from the Tibetan version, see Harrison 2004. Two short passages are translated from the Chinese version in *Buddha-Dharma*, pp. 551–552 (Section 2) and 560 (Section 3). The latter – of debated, possibly Central Asian origins – is a foundational text of the "Pure Land" tradition in East Asia. See most recently Ducor and Loveday 2011 and Radich 2011. Radich discusses the "Contemplation Sūtra" and another important source for "Ajātaśatru studies," the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*.

[34] A recent collection of essays on "Aśokan studies" is Olivelle 2009b. For Aśoka's material traces, see Harry Falk's superb *Aśokan Sites and Artefacts* (2006).

[35] See Falk 2006: 187–189.

[36] Sircar 1998: 9.

[37] Deeg 2009: 110.

Despite the conviction of these and other authorities, one wonders: most other contemporary religious groups died out with their teachers, but Buddhism not only survived, but spread across northern India for a century or more before Aśoka arrived on the scene. By the time of Aśoka, on the evidence of his edicts alone, the Saṃgha was already established beyond the Magadhan heartland in western India (Bairāṭ) and even southern India (Amarāvatī, Sannati). Can we conclude that it was Aśoka who introduced the Dharma to these places? What distinguished Buddhism? What gave Buddhism its resilience – was it simply external, institutional and social factors? Is it reasonable, or logical, to attribute the agency exclusively to Aśoka? Might it not owe anything to the charisma and vision of the Buddha and his immediate disciples and their successors?

Aśoka's relation to Buddhism as an historical individual is read from his edicts; his role as exemplar is idealized in sermons and legends. Inscriptions and narratives both transmit hierarchical models – not only the ethical system and social guidelines that Aśoka sought to inculcate, but also a model in which Aśoka subordinates himself to the Buddha. Aśoka declares himself to be a lay-follower (*upāsaka*) but his relations with the Saṃgha are ambivalent. On the one hand, he addresses the Saṃgha with classical – one might say canonical – formulas of respect; on the other, in the "schism" and other edicts he issues orders to the Saṃgha.

Aśoka's endorsement of the Buddha through his pilgrimages, his erection of pillars at sites associated with the Buddha and the Buddhas, and with the Buddhist Saṃgha, and his direct patronage of the Buddhist monastic order, are public documents. They are the earliest written documents in the archives of Indian history. The earliest surviving external validation of the words of the Buddha is an Aśokan record, the celebrated Bairāṭ-Calcutta (or Bhābrā) edict:

> Priyadarśī, King of Magadha, venerates the Saṃgha and enquires after their health and comfort. Known to you, sirs, is the extent of my reverence for and faith in the Awakened One, the Dharma, and the Saṃgha. Whatever, sirs, has been spoken by the Blessed One, the Awakened

> One – all that is well spoken.[38] With the wish that the Saddharma may last long, it is suitable for me to say, These, sirs, are the "turns of the Dharma" (*dhaṃma-paliyāya* = Pali *dhamma-pariyāya* = Skt. *dharma-paryāya* … [here follows a list of seven titles][39]… which were spoken by the Awakened One, the Blessed One. It is my desire, sirs, that many monks and nuns regularly listen to these "turns of the Dharma" and memorize them. Male and female lay disciples should do the same. I have ordered this edict to be inscribed, sirs, in order that they may know what I intend.[40]

The edict shares several expressions with Buddhist texts – the polite address concerning good health, the terms *gālava* (Pali *gārava*, San-

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[38] The multivalent concept of *subhāṣita* is immensely important. It is discussed in the *Vyākhyāyukti* (260–262) and elaborated by Bu ston (Obermiller 1931: 25–30).

[39] For the list of titles, some of which are still not conclusively identified, see Lamotte 1967: 256–259. For the possibility that the last, the "sermon to Rāhula on the subject of false speech," could be related to certain verses transmitted in (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin versions of the **Rāhula-sūtra*, but not included in the Pali – the *Ambalaṭṭhika-rāhulovāda* or *Cūḷa-rāhulovāda* (*Majjhima-nikāya* 61) – , see Skilling 1996. For further comparative details of the *sutta* in general, see Anālayo 2011a: I 341–346.

[40] Text from Bloch 1950: 154–155: *priyadassi lājā māgadhe saṃghaṃ abhivādetūnaṃ āhā appābādhattaṃ ca phāsuvihālattaṃ cā.*[(1)] *vidite ve bhaṃte āvatake hamā buddhassi dhaṃmassi saṃghassi ti gālave ca prasāde ca. e keci bhaṃte bhagavatā buddhena bhāsite savve se subhāsite vā. e cu kho bhaṃte hamiyāye disseyā hevaṃ saddhamme cilaṭṭhitike hossatī ti alahāmi hakaṃ taṃ vattave. imāni bhaṃte dhaṃmapaliyāyāni vinayasamukkasse aliyavasāṇi anāgatabhayāni munigāthā moneyyasūtte upatissapasine e cā lāghulovāde musāvādaṃ adhigicya bhagavatā buddhena bhāsite*, *etāni dhaṃmapaliyāyāni icchāmi kiṃti bahuke bhikkhupāye cā bhikkhuniye cā abhikkhinaṃ suneyu cā upadhāleyū cā. hevaṃmevā upāsakā cā upāsikā cā. etenā bhaṃte imaṃ likhāpayāmi abhipretaṃ*[(2)] *me jānaṃtū ti*.

> [(1)]*appābādhattaṃ ca phāsuvihālattaṃ*: for cognate terms and phrases in Pali see CPD I, p. 317; DOP I, p. 176; [(2)]*Abhipretaṃ* (here translated "what I intend"): cp. Pali *adhippeta*, CPD I, p. 135; DOP I, p. 92.

Translation mine; for another translation, see Nikam/McKeon 1978: 66–67. For the site and a bibliography see Falk 2006: 106–108.

skrit *gaurava*) and *prasāda* (Pali *pasāda*).[41] I assume that these expressions were in vogue in northern India at the time, and that they were preserved and perpetuated by Buddhist literature. More significant is the fact that the edict gives the first epigraphic references to the Triple Gem – Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha –, the four assemblies – monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen – and the term *dhaṃmapaliyāya* (Pali *dhammapariyāya*, Sanskrit *dharmaparyāya*). The latter, on internal textual evidence, was the common word for "discourse" before it was supplanted by *sutta*/*sūtra*. The pairing of *bhagavat* and *buddha* is stock, for example in the Pali *Vinaya*.[42] Concepts that I find especially significant are the concern that the Saddharma endure – a perpetual concern expressed to this day in Buddhist liturgy and piety, for example in the Pali phrase, *ciraṃ tiṭṭhatu buddhasāsana* – with idea of "the future threats" (to the Sāsana; a technical term or key phrase that runs throughout Buddhist texts), the recommendation that the four assemblies repeatedly listen to and memorize texts, and the use of *abhipreta*, which brings to mind *abhiprāya*, a key interpretative tool in later hermeneutics and apologetics.

Teacher of kings, *gods and humankind*: *the Buddha in early art*

The labelled depictions of Pasenadi and Ajātaśatru paying homage to the Buddha ("Ajātasatu venerates the Blessed One") at Bharhut are early public visual "memories" of royal patrons of the Master.[43] There is no labelled depiction of Aśoka at Bharhut, and the only certain depiction of the king (*rāya asoka*) elsewhere is that on a slab from the great *caitya* at Kanaganahalli in Karnataka.[44] The Śuṅga-period inscriptions of "Āyā Kuraṃgī" and the queens of kings Iṃdāgimitra and Brahmamitra on the railing pillars at Bodh Gaya are early relics

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[41] On *gaurava* and the notion of "prestige," see von Hinüber 2009: 34–36.

[42] *Vinaya Mahāvagga* in *Vinaya* I, 1.5: *tena samayena buddho bhagavā*…

[43] Lüders 1998, B39 (751): *rājā pasenaji kosalo*; B40 (774): *a[jā]tasat[u] bhagavato vaṃdate*.

[44] Figures often identified as Aśoka on the Sanchi gateways have been otherwise interpreted by Schlingloff and other authorities.

of royal patronage at the seat of awakening itself.[45] At the recently excavated but not yet published site in Karnataka, Kanaganahalli, "rājas are depicted everywhere," including several Sātavāhana kings identified by inscriptions.[46] In addition to the already famous depiction of Aśoka, there are at least five labelled "portraits" of kings of the Sātavāhana dynasty, not to speak of Cakravartins, Nāgarājas, and so on.

The Buddha was superior to kings, and also to spirits and gods; he was *devātideva*, the "god beyond the gods." At Bharhut we see him venerated by serpent-deities ("The *nāga*-king Erapato venerates the Blessed One"),[47] and we see the deities in Indra's heaven celebrating a festival for his turban-relic.[48] Early Indian Buddhist art encodes the hierarchies of the Blessed One's authority over gods and men; it is a pageant of the glory of the Buddha. The early stūpas lay out circles of sacred and narrative space with the Buddha – his living relics – in the centre, initiating a structure that became increasingly intricate as the hierarchies of the maṇḍala developed, enlisting new deities and new ideas, and catering to new ritual programmes.

The Buddha's great departure from the palace is a defining event in his quest for truth, recounted in literature and celebrated in art to the present day. The young prince left the palace behind; he rejected the Dharma of the householder (*gṛhasthadharma*) and the throne that awaited him.[49] But he could not leave behind his royal

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[45] For Āyā Kuraṃgī see references in Tsukamoto 1996: I, Bodh-Gaya 3, 7, 8, 12, 13; Coomaraswamy 1935: 58–61; Barua 2004. For the date, see Marshall in Rapson 1922: 625–627 and Chanda 2002: 98–99. For the many complications in the interpretation of these inscriptions, see Bhandare 2006.

[46] Monika Zin, personal communication, December 2010. These are discussed in Zin 2012.

[47] Lüders 1998, B37 (753): *erapato nāgarājā bhagavato vadate*.

[48] Lüders 1998, B21 (775): *sudhammā devasabhā bhagavato cūḍāmaho...* The Sudharmā Assembly-hall of the Gods: the festival of the Blessed One's top-knot.

[49] See *Buddhacarita* 5:32–33 (Olivelle 2008: 136–137).

or imperial Cakravartin nature – this was his destiny – and he was not allowed to shed his royal status. He abandoned his regalia on the banks of the Nairañjanā River, but it returned to him – he became the King of the Dharma, and returned to sit in majesty on opulent thrones wearing a magnificent crown. The ideal of the Buddha as Dharmarāja and Cakravartin resounded powerfully across Asia and across the centuries.

Regardless of the historical details, the value of which is by nature contentious, the point is that the texts establish hierarchical paradigms, in which kings, brahmins, *gṛhapati*s, and *śreṣṭhin*s are all subordinate to the Buddha and the Saṃgha. The texts hold up role models and transmit ideal relationships.[50]

The roles continued to delineate the ecologies of exchange between Dharma masters and rulers in Central and East Asia, through the periods of Mongolian, Manchu, and Han political power in China into the Qing and Republican eras. The "five regalia" (*pañcakakudhabhaṇḍa*: the technical term belongs to the *Jātaka* commentary) are part of the regalia of Siam, used in royal consecrations; they are defined and illustrated in the standard Thai language dictionary of the Royal Institute to this day. Monasteries have a special chamber accessible from the perimetre wall where the king, after alighting from a palanquin, changes his royal costume into that of a lay follower. Two millennia of political protocol and theater define the architecture of ritual.

Authority and the aesthetics of worship

What is authority? Authority functions through relationship, specifically, the relationship between the follower and the Buddha. The basic relationship – for peasant and *paṇḍita*, for merchant and monarch – is refuge (*śaraṇa*). People, and beings, take refuge in the Buddha; this brings security and happiness. The Buddha is Śāstṛ, teacher of gods and men. The Buddha is not a distant, abstract being, he is "our Buddha" (*amhākaṃ buddha*) – the particular Buddha of a commu-

[50] Relations with rulers are also seen in epistles sent by monk-scholars to kings, for which see Hahn 2007 and Hahn/Dietz 2008.

nity or individual. The relationship of the devotee to the Buddha is expressed through body, speech, and mind in liturgy, which embeds norms and ideals and impregnates expectations, and through the aesthetics of worship – images, shrines, offerings, lamps, incense, settings. In liturgy and narrative, recurrent terms for authority include *ānubhāva* and *tejas* – aspects of a Buddha's power which vouchsafe his authority in narrative and in life. The literature of liturgy elaborates on this, from Upāli's verses[51] and Tsongkhapa's hymns to the Pali hymns of King Rama IV.

The efficacy of confession is the validation of Buddhas as witnesses:

> Before those Buddhas who have become knowledge (*jñānabhūta*), who have become sight (*cakṣubhūta*), who have become witnesses (*sākṣibhūta*), who have become authorities (*pramāṇabhūta*), who know and who see, I confess all of my karmic obstacles – I lay them bare, I do not hide them, I do not cover them up, and in future I will restrain myself.[52]

What the Buddha says must be true, but a problem arises: how can we know what the Buddha said? What is Buddhavacana?[53] The an-

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[51] See *Upālisutta*, *Majjhimanikāya* No. 56; Sanskrit version in Waldschmidt 1979; for the Chinese version see Minh Chau 1991: 188–191, 279–289. For details of Sanskrit and other parallels see Anālayo 2011a: I 320–333.

[52] *Vinayaviniścayopāliparipṛcchā* 35.32–36.22: *tatsarvaṃ karmāvaraṇaṃ teṣāṃ buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ jñānabhūtānāṃ cakṣubhūtānāṃ sākṣibhūtānāṃ pramāṇabhūtānāṃ jānatāṃ paśyatām agrataḥ pratideśayāmy āviṣkaromi na praticchādayāmy āyatyāṃ saṃvaram āpadye*.

[53] The compound *buddhavacana* is used by the Buddha himself, at least in response to the two monks, the "Yameḷutekula brothers," according to the *Cullavagga*: *Vinaya* II, p. 139.1 foll. For a recent contribution to the subject of this exchange, the famous or infamous "*buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropema*" proposal, see Levman 2009. The term *buddhavacana* is infrequent in early Pali texts: it occurs one other place in the *Vinaya* (IV, p. 54.25, prose) and once in verse in the *Suttanipāta* (v. 202a = *Uragavagga*, *Vijayasutta*, v. 10a). It does not occur in the four *Nikāya*s. I doubt that, except *perhaps* in the *Cullavagga*, the word has the global acceptation that it developed in later centuries, with the exception of the *Saññojana-sutta* of the *Citta-saṃyutta*, in which a group of senior

swer is not as easy as it might seem. Modern scholarship has generally been convinced that there was, has been, and is, a *canon*, but this idea warrants careful scrutiny in the light of traditional Buddhist and Indian understandings of text and context, rather than in the certainties of positivism or the uncertainties of post-modernity. Early definitions of the Buddha's teaching – for example, those given in the *Vinaya*s – were flexible,[54] but the question was not one of canonicities – the inclusion or the exclusion of fixed texts – so much as transmission and authority of the word(s) of the Buddha(s),[55] and the elaboration of his or their thought(s). If useful at all, the word "canon" should be used in the plural.

An intriguing record of an "official" policy that attempts to address this problem – official insofar as it was sanctioned by the monastic order – is the famous passage on the four *mahāpadeśa*s. Embedded in the various versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, it is evidently a record from an early oral period when the Saṃgha was relatively undivided and not especially widely dispersed. The *mahāpadeśa* guidelines are flexible, and they do not categorically reject proposed teachings.[56]

Very different is the approach to the question of authenticity seen in some Mahāyāna *sūtra*s, such as the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* or the *Saṃdhinirmocana*,[57] or in Abhidharma literature. Something

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monks praise the householder Citta, saying, "It is a gain for you, Gahapati, it is a good gain for you, that the eye of wisdom functions for you with regard to the profound teaching of the Buddha" (*Saṃyuttanikāya*, *Saḷāyatanavaggo* 349,16: *lābhā te gahapati*, *suladdhaṃ te gahapati*, *yasse te gambhīre buddhavacane paññācakkhu kamatī ti*; PTS IV, p. 283.18 reads *lābhā ti*).

[54] But constricted by the Pali commentary: see Skilling 2010: 22–23, 32.

[55] The *Mahāvadāna*/*Mahāpadāna sūtra*s cite the verses of previous Buddhas.

[56] See most recently Yang-gyu An 2002: 55–66, with reference to earlier studies. For an English translation of the Pali commentary, see Yang-Gyu An 2003: 114–121.

[57] Tola/Dragonetti 1997.

has changed. Here the response to ideas that challenge a perceived status quo is categorical (*ekāṃśena*) rejection as insinuations of Māra. Questions and challenges are *mārabhāṣita*, "spoken by Māra" – a phrase that evokes direct contrast and opposition to *buddhabhāṣita*, "spoken by the Buddha or by the Buddhas." These are potent expressions; the one drives the opponent beyond the arena of debate. An early phrase is *sarva-paravādi-nigrahaṇa*, crushing all opponents,[58] contrasted with another authenticating phrase that is frequent in *dhāraṇī* literature, *sarvabuddhabhāṣita*, "spoken by all the Buddhas." Was it the same mentality, the same ideological milieu, that promoted the idea of *apavāda*, or rejection of the Saddharma – the equation of Saddharma with Mahāyāna ideas and literature, and the rejection of Mahāyāna with the rejection of the Saddharma? Was it at the same time that the idea of *apavāda* began to be promoted with the thrust that to question the authenticity of Mahāyāna *sūtra*s is to reject and slander the Saddharma itself? These reactions continually draw on established themes and tropes but put them to new purposes, to the defense of new ideologies and practices and their proponents and adherents. The new *sūtra*s promote their own authority against all others.

Among the more confrontational is the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. In Chapter 3, for example, Śāriputra relates how he struggled with doubt, wondering whether the *sūtra* was being taught by Māra in disguise:

> At first, when I heard the Buddha's preaching,
> there was great astonishment and doubt in my mind.
> Is this not a devil pretending to be the Buddha,
> trying to vex and confuse my mind?[59]

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[58] Which already becomes a mantra in the *Druma-kinnara-rāja-paripṛcchā-sūtra*; see Harrison 1992: 296.

[59] *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* 3:15: *balavac ca āsīn mama chambhitatvaṃ prathamaṃ giraṃ śrutva vināyakasya*; *mā haiva māro sa bhaved viheṭhako abhinirminitvā bhuvi buddhaveṣam*. Translation (from the Chinese of Kumārajīva) Watson 2009: 85. Cp. Burnouf 1989: 40.

This trend of apologetics for the authority of the Mahāyāna does not rely on logical argument, but rather defines the Mahāyāna as the Saddharma, and any opposition as Māra or worse.[60] Evolving ideologies call for corresponding redefinitions of the "other(s)," the remapping and rebuttressing of the frontiers of belonging. Emerging texts recycle key words and phrases, striving to renegotiate fundamental questions of authority. But the other(s) are always moving targets. Was *pramāṇa* a return to the basics, to the epistemology of the *skandha-dhātu-āyatana*, the earliest curriculum of ideas?

I have mentioned only some of the strategies of authentification. Other defences of the Mahāyāna cite scripture and use logical arguments, as may be seen in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*, and in Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā*. The denigration of the opposition as a "demonic" Māra is a powerful device that runs through the *sūtra* literature; as a form of insinuation, it needs no logical defense.

The long tongue of truth

We move now from the authority of the *pramāṇapuruṣa* to the authority of the *mahāpuruṣa*, without suggesting that there is any necessary contradiction or tension between the terms. The authority of the Buddha is established physically by the thirty-two marks of the *mahāpuruṣa*, the "great man." From infancy, his extraordinary bodily features are sufficient to mark him as a man of destiny:

> The signs on the body of this illustrious one,
> with the brilliance of gold, the radiance of a lamp,
> foretell that he'll be either an Awakened Seer,
> or a World Conqueror on the earth among men.[61]

Among the thirty-two marks, there is one that directly concerns truth and authority: the Buddha has an exceptional, stupendous, and

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[60] See Jaini 2002.

[61] *Buddhacarita* 1: 34. Translation Olivelle 2008: 13. For the significance of the signs, see Olivelle's introduction, pp. xxviii-xxxi.

spectacular tongue.[62] Together with the sheathed male organ, the tongue is one of the two marks that is not normally visible. The long "Perfection of Wisdom" describes the mark as follows:

> His tongue is long, i.e. when he desires to do so he touches and strokes with his tongue the apertures of his two ears, and he covers with his tongue the apertures of his two eyes and his entire face up to his hairs.[63]

The Buddha displayed his tongue under special circumstances, in order to convince others that he was indeed a "great man." Pali texts record at least three occasions on which the Buddha exhibited the two

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[62] For an early note, see Burnouf 1989: 567. See also Wimalaratana, n.d., pp. 120–121. Like the other marks, the long tongue is a product of aeons of practice aiming towards Buddhahood. Nāgārjuna attributes the long tongue – together with the *brahmasvara* – to speaking true and soft words (Hopkins 1998, v. 191, tr. p. 119, Tib. [unpaginated], *tshig ni bden la ʾjam po dag*, *yun ring dus su brjod pa yis*, *mi bdag ljags ni ring ba dang*, *tshangs paʾi dbyangs su ʾgyur ba lags*.) There are several variant versions of the verse; see for example *Ratnāvalī* 2:90: *tshig ni bden pa ʾjam po dag*, *yun rings dus su brjod pa yis*, *mi yi dbang po ljags yangs shing*, *tshangs pa yi ni dbyangs ldan ʾgyur*. The verse is cited in the biography of Dharmasvāmin; see Roerich 1959: 3.10, tr., p. 49: "In conformity with these words, the Dharmasvāmin was born with a large and nimble tongue, endowed with the voice of Brahmā …." According to the *Arthaviniścaya-dharmaparyāya* (59.3), the tongue results from adhering to true speech in the past (*pūrve satyavacanasaṃrakṣaṇatayā nirvṛttam*). Cf. further *Nibandhana* 297.

[63] *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Conze}}$ 51.4: *prabhūtajihva sa bhagavān. tatreyaṃ prabhūtajihvatā. yadā ākāṃkṣati jihvāyobhe karṇe srotasi parāmṛśati samparāmṛṣṭi*: *ubhe cakṣuḥ srotasi sarvaṅkakeśaparyantaṃ mukhamaṇḍalaṃ jihvāyā ācchādayati*. Translation Conze 1974: 178 = Conze 1984: 585. In this list this is mark No. 27. See also *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Kimura}}$ 2006: 61.28, 62.24, 64.6, 66.14 = *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Vajracharya}}$ 2008: 1225.1, 1226.4, 1227.20, 1230.11 = Conze 1984: 659 (24), 661 (24), (25), 663 (49), (50), (51). For Tibetan see *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, Otani Cat. No. 5188, Repr. Vol. No. 90, *sher phyin*, *ca*, 279a7; 280a4, 281a6, 283a8. See also the "*Bṛhaṭṭīkā*" (*ʾPhags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ʾbum pa dang nyi khri lnga stong pa dang khri brgyad stong paʾi rgya cher bshad pa*, Otani Cat. No. 5206, Repr. Vol. No. 93, *sher phyin*, *pha*, 306a3).

marks to brahmins: to Brahmāyu, to Sela,[64] and to Pokkharasādi.[65] Brahmāyu and Pokkharasādi are two of six Vedic masters listed in the *Saṃghabhedavastu*,[66] and others (Kūṭatāndya, Śroṇatāndya, Lohitya) lend their names to *sūtras* in the *Dīrghāgama*. There must be some reason for the focus on brahmins, for the redaction of long and well-crafted narratives designed to demonstrate the superiority of the Buddha over brahmins – can it be a response to ideological and social rivalries in Greater Magadha at the time of redaction?

In the first case, Brahmāyu went to see the Buddha and verified thirty of the features. At first he saw:

> [28] … the thirty-two marks of a Great Man on the Blessed One's body, except two; he was doubtful about two of the marks, and he could not decide and make up his mind about them: about the male organ being enclosed in a sheath and about the largeness of his tongue.
>
> [29] The brahmin Brahmāyu addressed the Blessed One in stanzas:
>
> The two-and-thirty marks I learned
> That are the signs of a Great Man –
> I still do not see two of these

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[64] *Brahmāyusutta*, *Majjhimanikāya* No. 91; *Selasutta*, *Majjhimanikāya* No. 92 and *Suttanipāta*, *Mahāvagga*, pp. 102–114; *Ambaṭṭhasutta*, *Dīghanikāya* No. 3. I refer to the Pali versions and use the Pali forms as a convenience. There are Sanskrit fragments and Chinese and Tibetan translations of the *sūtras*. For a comparison of the Pali *Brahmāyusutta* with the *Fanmo jing*, No. 161 in the Chinese *Madhyamāgama*, see Minh Chau 1991: 306–312; for the Chinese *Ekottarikāgama* version, see Anālayo 2011b.

[65] *Ambaṭṭhasutta*, *Dīghanikāya* No. 3: the two complete versions that are preserved in the Tibetan translations of the "Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya" (*Bhaiṣajyavastu* and *Kṣudrakavastu*) are edited together with extensive Sanskrit from the Gilgit *Dīrghāgama* in Melzer 2006.

[66] *Saṃghabhedavastu* 39.2: *ṣaḍ ānuśravikāḥ katame*? *tadyathā kūṭatāndyo brāhmaṇaḥ*, *śroṇatāndyo brāhmaṇaḥ*, *cogī brāhmaṇaḥ*, *brahmāyur brāhmaṇaḥ*, *puṣkarasārī brāhmaṇaḥ*, *lohityaś ca brāhmaṇaḥ*. Otani Cat. No. 1030, Otani Repr. Vol. 42, *'dul ba*, *nge*, 260a8: *rjes su sgrogs pa drug gang zhe na*? *'di lta ste*, *bram ze rgyus rgyal dang*, *bram ze gnas rdeg dang*, *bram ze bzang ldan dang*, *bram ze tshangs pa'i tshe dang*, *bram ze pad ma'i snying po dang*, *bram ze dmar po'o*. I am guessing at the meaning of the rare word *ānuśravika* (Tib. *rjes su sgrogs pa*).

Upon your body, Gotama …
Though called by a word of feminine gender,
Perhaps your tongue is a manly one?
Perhaps your tongue is large as well,
According to what we have been taught?
Please put it out a little bit
And so, O Seer, cure our doubt …

[30] Then it occurred to the Blessed One: "This brahmin … and about the largeness of the tongue."

Then the Blessed One worked such a feat of supernormal power that the brahmin Brahmāyu saw the Blessed One's male organ enclosed in a sheath. Next the Blessed One extruded his tongue, and he repeatedly touched both ear holes and both nostrils, and he covered the whole of his forehead with his tongue.

[31] Then the Blessed One spoke these stanzas in reply to the Brahmin Brahmāyu:

The two-and-thirty marks you learned
That are the signs of a Great Man –
All on my body can be found:
So, brahmin, doubt no more on that.
What must be known is directly known,
What must be developed has been developed,
What must be abandoned has been abandoned,
Therefore, brahmin, I am a Buddha.[67]

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[67] *Majjhimanikāya* II, p. 143.1–31: *addasā kho brāhmāyu brāhmāṇo bhagavato kāye dvattiṃsa mahāpurisalakkhaṇāni yebhuyyena ṭhapetvā dve. dvīsu mahāpurisalakkhaṇesu kaṅkhati vicikicchati nādhimuccati na sampasīdati, – kosohite ca vatthaguyhe pahūtajihvatāya ca. atha kho brahmāyu brāhmaṇo bhagavantaṃ gāthāhi ajjhabhāsi* : *– ye ʾme dvattiṃsāti sutā mahāpurisalakkhaṇā, duve tesaṃ na passāmi bhoto kāyasmiṃ, gotama … nārīsaha nāma savhayā? kacci jivhā narassikā? kacci pahūtajivho si? yathā taṃ jāniyāmase. ninnāmayʾ etaṃ tanukaṃ, kaṅkhaṃ vinaya no, ise … atha kho bhagavato etad ahosi … ayaṃ … brāhmaṇo … pahūtajivhatāya cāti. atha kho bhagavā tathārūpaṃ iddhābhisaṃkhāraṃ abhisaṃkhāsi yathā addasā brahmāyu brāhmaṇo bhagavato kosohitaṃ vatthaguyhaṃ. atha kho bhagavā jivhaṃ ninnāmetvā ubho pi kaṇṇasotāni anumasi paṭimasi, ubho pi nāsikāsotāni anumasi paṭimasi, kevalakam pi nalāṭamaṇḍalaṃ jivhāya pacchādesi. atha kho bhagavā brahmāyuṃ brāhmaṇaṃ gāthāhi paccabhāsi*: *ye te dvattiṃsāti sutā mahāpurisalakkhaṇā, sabbe te mama*

After a further exchange of verses,

> [34] When this was said, the brahmin Brahmāyu rose from his seat, and after arranging his upper robe on one shoulder, he prostrated himself with his head at the Blessed One's feet, and he covered the Blessed One's feet with kisses and carressed them with his hands, pronouncing his name: "I am the brahmin Brahmāyu, Master Gotama; I am the brahmin Brahmāyu, Master Gotama."
>
> [35] Those in the assembly wondered and marvelled, and they said, "It is wonderful, sirs, it is marvellous, what great power and great might the recluse Gotama has, for the well-known and famous brahmin Brahmāyu to make such a display of humility."[68]

After taking his seat and receiving progressive instruction (*anupubbikathā*) from the Buddha, Brahmāyu realizes stream-entry. He takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṃgha, and he declares himself a lay follower who has gone to the Buddha for refuge for life. He invites the Buddha and the monks for a meal the next day. Not long afterwards, Brahmāyu dies. When asked by the monks, the Blessed One explains that Brahmāyu "has reappeared spontaneously [in the Pure Abodes], and will there attain final Nibbāna, without ever returning to this world."[69]

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kāyasmiṃ; *mā te kaṅkhāhu*, *brāhmaṇa. abhiññeyyaṃ abhiññātaṃ bhāvetabbañ ca bhāvitaṃ*, *pahātabbaṃ pahīnam me*; *tasmā buddho 'smi brāhmaṇa.* Translation MLDB, p. 751–752. See MLDB, p. 1298, n. 862. For other occurrences of the verses see Skilling/Harrison 2005.

[68] *Majjhimanikāya* II, p. 144.23–31: *evaṃ vutte brahmāyu brāhmaṇo utthāy' āsanā ekaṃsaṃ uttarāsaṅgaṃ karitvā bhagavato pādesu sirasā nipatitvā bhagavato pādāni mukhena ca paricumbati pāṇīhi ca parisambāhati nāmañ ca sāveti*: *– brahmāyvāhaṃ*, *bho gotama*, *brāhmaṇo ti. atha kho sā parisā acchariyabbhutacittajātā ahosi*: *acchariyaṃ vata bho*, *abbhutaṃ vata bho*; *samaṇassa mahiddhikatā mahānubhāvatā*; *yatra hi nāmāyaṃ brahmāyu brāhmaṇo ñāto yasassī evarūpaṃ paramanipaccakāraṃ karissatīti*. Translation MLDB, p. 753.

[69] *Majjhimanikāya* II, p. 146.17–18: *opapātiko hoti tatthaparinibbāyī anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā ti.* Translation MLDB, p. 754.

The progression of events in the *Selasutta* is similar.[70] After the Buddha displays his male organ enclosed in a sheath and then his tongue, the brahmin Sela thinks,

> [15] … "The recluse Gotama is endowed with the thirty-two marks of a Great Man; they are complete, not incomplete. But I do not know whether he is a Buddha or not. However, I have heard from elder aged brahmins who speak according to the lineage of teachers that those who are the Accomplished Ones, Fully Enlightened Ones, reveal themselves as such when their praise is spoken. Suppose I extol the recluse Gotama to his face with fitting stanzas."[71]

Sela asks why the Buddha is content to be a recluse, when he deserves to be a king. The Blessed One replies:

> [17] "I am already a king, O Sela,"
> the Blessed One replied.
> "I am supreme king of the Dhamma,
> I make the Wheel of Dhamma revolve,
> The wheel that none can stop."[72]

When he has been convinced that Gotama is a Buddha, Sela announces to his three hundred pupils that he will go forth under him. His disciples follow suit; three hundred brahmins become monks under the Buddha.

The *Brahmāyusutta* and its Chinese *Madhyamāgama* counterpart are both set in Videha; the aged brahmin Brahmāyu lives in Mithilā.[73]

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[70] MLDB, pp. 758–761, §§15–24.

[71] *Suttanipāta*, p. 108.5–12: *samannāgato kho samaṇo gotamo dvattiṃsamahāpurisalakkhaṇehi paripuṇṇehi no aparipuṇṇehi, no ca kho naṃ jānāmi 'buddho vā no vā.' sutaṃ kho pana metaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ vuddhānaṃ mahallakānaṃ ācariyapācariyānaṃ bhāsamānānaṃ: 'ye te bhavanti arahanto sammāsambuddhā, te sake vaṇṇe bhaññamāne attānaṃ pātukarontī'ti, yan nūnāhaṃ samaṇaṃ gotamaṃ sammukhā sāruppāhi gāthāhi abhitthaveyyan ti.* Translation MLDB, p. 758.

[72] *Suttanipāta*, p. 109.3–7 (v. 554): *rājāhamasmi, selā ti bhagavā, dhammarājā anuttaro, dhammena cakkaṃ vattemi, cakkaṃ appativattiyaṃ.* Translation MLDB, p. 759.

[73] For Sanskrit fragments from the Turfan collections, see references at

The *Selasutta* opens in Aṅguttarāpa; the matted-hair ascetic Keṇiya goes to see the Buddha and invites him together with the Saṃgha, on this occassion 1250 monks, to a meal.[74] When the Buddha accepts, Keṇiya returns to his hermitage (*assama*, *āśrama*) and orders preparations for the morrow's great event. At that time, the brahmin Sela is staying at Āpaṇa.[75] Both Brahmāyu and Sela are described as follows:

> He was a master of the Three Vedas with their vocabularies, liturgy, phonology, and etymology, and the histories as a fifth; skilled in philology and grammar, he was fully versed in natural philosophy and the marks of a Great Man.[76]

In addition, Sela "was teaching the recitation of hymns to three hundred brahmin students,"[77] who all follow their teacher to become monks at the end of the Pali version.

Anālayo 2011a: II 527 n. 2. Nattier (2008: 129–130) includes the independent translation *Fanmoyu jing* (T. 76) among the authentic texts attributed to Zhi Qian.

[74] The social significance of the conversion of matted-hair ascetics (*jaṭila*) in the formative period of Buddhist texts is evident from the importance accorded to the conversion of the *jaṭila*s Urubilvā Kāśyapa, his brothers, and their followers.

[75] According to DPPN I, p. 22, Aṅguttarāpa is a country north of the river Mahī. The village Āpaṇa is the site of several *sutta*s including the *Poṭaliya* and the *Laṭukikopama* (see DPPN I p. 277). A birch-bark fragment in the Schøyen collection, 2381/188, has a stock formula referring to *aṃguttarāṇām āpaṇo nigamo*. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* version of *Selasutta* agrees on the location with the Pali, but the *Ekottarikāgama* and (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* versions take place at Rājagṛha and Udumā, respectively (Anālayo 2011a: II 545 nn. 85, 86).

[76] *Suttanipāta*, p. 105.1–3: *tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ pāragū sanighaṇḍuketubhānaṃ sākkharappabhedānaṃ itihāsapañcamānaṃ padako veyyākaraṇo lokāyatamahāpurisalakkhaṇesu anavayo…* Translation MLDB, p. 756. For this stock description, see MLDB, p. 1293, n. 850.

[77] *Suttanipāta*, p. 105.3–4: …*tīṇi māṇavakasatāni mante vāceti*. Translation MLDB, p. 756.

Both *sutta*s include the verses, "What must be known is directly known … Therefore, brahmin, I am a Buddha." The narrative progresses through the confirmation of the marks and the Buddha's status as Mahāpuruṣa to the realization that he is a Buddha. Further to this, Sela emphasizes the Buddha's royal potential, the link between marks and the Cakravartin. In response, the Buddha explains how he is already a king of the Dharma.

The *Selasutta* is one of only two suttas which is included in both *Suttanipāta* and *Majjhimanikāya* (the other is *Vāseṭṭhasutta* (MN 98 and *Suttanipāta* 594ff). The verse can possibly bring us back to Aśoka: one of the titles, the *dhaṃmapāliyāya* recommended by Aśoka, is the *Śailagāthā*. In addition, the *Śailagāthā* is regularly included among the titles that, with other "poésies psalmodiées," are incorporated into narratives.[78] Lamotte describes them as "compositions anciennes d'une haute valeur poétique, utilisant la stance comme moyen d'expression." Is it possible that the *sutta* is included in the *Suttanipāta* in recognition of its ancient "Kṣudraka" status, to keep it together with other texts in the group like *Pārāyaṇa*, *Arthavargīya*, and *Munigāthā*?

These narratives reflect a phase in the early social context of Buddhism, a period in which there was a need to demonstrate the superiority of the Buddha vis à vis the brahmins and other religious systems.[79] Several long *sūtra*s describe "exemplary encounters" in which a leading brahmin goes to see the Buddha, despite being discouraged by his peers. The narrative device of the verification of the two marks occurs in dialogues with brahmins, for – at least according to early Buddhist texts – it is the brahmins who transmit and verify the lore connected with the great man: "M[ajjhima] A[ṭṭhakathā] says that this was a science based on 12,000 works explaining the characteristics of great men, such as Buddhas, paccekabuddhas, chief disciples, great disciples, Wheel-turning monarchs, etc. These

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[78] Lamotte 1967: 176–178.

[79] On this subject see Chakravarti 1996, and Bailey/Mabbett 2006. More recently see Witzel 2009.

works included 16,000 verses called 'The Buddha Mantra'."[80] Early Buddhism claimed authority within or through brahminical notions, and attempted to negotiate a superior position in the established hierarchy. A similar mark is mentioned in Jaina lore, but it does not seem to play a dramatic narrative role.[81]

Narrative authority would seem to be beyond argument – it addresses different needs than those addressed by logical debate or the rhetoric of reason. The marvellous tongue is a familiar feature, mentioned in passing in some Mahāyāna *sūtra*s. In such cases it has no special narrative function; it is part of a package, the glory of the Buddha, for example in the *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā*,[82] *Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa*,[83]

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[80] MLDB, p. 1293, n. 850, with reference to *Papañcasūdanī* (PTS III p. 363.1–8), *mahāpurisalakkhaṇan ti mahāpurisānaṃ buddhādinaṃ lakkhaṇadīpakaṃ dvadasasahassaganthappamāṇaṃ satthaṃ. yattha soḷasasahassagāthāpadaparimāṇabuddhamantā nāma ahesuṃ*, *yesaṃ vasena iminā lakkhaṇena samannāgatā buddhā nāma honti*, *iminā paccekabuddhā dve aggasāvakā asīti mahāsāvakā buddhamātā*, *buddhapitā*, *aggupaṭṭhāko*, *aggūpaṭṭhāyikā*, *rājā cakkavattī ti ayaṃ viseso ñāyati*. See also Anālayo 2011a: II 537–538. The relation to brahmins must be more complex, since many of the features are shared in the Jaina and perhaps other *śramaṇa* traditions.

[81] According to *Aupapātika-sūtra* §16, Mahāvīra "has a palate and a tongue which are red like gold being refined by fire, washed, and [again] heated" (*huyavaha-niddhanta-dhoya-tatta-tavaṇijja-ratta-tala-tālu-jīhe*) – from Kawasaki 2009. Kawasaki points out the parallel to the *raktajihvā* of some Buddhist lists of *anuvyañjana*. He notes that other characteristics related to the Buddha's tongue as listed in BHSD "are not found in depictions of Mahāvīra." Conversely, the Buddhist texts do not seem to enumerate any special qualities of the palate.

[82] *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā* 46.18: *svakamukhapratichādā tasya jihvā prabhūtā*. See Ensink 1952: 108, ult./45; Boucher 2008: 155; *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā* 50.15: *jihvā prabhūta tanu tāmranibha vadanaṃ ca chādayasi yena svakaṃ*. See Ensink 1952: 113.13/49; Boucher 2008: 160.

[83] *Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa* 144.7: *ljags ni shin tu ring zhing srab*, *bdag nyid kyi ni zhal gyi ngos*, *de yis kun tu khyab par gnas*.

and *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā*.[84] The *Suvarṇabhāsottama* describes the tongue as:

> His fine, broad tongue is like a lotus or gold, shining like a lotus, resembling a lotus filament.[85]

The revelation of the tongue features in some of the great *Vaipulya-sūtras*, for example in the splendid opening of the long *Prajñāpāramitā* (*Pañcaviṃśati*,[86] *Daśasāhasrikā*[87]). It is discussed in the great treasury of Indian Buddhist lore, Kumārajīva's *Da zhidu lun*.[88]

The tongue as arbiter of truth

A tongue as glorious as that of the *tathāgata* could hardly have a single function. The display of the tongue as a guarantee of truth, again to brahmins, occurs in number of narratives, such as one cited at length by Kumārajīva in *Da zhidu lun*,[89] or, several, times in *Divyāvadāna*, where the Buddha recites a verse with the rhetorical question, how could such a tongue tell lies?

> The Blessed One then stuck out his tongue from his mouth so that it covered the entire sphere of his face up to his hairlines. Then he said to the brahmin, "What do you think, brahmin, would a person who can stick out his tongue from his mouth and cover the entire sphere of his

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[84] *'Phags pa dri ma med kyis zhus pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*, Otani Cat. No. 760(33), Repr. Vol. No. 24, *Dkon brtsegs*, *zi*, 257a1: *de'i ljags che zhal gyi dkyil 'khor khebs*; translated from Chinese in Chang 1983: 77.

[85] *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra* 4:4cd (p. 46.7–8): *padmasuvarṇaviśālasujihvaṃ*, *padmaprabhāsita padmaruhābham*. Translation Emmerick 1996: 18.

[86] Conze 1984: 658–659, 661. See also Burnouf 1989: 567; *Traité* I 278–279 and 456–471; Conze 1984: 39; Zacchetti 2005: 153–154 (§1.61).

[87] Konow 1941: 55 (no. 27), 109.33–36.

[88] *Traité* I 275–276; *Traité* III 1667–1668. At *Milindapañha*, pp. 167.23–170.14 there is a discussion on the Buddha's revealing the hidden organ.

[89] *Traité* I 457–463 = Dharmamitra 2009: 436–443.

face knowingly tell lies, even for the sake of hundreds of thousands of wheel-turners' kingdoms?"

"No, Gautama."

Then [the Blessed One] uttered this verse:

How could this tongue of mine tell lies;
It speaks with honesty and truth.
Things are as I say, brahmin.
Know that I am the *tathāgata*.

The brahmin became filled with faith.[90]

The tongue as the measure of miracles

With the passage of time, preachers developed new priorities in response to changing contexts. The display of the tongue was no longer used to impress and convert brahmins; it came to figure in fully Buddhist contexts, and to be used for dramatic effect within Buddhist circles (admittedly we know almost nothing about the intended or real audiences of these texts). One of the *Prajñāpāramitā* versions reads:

Thereupon the Lord stretched out his tongue, covered his whole face with it, and said to the Venerable Ānanda: What do you think, Ānanda, could such a tongue speak what is false, what is otherwise?

Ānanda: No, O Lord, no, O Sugata!

The Lord: Therefore, then, Ānanda, do reveal this perfection of wisdom to the four assemblies, explain it, encourage it, analyse it, explain it, enlarge on it, and reveal it in detail![91]

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[90] *Divyāvadāna* 71.14–22: *tato bhagavatā mukhāj jihvāṃ nirṇamayya sarvaṃ mukhamaṇḍalam ācchāditaṃ yāvat keśaparyantam upādāya*, *sa ca brāhmaṇo ʾbhihitaḥ*, *kiṃ manyase brāhmaṇa yasya mukhāj jihvāṃ niścārya sarvaṃ mukhamaṇḍalam ācchādayaty api tv asau cakravartirājyaśatasahasrahetor api samprajānan mṛṣāvādaṃ bhāṣeta*, *no bho gautama*, *tato ʾnv eva gāthāṃ bhāṣate. apy eva hi syād anṛtābhidhāyinī mameha jihvārjavasatyavāditā*, *tad evam etan na yathā hi brāhmaṇa tathāgato ʾsmīty avagantum arhasi*, *atha sa brāhmaṇo ʾbhiprasannaḥ*. Translation from Rotman 2008: 141.

[91] *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Kimura}}$ 77,19–26: *atha khalu bhagavāñ jihvendriyaṃ nirṇāmya sarvāvantaṃ mukhamaṇḍalaṃ jihvendri-*

Here we meet familiar terms – *vitatha*, *anyathā* – in the vocabulary of truth; the tongue now certifies the teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitā* to the four assemblies.

In the simplest form of the miracle – in early *sūtra*s and *avadāna*s – the Blessed One licks his ears and covers his face, up to the hairline. In later texts, his tongue reaches as far up as the Brahma-world. As the literature developed, the wonders diversified – Buddhists took it for granted that the Master's words are true – and the tongue became a launching pad for further miracles like the emission of rays of light and emanations of multitudes of Buddhas seated on lotus flowers, for example in the Long Perfection of Wisdom:

> Then at that time the Blessed One extended his tongue, and with it covered the three thousandfold great-thousand world system. Having pervaded in this way, he smiled. From his tongue issued forth hundreds of thousands of *koṭi*s of *prabheda*s of variegated rays of lights; on each of these rays appeared a thousand-petalled lotus made of supreme jewels, gleaming with gold; on those lotuses magically created Buddhas were seated cross-legged, teaching a sermon on the six perfections. The beings who heard that sermon became destined with certainty to unsurpassed true and perfect awakening.[92]

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yeṇ' ācchādayitvāyuṣmantam ānandam etad avocat: *tat kiṃ manyase. ānandāpi nv īdṛśaṃ jihvendriyaṃ vitatha-vādy anyathā-vādi syāt. ānanda āha*: *na bhagavan na sugata. bhagavān āha*: *tasmāt tarhy ānanda imāṃ prajñāpāramitāṃ catasṛṇāṃ parṣadāṃ vistareṇ'ākhyāhi deśaya prajñāpaya prasthāpaya vibhaja vibhāvayottanīkuru samprakāśaya*. Cp. Conze 1984: 488.

[92] *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Dutt}}$ 7.12–8.4: *atha khalu bhagavāṃs tasyāṃ velāyāṃ jihvendriyaṃ nirṇāmayām āsa. yenemaṃ trisāhasramahāsāhasraṃ lokadhātuṃ jihvendriyeṇācchādayām āsa … sphuritvā … smitam akarot … yato 'nekāni raśmikoṭīniyutaśatasahasrāṇi niśceruḥ. raśmimukhe caikaikasminn uttamaratnamayāni suvarṇanirbhāsāni sahasrapatrāṇi padmāny utpannāny abhūvan. teṣu ca padmeṣu buddhavigrahā niṣaṇṇāḥ saṃsthitāś cābhūvan dharmaṃ deśayanto yad utemām eva ṣaṭpāramitāpratisaṃyuktāṃ dharmadeśanām. …* (8.3) *ye ca sattvās tāṃ dharmadeśanāṃ śṛṇvanti te niyatā bhavanty anuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhau*. See also *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Kimura}}$ I-1, 3.16; *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Vajracharya}}$ I 50.8; *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* 10.11; Conze 1984: 39; *Traité* I 456 = Dharma-

Chapter 20 of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* presents a grand version of the act:[93] Śākyamuni and Prabhūtaratna extend their tongues, which reach up to the Brahma world; from their tongues shine forth multitudes of rays of light, and from each ray issue multitudes of bodhisatvas. The *tathāgata*s who have assembled from multitudes of worlds perform the same miracles with their tongues (*jihvendriyeṇarddhiprātihāryaṃ kurvanti*) for one thousand years. After one thousand years, they withdraw their tongues, all simultaneously clear their throats, snap their fingers, and the earth quakes.

But the tongue may reach even further than the Brahma world, as in the *Siṃhanādika-sūtra*:

> The tongue-faculty (*jihvendriya*) of the Blessed One, the *tathāgata*, *Dharmodgata extended and with his tongue he covered the three-thousand-fold great chiliocosm; from his tongue there issued many hundreds of thousands of rays of light. Those rays illuminated all of the worlds from the great hells, etc., up to the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*). The Blessed One then retracted his tongue and said to the entire assembly: "Friends, one with a tongue like this does not lie. Friends, whatever statements I make should be understood just like that, should be believed that way, you should have faith in them like that."[94]

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mitra 2009: 436. See Zaccheti 2005: 153–154 (§1.61, texts), 260–261 (commentary). For another tongue-based miracle, see *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Dutt}}$ 95.15; *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Kimura}}$ 107.8; *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*$_{\text{Vajracharya}}$ I 170.10; Conze 1984: 86. Cf. here the "*Bṛhaṭṭīkā*" (*'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa 'bum pa dang nyi khri lnga stong pa dang khri brgyad stong pa'i rgya cher bshad pa*, Otani Cat. No. 5206, Repr. Vol. No. 93, *sher phyin*, *pha*, 32a1).

[93] *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* 387.7; Burnouf 1989: 234 (Notes, p. 417).

[94] (*'Phags pa*) *Seng ge'i sgra bsgrags pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*, Otani reprint, Cat. No. 875, Vol. 34, *mdo*, *tsu*, 121a3 (Derge [Tōhoku] 209, *mdo sde*, *tsha*, 114a5): *bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa chos 'phags kyi ljags kyi dbang po phyung nas stong gsum gyi stong chen po'i 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad ljags kyi dbang pos yang dag par bkab par gyur to. ljags kyi dbang po de las 'od zer bye ba khrag khrig brgya stong phrag du ma byung ste, 'od zer de dag gis sems can dmyal ba chen po la sogs pa nas*

The tongue is an outstanding and unique engine of authority in Buddhist narrative, but it is more than a stage prop. There are other metaphors of authority: the Buddha roars the lion's roar, and he is the great bull who leads the assembly – but only the Buddha's tongue has metaphysical and cosmic dimensions. It is the impossible tongue that most effectively expresses the wonder and the ineffability of truth.[95] In early Buddhism, this and other metaphors helped to propel the Buddha onto the stage of Indian religion and philosophy. Otherwise the Dharma might not have been as "long-lasting" as it has proved to be.

References and abbreviations

Primary sources

Unless otherwise noted, references to Pali texts are to editions of the Pali Text Society (PTS) (UK) by volume, page, and line. References to Tibetan texts are to the Peking edition kept in the Otani University Library, Kyoto, by catalogue number, reprint volume number, section and volume, page, and line. Except when otherwise noted, translations are my own.

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srid pa'i rtse mo'i bar gyi 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad snang bar byas so. de nas bcom ldan 'das kyi ljags kyi dbang po de nyid slar bsdus nas 'khor gyi dkyil 'khor thams cad la bka' stsal pa, *grogs po dag lce 'di lta bu yod pa ni brdzun mi zer ste*, *grogs po dag ngas gtam cung zad ji lta ba bzhin bshad pa de ltar brtag pa dang*, *de ltar dad pa dang*, *yid ches par bgyis shig.*

[95] Burnouf had a quite different opinion. He describes the Lotus Sūtra version of the miracle as "un exemple des incroyables niaiseries auxquelles peut conduire la passion du surnaturel," concluding that "il semble que les Buddhistes du Nord aient été punis de leur goût pour le merveilleux par le ridicule de leurs inventions" (1989: 417). Conze (1984: 39, n. 8) notes that "In the Rig Veda already Agni's tongue, the priestly voice, 'touches heaven.' S. Thomas Aquinas has a similar idea when he says: 'The tongue of an angel is called metaphysically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concepts. Since the intellectual operations of an angel have no reference to the here and now, in angelic speech distance is no impediment'."

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On Buddhists and their chairs

Joseph Walser

For some time now, I have been interested in the genre of Buddhist scripture and the ways in which it was seen to be invested with authority. In this paper, I would like to address two questions: First, is there a distinct jurisdiction for scripture, or can it overlap with other, empirical sources of knowledge? Second, can non-philosophical circumstances be interpreted as having been instrumental in the development of apologetical endeavors within a tradition? It seems to me that such questions of authority, jurisdiction and apologetics may be brought into fruitful conversation with a number of theories falling under the rubric of *genre studies*. Specifically, I want to think about the relation between Buddhist scripture as a genre and the physical props that frame and authorize a particular scripture *as Buddhist.*

In particular, I wish to argue that Buddhists understood the preaching dais to have a special relationship to the genre of scripture, and that conversely censorship of a scripture would have been epitomized by denied access to such a dais. Put differently, Buddhists of different stripes would have had to establish their right to access the preaching dais in order to be able to authorize their version of Buddhism as "Buddhism." In the following, I would like to discuss the development of the chair as authorizing frame for Buddhist scriptures and ways in which Mahāyāna texts key this image in order to authorize their own *sūtra*s and *sūtra* preachers and ultimately to dominate that space.

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 49–70.

The dais

In Buddhist texts we find three terms designating the authorized dais for preaching: the high seat (*uccāsana*), the lion throne (*siṃhāsana*), and the dharma seat (*dharmāsana*). As we shall see, each of these terms carries with it distinct nuances connecting it with other fields of discourse. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the usage of these terms is unstable and we find the terminology shifting not only between texts, but between multiple translations/editions of the same text.

The high seat

From the earliest Buddhist *sūtra*s there appears to have been a kind of protocol to listening to the Buddha. The Buddha's chief interrogator is often depicted as coming to him, respectfully greeting him and then sitting down to one side. There are a few sermons in which we are told that someone has "arranged a seat" (*āsanaṃ prajñapya*) for the Buddha before he starts preaching. In most cases, this seat arranging is largely pragmatic and little is made of it. Indeed, it is easy to take the Buddha's chair as simply one more mute prop in the overall scene. But even at its simplest, the Buddha's chair acts as a framing device for the Buddha's speech, narratively inserting it into the discursive and highly intertextual world of chairs populating Buddhist and non-Buddhist literature. As stories of the Buddha's chair become elaborated and more importantly *reiterated,* the chair itself becomes an important trope in Buddhist scripture functioning to connect Buddhist discourse to various registers of authority; some Buddhist and some non-Buddhist.[1]

[1] Cf. Bakhtin 1982: 278: "The word forgets that its object has its own history of contradictory acts of verbal recognition, as well as that heteroglossia that is always present in such acts of recognition. For the writer of artistic prose, on the contrary, the object reveals first of all precisely the socially heteroglot multiplicity of its names, definitions and value judgments. Instead of the virginal fullness and inexhaustibility of the object itself, the prose writer confronts a multitude of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness. Along with the contradictions inside the

At its simplest, the ritual of offering the Buddha a seat keys into larger social customs establishing hierarchy.[2] The Buddha sits on a seat while his audience does not. Presumably, these seats were less like chairs and more like low platforms or cushions that the Buddha would sit on cross legged as can be seen in many early anthropomorphic representations of the Buddha.

Nevertheless, to sit on anything at all is a signal of status since, in narrative friezes, when the Buddha sits everyone else stands or sits below him.[3] Sitting on a seat is superior to standing just as the relative height of a seat reflects one's status. The idea that relative height of the seat was a marker of hierarchy is reflected in the *Pratimokṣa* rules stating that a monk may not preach to someone on a seat higher than himself.

The Buddha's teaching authority results from his experience at the *bodhimaṇḍa*, and thus it should not be surprising to find that both the terminology and imagery used to describe his seat at the base of the Bodhi tree is identical to that of his preaching seat. Thus, we find Aśvaghosa's *Buddhacarita* referring to the Buddha's seat under the Bodhi tree as the "jeweled seat" (*ratnāsana*),[4] while the Pali *Aṭṭhakathā*s refer to it as the diamond seat (*vajirāsana*)[5] or more

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object itself, the prose writer witnesses as well the unfolding of social heteroglossia *surrounding* the object ... the dialectics of the object are interwoven with the social dialogue surrounding it."

[2] Boris Oguibenine specifically attempts to connect the ritual of offering a seat to Vedic rites of initiation. While I agree with him that these rites may be alluded to in certain Buddhist contexts, the present paper seeks to demonstrate that the cultural resonances surrounding chairs include, but certainly extend beyond Vedic references. See Oguibenine 1983. My thanks to Amy Langenberg for pointing this source out to me.

[3] For example, when the *samana* Bhaggava-gotta invites the Buddha to his hermitage for a discussion, we are told that he arranges a seat for the Buddha and that he himself sits on a low stool beside the Buddha. Walshe 1995: 371; CSCD, DN III p. 2.

[4] Cowell 1969: 164; Johnston 1935: 15, vs. 51.

[5] CSCD, *Udāna Aṭṭhakathā* 31.

commonly the unconquered seat (*aparājitapallaṅka*).[6] The *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* both refer to this seat as a "lion throne." The latter text has all the gods competing to provide the lion throne that the Bodhisattva will sit on under the Bodhi tree. The scene is soon filled with 80,000 lion thrones and Bodhi trees, but by the power of the Bodhisattva, each *devaputra* thinks that Śākyamuni will sit on *his* throne alone.[7] Though labeled as lion throne, the seat is also clearly a high seat. The *Mahāvastu* waxes eloquent on how this seat is perceived by different tiers of devas; each group's perception of its height being an index to the amount of merit they earned in a previous life.[8]

As is often the case in Buddhist texts, issues of authority and respect are worked out in the mythical time of the historical Buddha and his disciples and keyed to the local monastics by implication of semiotic similarity. Buddhist texts may not demand respect for the local preacher, but they do depict the Buddha[9] and luminaries such as Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana and Upāli preaching from high seats and lion thrones that would have been identical to the chair the text was being read from.

Indeed, there are numerous passages in the *vinaya*s dictating that when a monk preaches in the monastery it should be done from a high seat or lion throne just as the Buddha and his disciples are depicted as doing. Though space limitations prevent me from going into all of the details, it is clear from *vinaya* materials that the high seat or lion throne was an important part of the everyday furniture of the monastery. According to the *Dharmaguptavinaya* its use was restricted to one person at a time,[10] and the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* and Daoxuan's commentary on the *Dharmaguptavinaya* also give

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[6] See, e.g., CSCD, *Dīgha Aṭṭhakathā* (Pali Text Society) i 67.

[7] See CBETA, T. 186 p. 515a12–22.

[8] Jones 1976: 293; Senart 1890: 312–313.

[9] See, for example, CBETA, T. 1421 p. 30b9.

[10] CBETA, T. 1428 p. 817a9–11; also see Daoxuan's commentary CBETA, T. 1804 p. 138a25.

rules for what to do if a heretic mounts the high seat.[11] We should take this as a strong indication that the seat was not to be used by heterodox preachers. A key point in all of this is that these preaching daises would have been limited in number and restricted in usage.

Thus, although the hagiographical descriptions of the Buddha's seat also refer to and authorize a particular piece of monastic furniture, once incorporated as a narrative trope, particular features of the trope key into discourses of legitimation and authority at the intersection of several different cultural fields. In particular, the emphasis on the height of the seat echoes the role of the *āsandī* in Vedic ritual. The *āsandī* is an item of *śrauta* paraphernalia that Jeannine Auboyer argues doubles as both an altar and a throne in late Vedic rituals of sovereignty. She notes, for example, that the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* contains quite a few discussions of the seat on which the sacrificer receives *abhiṣekha*. While one would not necessarily have to be a king to perform these rituals, these passages did form an important component in royal consecration rituals since the passages in question explicitly associate the seat and especially its height with royal power (both *kṣatra* and *saṃrājya*).[12]

Lion throne

The connection of the preaching seat with sovereign authority becomes even more explicit when the high seat is referred to as the

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[11] CBETA, T. 1442 p. 673b7; CBETA, T. 1804 p. 36a8.

[12] See Auboyer 1949: 16, n. 3–4. Vedic use of the throne is by no means limited to the *Śukla Yajurveda śākhā* but seems to be relatively common in *śrauta* texts. Theodore Proferes (2007: 88–90) discusses a passage in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* in which Āditya himself is anointed on a royal throne. The parallels between thrones of the Buddha and those depicted in *śrauta* rituals become even more explicit when we get into tantric materials. For example, in the introduction to the *Mahāvairocanābhisambodhisūtra* we find the throne of Vairocana made up of the bodies of bodhisattvas (singular body in T. 848 but apparently plural in the Tibetan and in Buddhaguhya's commentary [see Hodge 2003: 47–48] just as we find in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*'s account of the coronation of Indra [cp. A.B. 8.3.12 and CBETA, T. 848 p. 1a12]).

siṃhāsana or "lion throne." The earliest evidence for the lion throne in India occurs in a statue of Vima Khadphises from Mathurā.[13] Unlike the high seat, the lion throne is first and foremost a royal throne. So, for example, the *Amarakośa* lexicon defines the king's seat (the *nṛpāsana*) as the *bhadrāsana* and the *siṃhāsana.*[14] As the lion throne becomes the symbol of sovereignty in North India and Central Asia, we find some of the earliest Chinese translations depicting the Buddha sitting on a "lion seat" (師子座 – *shīzǐ zuò* = *siṃhāsana*). Clearly, the adoption of the lion throne motif for the Buddha's seat was designed to meld religious power to widely established images of political power, and this connection is made explicit in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* where it is said, "The place where the Buddha sits, whether wood, or earth is called the lion throne. Just like today the place where the king sits is also called the lion throne."[15]

Public high seat

The idea of the high seat or lion throne as a platform for authoritative speech was not limited to Buddhist monasteries. Rather, the Buddhist high seat or lion throne appears to have been a sectarian iteration of a pan-Indian phenomenon. Not only do we find lion thrones depicted in Jain sculpture from the same period, but there is also evidence for such seats in use in a non sect-specific way. For

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[13] See Zimmer 1955, plate 59. Rosenfield (1967: 184) argues that, "the form of Vima's throne has less in common with the Buddhist *siṃhāsana* than with the iconic emblems and thrones of the contemporary Middle East." He then goes on to cite a number of examples from Persia all the way to the Mediterranean that pre-date Vima. Suffice it to say this specific type of throne with lions for legs has quite a long history. The earliest example that I could find was that of the Pharaoh Khephren who lived from roughly 2558 to 2532 BCE, and even after the Kuṣāṇas, the lion throne continued to be used until at least the late fifth century by the Sassanian king Bahram Gur (r. 421–438). See for example, Ackerman et al. 1940: 35.

[14] *Amarakośa* 2.7.995: *nṛpāsanaṃ yat tad bhadrāsanaṃ siṃhāsanaṃ tu tat*.

[15] CBETA, T. 1509 p. 111a28–b5. This is echoed in a tenth-century commentary on the *Dharmaguptavinaya*, cp. CBETA, T. 1805 p. 414a5–7.

example, Kumārajīva's translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* mentions a story in which an eight year old Śāriputra defeats a group of Brahmins, amazing them with his intelligence.[16] For our purposes, however, what is significant is that the discussion takes place out in the open at the *Giryagrasamāja* festival during which four high seats (*gāo zuò* 高座) were set up: one for the king of the country, one for the crown prince, one for the great minister and one for a master of *śāstra*s (論士).[17] What initially shocks the crowd is the fact that the precocious Śāriputra mounts the last of these high seats. This is understood to be a challenge that prompts the Brahmins in the crowd to test his knowledge. Śāriputra's success on the high seat wins him not only the respect of the brahmins but an endowment from the king of six villages.[18] Perhaps not incidentally, we find such

[16] CBETA, T. 1509 p. 136a14ff.; Lamotte 1976: 621–623.

[17] 論士 could also be translated as "master of debate," but while there is certainly always an implicit understanding that anyone sitting in such a chair had better be prepared to defend themselves, the primary intent of mounting the seat seems to have been to preach rather than to debate. To get a feel for the social significance of these seats, I direct the reader to the account of Upagupta in the *Aśoka Avadāna* who mounts the lion throne in Mathura to preach the four noble truths.

> When many hundreds of thousands of Brahmins had assembled, the elder, fearless as a lion, mounted the lion's throne.
>
> As it is said:
>
> > It is impossible, they say,
> > for an ignorant man to ascend the lion's throne;
> > for he who merely sits on that seat
> > becomes timid like a deer.
> > But he who roars out like a lion
> > in order to destroy the arrogance
> > of differing philosophers,
> > he is a lion among speakers,
> > and is fit to mount the lion's throne.
>
> The elder Upagupta preached a step-by-step discourse and exposed the truths. And upon hearing [his Teaching], many hundreds of thousands of living beings planted roots of merit conducive to liberation. [See Strong 1983: 196–197; Mukhopadhyaya 1963: 27–28.]

[18] This story is also mentioned in the Chinese translation of the *Dīrghanākha Avadāna* in the *Avadāna Śataka* (although it is elided in the

public high seats still in use in South Asia. For example, storytellers in Kathmandu will speak from similar specially constructed raised platforms.[19]

Fetishized charisma

In order for the high seat or the lion throne to function as an authoritative dais in the monastery, the authoritative registers keyed in Buddhist hagiographical literature would have to be seen as somehow concretized in the physical object in the monastery. A looser way of putting this would be to simply say that the chair would have to be seen as sacred. That the chair itself became invested with charisma and a power of its own can be demonstrated through Buddhist mythology, specific monastic regulations, as well as through art history. Mythologically speaking, there is a story in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Dharmaguptavinaya* in which the Buddha is engaged in a magical competition with all of the *tīrthika*s from across India.[20] In the course of the story all of these *tīrthika*s along with their retinues come together to compete with the Buddha. The Buddha begins the competition by creating 100,000 seats for all of his monks and the *tīrthika*s and then creates a seven jeweled lion throne in the center of these on which he himself sits.[21] He proceeds to perform a miracle a day for a fortnight. On the eighth day, the *tīrthika*s apparently discover that they cannot compete with the Buddha's magical powers and so they plot, *not* to kill the Buddha, *but to destroy his high seat*.[22] On the level of monastic regulation, the *Mahīśāsakavinaya* reports that at a certain monastery the high seat from which the dharma was preached began to be worshiped by monks who threw flowers

Sanskrit text translated by Feer). See, CBETA, T. 200 p. 255b2ff.

[19] Todd Lewis, personal communication. The aspect of the high seat as a platform for debate is reflected in the modern Tibetan practice of having the contenders in certain special debates sit on a seat over six feet high. See Dreyfus 2003: 235.

[20] CBETA, T. 1428 p. 946b13ff.

[21] CBETA, T. 1428 p. 949a2–4.

[22] CBETA, T. 1428 p. 949c2.

on it. The laity objected that this was too much like the worship of the king's chief minister. Later, the laity themselves wanted to offer flowers to the preaching monks. The Buddha steps in and dictates that while the seat itself could receive this kind of *pūjā*, the dharma preacher sitting on it could not.[23]

That the idea of doing *pūjā* to the chair was both early and not necessarily limited to any one sect, we need only to note that prior to the advent of anthropomorphic representations of the Buddha, his chair is often used as a symbolic representation of his presence. It is often, as in early friezes from Amaravati, Mathura and Gandhara, depicted as the object of worship.

The seat as authorizing frame

Now I am not suggesting that all sermons were delivered from a lion throne, just as the Pope does not always speak *ex cathedra* (literally, "from the chair"). But the fact that the Pope is *authorized* to speak *ex cathedra* lends a kind of implicit legitimacy to his speeches in other venues (only two popes have declared anything *ex cathedra*). What I am suggesting is that there was a culturally understood reciprocal authorization between the *sūtra* as a genre and the fact that its salient instantiation would have been framed by such a dais.

As such, to have access to the dais becomes the best route to authorize a given message as legitimately "Buddhist," and for that reason one of the more important stakes in any ideological struggle. There was probably only one per monastery and its use certainly would have been restricted to those who were explicitly authorized to occupy it. This becomes apparent when we look at specific Buddhist monastic sites. Take for example Bavikoṇḍa and Thotlakoṇḍa in Andhra Pradesh. As Lars Fogelin has shown, the *mahāstūpa* with circumambulatory path was not conducive to a single focal point necessary for preaching.[24] That leaves us with the *caityagṛha* and the *maṇḍapa*. In sites like Bavikoṇḍa and Thotlakoṇḍa the *caityagṛha*

[23] CBETA, T. 1421 p. 121c14.

[24] Fogelin 2006: 66–73.

would not have been large enough to accommodate many people, although I suppose it would be possible. The main site of preaching would have been the *maṇḍapa* in the center of the *vihāra* area which, according to Sastry contained, "a brick built platform measuring 2.40 × 2.00 meters."[25] This would have been the one spot in the monastery for preaching and only the monk occupying this spot would have "air time."

We find an even more dramatic example of how a lion throne authorizes a preaching space if we look at cave 10 at Ellora. The cave forms an apsidal *caityagṛha* in which the stupa lies at the top of the apse. This arrangement forms a convenient space for an audience in front of the stupa. In such a situation the dharma preacher would have sat directly in front of the stupa, and in this cave, the front of the stupa is adorned with a life sized depiction of the Buddha preaching on a lion throne. Here it is easy to see how the authority of the Buddha's lion throne reflects on the preaching monk who presumably would have positioned his own chair directly in front of the statue of the similarly seated preaching Buddha.

In the preceding, I have drawn on materials spanning at least a thousand years and a broad swath of the Subcontinent. This, however, is precisely the point. While certain strategies of legitimation, the Aśvamedha versus Purāṇic genealogies of descent from the gods, may vary over time, the trope of the throne and enthronement remains a fairly stable index of authority within the Indic cultural sphere, and thus provided a reliable source of legitimacy to be tapped.

Mahāyāna *sūtra*s

If access to the monastic dais was constrained and regulated, then we should expect to find those *sūtra*s whose own legitimacy had not yet been established responding precisely at the level of the authorizing trope. This is exactly what we find in some Mahāyāna texts. In the remainder, I will give four examples of ways in which some

[25] Sastry 1992: 48.

Mahāyāna texts re-frame the frame of the preaching dais to authorize their own preaching.

Despite Richard Gombrich's argument suggesting that Mahāyānists may have been content writing scriptures and quietly slipping them into the monastic library, it seems to me that Mahāyāna texts are equally, if not more concerned with being preached. And so we find that Mahāyāna texts have a lot to say about chairs.

Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra

For example, in Kumārajīva's 5th-century translation of the *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra*, immediately after a list of the benefits from "believing it, grasping it, remembering it and speaking and explaining it to others," the *sūtra* tells us that, "the Śakras, Brahmās and Lokapāla Kings of the gods," wished to, "present (*prajñāpayitum*) to the Tathāgata a lion throne (*siṃhāsana*) ... a throne for a great turning of the Wheel of the Dharma (*mahādharmacakrapravartanāsana*), so that the Tathāgata, seated on this throne of ours, will expound the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi* for a great turning of the Wheel of the Dharma."[26]

Each of the gods offers his own throne to the Buddha thinking that his is the only one, and that the Buddha will expound the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi* from his throne alone. There were 84,000 *koṭinayuta*s of lion thrones in the assembly and yet they did not obstruct one another. Then, "desiring to demonstrate a little of the potency (*prabhāva*) of the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi* and have the practices (*caryā*) of the Mahāyāna adopted, the Tathāgata ... acted so that all the assemblies saw the Tathāgata present everywhere on the 84,000 *koṭinayuta*s of precious *siṃhāsana*s."[27]

The theme of the gods competing to offer the Buddha a lion throne shows up in the *Lalitavistara* and in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* and in those contexts there is nothing particularly remarkable about the story. Here, however, the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi* takes what was probably an already established theme in Buddhist literature and recasts it

[26] Lamotte 2005: 115.

[27] Lamotte 2005: 116.

to serve the reproduction and authorization of the *sūtra* itself. In fact, I should point out here that when it comes to seats, we find a remarkable difference between Mahāyāna texts and their non-Mahāyāna counterparts. Whereas non-Mahāyāna texts often depict either the Buddha or one of his disciples preaching from a dais, we are seldom told the name of the *sūtra* being preached.[28] When Mahāyāna *sūtra*s talk about daises, they tend to lapse into baroque excesses designed to rivet the reader's attention to the fact that *precisely this sermon* is being preached from that authorized chair – with the strong implication being that the reader should ensure the same happens from the corresponding chair in the local monastery. But unlike the monastic lion throne, of which there can be only one occupant, the staggering multiplication of lion thrones here (and the preaching of the *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra* on them) seems to be arguing for the authorization of a proliferation of such daises – arguing that when this does happen there will be no mutual obstruction.

Vimalakīrtinirdeśa

Indeed, we find this theme of the proliferation of preaching daises (as well as their mutual non-obstruction) from the earliest strata of Mahāyāna texts to be translated into Chinese. The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, first translated by Zhī Qiān in the early third century, employs a slightly more complicated strategy than the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi.* The text first attempts to "dethrone" traditional preaching authorities specifically by undermining the authority of the seat. It then proceeds to authorize and seat a different set of authorities, the bodhisattvas – but not in the monastery. Though I am sure everyone here is familiar with this story, I ask you to rethink its significance as a story about preachers.

Reading from Zhī Qiān's translation at the beginning of chapter five, we find Śāriputra looking around Vimalakīrti's empty house and noticing that there are no chairs for the bodhisattvas and *śrā-*

[28] The *Dharmacakraparivartana* preached by Upagupta in the *Aśokāvadāna* and the *Appamādavagga* preached by Nigroda being two notable exceptions.

*vaka*s to sit on. Vimalakīrti at first de-authorizes the preaching chair as commonly understood by chastising Śāriputra for seeking a chair instead of seeking the dharma.[29] After a short sermon expounding the Mahāyāna dharma, he tells of a distant universe called Sumerudhvajā whose resident Buddha, Sumerudīparāja sits on a lion throne whose height is 68,000 *yojana*s and his country is filled with 8,400,000 beautifully adorned lion thrones for his bodhisattvas. Sumerudīparāja then sends 32,000 thrones to Vimalakīrti's house, and the thrones all manage to fit without hindering one another. If the term "lion throne" here is meant to key the preaching chair in the monastery, then the multiplication of the preaching chairs along with the comment that they did not hinder one another again seems to be arguing that a similar proliferation of Mahāyāna preachers will similarly not cause any obstruction. We know that it is Mahāyāna that is to be preached from these seats since only the bodhisattvas are able to increase their size to sit on them. Traditional masters of preaching like Śāriputra cannot even get on the seat. What authorizes the bodhisattvas to sit on the seats is not their knowledge of traditional sermon material, but their supernatural powers. Only after paying homage to the Tathāgata Sumerudīparāja, are the *śrāvakas* granted the power to occupy the *siṃhāsana*s.

If the lion throne in this story is meant to key the authority of the actual preaching dais in the monastery, its reframing here effects two important displacements. As I have already mentioned, the traditional preaching authorities, the arhats, are displaced in favor of the layman Vimalakīrti and the bodhisattvas. While this plays on a theme that appears in the *Dharmaguptavinaya* in which the Buddha creates hundreds of thousands of chairs in a *gṛhapati*'s house,[30] unlike that story in which all of the thousands of *tīrthika*s get to sit, the seats in Vimalakīrti's house serve the function of separating the worthy from the unworthy. This leaves us with the distinct impression that the author(s) expected such a winnowing to take place away

[29] Lamotte 2005: 134; CBETA, T. 474 p. 526c20ff.

[30] CBETA, T. 1428, p. 947a11–b23. This story appears to have been a later insertion into the larger story of the Buddha's competition with the other *tīrthika*s to show supremacy of magical powers.

from the monastery among the laity. Granted, laypeople's houses have always been an important preaching venue. But the authority of the preacher in the household context is derivative of that person being authorized by their monastery. Here, the center of gravity (if not the actual locus) seems to have shifted to the itinerant preacher, and is no longer with the elders back at the monastery.

Sadāprarudita story

We find a different tactic in the story of Sadāprarudita in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*.[31] Here, the dais that Dharmodgata preaches from is completely dissociated from the monastery. For example, in Lokakṣema's late second century text we find Dharmodgata's high

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[31] The theme of the preaching throne actually occurs earlier in chapter 4 of the *Aṣṭa*, though there the implication for the Buddhist preaching dais is more oblique. The chapter has the Buddha ask whether Śakra would choose a copy of the *Prajñāpāramitā* or a universe full of the Tathāgata's relics. He responds that, although he has great reverence for the relics of the Tathāgata, he would choose the *Prajñāpāramitā*, since it is the cause of the *sarvajña* that pervades the relics and gives them authority. Śakra then goes on to give the example of his own throne.

> It is as with my own godly seat in the Sudharmā, the hall of the Gods. When I am seated on it, the Gods come to wait on me. But when I am not, the Gods, out of respect for me, pay their respect to my seat, circumambulate it, and go away again. For they recall that, seated on this seat, Śakra, the Chief of the Gods, demonstrates Dharma to the Gods of the Thirty-three. In the same way, the perfection of wisdom is the real eminent cause and condition which feeds the all-knowledge of the Tathāgata. The Relics of the Tathāgata, on the other hand, are true deposits of all knowledge, but they are not true conditions, or reasons, for the production of that cognition. As the cause of the cognition of the all-knowing the perfection of wisdom is also worshipped through the relics of the Tathāgata. [Conze 1994: 116]

This passage can be found (with minor variations) in most versions of the *Aṣṭa*, with the exception of T. 225. While the main thrust of the paragraph is to subordinate the authority of the Buddha's relics to that of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, a secondary implication of the passage is that the preaching throne achieves its ultimate legitimacy, not from the Buddha, but from that which *enlightens* the Buddha – namely the *Prajñāpāramitā*.

seat, set up in the middle of the realm. There is no indication in the text that he is in a monastery, and on the contrary, his status as a layperson is emphasized by references to his concubines. Here, Dharmodgata occupies the highest chair from which he preaches the *Perfection of Wisdom* while the bodhisattvas listen, write it down, study it, etc.[32]

Dharmodgata, like Vimalakīrti, is clearly a layperson here, but unlike the Vimalakīrti example, Dharmodgata's seat is not meant to invoke the monastic dais, but the high seat set up in public places. The Sanskrit version of this passage differs in a number of ways, but despite the fact that Dharmodgata's seat is designated a *dharmāsana*, the Sanskrit further emphasizes the non-monastic setting by placing Dharmodgata's dais at the *nagara śṛṅgāṭaka* – the crossroads of town. This is less a recontextualization of monastic authority than a call to street preaching of the *Prajñāpāramitā* by lay adherents.

Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā

We see the opposite strategy developed in the *Perfection of Wisdom in 25,000 Lines*, which, it seems, fully intends to usurp the monastic dais. Mokṣala's late third century translation opens with the Buddha setting out his own lion throne and sitting on it in lotus position.[33] He does not speak,[34] but performs a number of miracles by entering different kinds of *samādhi*s on the lion throne. The last of these has him reveal himself on a lion throne[35] whose luster and height all surpasses all mount Sumerus.[36] From that lion throne, he illuminates the

[32] Translation from Lancaster 1968: 239–240; cp. Conze 1994: 280–281 and CBETA, T. 224 p. 471c23ff.

[33] CBETA, T. 221 p. 1b7.

[34] Although CBETA, T. 221 p. 1c21 states that some of the assembled beings, "…examine the lion throne and 聞 what the Buddha has said…" Usually *wén* means "to hear," but it can also mean "to make known." This is missing in the Sanskrit.

[35] Mokṣala has him sitting (beneath) a "lion tree." Presumably 床 is a mistake for 座. CBETA, T. 221 p. 1c16.

[36] CBETA, T. 221 p. 1c17.

Tathāgata Ratnākara who teaches the *Perfection of Wisdom* in the world system Ratnavatī.[37]

Here the Perfection of Wisdom tradition appears to be aiming straight for the monastic lion throne. The Buddha himself does not speak throughout the introduction, but sits in *samādhi* throughout. It is other Buddhas who speak for him and about him. We are nevertheless told several times that these *samādhi*s are performed by the Buddha sitting in lotus position on the lion throne. The classical instance in which the Buddha sits in *samādhi* on a lion throne is when he sits under the Bodhi tree. If his *samādhi* illuminates other Buddhas preaching the perfection of wisdom and if in the Sanskrit version of this text,[38] those other Buddhas describe Śākyamuni as preaching Perfection of Wisdom in this *samādhi*, we might be forgiven from assuming that the "original" lion throne was itself authorized by the king of *samādhi*s stemming from the practice of the Perfection of Wisdom. In so doing this text usurps one of the sources of authority for any monastic lion throne – the *bodhimaṇḍa* itself.

Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra

There is one last example I would like to discuss in regard to preaching daises, although I haven't been able to find other examples of it in Mahāyāna literature. The *Suvarṇabhāsasūtra* addresses the king to offer his throne to a monk to preach.[39] But here, he is to do so specifically to have the monk preach the *Suvarṇabhāsasūtra.*

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[37] CBETA, T. 221, p. 2a10.

[38] Conze 1975: 42; Dutt 1934: 13, lines 6–7.

[39] The *Ajitasenavyākaraṇasūtra* has King Ajitasena offering his own lion throne to the Buddha to sit in and preach to him. The implication here is that in matters of dharma, the preaching monk (the contemporary stand-in for the Buddha) is king and the king is supplicant. [Dutt 1939: 129] The Pali *Mahāvaṃsa* makes this move explicit, bypassing the Buddha altogether to connect the authority of the lion throne directly to the preaching Buddhist saint when Aśoka offers his throne to the monk Nigroda.

> The king, in whom kindly feelings had arisen towards that same (Nigroda), summoned him in all haste into his presence; but he came

> In order to hear this excellent *Suvarṇabhāsa*, king of *sūtra*s, that king of men must enter the chief palace. And having entered that place, he must sprinkle it well with water of various perfumes and bestrew it with flowers. In that place ... a seat of the Law[40] is to be provided, set up high (and) well adorned with various adornments. That place must be well adorned with various umbrellas, banners and flags. And that king of men must wash his body well, wear well-perfumed clothes, be clad in new and brilliant garments, be adorned with various ornaments. For himself a low seat must be provided. When he has sat down on that seat, he must not be elated by his sovereignty.[41]

Here, one wonders whether the chair being sought may not be the lion throne of the palace itself, but rather the *dharmāsana* or "dharma seat" discussed in *dharmaśāstra*, i.e., the equivalent of the judicial bench.[42] Manu says that it may be occupied by a Brahmin if the

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> staidly and calmly thither. And the king said to him: 'Sit, my dear, upon a fitting seat.' Since he saw no other *bhikkhu* there he approached the [lion] throne. Then as he stepped toward the throne, the king thought: 'To-day, this *sāmaṇera* will be lord in my house!' Leaning on the king's hand he (the monk) mounted the throne and took his seat on the royal throne under the white canopy. And seeing him seated there king Asoka rejoiced greatly that he had honoured him according to his rank. When he had refreshed him with hard and soft foods prepared for himself he questioned the *sāmaṇera* concerning the doctrine taught by the Saṃbuddha. Then the *sāmaṇera* preached to him the '*Appamādavagga*.' [Geiger 1986: 31]

[40] The Sanskrit has *dharmāsana* here, while Dharmakṣema's two early fifth century translations both have 大法座師子之座 (**mahādharmāsana siṃhāsana*). See CBETA, T. 664 p. 383b5 and T. 663 p. 342a17–18.

[41] Emmerick 1992: 32.

[42] While this term would seem to be a natural designation for a preaching chair, it doesn't occur in Pali before the *Aṭṭhakathā*s and doesn't occur in any Chinese text before Dharmarakṣa in the third century. When it does occur, it is used interchangeably (often in the same sentence) with "high seat" and so in most contexts it may be treated as a kind of high seat. Here, however the *dharmāsana* clearly occurs in the king's court, hence we should also be aware of discussions of the *dharmāsana* that occur in later *dharmaśāstra*s. Thus, according to the *Manusmṛti*, the *Nāradasmṛti* and the *Viṣṇusmṛti*, the *dharmāsana* is the seat from which

king does not wish to be bothered by the caseload, and here we have a Buddhist text that displays an unusual degree of concern with the brahmanical world putting a Buddhist monk in the same chair. Manu says that the one ascending the dharma seat should first propitiate the *lokapāla*s. In the *Suvarṇabhāsasūtra* it is the *lokapāla*s themselves (the four Kings) who urge the king to put the Buddhist monk in that seat (if this were the case, it would certainly make Mahāyānists' life easier). Even if the dharma seat here is not specifically the seat of justice it clearly is not a preaching dais in a monastery. Like the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, the strategy here is to vie for non-monastic preaching space and perhaps to gain access to the monastic dais on the recommendation of the king. In this context, it is perhaps significant that the earliest inscription to mention the word *mahāyāna*, describes a *cozbo* as one "who has set forth in the *mahāyāna*."[43] The end of this same letter may also refer to the *Suvarṇabhāsasūtra* itself.[44] Though most of the Niya documents depict the office of *cozbo* as a kind of governor-general,[45] some of the documents clearly depict the *cozbo* engaging in the investigation of legal cases.[46] In this context, we can

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court cases are decided. The following is from the *Manusmṛti* 8: 23ff:

> Ascending the *dharmāsana* with his body covered and his mind composed, he should pay homage to the guardians of the world [the *lokapāla*s] and open the trial. Paying attention to only these two – what is and what is not in accord with the provisions of polity (*artha*), and what is and is not in accord with the Law (*dharma*) he should try all the cases brought by litigants in the order of their social class. [Olivelle 2004: 124.]

[43] Fragment 390, Senart 1920: 140; Burrow 1940: 79–80.

[44] This is not clear from Burrow's translation, but line 6 of Senart's edition clearly mentions a "*suvaṃniya nama sutra*." That this refers to the Mahāyāna *sūtra* of the same name, though possible, is nevertheless not certain.

[45] This is the translation used by Valerie Hansen in her discussion of these documents. See Hansen 2004: 305.

[46] See, for example, fragment 364:

> (To *cozbo* Soṃjaka.)

read the *Suvarṇabhāsasūtra* as attempting to coopt the center of political/judicial authority.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I wish to answer the question with which I began this investigation "*Is there a distinct jurisdiction for scripture?"* Though I suspect that I have taken the word *jurisdiction* in a different sense than was intended, I nevertheless find that *sūtra*s (and *sūtra* authors) did seek jurisdiction or a kind of polemical dominance over concrete spaces in the monastery as a key tactic in maximizing attention for particular messages and for legitimating them as properly "Buddhist." In looking at the preaching dais in Buddhist monasteries, I have also shown how the numerical limitations and regulative practices associated with these daises are reflected in the apologetical endeavors of certain key Mahāyāna *sūtra*s that seek access to these daises.

Abbreviations and references

Abbreviations

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CBETA – *Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association.*

... are quickly to be sent under custody to the king's court. They will make a complaint here in our presence, (and) there will be a decision. Let him (it) not be unlawfully taken from Camaka. Also Caṣgeya has worked a slave belonging to Camaka for twelve years ... has brought. Again he demands the camel. This dispute is to be carefully examined in your presence with oath and witness. A decision is to be made according to the law. If you are not clear there, they are to be quickly sent here to the king's court under custody, and there will be a decision here in our presence. [Burrow 1940: 72].

CSCD – *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Compact Disc* (Burmese Edition of the Pali Canon)

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Turning hermeneutics into apologetics

Reasoning and rationality under changing historical circumstances

Vincent Eltschinger

Introduction

As recent research by R. Davidson and A. Sanderson strongly suggests,[1] 6th- to 7th-century India underwent a number of economic and sociopolitical changes. These changes put the Buddhist institutions under pressure and led them to evolve new patterns of self-assertion. As I see it, the Buddhist literary landscape saw the rise of two newcomers during the dawn of the early medieval period (500–1200 CE):[2] On the philosophical and apologetic level, the so-called Buddhist epistemological school, and on the ritual, symbolic and soteriological level, the kind of Buddhist esoterism commonly referred to as "tantrism." Whereas the epistemological turn was meant to oppose, at the religio-philosophical level, the growing hostility of the brahmanical orthodoxy (Purāṇas, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya) towards Buddhism, the esoteric synthesis was designed to counter Śaivism's strong appeal to the ruling classes, which had enabled Śaivism's growing economic success.

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[1] See Davidson 2002, Sanderson 2009 and Eltschinger 2010a.

[2] See Eltschinger forthcoming.

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 71–145.

Epistemology and esoterism share a number of interesting features. First, they do not define themselves as being in opposition to contending Buddhist schools (as had been so clearly the case in Abhidharma, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika scholasticism, as well as in early Mahāyāna), but by contrasting themselves with their *non-Buddhist* challengers. Second, they both exhibit strong supersectarian tendencies by newly resorting to self-designations such as *bauddha*, *saugata* or *śākya*(*putrīya*) (all meaning "Buddhist"). Third, both epistemology and esoterism understand and legitimate themselves as that which, by defeating the non-Buddhist philosophical tenets and subjugating the outsiders' divinities, removes the obstacles to the Buddhist dispensation and hence to the path toward liberation. Leaving the long-trodden path of sectarian self-reflection and intersectarian polemics, the Buddhist intellectuals who felt themselves responsible for defending the law resolved to demonstrate the authority of the Buddhist dispensation as a whole rather than the superiority of any given sectarian interpretation of it. Turning to apologetics on behalf of Buddhism, they broke, at least partly, with four key features of traditional scholasticism. First, they departed from doctrinal systematics and shaped new arguments aimed at defending those doctrines they agreed with. Second, they put soteriological concerns aside and viewed their discourse as a precondition to the reflective and meditative parts of the Buddhist path, this having been made necessary by the non-Buddhists' misconceptions. Third, they abandoned the intra-Buddhistic argumentative devices that resorted to the Buddhist scriptures as a means of proof complementing reasoned argument. Fourth, they repudiated the purely intra-Buddhistic *dharma* terminology and adjusted themselves to the rising pan-Indian philosophical standards.

However, one should be wary of seeing the rise of Buddhist epistemology as a *tabula rasa*, for it more closely resembles a process of selective adaptation that reworked and coalesced older elements around a new paradigm of human rationality. This reconfiguration involves a clear-cut delineation between the jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture, a model of rationality based on argumented decision in religious matters, the critical evaluation of competing

truth claims, and self-legitimation. I am therefore inclined to view the 6th-century Buddhist construction of new self-assertive strategies centred on apologetics as an *externalization* of Buddhist scholasticism. In this process, earlier and mainly Yogācāra ideas pertaining to reason(ing) and scripture, as well as to a *bodhisattva*'s "private" endeavour to interpret and assess the practicability of the Buddhist law, coalesced into a new matrix designed to fit redirected polemic commitments. In other words, the Buddhist epistemologists turned hermeneutic and soteriologically valued devices into apologetic instruments on behalf of Buddhism. This involved three steps: First, reconfiguring the relationships between reason(ing) and scripture; second, evolving a set of evaluative criteria allowing one to assess the reliability of competing scriptural traditions; third, shaping philosophical devices capable of demonstrating that the Buddhist path to salvation is indeed rational, and hence possible. Accordingly, the Buddhist epistemologists attempted to ground their apologetic endeavours on appeals to human reason (S. McClintock's "rhetoric of reason") that involved two closely related concepts of rationality, viz. *yukti* ("reason[ing]") and *prekṣā* ("*prudentia*").

The first part of the present paper focuses on the changing Buddhist models of rationality in their relationship with scriptural authority. Its second part concentrates on the theoretical foundations and apologetic uses of practical rationality as defined by the epistemologists.

1. Evaluative rationality

1.1.0. Let me briefly outline Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' understanding of *yukti*. Five points seem relevant in this connection:

1.1.1. *yukti* is equivalent with *nyāya* as "reason(ing)/reasoned argument."[3] It consists of the cognitive operation (*vṛtti*) of the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*) and

[3] PVṬ *Je* D264b5/P316b2–3 = PVSVṬ 423,9; PVṬ *Ñe* D51a6/P60b8–61a1 = PVSVṬ 592,7.

inference (*anumāna*).[4] *yukti* is regularly identified with inference alone, so that contradicting *yukti* (*yuktivirodha*) amounts to violating an already offered proof (*sādhana*, like that of momentariness) or something yet to be inferred. A proposition that is contradictory to or incompatible with *yukti* is a thesis (*pratijñā*) that is opposed by an inference (*anumānabādhita*).[5]

1.1.2. The jurisdiction of *yukti* covers only empirical states of affairs (*dṛṣṭārtha*). Our authors draw a sharp distinction between the scope of *yukti* (*yuktiviṣaya*) and the class of objects that are beyond the reach of *yukti* (*ayuktiviṣaya*),[6] viz. objects that remain out of cognitive reach (*viprakṛṣṭa*) in terms of time (*kāla*), location (*deśa*) or intrinsic nature (*dravya*, *svabhāva*).[7] Examples of such objects include ghosts (*bhūta*), the efficiency of mantras (*mantraśakti*), the laws of karmic retribution, cosmology (*lokasaṃniveśa*), etc. These are variously labelled "supersensible" (*atīndriya*), "imperceptible" (*apratyakṣa*, *atyakṣa*, [*atyanta*]*parokṣa*), "trans-empirical" (*adṛṣṭa*), and sometimes (although the two categories do not entirely overlap) as "inconceivable" (*acintya*) and "(extremely) profound" ([*ati*] *gambhīra*).[8] This class of objects is the exclusive jurisdiction of scripture (*āgama*). In other words, our authors sharply contrast *yukti* and *āgama*, reason(ing) and scriptural/verbal authority.[9] Proper scrip-

[4] PVP D291a1–2/P347a6–7 and PVV 450,15.

[5] PVṬ *Je* D315b4/P384b7–8 = PVSVṬ 508,13; PVṬ *Ñe* D117a2/P143a2–3 and PVV 57,7; PVṬ *Je* D310a4/P378a3 = PVSVṬ 497,3–4.

[6] PVSV 167,23–168,3.

[7] PVṬ *Ñe* D51b4/P60a2 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,22.

[8] On *acintya*, see below, n. 42. Note that something inconceivable can be perceptible, such as the attraction of iron by a magnet, and that something supersensible can be conceivable, such as ghosts and other "supernatural" beings.

[9] See, e.g., PV 4.108ac: *śāstraṃ yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate / dṛṣṭe 'dṛṣṭe 'pi tad grāhyam* … "That treatise which is not invalidated by proven reasoning or by its own words with regard to [respectively] empirical [objects] (*dṛṣṭa*) and non-empirical [objects] (*adṛṣṭa*) [i.e., *atyantaparokṣa*] is to be accepted." Translation Tillemans 2000: 152.

tural objects are beyond the reach of the two ordinary means of valid cognition.[10]

1.1.3. That the legitimate jurisdiction of scripture includes trans-empirical states of affairs certainly does not mean that scripture does not occasionally impinge upon the empirical realm. And it is precisely because it does that scripture can be evaluated (*parīkṣā*, *vicāra*) at all. Scripture must be evaluated due to the fact that it is *not* a genuine, independent (third) means of valid cognition.[11] And reason(ing) provides the only means for assessing scripture's reliability (*avisaṃvāda*). Its reliability concerning trans-empirical matters is to be inferred, or, better perhaps, transferred: one can conclude its reliability in the supersensible realm either after having (successfully) verified *all* of its statements pertaining to empirical states of affairs, or after having (successfully) put its principal point (*pradhānārtha*, such as the four nobles' truths) to critical test.[12] According to Dharmakīrti, however, the act of transferring reliability from one class of statements onto another is formally quite objectionable[13] and ultimately relies on nothing but the compassion of the prophet (which supposedly prevented him from distorting the truth).[14] Note that the scriptures included here cover virtually all the *āgama*s and *śāstra*s that were available on the 6th-century religio-philosophical market.

1.1.4. One can assess the reliability of scripture but *not* the trustworthiness of persons (*pudgala*). This is due to the fact that another person's mental properties are beyond the reach of ordinary human cognition: a certain person's truthfulness or compassion can be neither perceived nor inferred (say, from his/her verbal and/or bodily

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[10] PVSVṬ 593,20.

[11] PVSV 168,2–3, 173,26–174,2 and 175,27–29. See also Eltschinger 2007a: 70–75 and Krasser 2012.

[12] See below, §1.4.

[13] See below, §1.4.0.

[14] See also below, §1.4.2.

behaviour).[15] In other words, one should rely on *yukti* when assessing scriptural authority, not on personal authority.[16]

1.1.5. (S)he who, instead of following blind faith (*vyasana*), resorts to this kind of scriptural evaluation is called "practically rational" (*prekṣāvat*, *prekṣāpūrvakārin*).[17] The practically rational person is someone who wishes to engage (*pravṛttikāma*) in (religious) practice and resorts to *yukti*, especially to inferences, in order to maximize his/her chances of being successful in his/her endeavours. And indeed, this person is but an ordinary human being (*prākṛtapuruṣa*, *rathyāpuruṣa*), i.e., someone who lacks cognitive access to the transempirical realm (*arvāgdarśin*, *arvāgdarśana* [*bahuv.*]) but is in possession of *yukti*. The only possibility for this person to behave rationally, i.e., to minimize the risk of being deceived, is to ground his/her practice on a scripture that (s)he has subjected to a thorough critical evaluation. Note that in this period of competing claims to rationality, our authors are strongly inclined to hold *yukti* and, especially, practical rationality to be characteristically Buddhist.[18]

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[15] See below, §1.3.6.

[16] Although personal authority can be derived from a (successful) critical examination of a certain person's treatise (*śāstra*), as Dharmakīrti does (or rather seems to do) in PV 2 while demonstrating that the Buddha is *pramāṇabhūta*. As shown by Krasser (2001), however, Dharmakīrti's demonstration aims at showing that the Buddha has become *like* or *similar to* a *pramāṇa*, not that he has become or is a *pramāṇa*.

[17] See McClintock 2010: 58–62, Eltschinger 2007b: 137–150, and below, part 2.

[18] Note, e.g., TSP_K 765,22–23/$TSP_Ś$ 891,23–892,4: *tathā hi … nyāyam evānupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa* /. "For it is by following reason(ing) alone that the Buddhists, [who are persons] of good sense, proceed [while interpreting scripture, and] not by merely [conforming to other peoples'] discourse." PVṬ *Ñe* D51a7–b1/P59b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,9–13 (see also Vibh. 406 n. 2): *anekārthatvasambhave 'pi śabdānāṃ yuktiyuktaṃ puruṣārthopayoginam evāgamārthaṃ niścinvanti saugatā na paropadeśamātreṇa* /. "Although the words [of their scriptures] can be [as] polysemic [as those of the Veda], the Buddhists ascertain, for [their] scriptures, only a meaning that is rational [and] serves a human goal, [but do] not[, contrary to their Mīmāṃsa-

1.2.0. If one considers the status and uses of *yukti* and *āgama* in Abhidharma and Yogācāra literature until the end of the 5th century CE, this complex of ideas comes very close to reflecting a "paradigm shift." Most of the above-mentioned features can be traced back to earlier, mainly Yogācāra sources. Their coalescence around the matrix of scriptural evaluation in a pluralistic and polemical context is strikingly innovative.

1.2.1. Until the end of the 5th century, Yogācāra intellectuals (including Vasubandhu, the *kośakāra*) generally recognized three means of valid cognition, viz. perception, inference and scripture ([*āpt*] *āgama*, etc.),[19] sometimes four (the same plus analogy [*upamāna*])[20]

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ka opponents,] merely [follow] the teaching of others." PVṬ *Ñe* D51a6/P59a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 592,7: *paṇḍitāḥ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇo bauddhāḥ* … "The wise(/learned) [and] practically rational Buddhists." Concerning rival (Mīmāṃsaka) claims to having the privilege of rationality, note, e.g., TS_K 3241–3243/$TS_Ś$ 3240–3242: *tasmin dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavad āsthite / niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kuṭyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ // tābhir jijñāsitān arthān sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ / hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ kṣipram āsādayanti te // ityādikīrtyamānaṃ tu śraddadhāneṣu śobhate / vayam aśraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe //*. "When the [Buddha], as the wish-fulfilling gem, dwells [deeply] absorbed in contemplation, [his] teachings issue at will even from the walls [so that] human beings know from them all the things they wish to know, and quickly obtain what is profitable [to them] according to [their] needs. To say such things, however, sounds beautiful to [blind] believers, but we, who are looking for reasons, are not [blind] believers." On this passage, see McClintock 2010: 357–358 and Kataoka 2011: II.371–372 nn. 430, 431.

[19] BoBh D25,17/W37,25–26, MAV 3.12b, MAVBh 42,11–12, MAVṬ 128,17–21, ASBh 152,27, 153,1 and 153,5. According to Frauwallner (1957), Vasubandhu had already restricted the number of *pramāṇa*s from three to two in his *Vādavidhi*. But this might well be another case of Frauwallner's use of the *argumentum a silentio*: the fact that no fragment dealing with (*āpt*)*āgama* is available to us does not mean that the original *Vādavidhi* did not address scripture as a third means of valid cognition. Be that as it may, Vasubandhu clearly acknowledges three means of valid cognition in AKBh 76,24–25 and VY P102b6–7/L173,16–17.

[20] See *UH/*PS 13,3–14,17. As far as I am aware, the *UH/*PS contains no hint at its sectarian and/or doctrinal affiliation.

and maybe even five,[21] but *never* only two, contrary to the Buddhist epistemologists. These three means of valid cognition enter, *with equal rights*, the hermeneutic and argumentative complex of *yukti*, most conspicuously in the form of the so-called reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments (*upapattisādhanayukti*). In other words, scripture qua *pramāṇa belongs* to reason(ing). The interpretative complex of reason(ing) provides a *bodhisattva* with the heuristic tools needed for pondering on the Buddhist scriptures that he has learnt earlier (at the stage of learning or "listening" known as the "insight born of listening" [*śrutamayī prajñā*]). At this stage of reflection, the *bodhisattva* analyzes scriptures in order to work out the intellectual (and ultimately soteric) contents that he will subsequently cultivate or "meditate" upon (at the stage of cultivation known as the "insight born of [mental] cultivation" [*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*]).[22]

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[21] According to the HV (4,15–16), proof (*sādhana*) is comprised of eight elements: thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), similarity (*sārūpya*), dissimilarity (*vairūpya*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and scripture (*āptāgama*). However, items 1–3 and 4–8 do not belong to the same level, for the latter, as in the *UH, are that which provides justification for the reason (HV 5,3–5: *hetuḥ katamaḥ. yas tasyaiva pratijñātasyārthasya siddhaya udāharaṇāśritaḥ sārūpya-vairūpyato vā pratyakṣato vānumānato vāptāgamo vā hito yuktivādaḥ*. "What does the reason consist of? It is the justification that, based on an example and drawn from similarity and dissimilarity, or perception, or inference, or scripture, is aimed at establishing the point [at stake] in the thesis.") According to whether one counts *sārūpya* and *vairūpya* as distinct items (they sometimes occur in a singular *dvandva* compound, sometimes separately), the *pramāṇa*s amount to four or five. Note, however, that only *pratyakṣa* is explicitly termed a *pramāṇa* (HV 7,22; 11,3).

[22] AKBh 334,16–19: *satyāni hi draṣṭukāma ādita eva śīlaṃ pālayati / tataḥ satyadarśanasyānulomaṃ śrutam udgṛhṇāty arthaṃ vā śṛṇoti / śrutvā cintayaty aviparītaṃ cintayitvā bhāvanāyāṃ prayujyate / … śrutamayīṃ prajñāṃ niśritya cintāmayī jāyate / cintāmayīṃ niśritya bhāvanāmayī jāyate /*. "He who desires to see the truths should indeed keep the precepts from the very beginning. Then he learns the word (*śruta*) that is conducive to the vision of the truths, or he listens to its meaning. Having heard, he reflects. Having correctly reflected, he gives himself up to [mental] cultivation. Based on the insight born of listening, there arises the insight born of reflection; based on the [insight] born of reflection,

As we can see, reason(ing) is subordinate to soteriology. It is an interpretative device applied to an already accepted religious authority. There is no question here of evaluating non-Buddhist scriptures, not even of putting the Buddhist dispensation to critical test. In the stage of rational reflection, reason(ing) is required to filter and analyze mechanically learnt scriptural items so that these can be turned into salvational intellectual contents. What does *yukti* consist of? Yogācāra texts provide a fourfold analysis of reason(ing). The ŚrBh spells this out as follows:

> How is one to reflect on the teaching of the *skandha*s by means of the reflection consisting of an examination through reason(ing)? One is to examine [it] by means of four [types of] reason(ing). – Which four? – By means of reason(ing) on(/of) dependence (*apekṣāyukti*), reason(ing) on(/of) the production of an effect (*kāryakaraṇayukti*), reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments (*upapattisādhanayukti*), and reason(ing) on(/of) the fundamental nature of things (*dharmatāyukti*).[23]

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there arises the insight born of [mental] cultivation." Vasubandhu's own position on the three successive insights appears at AKBh 335,4–6: *āptavacanaprāmāṇyajātaniścayaḥ śrutamayī / yuktinidhyānajaś cintāmayī / samādhijo bhāvanāmayīti /*. "The [insight] born of listening is a certitude arisen from the authority of the statements of a trustworthy [person]; the [insight] born of reflection is a [certitude] arisen from an investigation through reason(ing); the [insight] born of [mental] cultivation is a [certitude] arisen from [psychic] concentration." On the expression *yuktinidhāna*, see also MSABh 82,1–4.

[23] ŚrBh 118*,10–13/141,7–10 (ŚrBh$_T$ D57b2–3/P68a1–2): *kathaṃ yuktyupaparīkṣākārayā cintayā skandhadeśanāṃ cintayati / catasṛbhir yuktibhir upaparīkṣate / katamābhiś catasṛbhiḥ / yad utāpekṣāyuktyā kāryakaraṇa*[(1)]*yuktyopapattisādhanayuktyā dharmatāyuktyā /*.

[(1)] As Sakuma (1990: II 8 n. 36) has rightly pointed out, one must read °*karaṇa*° instead of °*kāraṇa*°.

On the four *yukti*s, see Oberhammer et al. 1991: 74b–76a, 1996: 77a–78b, 1996: 40b–42b, 1996: 124a–125b and 2006: 93–96, Sakuma 1990: II.99–102 nn. 596–605, Yoshimizu 1996: 114–119 n. 85, Kapstein 2003: 324–329, Deleanu 2006: II.494–495 n. 74, Nance 2007: 153–156. See also MSABh 58,5–12 on MSA 19.43–46. On *yukti* in general, see Scherrer-Schaub 1981 and Nance 2007.

Leaving three of the four types of reason(ing) out of consideration, let me briefly focus on the *upapattisādhanayukti*, "reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments," which provides us with a useful insight into the early Yogācāra way of dealing with reason(ing) and scripture. The ŚrBh defines it as follows:

> By means of the three means of valid cognition, viz. scripture of a trustworthy [person], perception and inference, [a practitioner] examines [the fact] that the *skandha*s are impermanent, [and/or] that they are produced in dependence [on causes and conditions, and are] unsatisfactory, empty and selfless. By means of these three means of valid cognition, which are subordinate to [particular] arguments (*upapatti*) [and] convince (*hṛdayagrāhaka*) wise [people], one carries out probative determinations, viz. of the *skandhas*' being impermanent, or produced in dependence [on causes and conditions], or unsatisfactory, or empty, or selfless. This is termed a reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments.[24]

Were it not for the inclusion of scripture as a legitimate means of proof, the *upapattisādhanayukti* would seem very close to the epistemologists' understanding of *yukti* as an argumentative device resorting to the means of valid cognition. This difference cannot be overestimated, however, since it is a reflection of the very distinct meanings of the two *yukti* complexes: whereas the *upapattisādhanayukti* is made subservient to the *cintāmayī prajñā*, i.e., to the soteriologically valued *personal* reflection of the *yogin* on *Buddhist* scriptures that he already trusts, the epistemologists' *yukti* serves the polemical and apologetic purpose of assessing both Buddhist *and*

[24] ŚrBh 119*,14–120*,1/142,12–143,3 (ŚrBh$_T$ D58a1–4/P68b3–6): *upapattisādhanayuktiḥ katamā / anityāḥ skandhā iti pratītyasamutpannā duḥkhāḥ śūnyānātmāna iti tribhiḥ pramāṇair upaparīkṣate yad utāptāgamena pratyakṣeṇānumānena ca / ebhis tribhiḥ pramāṇair upapattiyuktaiḥ satāṃ hṛdayagrāhakair vyavasthāpanā sādhanā kriyate yad uta skandhānityatāyā vā pratītyasamutpannatāyā vā duḥkhatāyā vā śūnyatāyā vānātmatāyā vā / iyam ucyata upapattisādhanayuktiḥ /*. Note also MSABh 168,9–10: *upapattisādhanayuktiḥ pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣā /*. "The *upapattisādhanayukti* is an examination [carried out] by means of *pramāṇa*s such as direct perception." See also SNS 10.7, 155,23–25 and 157,30–32. On the SNS's understanding of the *upapattisādhanayukti*, see Steinkellner 1988: II.14–19 and Yoshimizu 2010.

non-Buddhist scriptures.[25] Moreover, whereas early Yogācāra views scripture as a means of proof working additionally but co-equally to perception and inference, the epistemologists deny scripture any probative value, at least as far as the empirical sphere is concerned.

1.2.2. The close association of reason(ing) and scripture in doctrinal argumentation is even clearer in the so-called *yukti–āgama* proof strategy that permeates Abhidharma and Yogācāra works until the end of the 5th century. As C. Cox has it,

> "doctrinal discussions utilized a dual technique of appealing to the co-equal authorities of both scripture (*āgama*) and reasoned argument (*yukti*) … [E]ven for the mature Abhidharma texts of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, reasoned argument could not stand alone in the proof of doctrinal points. Quite the contrary, proof by recourse to and reanalysis of scriptural passages (*āgama*) continued, even in the later Abhidharma materials, to occupy the predominant position in doctrinal debate."[26]

The important point here is the fact that in this method, reason(ing) and scripture are *jointly* (though most often successively) used to make one's point: the doctrines arrived at through reason(ing) are supposedly and expectedly the same as those laid down in the scriptures quoted. In other words, the scope of *yukti* is co-extensive to that of *āgama*. Far from ranging over different kinds of objects, both have

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[25] But see below, §§2.5.1–2.

[26] Cox 1995: 14–15. Note, e.g., BoBh D32,24–25 and 33,9/W48,9–10, 11, 23: *āptāgamato 'pi nirabhilāpyasvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā veditavyāḥ / yathoktaṃ bhagavatā… bhavasaṃkrāntisūtre … arthavargīyeṣu …*; MSABh 158,16–17: *evaṃ tāvad yuktim āśritya dravyataḥ pudgalo nopalabhyate /* (see Eltschinger 2010b: 322); MSaṅg 26,28–30 and 27,18: *luṅ daṅ rigs pas dpag par bya ste / de la luṅ ni … luṅ 'dis rigs pa yaṅ bstan pa yin no // 'di ltar …* (see Lamotte 1973: 93 and 95); AKBh 120,15–16: *tan neṣyate / kiṃ kāraṇam / yuktitaś cāgamataś ca / tatra tāvad yuktiṃ niśrityocyate …* (see *Kośa* III 33); AKBh 372,13: *iyaṃ tāvad yuktiḥ / āgamo 'py ayam …* (see *Kośa* IV 250); TrBh 114/*39,14–15: *sarvabījakaṃ na cakṣurādivijñānam iti kuta etat / āgamād yuktitaś ca / uktaṃ hi bhagavatābhidharmasūtre …* (see Jacobi 1932: 50). This remains true, e.g., of the 6th- to 7th-century Mādhyamika philosopher Candrakīrti (see May 1959: 73–77, 95–96, 104–105, 141–142, 156–157, 168, 177–178, 203–205, 247–250, 296–297) as well as of later Mādhyamika works.

the same material jurisdiction. This methodology was certainly not without problems, however. In addition to requiring sophisticated hermeneutic devices such as the distinction between explicit/direct meaning (*nītārtha*) and implicit/intentional meaning (*neyārtha*), the *yukti–āgama* proof strategy often came up against the problem of "canonicity," for the various Buddhist denominations did not all recognize the same texts as authoritative, i.e., as *āgama* or *buddhavacana*, a fact best exemplified in an interesting dialogue found in AKBh 9.[27] To the best of my knowledge, however, this method was never called into question by the Buddhist intellectuals themselves, and thus we can surmise that it met their dialectical needs. However, with the exception of Mādhyamika literature (and Kamalaśīla's *prastāvanā* on the TS), the *yukti–āgama* method nearly died out in

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[27] AKBh 466,17–24/LE78,1–12: *na vai ta enaṃ*(1) *granthaṃ pramāṇaṃ kurvanti / kiṃ kāraṇam / nāsmākam ayaṃ nikāye paṭhyata iti / kiṃ punas teṣāṃ nikāya eva pramāṇam āhosvid buddhavacanam / yadi nikāya eva pramāṇaṃ na tarhi teṣāṃ buddhaḥ śāstā / na ca te śākyaputrīyā bhavanti / atha buddhavacanaṃ pramāṇam / ayaṃ granthaḥ kasmān na pramāṇam / na hi kilaitad buddhavacanam iti / kiṃ kāraṇam / nāsmākaṃ nikāye paṭhyata iti / ayam anyāyo vartate / koʾtrānyāyaḥ / yo hi granthaḥ sarveṣu nikāyāntareṣv āmnāyate na ca sūtraṃ dharmatāṃ vā bādhate soʾsmābhir apāṭhān na buddhavacanam iti vacanaṃ kevalaṃ sāhasamātram /.*

(1)em. < Tib. (ʾ*di*) : *evaṃ* Eds.

"The [Vātsīputrīyas] do not take this text as authoritative. [But] why? [They say:] 'The [text that you cite from] is not read(/recited) in our sect.' But[, we ask,] is it their sect that is authoritative, or the word of the Buddha? If it is [their] sect that is authoritative, then the Buddha is not their teacher and they are not Buddhists (*śākyaputrīya*). But if the word of the Buddha is authoritative, why is the text [we cite from] not authoritative [for them]? Because, they say (*kila*), this is not the word of the Buddha. [But] why? [They say:] 'It is not read in our sect.' [Now,] this is unjustified. [And] what is unjustified here? Because to claim[, as they do,] that a text that is transmitted in all other sects and contradicts neither the *sūtra* nor the fundamental nature [of things] is not the word of the Buddha on the grounds that they (*asmābhiḥ*) do not read it, [this] is purely and simply inconsiderate." On the text in question, see AKBh 466,14–17/LE76,6–9 and *Kośa* V 250–252, MSABh 158,22–25 and Eltschinger 2010b: 323–324 (+ n. 103).

6th-century and post-6th-century philosophical literature, along with traditional scholastics itself (after the 6th century, Abhidharma turns into a petrified study of Vasubandhu's AKBh, while Yogācāra scholasticism merges into epistemology). This is in fact hardly surprising granted that this device was meant for purely intra-Buddhistic polemical purposes (as the recourse to scriptures sufficiently testifies) and can, as the *upapattisādhanayukti*, be interpreted as mirroring the soteriological concerns inherent in insight born of reflection. At least according to the 8th-century philosopher Kamalaśīla,[28] this method amounts to nothing other than insight born of reflection by means of which a *yogin* penetrates (*nirvedhayati*) the explicit and intentional meanings (*nītaneyārtha*) and ascertains (*niśCI*) the real meaning in order to dispel any possible doubts (*vicikitsā*) before he proceeds to mental cultivation (*bhāvanā*). As Kamalaśīla spells it out,

> it is the real nature of entities that should be cultivated [by the *yogin*] after he has pondered [on it] by means of insight born of reflection, i.e., by means of reason(ing) and scripture. And the proper nature of entities has been ascertained (*niścita*) through reason(ing) and scripture as consisting ultimately of mere non-origination.[29]

1.2.3. As we can see, the pre-6th-century paradigm of *yukti* and *āgama* (1) does not contrast their material jurisdictions and has them contributing equally and co-extensively to doctrinal elaboration and proof procedures; (2) it does not appoint *yukti* as a means of evaluating scripture, but takes it as an hermeneutic device subservient to the *yogin*'s personal endeavour along the Buddhist path; (3) it does not consider the non-Buddhist scriptures, neglects apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole and remains subordinate to purely inter-sectarian, intra-Buddhistic polemics. In sharp contradistinction to this, Dharmakīrti (and the remark is likely to apply to Dignāga also) clearly distinguished between the material jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture. He granted full epistemic autonomy to reason(ing) in the empirical sphere and concomitant-

[28] BhK 1.508/198,11–16.

[29] BhK 1.508/198,21–509/199,2: *cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyāṃ pratyavekṣya bhūtam eva vasturūpaṃ bhāvanīyam / vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ ca paramārthato 'nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam /*.

ly restricted the legitimate scope of scripture to the supersensible realm. The authority of scripture was now dependent on reason(ing) via a set of evaluative criteria.[30] But one of the most decisive features of Dharmakīrti's model consists in its dismissal of any attempt at deriving scriptural authority from (claims to) personal authority or charisma (as, e.g., the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas, but also many of his co-religionists were inclined to do). Scriptural authority must now be sought in *texts* and according to the criterion of *yukti* alone.

1.3.1. Let me concentrate now on Dharmakīrti's dismissal of personal authority as a criterion of scriptural authority and the concomitant subjection of scripture to reason(ing). As is well known, the Buddha entered *parinirvāṇa* without appointing any of his disciples as the head of the order. He also did not provide the latter with a hierarchy, nor did he leave a body of authoritative scriptures. Asked by Vassakāra (a minister of King Ajātasattu) about the persistent unity of the order, however, Ānanda answered that the fully enlightened one had not left the *saṅgha* without a refuge (*pratisaraṇa*), since the latter had the *dharma* for its refuge.[31] But as Buddhist missionary activity spread all over India and communities were founded in remote areas, gradually evolving their own disciplinary and doctrinal specificities, an increasing need was felt for criteria enabling the Buddhists to authenticate the teachings they encountered in various places. This circumstance was instrumental in the development of the set of (two or) three authenticating criteria that are found scattered throughout the various recensions of the so-called *Mahāpadeśasūtra*, "The Scripture on the [four] references to authority."[32] As R. Davidson has it, "[f]our specific situations were designated as normative in the transmission of the *dharma*."[33] According to

[30] See below, §1.4.

[31] See Lamotte 1947: 213, Dutt 1962: 70–72, Davidson 1990: 302.

[32] See Lamotte 1947, Davidson 1990: 297–303 and, for references, Lamotte 1947: 219–220.

[33] Davidson 1990: 300.

this source, a monk might be inclined to admit as authentic a teaching heard from

> "1. the mouth of the Buddha, 2. a [s]aṃgha of elders, 3. a group of bhikṣus who were [a] specialists in the *dharma* (*dharmadhara*), [b] specialists in the *vinaya* (*vinayadhara*), or [c] specialists in the proto-*abhidharma* lists (*mātṛkādhara*), or, 4. a single bhikṣu who was such a specialist."[34]

But according to the Buddha, or at least his literary representatives, this would simply amount to granting an individual or a community authority, and this was something he was not ready to allow. Upon hearing a teaching from the mouth of these individuals, a monk should rather decide whether this teaching occurs in the *sūtra* (*sūtre ʾvatarati*), "is reflected in the *vinaya*, and does not contradict reality (*dharmatā*)" (*vinaye saṃdṛśyate dharmatāṃ ca na vilomayati*).[35] In other words, an individual cannot be granted authority unless his words have been proven to stand this threefold analysis, i.e., to match *dharma*.

1.3.2. However, in the definitive absence of the Buddha, the Buddhist communities not only faced the problem of authenticity (or: external criticism), but also had to address the issue of interpretation (or: internal criticism).[36] This development may have taken place a few centuries later: While it cannot be traced in the Pāli *nikāya*s (but only in the *Nettipakaraṇa*), it is abundantly reflected in Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika as well as Mādhyamika sources.[37] Specialists in scriptural exegesis and hermeneutics evolved a set of four criteria, called "[interpretative] refuges/bases" (*pratisaraṇa*), which were aimed at warding off personal charisma, literalism, mental confusion and excessive discursivity in the interpretation of the Buddhist law and its sources. This doctrine warns the monk and/or *bodhisattva* to rely 1. on *dharma* and not on persons (*pudgala*), 2. on the meaning/spirit (*artha*) and not on the letter (*vyañjana*), 3. on *sūtra*s of explicit mean-

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[34] Davidson 1990: 300.

[35] Davidson 1990: 300.

[36] On the Buddhist critique of interpretation, see Lamotte 1949.

[37] For references, see Lamotte 1949: 342 and *Traité* I 536–540.

ing (*nītārtha*) and not on *sūtra*s of intentional meaning (*neyārtha*), and 4. on insight (*jñāna*) and not on discursive knowledge (*vijñāna*).[38] Of decisive importance in the present context is the first of these four principles, the injunction to take recourse in *dharma* rather than a person purporting to teach *dharma*. In my opinion, Dharmakīrti is endeavouring to reinstate this hermeneutic principle on a sound philosophical basis. But, as we have seen, Dharmakīrti contrasts *pudgala* with *yukti*, not with *dharma*. How did, then, the distinction between reason(ing) and scripture come about? In order to understand this, let me turn to an early Yogācāra interpretation and reworking of this fourfold interpretative pattern.

1.3.3. As the BoBh amply testifies, a number of Buddhist intellectuals of (proto-)idealist persuasion later merged this fourfold interpretative structure into the soteriological scheme of the three successive insights (*prajñā*). Not content with this innovation, they substituted *yukti* for *dharma* in the wording of the first principle. In so doing, they were true to the demands of the *cintāmayī prajñā*, which, as we have seen, resorts to four types of reason(ing). Note, however, that these thinkers did not, for all this, renounce the pattern of warning one to check a given teaching's conformity to *sūtra*, *vinaya*, and reality: the ambition to keep true to the *dharma* remained (as alluded to in the motif of "the harmful and the great references to authority" [*kālāpadeśamahāpadeśa*]),[39] but a strong emphasis on reason(ing)

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[38] Note, e.g., AKVy 174,8–11 and 704,20–22: *catvārīmāni bhikṣavaḥ pratisaraṇāni / katamāni catvāri / dharmaḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na pudgalaḥ / arthaḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na vyañjanam / nītārthasūtraṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na neyārtham / jñānaṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na vijñānam iti /*. "There are, O monks, four [interpretative] bases. Which four? The law is the [interpretative] basis, not the person. The meaning(/spirit) is the [interpretative] basis, not the letter. The *sūtra* of direct(/explicit) meaning is the [interpretative] basis, not [the *sūtra*] of indirect(/intentional) meaning. Insight is the [interpretative] basis, not discursive knowledge."

[39] BoBhVy D *Yi* 129a1–2/P *Ri* 157b12: *nag po bstan pa ni mdo sde la mi ʾjug ʾdul ba la mi snaṅ chos ñid daṅ ʾgal bar gnas paʾo // de las bzlog pa dkar poʾi phyogs ni chen po bstan paʾo //*. "The black references to authority are points that do not occur in the *sūtra*s, do not appear in the *vinaya* and contradict the fundamental nature [of things]. The white side, which is

as an investigative and, at least in part, autonomous principle was added to it. Let us consider a first excerpt from the BoBh:

> How does a *bodhisattva* apply himself to the four [interpretative] bases? In this case, a *bodhisattva* looks for the [true] meaning rather than the [formal] perfection of the letter [when] he learns the law from someone else. [Therefore,] while learning the law in looking for the [true] meaning rather than the letter, that *bodhisattva* who relies on the [true] meaning respectfully learns the law even if it is taught in a vulgar(/vernacular) language (*vāc*). Moreover, a *bodhisattva* acquaints himself thoroughly with both the harmful and the great references to authority. While getting acquainted [with them], he relies on reason(ing) and not on the person [by thinking]: 'These doctrinal items have been preached by an elder, or by a distinguished person, or by a(/the) Tathāgata, or by a(/the) community.' While thus relying on reason(ing) rather than on the person, neither does he depart from the [true] reality nor does he depend on anyone else regarding the doctrinal items [which he subjects to reason(ing)]. … To sum up, four [things] have been declared here as authoritative regarding these four [interpretative] bases: the [true] meaning [as it has been] preached, reason(ing), the Teacher, and the cultivational cognition [consisting in direct] realization. And all four [interpretative] bases display the unerring expertness of a *bodhisattva* who has undertaken true practice.[40]

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contrary to them, is [called] a great reference to authority" BoBhVṛ D *'I* 175b7–176a1/P *Yi* 221b2–3: *gaṅ mdo sde la 'jug ciṅ 'dul ba la snaṅ la / chos ñid daṅ mi 'gal ba de ni chen po bstan pa yin la / de las bzlog pa ni nag po bstan pa'o //*. "That which occurs in the *sūtra*s, appears in the *Vinaya* and does not contradict the fundamental nature [of things] is [called] a great reference to authority. [That which is] contradictory to it is [called] a black reference to authority." On *kālāpadeśa*, see La Vallée Poussin 1938: 158–160. Unfortunately, it seems that La Vallée Poussin was not aware of these passages and thus, was unable to determine the meaning of the expression.

[40] BoBh D175,14–176,7/W256,23–258,3: *kathaṃ bodhisattvaś caturṣu pratisaraṇeṣu prayujyate / iha bodhisattvo 'rthārthī*(1) *parato dharmaṃ śṛṇoti na vyañjanābhisaṃskārārthī / so 'rthārthī dharmaṃ śṛṇvan na vyañjanārthī prākṛtayāpi vācā dharmaṃ deśyamānam arthapratisaraṇo bodhisattvaḥ satkṛtya śṛṇoti / punar bodhisattvaḥ kālāpadeśaṃ ca mahāpadeśaṃ ca yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / prajānan yuktipratisaraṇo bhavati na sthavireṇābhijñātena vā pudgalena tathāgatena vā saṅ-

As we can see, the "older" concern for a given teaching's conformity to *dharma* is now if not abandoned, at least split into two distinct things: first, the acquaintance with the so-called "black" and "great" references to authority, i.e., one's ability to distinguish between teachings that conform to *sūtra*, *vinaya* and reality, and those that do not; second, and more importantly, reason(ing), which ensures that the reflecting *bodhisattva* does not lapse from true reality, a statement that parallels the ŚrBh's strong insistence on the fact that reason(ing) closely mirrors reality itself (or, at least, mundane conventional reality). This concern with reason(ing) as an autonomous investigative principle is further strengthened by our text's final statement concerning the four authoritative elements successively involved in the process: at its proper level and in its jurisdiction, reason(ing) is fully authoritative and, when interpreting the law, must be resorted to instead of the person.

1.3.4. The BoBh has more to offer in this connection. In another passage pertaining to the four interpretative bases, the BoBh draws a sharp delineation between reason(ing) and faithful conviction (*adhimukti*), i.e., between the jurisdictions of autonomous reason(ing) on one hand, and belief in the inconceivable things preached by the Buddha on the other:

> What does the correct reflection of a *bodhisattva* consist of? In this case, eager to reflect upon, to ponder and to investigate the doctrinal items as [he has previously] learnt them, the *bodhisattva* [remains] solitary, retreats to a lonely place and sets about reflecting upon [these] doctrinal items, avoiding the inconceivable points from the very beginning. He reflects on [them] extensively with a perseverant and zealous application, not carelessly. The *bodhisattva* who applies himself to reflection examines [and] penetrates certain [points] by [means of] reason(ing),

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ghena veme dharmā bhāṣitā iti pudgalapratisaraṇo bhavati / sa evaṃ yuktipratisaraṇo na pudgalapratisaraṇas tattvārthān na vicalaty aparapratyayaś ca bhavati dharmeṣu / … tatraiṣu caturṣu pratisaraṇeṣu samāsataś caturṇāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ samprakāśitam[(2)] */ bhāṣitasyārthasya yukteḥ śāstur bhāvanāmayasya cādhigamajñānasya / sarvaiś ca punaś caturbhiḥ pratisaraṇaiḥ samyakprayogasamārambhagatasya bodhisattvasyāvibhrāntaniryāṇam abhidyotitaṃ bhavati /*.

[(1)]Note Tib. *don ʾdod paʾi phyir*; [(2)]note Tib. *tshad ma ñid bźi bstan te*.

[whereas] he just believes in certain [other points].[41] While reflecting, he relies on the [true] meaning and not on the letter. He gets thoroughly acquainted with the harmful and the great references to authority and enters into reflection by entering [it] from the very beginning. [Once he has] entered [reflection], he strengthens [it] ever more by concentrating his mind. Leaving what is inconceivable[42] aside, the *bodhisattva* does not lapse into confusion and mental distraction. While he applies himself persistently and zealously and reflects extensively, he discerns and attains a previously undiscerned meaning (*avijñātapūrva*) and neither ruins nor loses the meaning [newly] discerned and acquired. Moreover, when he discriminates, penetrates and examines certain [points] by [means of] reason(ing), he does not depend on anyone else regarding the doctrinal items that he is rationally analyzing. And when

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[41] I.e., according to BoBhVy D *Yi* 128b7/P *Ri* 157a8–b1, holds the Tathāgata to be an authority (**pramāṇabhūta*) regarding them.

[42] As hinted at by *Sāgaramegha (BoBhVy D128b5/P157a5–6), these inconceivable points (*acintyasthāna*) have their *locus classicus* in the *Śrutamayībhūmi* of the VinSg. According to at least two passages in the YBh (see ŚrBh 117*,8–12/140,6–11 [ŚrBh$_T$ D57a3–5/P67a8–b3] and VinSg D190a6–b1/P197b2–4), the inconceivable points amount to six: conception of a self (*ātmacintā*), conception of a living being (*sattvacintā*), conception of a worldly being (*lokacintā*), conception relating to the (result-of-)maturation of living beings' act(ion)s (*sattvānāṃ karmavipākacintā*), the object meditated upon by the meditators (< *dhyāyināṃ dhyāyiviṣayaḥ*), and the object that is proper to the *buddhas* (< *buddhānāṃ buddhaviṣayaḥ*). The VinSg draws a sharp delineation between *ātmacintā*, *sattvacintā* and *lokacintā* on the one hand, which are all based on the false view of a self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*, VinSg D190b5–6/P197b8), and *sattvānāṃ karmavipākacintā*, *dhyāyināṃ dhyāyiviṣayaḥ* and *buddhānāṃ buddhaviṣayaḥ*, which are free of the false view of a self. Next, the VinSg (D191a1–2/P198a4–5) gives a threefold content to the *dhyāyināṃ dhyāyiviṣayaḥ*, and a fivefold one to the *buddhānāṃ buddhaviṣayaḥ*: whereas the object meditated upon by the meditators consists of thusness alone (**tathatāmātra*), the supremacies (**vaśitā*) and the pure realm (**anāsravadhātu*), the object that is proper to the *buddhas* consists of these three plus two, viz. the absence of obstacles (**anāvaraṇa*) and action for the benefit of the living beings (**sattvārthakriyākāra*). For definitions of *acintya*, see MSU D277a4–5/P335a7–b1 (see Lamotte 1973: II 274) and BoBhVṛ D *'I* 175b4–6/P *Yi* 221a5–8. On *acintya*, see also Kritzer 2002.

> he [just] believes in certain [other points], he does not reject those profound doctrinal items which his intelligence does not fathom, [but just thinks] the following: 'These doctrinal items are within the scope of the Tathāgata(s) [only], not within the scope of our intelligence;' [in doing so,] he guards himself [and remains] uninjured, unimpaired and irreproachable. A *bodhisattva* who relies on the [true] meaning and not on the letter penetrates all the intentional sayings of the blessed *buddha*s. Nobody can cause a *bodhisattva* who is expert in the harmful and the great references to authority to turn away and deviate from true reality in any way. A *bodhisattva* who enters reflection from the beginning acquires a previously unacquired forbearance. Consolidating this forbearance, the *bodhisattva* enters [mental] cultivation.[43]

Especially noteworthy is our text's emphasis on the distinction between reason(ing) and belief/faithful conviction. Here, the *bodhisat-*

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[43] BoBh D76,8–77,1/W108,2–109,5: *samyakcintanā bodhisattvasya katamā / iha bodhisattva ekākī rahogato yathāśrutān dharmāṃś cintayitukāmas tulayitukāma upaparīkṣitukāma āditа evācintyāni sthānāni vivarjayitvā dharmāṃś cintayitum ārabhate / pratataṃ ca cintayati sātatyasatkṛtyaprayogena na ślatham / kiṃcic ca bodhisattvaś cintāprayukto yuktyā vicārayaty anupraviśati / kiṃcid adhimucyata eva / arthapratisaraṇaś ca bhavati cintayan na vyañjanapratisaraṇaḥ / kālāpadeśamahāpadeśāṃś ca yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / ādipraveśena ca cintāṃ praviśati / praviṣṭaś ca punaḥ punar manasikārataḥ sāratām upanayati / acintyaṃ varjayan bodhisattvaḥ sammohaṃ cittavikṣepaṃ nādhigacchati / pratataṃ sātatyasatkṛtyaprayuktaś cintayann avijñātapūrvaṃ cārthaṃ vijānāti labhate / vijñātaṃ ca pratilabdham arthaṃ na vināśayati na sampramoṣayati / yuktyā punaḥ kiṃcit pravicinvan praviśayan vicārayan na parapratyayo bhavati teṣu yuktiparīkṣiteṣu dharmeṣu / kiṃcit punar adhimucyamāno yeṣv asya dharmeṣu gambhīreṣu buddhir nāvagāhate*(1) *tathāgatagocarā ete dharmā nāsmadbuddhigocarā ity evam apratikṣipaṃs tān dharmān ātmānam akṣataṃ cānupahataṃ ca pariharaty anavadyam / arthaṃ pratisaran bodhisattvo na vyañjanaṃ buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ sarvasandhāyavacanāny anupraviśati / kālāpadeśamahāpadeśakuśalo bodhisattvas tattvārthān na vicalayituṃ na vikampayituṃ kenacit kathaṃcic chakyate / āditaś cintām anupraviśan bodhisattvo 'pratilabdhapūrvāṃ kṣāntiṃ pratilabhate / tām eva*(2) *kṣāntiṃ sāratām upanayan bodhisattvo bhāvanām anupraviśati /*.

(1)BoBh$_D$: *na gāhate* BoBh$_W$; (2)BoBh$_D$: *tām eva ca punaḥ supratilabdhāṃ* BoBh$_W$.

On (parts of) this passage, see also Nance 2007: 156 n. 29.

tva is summoned to resort to reason(ing) wherever the points he inquires into are not inconceivable, i.e., are not to be reflected upon. In so doing, he wards off confusion, mental distraction and remains unimpaired.

1.3.5. As we can see, the BoBh substituted *yukti* for *dharma* in the wording of the first interpretative principle and drew a sharp delineation between the legitimate scope of *yukti* and the realm of inconceivable things. While rationally reflecting on the items that he has learnt, the *bodhisattva* is warned to provisionally set the inconceivable items aside and to evaluate the reliability of the empirical ones. Beyond that, the BoBh strongly insists on the independent authority of reason(ing) in its own sphere and advises the *bodhisattva* not to rely on the person who has revealed the teachings under scrutiny. This is in line with two significant features of Dharmakīrti's views on *yukti* and *āgama*. Note, however, that the BoBh's account still fully belongs to the hermeneutic and soteriological pattern of the three insights and as such bears no relationship whatsoever to scriptural evaluation and apologetics.

1.3.6. Leaving the sociohistorical context aside, how is Dharmakīrti's decision to ground scriptural authority in texts rather than persons to be explained? In order to answer this question, we have to turn briefly to the 6th-century philosophical context. Dharmakīrti's main opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, had directed a devastating critique against the Buddhist notion of omniscience. Now, many of Dharmakīrti's Buddhist coreligionists overlooked this principle and surrendered to the personal authority of the omniscient Buddha. As even a superficial glance reveals, many Buddhist intellectuals at least partly infringed the injunction to carry out scriptural interpretation by relying on *dharma* or reason(ing) rather than *pudgala*, thus indulging in deriving scriptural authority from personal authority and especially from the *buddha*s' omniscience. For example, the *UH clearly relates scriptural knowledge to highly authoritative individuals such as elders, *buddha*s and *bodhisattva*s.[44] Commenting on the MAV (3.12b) and its *Bhāṣya* (42,10), Sthi-

[44] See *UH/*PS 14,6–8.

ramati provides the following definition: "Scripture consists of the word of trustworthy [persons]; as for trustworthy persons, they are free of [all] causes of untruth."[45] No less characteristic are some definitions encountered in Mādhyamika literature, such as Candrakīrti's statement to the effect that "the word of trustworthy [persons] cognizing supersensible things in a direct [perceptual] manner, this is scripture."[46] To put it briefly, certain Buddhist intellectuals were inclined to derive the authority of scripture from the authority of individuals such as *buddha*s, *bodhisattva*s, and noble hearers. In doing so, they came dangerously close to the Naiyāyika formula according to which "the authority of the [Veda/trustworthy word comes] from the authority of the trustworthy [person who revealed it]."[47]

1.3.7. As is well known, the Mīmāṃsā school of Vedic exegesis denied human beings or divinities any cognitive access to the supersensible realm to which the Vedic injunction refers. According to this school, and especially to Kumārila, the only authority regarding *dharma* is the authorless Veda. In order to make his point, Kumārila directed a devastating critique against omniscience. Let us consider here only the following argument:

> For even in those days, how did people who desired to know that he is omniscient know [that he was so], without knowing the objects of his cognition? And, for you, there would be many omniscient beings to be postulated. One who is not omniscient [can]not know [that] an omniscient being [is indeed omniscient].[48]

This criticism undermines all attempts at resorting to an omniscient *pudgala* in order to argue for the reliability of the Buddhist scriptures.

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[45] MAVṬ 128,21: *āptavāg āgamaḥ / āptāḥ punar anṛtahetuvimuktāḥ /*.

[46] Pr 75,6–7: *sākṣādatīndriyārthavidām āptānāṃ yad vacanaṃ sa āgamaḥ /*.

[47] NS 2.1.68: *tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt*.

[48] ŚV *codanāsūtra* 134–135: *sarvajño'sāv iti hy etat tatkāle'pi bubhutsubhiḥ / tajjñānajñeyavijñānarahitair gamyate katham // kalpanīyāś ca sarvajñā bhaveyur bahavas tava / ya eva syād asarvajñaḥ sa sarvajñaṃ na budhyate //*. Translation Kataoka 2011: II 362–364.

In my opinion, Dharmakīrti was so fully aware of the philosophical cogency of Kumārila's argument that he even developed it further:

> Others [i.e., we Buddhists] consider that it is difficult to know other [persons]' vices or even(/and also) [their] being [morally] immaculate [in judgements such as:] 'This [person] is so or not so,' because the *pramāṇa*s [that could ascertain these mental properties] are[, to say the least,] difficult to be found. Indeed, it is due to [their] mental qualities and vices that human beings behave correctly and wrongly. Now, these [mental properties, being] supersensible [and therefore out of perceptual reach], might be inferable from the bodily and verbal actions they give rise to, but as a rule, [human] actions can also be done deliberately in an insincere way (*anyathā*), because they are a function of human arbitrariness, and because these [human beings] have [the most] various motivations. Therefore, failing to ascertain [another person's moral qualities] due to the confusion of the [inferential] mark, how could one [who intends to infer them] recognize [the author of a reliable scripture]?[49]

In order to ground a certain scripture's reliability in its author's personal reliability, one ought to discern this person's mental qualities. But these are supersensible and hence not within the reach of ordinary perception; these mental properties are not inferable, for the verbal and corporeal behaviours supposed to manifest them can be made intentionally deceptive. One should, then, be endowed with *abhijñā*s in order to gain access to these qualities, which is not the case of (most) ordinary persons. This is, I believe, the philosophical rationale behind Dharmakīrti's reaffirmation of the priority of *yukti* over *pudgala*.

[49] PV 1.219 and PVSV 110,11–15: *ayam evaṃ na vety anyadoṣā nirdoṣatāpi vā / durlabhatvāt pramāṇānāṃ durbodhety apare viduḥ // caitasyebhyo hi guṇadoṣebhyaḥ puruṣāḥ samyaṅmithyāpravṛttayaḥ / te cātīndriyāḥ svaprabhavakāyavāgvyavahārānumeyāḥ syuḥ / vyavahārāś ca prāyaśo buddhipūrvam anyathāpi kartuṃ śakyante puruṣecchāvṛttitvāt teṣāṃ ca citrābhisandhitvāt / tad ayaṃ liṅgasaṅkarāt katham aniścinvan pratipadyeta /*. To be compared with PVin 2 66,12–67,3 (see Steinkellner 1979: 65–66). On this passage, see Yaita 1988: 435, Dunne 2004: 367–368, Eltschinger 2007a: 92–96 and 229–230, McClintock 2010: 253–261. More generally, see Akimoto 1993.

1.4.0. Although Dharmakīrti readily accepts, as do all the Buddhist and most Indian religio-philosophical systems, that the authority of scripture can only proceed from an individual's cognitive and moral qualities, he strongly rejects as irrational any attempt at deriving scriptural authority from (alleged) personal authority. The only way out is therefore to evaluate the reliability of scriptures themselves. But here again, the cognitive limitations of ordinary persons prevent them from assessing those scriptural statements that bear on supersensible matters, the proper jurisdiction of scriptures. These persons are doomed to resort to reason(ing), i.e., to the two means of valid cognition which, though limited in scope, are practically reliable in the empirical sphere. In other words, a rational person qua rational will subject scriptures to critical test, i.e., assess their reliability on empirical matters. Should the treatise under examination stand critical evaluation in this respect, its reliability in transempirical matters also can be reasonably hypothesized. What rationality prescribes, then, is an inferential transfer of authority from one class of statements to another. It is clear that this way of concluding a treatise's authority concerning the supersensible realm is formally flawed, insofar as it is just as uncertain as to conclude that all the rice grains boiling in the same pot are cooked because the few grains one has tasted are cooked.[50] Provided the treatise under scrutiny teaches a human goal (*puruṣārthābhidhāyin*) together with a suitable or practicable means (*anuguṇopāya*), and this in an internally coherent way (*sambaddha*), it is qualified (*adhikṛta*) for being evaluated as to its reliability.[51] Dharmakīrti presents us with two alternative strategies. And although he seems not to favour one over the other, it is nearly certain that they served fairly distinct purposes, for if, in actual use, the first one suits "heresiological" purposes, the second one has an apologetic vocation.

1.4.1. Dharmakīrti presents the first evaluative strategy as follows:

> The [treatise]'s reliability consists in the fact that neither perception nor the two kinds of inferences invalidates the empirical or transem-

[50] See PVSV 109,21–22 and 173,20–174,6.

[51] See PV 1.214 and PVSV 108,6–16.

pirical things [that are] their [respective] objects. [A treatise's] not being invalidated by perception consists [first] in the fact that the things it holds to be perceptible are indeed such [i.e., perceptible], as [the five *skandha*s, i.e., colours] such as blue, [affective sensations such as] pleasure and pain, [ideation consisting in one's] grasping the characteristics [of things, conditioning factors] such as desire, and cognitions[, which are all perceived by sensory perception and self-awareness]. [Second, a treatise's not being invalidated by perception consists] in the fact that the [things] it does not hold to be such [i.e., perceptible,] are [indeed] imperceptible, as [pseudo-constituents] such as pleasure, which [the Sāṅkhya erroneously takes to] combine in the form of sounds, etc., and [categories] such as substances, motions, universals and connections[, which the Vaiśeṣika erroneously takes to be perceptible]. Similarly, [a treatise's not being invalidated by inference] consists [first] in the fact that the [things] it holds to be the objects of an inference that does not depend on scripture are really such [i.e., inferable], as the four nobles' truths, [and second] in the fact that the [things it holds to be] non-inferable are really such [i.e., non-inferable], like the self, [God,] etc. [And this type of invalidation is] also [relevant] concerning an inference that depends on scripture[, which consists in identifying internal contradictions within a treatise]: for example, once it is admitted that demerit has the nature of [defilements] such as desire and the [corporeal and verbal acts] that originate from them, one does not prescribe [things] such as ablutions and fire oblation in order to remove it [i.e., demerit, because they cannot annihilate its cause].[52]

According to this method, a given treatise can be held to be authoritative, i.e., *āgama* proper, if its statements are not contradicted by, or

[52] PV 1.215 and PVSV 108,20–109,3: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam / dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ // pratyakṣeṇābādhanaṃ pratyakṣābhimatānām arthānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ / yathā nīlādisukhaduḥkhanimittopalakṣaṇarāgādibuddhīnām / atathābhimatānāṃ cāpratyakṣatā / yathā śabdādirūpasaṃniveśināṃ sukhādīnāṃ dravyakarmasāmānyasaṃyogādīnāṃ ca / tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviṣayābhimatānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām / ananumeyānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ / yathātmādīnām / āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam abhyupagamya tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ /*. On this passage, see Yaita 1987: 7–8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109 and 221–223 (especially nn. 23–27), and Moriyama 2013.

do not contradict the means of valid cognition. This way of characterizing scripture echoes early Yogācāra statements and definitions. Having provided definitions of perception and inference, the AS presents the scripture of a trustworthy person as a teaching (*upadeśa*) that is not contradicted by the first two (*tadubhayāviruddha*), i.e., perception and inference.[53] Among the many adjectives describing the perfection of the Buddha's teaching (*deśanāsampatti*) in MSA 12.5–6, one comes across *yukta*, "sound, correct," which Vasubandhu explains as "because it is not contradicted by the *pramāṇa*s," a pattern that occurs again in connection with the sixty members (*aṅga*, MSA 12.9) of this teaching's phonemes/letters (*vyañjana*), i.e., the infinite voice of the *sugata*s.[54] And among the many reasons accounting for the perfection of the phonemes/letters (*vyañjanasampatti*), one finds *uddeśāt*, "because of [its] statement," upon which Vasubandhu comments: "Because it is stated with words and phonemes that are correct because they are not contradicted by the *pramāṇa*s."[55] As we can see, the Buddhist teaching's correctness is due to its conformity to the means of valid cognition. As for the issue of *pramāṇavirodha*, it is addressed in Vasubandhu's influential VY, a treatise on the methodology of scriptural commentary. Having listed the three means of valid cognition and stated that a contradiction with any of them amounts to a contradiction with reason(ing) (**yuktivirodha*),[56] Vasubandhu discusses several examples of contradiction with perception (**pratyakṣavirodha*), inference (**anumānavirodha*) and scripture (**āgamavirodha*).[57] Once again, these definitions and strategies were certainly not meant to apply to non-Buddhist scriptures. And, al-

[53] ASBh 153,5: *āptāgamas tadubhayāviruddhopadeśaḥ* /. For the AS's definitions of perception and inference, see ASBh 152,27 (Schmithausen 1972: 161) and ASBh 153,1–4 (Prets 1994: 348) respectively.

[54] MSABh 78,16–17 and 80,15–16: *yuktā pramāṇāviruddhatvāt* /.

[55] MSABh 79,8: *yuktaiḥ padavyañjanair uddeśāt pramāṇāvirodhena* /.

[56] See VY P102b6–7/L173,16–19. On the VY as a possible source of the epistemologists' *parīkṣātraya*, see Verhagen 2008, which also provides an edition of the passage dedicated to *pramāṇavirodha*.

[57] See VY P102b7–103a3/L174,1–13, VY P103a3–6/L174,14–175,10, VY P103a8–104a4/L175,11–177,18.

though both the MSA(Bh) and the VY are clearly apologetic in nature, what they promote and defend is never Buddhism from outsiders, but Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna/Śrāvakayāna. Now Dharmakīrti's first evaluative strategy, though it is clearly supposed to apply successfully to the Buddhist scriptures (as Dharmakīrti's way of presenting it testifies), seems to have been intended as a polemical, "heresiological" device, as its application to the Veda strongly suggests:

> "[The Veda] says that a permanent soul is the agent [of action], [indeed] that there are permanent entities, [and] that supersensible [things] are sensible. [It declares] a wrong cause, a wrong duration as well as a [wrong] cessation of entities, or [puts forward yet] other [things] whose possibility (*gocara*) is excluded by the two means of valid cognition or contradicted by inference based on scripture. He who would pretend that [such a treatise] is veracious without having set aside [its] contradictions and without exhibiting the purpose of the treatise, would surpass an unchaste woman in audacity."[58]

1.4.2. Dharmakīrti seems to have subsumed his properly apologetic concerns under a second strategy that he is likely to have adapted from Āryadeva's CŚ (and/or Dharmapāla's commentary thereon):[59]

> Or, because the true nature of what is to be eliminated and what is to be realized, together with [their respective] means, is ascertained (*prasiddhi*) [by means of a *pramāṇa* based on the force of something real], the [treatise's] principal point is reliable. Therefore [even when it bears] on another[, transempirical matter, the cognition derived from this trea-

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[58] PV 1.332–334: *nityasya puṃsaḥ kartṛtvaṃ nityān bhāvān atīndriyān / aindriyān viṣamaṃ hetuṃ bhāvānāṃ viṣamāṃ sthitim // nivṛttiṃ ca pramāṇābhyām anyad vā vyastagocaram / viruddham āgamāpekṣeṇānumānena vā vadat // virodham asamādhāya śāstrārthaṃ cāpradarśya saḥ / satyārthaṃ pratijānāno jayed dhārṣṭyena bandhakīm //*. Translation Eltschinger et al. 2012, p. 65. For a parallel passage, see TS_K 2775/$TS_Ś$ 2774 and TSP_K 766,4–19/$TSP_Ś$ 892,13–893,10.

[59] CŚ 280: **buddhokteṣu parokṣeṣu jāyate yasya saṃśayaḥ / ihaiva pratyayas tena kartavyaḥ śūnyatāṃ prati //*. "When someone gives rise to doubt concerning the obscure [things] (*parokṣa*) taught by the Buddha, then he can rely on the voidness which is free of all [defining] characters, and [can thus] gain sure faith." Translation Tillemans 1986: 46 n. 21/1990: I 91 and II 132 (from the Chinese of T1571, 216c22–23).

tise is] an inference.[60] The reliability [of this treatise] consists in the fact that what is to be eliminated, what is to be realized, as well as their [respective] means as [they are] taught in it are non-belying [when they are submitted to inferential analysis], as the four nobles' truths [when they are analyzed] according to the method that will be presented [in the second chapter]. And since all that which serves a human goal and is [therefore] worthy of endeavour is reliable, to admit that it is such [i.e., reliable,] on another[, transempirical] matter also, [can]not be deceiving[, and this for two reasons: first,] because there [can] be no damage [in accepting it,] and [second,] because the speaker[, after having said what is true concerning the principal point,] has no [personal] interest in purposelessly speaking untruth [concerning this third kind of objects].[61]

As Dharmakīrti himself says, this is the method according to which he will establish the reliability of the Buddhist scriptures on the basis of a critical analysis of the four nobles' truths, their principal point. The proof covers about one half of PV 2 (i.e., PV 2.145–279), that part of the chapter in which Dharmakīrti comments on Dignāga's characterization of the Buddha as a "protector" (*tāyin*) of suffering living beings.[62] Note that in PV 2 as in the PVSV, Dharmakīrti grounds the

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[60] Or: "one [can] infer [that it is also reliable] on another[, transempirical matter]."

[61] PV 1.217 and PVSV 109,15–19: *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ / pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā // heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṃvādaḥ / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā / tasyāsya puruṣārthopayogino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare 'pi tathātvopagamo na vipralambhāyānuparodhān niṣprayojanavitathābhidhānavaiphalyāc ca vaktuḥ /*. On this passage, see Tillemans 1986, Yaita 1987: 9–10, Dunne 2004: 365–366, Eltschinger 2007a: 225–227 and Krasser 2012; on the interpretation of *anuparodhāt*, see Eltschinger 2007a: 226 n. 45.

[62] This section of PV 2 begins as follows: PV 2.145–146ab: *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam / dayālutvāt parārthaṃ ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ // tataḥ pramāṇaṃ tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam /*. "[For the Sugata,] to protect [the living beings] is to teach [them] the path [as] he has experienced it. He does not speak untruth [i.e., does not teach a wrong path,] because, since he is compassionate and has applied himself to all [these] undertakings [just] for other peoples' sake,

transference of authority in the Buddha's alleged lack of interest in leading the living beings astray on the soteriologically less relevant domain, the transempirical one.

1.4.3. As we have seen, the Buddhist epistemologists turned earlier, mainly Yogācāra hermeneutic devices into apologetic tools. This is certainly not to say that properly evaluative rationality was an innovation of 6th-century philosophers for, though it is surprisingly rarely mirrored in the texts that have come down to us, this might have been a self-assertive strategy from the early times of Buddhism. This is reflected in an oft-quoted stanza ascribed to the Buddha himself, although the stanza's earliest attestation might be in Aśvaghoṣa's BC.[63] This well-known stanza runs as follows:

> "Clever people, O monks, should accept what I say after putting it to the test, just as they accept gold after testing it by melting it, scratching it and scraping it on a whetstone. They should not believe what I say out of deference to me."[64]

As we can see, this stanza pertains to the word of the Buddha alone, and settles the ideal relationship between a Buddhist and the Buddhist scriptures as one of critical evaluation rather than blind adhesion. This stanza came to be regularly resorted to by the Buddhist epistemologists. Interestingly enough, they read their own religio-philosophical agenda into it, so that the stanza became the motto

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[he has] no interest [in lying]. Therefore, he is a *pramāṇa*. Or, to protect is to reveal the four [nobles'] truths."

[63] TSP_K 878,12/$TSP_Ś$ 1063,18: *ata eva viśuddhasuvarṇavat parīkṣya grāhyam etad vicakṣaṇair iti bhagavatoktam …* "This is the reason why the Blessed One has declared: 'Like pure gold, this [word of mine] should be adopted by the wise after examining it'." BC 25.45 (Honjo 1993: 484[/63]): *bdar las gcad las bsregs pa las // mkhas pa rnams kyis gser bźin du // ʾdul ba mdo las rigs pa las // de phyir yoṅs su rtog par rigs //*. This attitude towards authority is especially prominent in the *Kālāmasutta* (AN I 188–193). Most sincere thanks are due to René van Oosterwijk (The Hague) for this reference.

[64] TS_K 3588/$TS_Ś$ 3587 = NBPS 1.2.1: *tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ / parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṃ madvaco na tu gauravāt //*. Translation Hayes 1984: 664.

of evaluative rationality in a pluralistic context. This is already the case of the 6th-century Mādhyamika philosopher Bhāviveka (though in the context of a likely objection):

> [When] certain ignorant [persons] think of a glass jewel (**kācamaṇi*) as being a genuine jewel (**ratna*) and [this glass jewel is but] a pseudo-jewel (**ratnābhāsa*), [some expert] points out that it is [but a] glass [jewel] because it does not resist [tests] such as being melted (**tāpa*) or being scraped on a whetstone (**nikaṣa*). In the same way, one is not justified (**ayukta*) in concluding that this [or that treatise] is an [authoritative] scripture (**āgama*) when it is established in this way [i.e., without any preliminary test]. On the contrary, this [alone] is [to be considered as authoritative] scripture (**āgama*) which does not undergo any alteration (**vikriyā*) [when it is critically examined], like genuine gold that resists [the tests of] being melted and being scraped on a whetstone.[65]

The reinterpretation of the stanza along the lines of Dharmakīrti's threefold examination occurs in Kamalaśīla's NBPS:

> "There are three types of objects: (1) that which can be experienced directly, (2) that which is presently beyond the range of the senses, and (3) that which is ultrasensible in principle. Among those types of objects, whatever the Buddha discusses that can be experienced directly should be tested by direct experience, as gold is tested by melting. Whatever the Buddha discusses that is presently beyond the range of the senses should be tested by inference, as gold is tested by scraping it on a whetstone. Whatever the Buddha discusses that is ultrasensible should be tested for its internal consistency. For the trustworthy experts established the scriptures, which are free from such contaminations [as logical inconsistencies], as credible sources of knowledge, despite the fact that scriptures deal with ultrasensible things."[66]

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[65] TJ D279a7–b1/P315b5–7: *ji ltar mi mkhas pa ʾgaʾ źig nor bu ʾchiṅ*(1) *bu la / yaṅ dag paʾi rin po che yin no sñam du sems pa la / de ni rin po che ltar snaṅ ba yin te*(2) */ bsreg pa daṅ bdar ba la sogs pa mi bzod paʾi phyir / ʾchiṅ*(3) *bu yin no źes bstan pa bźin źes bsgrubs na de ñid yaṅ luṅ yin no źes sgrub par byed ciṅ rtog pa ni rigs pa ma yin gyi / yaṅ gaṅ źig bsreg pa daṅ bdar ba bzod paʾi gser bzaṅ po bźin du rnam parʾgyur ba med pa de ni luṅ yin no //*.

(1)P : *mchiṅ* D; (2)P : *no* D; (3)em. : *mchiṅ* D, *ʾchi* P.

[66] NBPS 1.2.1: *ʾdi ltar don ni rnam pa gsum ste*, *mṅon sum daṅ*, *lkog tu gyur*

With its allusion to a threefold way of testing gold, the (pseudo-) canonical stanza lent itself to being interpreted along the lines of Dharmakīrti's first strategy. In doing so, the Buddhist epistemologists once again turned a purely intra-Buddhistic device into an apologetic and heresiological one. This "recontextualization" of the stanza finds its best expression in a few verses of Śāntarakṣita:

> And the [omniscience that has been] established (*iṣṭa*, gl. *siddha*, Tib. *'grub*) [here] is [that] of the Sugata [alone], because [it is he who] first (*ādau*) promulgated selflessness. Therefore the Tathāgata stands at the head of all the religious founders (*tīrthakṛt*). [In that they are] teaching contradictory things, the other [prophets are] not [to be applied] the same reason[67] as this [Tathāgata] who possesses a perception of true reality that is [entirely] consistent with the means of valid cognition. [And] indeed, these are far from possessing the capacity to cognize imperceptible [things] whose speech is undermined (*ākula*, Tib. *dkrugs*) by invalidation through the means of valid cognition [even] regarding the domain of the [ordinary] means of valid cognition. [Contrary to these, the teaching of the Sugata] is [internally] coherent, provided with a practicable (*anuguṇa*) means, and it sets forth a human goal [such as *nirvāṇa*]; even in empirical matters it is not invalidated in the least by the two means of valid cognition, [and is] like pure gold (*kaladhauta*, gl.

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pa daṅ, śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'o. de la bka'i don mṅon sum la ni bsregs pas gser bźin du mṅon sum gyis brtags pa yin no. don lkog tu gyur pa la ni bdar ba bźin du rjes su dpag pas brtags pa yin no. de ñid kyi don śin tu lkog tu gyur pa la ni bcad pas gser bźin du phan tshun mi 'gal ba'i sgo nas brtags pa yin te, de ltar yoṅs su dag pa'i luṅ la ni yul lkog tu gyur kyaṅ, rtog pa daṅ ldan pa tshad ma yin par yid ches pa rnams 'jug pa'i phyir ro. Translation Hayes 1984: 664.

[67] TSP_K 877,17–19/$TSP_Ś$ 1062,16–18: *na hy eṣāṃ jñānātiśayayogitāprasādhakaḥ kaścid dhetur asti / tathā hi hetur bhavad vacanākhyam eva liṅgaṃ bhavet / tac caiṣāṃ pramāṇaviruddhārthapratipādakam iti kathaṃ tato jñānātiśayayogitāmīṣāṃ pratīyeta /*. "For there is no [logical] reason which establishes that these [other religious founders] are possessed with a superior cognition. Indeed, if there were a [logical] reason, it could only consist in the reason called 'statements' (*vacana*). Now, their [statements] teach things that are contradictory to(/contradicted by) the means of valid cognition. Therefore, how can one know from these [statements] that these [other religious founders] are possessed with a superior cognition?"

suvarṇa, Tib. *gser*) that does not undergo any alteration when one puts it to the test by melting it, scratching it or scraping it on a whetstone.[68]

Here, the old stanza has been entirely recast according to Dharmakīrti's evaluation methods and now perfectly suits the Buddhist epistemologists' apologetic agenda in a pluralistic and competing religious environment.

1.5. In my opinion, two distinct but ultimately connected[69] factors are likely to explain this twofold shift towards evaluation and the rational appraisal of scriptural texts. The first one is, say, "internal" or philosophical and consists in Kumārila's devastating critique of omniscience and personal authority, which made earlier Buddhist attempts to ground scriptural authority in omniscience irrelevant. The second one is "external" or non-philosophical and consists in the sociohistorical context that was responsible for overt religious hostility between Buddhist and non-Buddhist denominations and the concomitant rise of philosophical disputation. This context made the search for cross-denominational evaluative criteria necessary and saw the sudden rise of competing and mutually exclusive claims to rationality. This historical matrix generated a dramatic change in the intended audience and overall meaning of Buddhist scholastic discourse during the 6th century. It led one or two generations of Buddhist intellectuals to turn a theretofore purely intra-Buddhistic scholasticism towards apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole: first, as "heresiology," i.e., the critique of the non-Buddhist religio-philosophical tenets for allegedly conflicting with reason(ing), and

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[68] TS_K 3340–3344/$TS_Ś$ 3339–3343 (TS_T *Ze* D121b6–122a2): *etac ca sugatasyeṣṭam ādau nairātmyakīrtanāt / sarvatīrthakṛtāṃ tasmāt sthito mūrdhni tathāgataḥ // tena pramāṇasaṃvāditattvadarśanayoginā / na tulyahetutānyeṣāṃ viruddhārthopadeśinām // pramāṇagocare*(1) *yeṣāṃ pramābādhākulaṃ vacaḥ / teṣām atyakṣavijñānaśaktiyogo hi dūrataḥ // sambaddhānuguṇopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam / dṛṣṭe 'py arthe pramāṇābhyām īṣad apy aprabādhitam // tāpāc chedān nikaṣād vā kaladhautam ivāmalam / parīkṣyamāṇaṃ yan naiva vikriyāṃ pratipadyate //.*

(1)°*gocare* em. < Tib. (*spyod yul la*) : °*gocarā* Eds.

[69] See Eltschinger 2010a.

second, as apologetics proper, i.e., the positive defence of Buddhism as the only rational path to salvation. These two factors are, in my opinion, fully responsible for this shift towards a new "epistemic" configuration, so that incrementalist or developmental accounts of it should be excluded. This being said, it is no less certain that at least some of the elements composing this new matrix can be traced in earlier Yogācāra literature. This is the case of the delineation between the jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture (BoBh), of the foundation of scriptural authority in texts rather than persons (BoBh), of several definitions of scripture resorting to non-contradiction with the means of valid cognition (AS, MSA, VY), and even of the critical nature of reason(ing) – reason(ing) being the necessary counterpart of scripture. Both Kumārila's critique and the sociohistorical matrix (without which Kumārila's work itself would be inconceivable) are responsible for the *coalescence* of these elements around an entirely new apologetic concern and paradigm of rationality.

2. Practical rationality

2.1. For the Buddhist epistemologists, scriptural evaluation is but one part of a much broader concern with rationality as embodied in the character of the practically rational (*prekṣāvat*) person, also known as the one who acts rationally (*prekṣāpūrvakārin*) or "rational agent."[70] As S. McClintock has shown, the "judicious person"

[70] Despite its admittedly many connotations, I feel no reluctance at all to use the expression "(practical) rationality" for Skt. *prekṣāvattva/prekṣāpūrvakāritva*. As found in Webster's dictionary (col. 1885b), "RATIONAL usu[ally] implies a latent or active power to make logical inferences and draw conclusions that enable one to understand the world about him and relate such knowledge to the attainment of ends …" My use of "practical rationality" is independent of any commitment to a historically given definition of "reason," but rather loosely echoes the modern concept of "instrumental/purposive rationality" (or: "means-end-rationality"). I am well aware of the fact that Max Weber developed such a concept as a "Schlüsselbegriff … seiner Theorie des abendländischen Rationalisierungsprozesses" (HWP XII 1511 s.v. "Zweckrationalität").

forms the ideal audience of works such as the TS(P), a remark that can certainly be extended to most of the epistemological treatises, including those of Dharmakīrti.[71] In S. McClintock's characterization, the practically rational person "represents a standard of rationality," someone who "respects a version of the laws of contradiction and the excluded middle"[72] and only applies "the conventions 'true' or 'untrue' when there exists a *pramāṇa* that respectively establishes or disproves the affair in question."[73] But as McClintock rightly points out,

> "adherence to basic logical intuitions is just one facet of the judicious person. An element of practical reason is also involved, since a judicious person is invariably depicted as a person whose actions are directed toward some purpose or goal. In addition, … a judicious person does not act toward some goal in a haphazard or whimsical manner, but proceeds only upon completing a suitable investigation into the means for attaining his goal."[74]

Consequently, this person "avoids wasting time in investigating useless things," as a lustful woman doesn't "bother to investigate whether a eunuch is beautiful or ugly."[75] Most importantly, a judi-

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[71] The *prekṣāvat/prekṣāpūrvakārin* is the "ideal addressee" (McClintock 2010: 58) of the TS(P), which "can thus be seen as a guide for judicious persons who wish to undertake an examination of the rationality of Buddhist doctrines, and not *only* as a polemical work addressed at those who get it wrong" (McClintock 2010: 61). He "represents a standard of rationality to which Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla appeal regularly in the defense and promotion of their religious philosophy" (McClintock 2010: 58). To the best of my knowledge, Dignāga doesn't make use of either expression.

[72] McClintock 2010: 58.

[73] McClintock 2010: 60.

[74] McClintock 2010: 58–59.

[75] McClintock 2010: 59. The second quotation is from S. McClintock's translation (2010: 59–60 n. 137) of PV 1.211: *arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinām / ṣaṇḍhasya rūpavairūpye kāminyāḥ kiṃ parīkṣayā //*. "Why would those who seek the [thing in question] bother to analyze something that lacks causal efficacy? Why would a lustful

cious person is "anti-dogmatic, in that he or she will necessarily accept *any* position that is established through reasoning (*nyāya*), even if that position does not accord with the dogmas of the community in which he or she stands."[76] A passage from the TSP is worth citing in this connection:

> "If this thing were reasonable, then why would the Buddhist not accept it? For it is not correct for a judicious person not to accept a thing that has been proved through reasoning."[77]

There can be little doubt that the Buddhists' rational agent is but one case of the 6th- to 8th-century philosophers' repeated appeals to rationality as a criterion for the appraisal of their doctrines and the acceptance of their *pro domo* arguments.[78] But contrary to most of their opponents, the Buddhist epistemologists are to be credited with the development of a systematic concept of practical rationality that provides their apologetic discourse with fully worked out theoretical foundations.[79]

2.2. Let us briefly turn back to scriptural evaluation in order to see how it relates to practical rationality. Maybe first among the Indian philosophers, Dharmakīrti grounded the issues of scriptural authority and scripturally based action in an *anthropological* perspective, a demarche which, as Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin make clear, he ascribes to Dignāga himself:

> The teacher [Dignāga] did not say that scripture is an inference with reference (*kathayatā*) to any real authority(/epistemic validity) [i.e.,

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woman bother to investigate whether a eunuch is beautiful or ugly?"

[76] McClintock 2010: 60.

[77] TSP_K 740,18–19/$TSP_Ś$ 897,21–23: *yady ayam artho yuktyupetaḥ syāt / tadā kim iti bauddho nābhyupagacchet / na hi nyāyopapanne 'rthe prekṣāvato 'nabhyugagamo yuktaḥ /*. Translation McClintock 2010: 60 n. 140 (slightly modified).

[78] See above, n. 18.

[79] See Eltschinger 2007b, with which the second section of this essay partly overlaps.

> to scripture as a genuine means of valid cognition], but with reference (*apekṣya*) to [the requirements of] human practice.[80]

In other words, scripture does not meet the requirements of epistemic validity (*prāmāṇya*) but nevertheless represents, for the cognitively limited ordinary persons (*arvāgdarśin*, *prākṛtapuruṣa*, *rathyāpuruṣa*, etc.), the *only* way to interact with the supersensible realm of morals, ritual and eschatology:

> The person [who wishes to engage in religious practice] cannot live without resorting to scriptural authority[, and this for two reasons: first,] because [it is only in scripture that this person] learns (*śravaṇa*) the great benefits and evils [that are to be expected from] engaging in and refraining from certain [actions/intentions] whose results [remain entirely] imperceptible [to him/her; and second,] because [this person] doesn't see [anything] contradictory to the existence of these [desirable or undesirable results]. Thus if [this person] is [necessarily] to act [on a scriptural basis], it is better that (s)he act in this way [i.e., after evaluating scripture, and] this is the reason why [Dignāga recommends that scriptural] authority [be decided] through [critical] evaluation.[81]

The close association between scriptural evaluation and practical rationality is made clear in the following statement:

> [If] (s)he acts rationally and not out of [blind] adhesion, every [person] who wishes to engage [in religious practice] examines [whether a certain treatise is] scripture or not scripture[, thinking:] 'I may in all probability be successful if I act after learning (*jñātvā*) from this [scripture] what is to be realized.' [And] based on [this treatise's proven] reliability on [empirically] ascertainable (*śakyadarśana*) [matters], this [person will] act towards other[, transempirical things] also, for ordinary practice mainly proceeds in this way. But if one were to act by [first]

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[80] PVṬ *Je* D242b5–6/P286a2–3 = PVSVṬ 390,21–22: *nācāryeṇa bhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ kathayatānumānatvam āgamasyoktam api tu puruṣapravṛttim apekṣya…*

[81] PVSV 108,2–6: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṃ samarthaḥ / atyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāṃcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṃsāpāya*(1) *śravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca / tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam /.*

(1)em.: *mahānuśaṃsāpāpa*° Ed.

> evaluating the person [who has authored the scripture rather than the scripture itself], there would simply be no practice at all. [That there would be no practice at all is] due to the fact that it is impossible [for ordinary people] to recognize [that] this [person is] of this kind [i.e., endowed with properties such as extraordinary perception, and] not because [we would] not accept [the existence of this person], for such [persons certainly] say the truth (*avitathābhidhāyin*).[82]

These two passages highlight several features of practical rationality which we are already familiar with, such as its being sharply contrasted with non-critical adhesion and the fact that it is the only thing that can be resorted to by "ignorant" (*ajña*) ordinary persons.[83] But as expressions such as "it is better that (s)he act in this way" (*varam evaṃ pravṛttaḥ*) and "I may in all probability be successful" (*api nāma… arthavān syām*) suggest, practical rationality involves a

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[82] PVSV 110,3–8: *sarva evāgamam anāgamaṃ vā pravṛttikāmo ʾnveṣate prekṣāpūrvakārī na vyasanena / api nāmānuṣṭheyam ato jñātvā pravṛtto ʾrthavān syām iti / sa śakyadarśanāvisaṃvādapratyayenānyatrāpi pravartate / evamprāyatvāl lokavyavahārasya / puruṣaparīkṣayā tu pravṛttāv apravṛttir eva / tasya tathābhūtasya jñātum aśakyatvān nāniṣṭeḥ / tādṛśām avitathābhidhānāt /.*

[83] PVSV 175,27–176,4: *āgamaṃ pramāṇaṃ tadādarśitārthapratipattaye ʾjño janaḥ samanveṣate samadhigatayāthātathyānām upadeśānapekṣatvāt / ajñasya cātīndriyaguṇapuruṣavivecane ʾsāmarthyāt / vacanānāṃ samīhitārthasattām antareṇāpi vṛttiṃ paśyato bhavitavyam evādṛṣṭavyabhicāravacasām api puruṣāṇāṃ vāci śaṅkayā kiṃ yathārthā na veti / tena na yuktam anena kasyacid vacanena kiṃcin niścetum /.* "It is the ignorant person who looks at scripture as a means of valid cognition in order to put into practice its teachings[, and this for two reasons: first,] because [those] who have thoroughly understood the truth do not [need to] resort to the instruction [of others any longer]; and [second,] because the ignorant person cannot discriminate human beings whose [mental] qualities are inaccessible to the senses [and therefore he cannot recognize a trustworthy person]. Someone who sees that statements occur even in the absence of the desired meaning must indeed be beset with doubt – [asking himself,] 'Is it true or not?' – even in the case of the discourse of people whose utterances have not been observed to be fallacious. Therefore, the [ignorant person] cannot ascertain anything by means of someone's statement." Translation Eltschinger et al. 2012, pp. 75–76.

conspicuous element of *uncertainty* as to the result of one's action and basically amounts to the *maximization* of one's chances of practical success. As we shall see, this is due to the fact that ordinary people have no direct cognition of future events and cannot validly infer the effect from the cause. The following statement by Kamalaśīla encapsulates all we already know about the rational agent's attitude when dealing with scripture:

> One observes that certain [persons], unable as they are to live without resorting to scriptural authority because they learn [from scripture what] great benefits or evils [are to be expected from] engaging in or abstaining from certain [actions/intentions] whose results [remain entirely] imperceptible [to them, and that certain persons, then,] act on the basis of [human] speech. But for all that, they do not fall short of rationality, because they act due to an excellent means (*abhyupāya*, Tib. *thabs khyad par can*). There is indeed no other means (*abhyupāya*, Tib. *thabs*) than scripture to act with regard to something radically imperceptible. Now one is necessarily to act on the basis of a sound scripture (*svāgama*), for those who [would] adopt scriptures that are contradicted [by ordinary means of valid cognition] would not act rationally. But how could they not be rational if they act by relying on a non-contradicted scripture, since only this [kind of scripture] is a good means? … What could oppose the action of a rational [person who acts] with the thought that the full realization of the thing as it has been promised [by scripture] will occur one day? And further, it is unjustified to abstain [from action] out of the suspicion that [this realization] might fail to occur, because one also acts out of uncertainty about something profitable, [for] otherwise, … one would not act towards anything [any longer] because one would suspect the non-occurrence of the result.[84]

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[84] TSP_K 4,1–8/$TSP_Ś$ 4,23–5,4 and TSP_K 4,12–16/$TSP_Ś$ 5,10–14: *yāvatā dṛśyante hi kecid apratyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāṃcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahā*-[*nu*]*śaṃsāpāyaśravaṇād anāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum aśaknuvanto vacanāt pravartamānāḥ / na caitāvatā teṣāṃ prekṣāvattāhāniḥ / abhyupāyenaiva pravṛtteḥ / na hy āgamād ṛte ʾtyantaparokṣārthaviṣaye pravṛttāv anyo ʾbhyupāyo ʾsti / avaśyaṃ ca pravartitavyaṃ svāgamāt*(1) */ vyāhatāgamaparigrahaṃ hi kurvāṇā aprekṣāpūrvakāriṇaḥ syuḥ / avyāhatāgamasamāśrayeṇa tu pravṛttau kathaṃ na prekṣāvanto bhaveyuḥ / tasyaiva samyagupāyatvāt / … kadācid yathāpratijñātārthaparisamāptir bhaviṣyatīti mattvā prekṣāvataḥ pravṛttiḥ kena vāryeta / na cāpy asam-*

2.3. Let us now have a closer look at the Buddhist epistemologists' "theories of action." Since all the undertakings (*ārambha*) of so-called rational or judicious persons imply a goal (*upeya*, *prayojana*, *artha*),[85] these persons are justified in trying to determine the results (*phala*, *sādhya*) they can reasonably expect from the use of a certain means (*upāya*, *sādhana*). Let us consider the level of everyday action and take the practice of farmers (*kṛṣīvala*, *karṣaka*) as an example. Repeated practice and observation have taught them that seeds (*bīja*) of a given kind are capable of yielding the result they expect from them, i.e., a good crop (*sasya*). Although their work (ploughing, sowing, etc.) and its expedients (seeds, etc.) generally bring about the desired result, agriculturists are not unaware of the fact that the ultimate occurrence of this result might well be impeded by unhappy events such as drought or storms. In other words, they can at best infer their work's *fitness* for bringing about the expected results, or equivalently, the *possibility* that these results occur, because to infer the actual occurrence of the results themselves would suppose they can ascertain (*niścaya*) the absence of any impediment.[86] Farmers, then, act with uncertainty or doubt (*saṃśaya*) regarding the future and hence imperceptible results of their endeavours. To put it in a more technical way, farmers resort to the kind of non-perception called *adṛśyānupalabdhi*, i.e., the non-perception of things that are out of cognitive reach (*viprakṛṣṭa*, *viprakarṣin*) in terms of space, time and/or mode of being (*svabhāva*, *dravya*). Since this type of non-perception does not allow for any certainty regarding a given

bhavāśaṅkayā nivṛttir yuktā / arthasaṃśayenāpi pravṛtteḥ / anyathā … phalāsambhavāśaṅkāyāḥ sambhavāt kvacid api pravṛttir na syāt /.

(1)Pātan (2a2) as well as Jaisalmer (3a1,2) MSS unambiguously read *svāgamāt*, against TSP_K's and $TSP_Ś$'s unsatisfactory *tv āgamāt*; the reading *svāgamāt* is, however, *not* supported by TSP_T D135b3/P162b1 (*luṅ las*).

[85] TSP_K 76,17–18/$TSP_Ś$ 97,16–17: *prekṣāpūrvakāripravṛtteḥ prayojanavattayā vyāptatvāt* (quoted and translated in McClintock 2010: 59 n. 135); note also PVinṬ D4b1/P5a1: *rtog pa daṅ ldan pa'i rtsom pa thams cad ni dgos pas khyab pa'i phyir*; NBṬ 11,3: *tathā hi sarve prekṣāvantaḥ pravṛttiprayojanam anviṣya pravartante*; VNṬ 3,12–13: *yat prayojanarahitaṃ tat prekṣāpūrvakāribhir nārabhyate*.

[86] On this point, see Steinkellner 1991: 725–726.

thing's existence or non-existence, Dharmakīrti explicitly describes it as a dubious cognition.[87] This amounts to saying that this non-perception *should* compel our farmers *not* to treat this thing as existent (*sadvyavahāra*), hence invite them to abstain from action (*apravṛtti*, *pravṛttiniṣedha*).[88] But let us consider the following passage of the PVSV:

> This [kind of] non-perception is not a means of valid cognition at all, because the means of valid cognition result in [decisive] determination. Indeed, this [non-perception] does not provide the mind with any certain decision as to [one's] abstaining from action.[89] [And] indeed, people [such as farmers] also act out of uncertainty with regard to certain [things such as seeds]. But since, if one were to act out of certainty [only], this [non-perception] is in this way beyond reproach [as a reason for inactivity], it is said to result in inactivity.[90]

According to Śākyabuddhi, the *adṛśyānupalabdhi* is an irreproachable reason for refraining from action "if a rational agent is to act out of certainty [only], hence for those who admit that one aims at an action that conforms to certainty [only]."[91]

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[87] See PVin 2 73,12–13/PVin$_T$ 2 24*,2–6 as well as Steinkellner 1979: 81.

[88] See PVin 2 73,5–74,1/PVin$_T$ 2 23*,22–24*,9 as well as Steinkellner 1979: 80–81.

[89] PVṬ *Je* D230a7–b1/P268b2–3 = PVSVṬ 373,19–20: *saṃśaye sati na pravartitavyam avaśyam ity evaṃ niścitaṃ ceto na karotīty arthaḥ /*. Cf. the French expression: "Dans le doute, abstiens-toi."

[90] PVSV 102,14–18: *naiva... iyam anupalabdhiḥ pramāṇaṃ vyavasāyaphalatvāt pramāṇānām / na hi pravṛttiniṣedhe 'pīyaṃ niḥśaṅkaparicchedaṃ cetaḥ karoti / saṃśayād api kvacil lokasya pravṛtteḥ / tathā tv etan niravadyaṃ yadi niścayapūrvaṃ vyavahared iti seyam apravṛttiphalā proktā /*.

[91] PVṬ *Je* D230b2/P268b4–5: *gal te rtog pa sṅon du gtoṅ ba can ṅes pa sṅon du 'gro ba'i tha sñad du byed pa can yin pa de'i phyir ṅes pa ji lta ba bźin du 'jug pa don du gñer bar 'dod pa la'o //*. As for Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 373,22–26), he explains Dharmakīrti's final remark in the light of Dharmottara's conclusive statement on PVin 2 73,5–74,1/PVin$_T$ 2 23*,22–24*,9 (PVinṬ P282a7–b1): *tena rūpeṇaitad apravṛttikāraṇam anupalambhākhyaṃ niravadyaṃ nirdoṣaṃ yadi niścayapūrvaṃ vyavaharet kaścit /*

What does all this amount to? In the case of things that are (at least *hic et nunc*) inaccessible with regard to space, time or mode of being, or a combination thereof, just as the farmers' future crops are, non-perception is not a means of valid cognition since it does not allow one to ascertain these things' existence or non-existence, and hence leaves open the question whether one should treat them as existent (and engage in action) or rather as non-existent (and refrain from action). However, one observes that people such as farmers do *not* refrain from action, i.e., they engage in action in spite of this uncertainty. In other words, "doubt about something profitable is also a cause of action for rational [persons]."[92] Now are these persons rational, if uncertainty as to the existence of the desired result does not prevent them from engaging in action? Can they be described as rational at all? Śākyabuddhi provides us with an important statement in this connection:

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pramāṇapūrvaṃ sadvyavahārādi pravartayet / ity anena dvāreṇa seyam adṛśyānupalabdhir apravṛttiphalā proktā / niścitasadvyavahārādipratiṣedhaphalā proktā / sandigdhas tu sadvyavahārādir na niṣidhyata iti puruṣasya pravṛttir bhavaty api /. "In this [particular] form, the reason for inactivity called 'non-perception' is beyond reproach, i.e., faultless, if someone were to act out of certainty [only], i.e., [if someone] were to engage in the treatment [of something] as existent, etc., with a means of valid cognition. So, i.e., in this respect, non-perception of an imperceptible [thing] is said to result in inactivity, i.e., is said to result in the negation of an ascertained treatment [of something] as existent, etc. But since it does not negate an uncertain treatment as existent, etc., human being[s] nevertheless engage in action." Karṇakagomin's indebtedness to Dharmottara here was first noticed by Yaita (1985: 200 n. 94).

[92] NBṬ 13,4: *arthasaṃśayo 'pi hi pravṛttyaṅgaṃ prekṣāvatām /*. The text continues with (NBṬ 14,1): *anarthasaṃśayo 'pi nivṛttyaṅgam /*. Note also PPar II 22,1–5: *gal te 'jig rten the tshom las kyaṅ 'jug par mi 'gyur na ni the tshom za na ldog par bya ba yin na gaṅ gi phyir 'jug pa yin pa des na the tshom ldog par byed pa ma yin no //*. "If [ordinary] people did not engage in action out of doubt also, [then] they should abstain [from action] in case of doubt; [but] since they [nevertheless] engage in action, doubt [clearly] does not prevent [them from engaging in action]." See Krasser 1991: II 62.

"If one is acting out of doubt, how is it correct to say that people who do so are rational? – What is the contradiction here? Not only [one] who acts out of certainty is a rational [person]. There are indeed two causes that compel one to act: doubt about something profitable (*artha*) and certainty about something profitable. Inactivity also has two causes: doubt about [something] unprofitable (*anartha*) and certainty about [something] unprofitable. A person who acts out of the first two causes and a person who does not act out of the second two is what the world means by a rational person. If acting without certainty is so unusual, then it would be contradictory for farmers, etc., to work in the fields and so on, for they have no means of valid cognition that can ascertain that their future wheat and such will grow."[93]

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[93] PVṬ *Ñe* D72b2–5/P87b4–88a1: *gal te the tshom gyi sgo nas ʾjug pa yin na ji ltar rtog pa sṅon du soṅ ba can źes bya źe na / ʾdi la ʾgal ba ci yod / gaṅ kho na ṅes paʾi sgo nas ʾjug parʾgyur ba de ñid rtog pa sṅon du soṅ ba can ma yin no // de ltar na ʾjug par byed pa la don la the tshom za ba daṅ don ṅes pa daṅ rgyu rnam pa gñis yin no // ldog pa la yaṅ don med pa la the tshom za ba daṅ don med par ṅes pa gñis kho na yin no // de la daṅ po ñid kyi rgyu gñis kyis ʾjug parʾgyur ba gaṅ yin pa daṅ phyis bśad pa gñis kyis ldog parʾgyur ba gaṅ yin pa de ni rtog pa sṅon du soṅ ba can yin parʾjig rten dag brjod do // gal te ṅes pa med pa*(1) *ñid kyi sgo nas ʾjug par byed parʾgyur ba ṅo mtshar yin na / ʾo na ni źiṅ pa la sogs pa źiṅ la sogs pa la ʾjug par byed pa ʾgal barʾgyur te / de dag la ma ʾoṅs paʾi ʾbru la sogs pa ʾgrub pa la ṅes par byed paʾi tshad ma yod pa ma yin no //.*

(1)em. : DP om. *med pa*.

Translation Dunne 2004: 291 n. 126, partly modified. Parallel passages as well as internal consistency suggest that Tib. *don med pa* should not be understood as a Skt. *arthābhāva*, but rather as a Skt. *anartha*. The same fourfold structure can be found in DhPr 13,23–14,8 ad NBṬ 13,4 (*arthaniścaya*, *arthasaṃśaya*, *anarthasaṃśaya*, *anarthaniścaya*). TSP_K 4,16/$TSP_Ś$ 5,14 makes clear that, as we already know from the preceding discussion, *arthasaṃśaya* includes (or: is doctrinally equivalent with) *phalāsambhavāśaṅkā*; to read Tib. *don med pa* as a Skt. *arthābhāva*/*arthāsambhava* would then be redundant. Furthermore, as TSP_K 4,17/$TSP_Ś$ 5,15 also makes clear, *anartha* should be understood in the sense of *aniṣṭaphalāvāpti* (with the negation bearing on *iṣṭa* and not on *avāpti*), i.e., in the sense of: "(obtainment of) an undesirable result." In his PVinṬ (D4a3–5/P4b3–5) and NBṬ (14,4–15,1), Dharmottara himself lists respectively four and five *don med paʾi the tshom*/*anarthasambhāvanā* in the case of which a rational person would not engage himself with a

Śākyabuddhi's opponent contends that rationality entails acting out of certainty only. Śākyabuddhi quite strikingly replies that it is just the opposite, i.e., that he who only acts out of certainty is behaving in an irrational way, thus clearly implying that rational persons *also* act out of uncertainty, just as farmers do.

2.4.1. Is it, then, that these persons are at least in a position to *infer* the *arising* of a future result out of their present-day actions? Certainly not, at least, again, according to Dharmakīrti and his followers. In order to understand why ordinary persons behave rationally when engaging in action towards an imperceptible and *per se* non-inferable result, we have to turn to an important theoretical structure that was expected to safeguard the rationality of the inference of an effect – to be more precise, of the *possibility* of an effect. As we shall see, this logical device laid the theoretical foundations of all the subsequent Buddhist accounts of human rationality and pervades all of the epistemologists' apologetic strategies. Note, however, that Dharmakīrti himself seems *not* to have merged his concept of practical rationality into this logical framework, an achievement that the 8th-century philosophers Arcaṭa and especially Kamalaśīla are to be credited with.

2.4.2. Is the inference of an effect out of a cause (*kāryānumāna*) as legitimate as the inference of a cause out of its effect (*kāraṇānumāna*)? Early Buddhist and Naiyāyika philosophers seem to have answered this question affirmatively, as can be easily evidenced by passages from the HV and the NBh.[94] The "unorthodox" Sāṃkhya

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treatise.

[94] HV 13*,15–14*,5: *hetuphalato 'numānaṃ katamat. yad dhetunā phalasya phalena vā hetor abhyūhanam. tad yathā gatyā deśāntaraprāptim anuminoti, deśāntaraprāptyā gatim, rājārādhanena mahābhisāralābham, mahābhisāralābhena rājārādhanam, sukṛtasampannakarmāntatayā mahādhanadhānyalābham, mahādhanadhānyalābhena sukṛtasampannakarmāntatām, prāktanena sucaritaduścaritena sampattivipattī, sampattivipattibhyāṃ prākkṛtaṃ sucaritaduścaritam, prabhūtabhojanena tṛptim, tṛptyā prabhūtabhojanam, viṣamabhojanena vyādhim, vyādhinā viṣamabhojanam, dhyānena vairāgyam, vairāgyena dhyānam, mārgeṇa śrāmaṇyaphalam, śrāmaṇyaphalena mārgam. ity evambhāgīyaṃ hetu-*

thinker Vārṣagaṇya was likely one of the first to call the legitimacy of this inference into question. According to a fragment (?) of his *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, Vārṣagaṇya held the inference of the effect (the so-called *pūrvavadanumāna*) to be spurious (*vyabhicārin*).[95] Although the frag-

phalato ʾnumānaṃ veditavyam. "What does the inference out of causality (*hetuphalataḥ*) consist in? It consists in the deduction of the effect out of the cause, or of the cause out of the effect. For example, one infers [one's] reaching another place out of motion, motion out of [one's] reaching another place; [one infers] the acquisition of an important gift (BHSD 59b s.v. *abhisāra*) out of [one's] propitiating the king, [one's] propitiating the king out of the acquisition of an important gift; [one infers] the acquisition of much money and grain out of a successful (*sukṛtasampanna*) business, a successful business out of the acquisition of much money and grain; [one infers] welfare and misfortune out of [one's] past good and bad conduct, previous (*prākkṛta*) good and bad conduct out of [present] welfare and misfortune; [one infers] satiety out of abundant food, abundant food out of satiety; [one infers] disease out of rotten food, rotten food out of disease; [one infers] renouncement (*vairāgya*) out of meditative trance, meditative trance out of renouncement; [one infers] the result of religious life out of the path, [or] the path out of the result of religious life. The inference out of causality is to be known as [being] of such a kind." NBh 12,7–9: *pūrvavad iti / yatra kāraṇena kāryam anumīyate / yathā meghonnatyā bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti / śeṣavat tad yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇam anumīyate / pūrvodakaviparītam udakaṃ nadyāḥ pūrṇatvaṃ śīghrataratvaṃ ca dṛṣṭvā srotaso ʾnumīyate bhūtā vṛṣṭir iti /*. "By '*pūrvavat*,' [we intend an inference] in which one infers the effect out of the cause, as [when one infers] that there will be rain because of the rising of clouds. By '*śeṣavat*,' [we intend] that [inference] in which one infers the cause out of the effect, [as when one infers] that there has been rain after observing that the water of the river is different from the water of before and that the stream is [more] abundant and raging [than before]." On the question of the meaning of *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* in NS 1.1.5, see Wezler 1969. Uddyotakara already criticised naive interpretations of this NBh passage (see NV 43,17–44,6).

[95] PST$_T$ *Ye* D124b1–3 as edited in Frauwallner 1958: 124–125: *spyir mthoṅ baʾi rjes su dpag paʾdi yaṅ rnam gñis te / sṅa ma daṅ ldan pa daṅ lhag ma daṅ ldan paʾo // de la sṅa ma daṅ ldan pa ni gaṅ gi tshe rgyu ma tshaṅ ba med pa mthoṅ nas ʾbras bu ʾbyuṅ bar ʾgyur ba ñid rtogs pa ste / dper na sprin byuṅ ba mthoṅ nas char ba ʾbyuṅ bar ʾgyur ba ñid lta buʾo // lhag ma daṅ ldan pa ni gaṅ gi tshe ʾbras bu grub pa mthoṅ nas rgyu byuṅ zin pa ñid rtogs pa ste / dper na chu kluṅ gsar du chu ʾphel ba mthoṅ ba nas*

ment remains silent on this author's argument against this kind of inference, one may hypothesize that Vārṣagaṇya objected to it on the grounds that an obstruction (*pratibandha*) might hamper the causal process and thus prevent the effect from arising. This is, at least, the intent of an objection that occurs in an interesting passage of the YD:

> Among the [three kinds of inference,] the *pūrvavat*[-inference is the one which is resorted to] when, having observed that a cause has arisen, one concludes that the effect is about to occur (*bhaviṣyattva*), as [it is the case when one concludes] that rain must occur with the rising of the clouds. [Objection:] The example [you adduce] is not [correct], because it is inconclusive. Indeed, the rising of the clouds is not necessarily the cause of rain, because an obstruction [consisting of] a factor such as wind is possible. [Answer:] But if, having observed the unopposed (*aprativogin*) capacity of the cause, supported by the additional (*antara*) capacities of the cooperating [factors], one concludes the manifestation of the effect, then [the inference is] a *pūrvavat*[-inference]; for instance, when [one concludes] a pot [is being made] after having perceived a lump of clay fashioned (*adhiṣṭhita*) by a working potter furnished with instruments such as a wheel, water and a pole.[96]

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sprin byuṅ ba ñid lta buʾo // de la sṅa ma daṅ ldan paʾi rjes su dpag pa ni ʾkhrul paʾo // lhag ma daṅ ldan pa rnam par dpyad par daṅ bcas pa ni ʾkhrul pa med paʾo //. "Auch diese (Art der) Schlußfolgerung, das Sehen dem Gemeinsamen nach, ist zweifach, (Schlußfolgerung) mit Früherem (*pūrvavat*) und mit Restlichem (*śeṣavat*). Davon liegt (Schlußfolgerung) mit Früherem vor, wenn man Ursachen vollzählig gesehen hat und daraus das bevorstehende Eintreten der Wirkung erkennt, wie das bevorstehende Eintreten von Regen, wenn man das Aufsteigen der Wolken gesehen hat. (Schlußfolgerung) mit Restlichem liegt vor, wenn man das Eintreten einer Wirkung sieht und daraus erkennt, daß die Ursache vorhanden war, z.B. (wenn man erkennt), daß Wolken vorhanden waren, weil man sieht, daß das Wasser eines Flusses neuerdings anschwillt. Davon ist die Schlußfolgerung mit Früherem fehlerhaft. Die Schlußfolgerung mit Restlichem, wenn sie wohl überlegt ist, ist nicht fehlerhaft." Translation Frauwallner 1958: 128.

[96] YD 83,6–84,2: *tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṃ dṛṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvaṃ kāryasya pratipadyate yathā meghodaye bhavitavyatā vṛṣṭeḥ / āha – naitad asty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi meghodayo ʾvaśyaṃ vṛṣṭeḥ kāraṇaṃ bhavati vāyvādinimittapratibandhasambhavāt / ucyate – yadi tarhi kāraṇaśaktiṃ sahakāriśaktyantarānugṛhītām apratiyoginīṃ*

As this excerpt clearly testifies, the author of the YD was not ready to rule out any possibility of inferring the effect out of the cause and consequently submitted this inference to additional requirements. According to him, the inference is justified provided one has observed the *unimpeded* efficacy of *all* the causal factors involved in the process.

Now, this brings us very close to Dharmakīrti's own solution. To put it in a nutshell: According to PVSV 6,22–7,12, one cannot infer the rise of an effect (*kāryotpatti*) itself because an impediment[97] may present itself within the causal process, hence hampering the production of the effect. The best and only thing one can do in such a case is to infer, instead of the rise of the effect itself, the *fitness* of the complete cause for giving rise to its effect (*kāryotpādanayogyatā*) or, equivalently, the *possibility* of the effect's arising (*kāryotpattisambhava*). As is obvious, both fitness and possibility are essential properties of the complete cause or causal complex. In other words, the only way to allow for some kind of inference from cause to effect is to interpret the logical reason "complete cause" as a logical reason consisting of an essential property.[98]

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dṛṣṭvā kāryasya vyaktiṃ pratipadyate tadyathā yadā cakrodakadaṇḍādisādhanasampannena vyāpāravatā kumbhakāreṇādhiṣṭhitāṃ mṛdam upalabhya ghaṭasya tadā pūrvavat /.

[97] Dharmakīrti defines an impediment (*pratibandha*) in the following way (PVin 2 61,3–4/PVin$_{\text{T}}$ 2 13*,20–22): *kāryotpattiviguṇotpādanalakṣaṇatvāt pratibandhasya /*. See Steinkellner 1979: 54, 1991: 726 and 1999: 350 n. 9.

[98] On the reduction of *kāraṇahetu* to *svabhāvahetu*, see also Iwata 1991: 86–87 and Krasser 1991: II 107–109 n. 263–266. PVSV 6,22–7,10 and PV 1.7–8: *yas tarhi samagreṇa hetunā kāryotpādo 'numīyate sa kathaṃ trividhe hetāv antarbhavati / hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numīyate / arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitaḥ // asāv api yathāsaṃnihitān nānyam apekṣata iti tanmātrānubandhī svabhāvo bhāvasya / tatra hi kevalaṃ samagrāt kāraṇāt kāryotpattisambhavo 'numīyate samagrāṇāṃ kāryotpādanayogyatānumānāt / yogyatā ca sāmagrīmātrānubandhinīti svabhāvabhūtaivānumīyate / kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇasāmagryāḥ kāryam eva nānumīyate / sāmagrīphalaśaktīnāṃ pariṇāmānubandhini / anaikāntikatā kārye pratibandhasya sambhavāt //*

na hi samagrāṇīty eva kāraṇadravyāṇi svakāryaṃ janayanti / sāmagrījanmanāṃ śaktīnāṃ pariṇāmāpekṣatvāt kāryotpādasya / atrāntare ca pratibandhasambhavān na kāryānumānam / yogyatāyās tu dravyāntarānapekṣatvān na virudhyate 'numānam / uttarottaraśaktipariṇāmeṇa kāryotpādanasamartheyaṃ kāraṇasāmagrī / śaktipariṇāmapratyayasyānyasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvād iti /. "[Objection:] But the arising of an effect that is inferred out of a complete cause, how is it included in the threefold [logical] reason [that consists of essential property, effect and non-perception][(1)]? [Answer:] The arising of an effect that is inferred out of a complete cause is described as an essential property [of this complete cause], because it does not depend on something else. Since the [arising of the effect] itself does not depend on [anything] other than the [causal complex] as it is present, it relates to nothing but this [causal complex and hence is] an essential property of this thing [called the complete causal complex]. [And] indeed, [what] is inferred out of the complete cause, in this case, [is] only the possibility that the effect arises, because [it is] the complete [causal factors'] fitness for generating [their] effect [that] one infers. And since [this] fitness relates to nothing other than the [complete] causal complex, it is as an essential property [of this causal complex] that it is inferred. [Objection:] But why is it not the effect itself that one infers out of the causal complex? [Answer:] An effect depends on the [successive] transformations of the [causal] efficacies that result from the [preceding phases of the] causal complex; [cause as a logical reason] is inconclusive with regard to [this] effect, because an obstruction [hindering this transformation process] may occur. Indeed, it is not simply because they are complete [i.e., present,] that the causal factors (*dravya*) generate their own effect, because the arising of an effect depends on the [successive] transformations of the efficacies that are born of [each phase of] the causal complex. Now since an obstruction may occur in the meantime (*atrāntare*), one does not infer the effect [itself]. To the contrary, the inference of the [complete cause's] fitness [for bringing about its effect] is not contradicted, because [this fitness] does not depend on any factor other [than this complete cause itself. And this inference has the following form:] Due to the [final] transformation of [its] successive efficacies, this complex of causes is capable of generating an effect, because no further (*anya*) condition for the transformation of [its] efficacy is required (*apekṣaṇīya*)."

[(1)] PVṬ *Je* D19b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 43,11–14 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *sa kathaṃ kāraṇākhyo hetus trividhe svabhāvakāryānupalambhākhye hetāv antarbhavati / na tāvad anupalabdhau vidhisādhanatvāt / kāraṇasvabhāvatvān na kāryahetau / arthān-*

2.4.3. As stated above, the 8th-century Buddhist philosophers Arcaṭa and Kamalaśīla are to be credited with the development of a unified concept of practical rationality based on Dharmakīrti's reinterpretation of the *kāryānumāna*. Until the mid-8th century, the Buddhist epistemologists' depiction of practical rationality and the rational agent acting out of doubt formed a rather peripheral appendix to Dharmakīrti's account of the *adṛśyānupalabdhi*; their treatment of the topic drew heavily on an allegedly common-sense understanding of practical rationality as well as on empirical observation of everyday human action itself. The issue actually gained prominence and systematicity with the epistemologists' growing interest in the aim of a treatise (*śāstraprayojana*). Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the figure of Arcaṭa, the main target of Kamalaśīla's lengthy commentary on the first six verses of Śāntarakṣita's TS.[99] Suffice it to say here that Arcaṭa tried to play down the part of uncertainty in human action by reassessing the nature of certainty/ascertainment in the general framework of purposeful action.[100]

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tareṇārthāntarasyānumānān na svabhāvahetau /. "How is it that the logical reason designated as a '[complete] cause' is included in the threefold logical reason designated as 'essential property,' 'effect' and 'non-perception'? To begin with, it is not [included] in non-perception, for it is a positive argument; it is [also] not included in the effect as a logical reason, for it has the nature of a cause, nor in the essential property as a logical reason, for it consists in the inference of one thing out of another." For the general context of this passage, see Steinkellner 1991: 713–718 (with an English translation).

[99] See Funayama 1995.

[100] HBṬ 2,3–9 (see Funayama 1995: 184–185): *prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛttiḥ prayojanārthināṃ tadupāye tadbhāvaniścayāt / yathā kṛṣīvalādīnāṃ*[(1)] *sasyādyupāye bījādāv abījādivivekenāvadhṛtabījādibhāvānām / anyathā hy aniścitopāyānām upeyārthināṃ pravṛttau prekṣāvattaiva hīyeta / upeye tu bhāvini pramāṇavyāpārāsambhavād aniścaye 'pi vivecitopāyāḥ pratibandhavaikalyayor asambhave yogyam etad vivakṣitaṃ kāryaṃ niṣpādayitum iti sambhāvanayā pravṛttau prekṣāvattā*[*yā*][(2)] *ato na hīyeran* /.

[(1)]HBṬĀ 239,8–9: *karṣakāpi bījādiviṣaye buddhipūrvakāriṇa iti prekṣāvattvapuraskāreṇodāharaṇam*; [(2)]as Funayama rightly points out, Sanghavi's reading *prekṣāvattā* makes no sense (see Funayama 1995: 185 n. 17 for other syntactical hypotheses). "[When] rational [persons] who aim at a [given] goal

Though Arcaṭa admits that the future and hence non-cognizable results of actions cannot be ascertained, he holds practical rationality to consist in certainty with regard to the *means* itself. Especially noteworthy is his appeal to Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* theorem as being the psychological pattern underlying rational beings' interaction with duly ascertained means. However, the process which led to a full-fledged practical interpretation of the said theorem seems to have been completed by Kamalaśīla in the framework of his critique of Arcaṭa's views. In response to Arcaṭa's view that ordinary people act out of certainty only on the grounds that the means of their practical endeavours are ascertained, Kamalaśīla states the following:

> This is incorrect, for what is at stake here is that the [person] *x*, whose action aims at [the result] *y*, acts even if [(s)he feels] uncertain about *y*. Moreover, [people] such as farmers do not act toward these [seeds, etc.,] for the sake of the instrumental means [itself], so that one [could] describe their action as accompanied by certitude because they possess certitude about the instrumental means, but they act with regard to it for the sake of the result [only]. Now since an impediment to the arising of the result is possible, there is no certainty [at all]. Therefore, their action is accompanied by uncertainty only.[101]

> act toward the means of this [goal, they do so] due to [their previous] ascertainment of the fact that [this means] is [indeed] the [means toward the goal they are aiming at. In so doing, they behave] just like [people] such as farmers who, [when they act] toward the seeds, etc., which are a means toward the crop, etc., have [previously] determined that the seeds, etc., are [indeed the means], by distinguishing [them] from non-seeds, etc. Otherwise, if those who aim at a [given] goal were to act without having ascertained the means, they would indeed simply fall short of rationality. But even though [they can] not ascertain the future goal [itself], since the means of valid cognition cannot function [with regard to it], those who have determined the means do not fall short of rationality if they act based on the [following] assumption: 'This is fitting for bringing about the intended (*vivakṣita*) effect, provided that neither an impediment nor an incompleteness [of the causal complex] occurs.'"

[101] TSP_K 3,7–10/$TSP_Ś$ 3,20–4,2: *tad asamyak / yadarthaṃ hi yasya pravṛttiḥ sā tatsaṃśaye 'pi tasya bhavatīty etāvad iha prakṛtam / na ca kṛṣīvalādayaḥ sādhanārthaṃ teṣu*(1) *pravartante yena sādhanaviṣayaniścayasadbhāvān niścayapūrvikā pravṛttir eṣām*(2) *upavarṇyate / kiṃ tarhi / phalārthaṃ te tatra pravartante / tatra ca phale pratibandhādisambhavān na niścayo*

According to Kamalaśīla, the epistemic value of the cognition underlying human decisions about action is not independent of the relative probability that the goal being aimed at will be achieved. Since an impediment might hamper the causal process, certainty as to any future result cannot be arrived at with any assuredness. This amounts to saying that farmers engage in action out of uncertainty only. In another passage, Kamalaśīla shapes a new set of arguments against Arcaṭa's views on practical rationality; in doing so, he puts the finishing touches to an adjustment of the *kāryānumāna* theorem on the issue of practical rationality:

> Furthermore, even an [alleged] certainty of theirs with regard to the instrumental means, [insofar] as it [could only] depend upon the future result, might be either of a form such as: 'This [instrumental means] will necessarily realize a future result of that kind,' or of the form: 'This [instrumental means] is fitting for necessarily bringing about the desired result if neither an impediment nor an incompleteness of the cooperating [causes] presents itself.' To begin with, the first of the [two hypotheses] is incorrect[, and this for the following reason:] because one sees that a certain rice[-seed], etc., for which incompleteness of the cooperating [causes] or the intervention of an impediment (*pratibandhaka*) has occurred, is not an instrumental means towards a future result, even [though] one has observed [that it once had] such a result, one [cannot] rule out a doubt with regard to all [other rice-seeds. This is] what [Dharmakīrti] says:
>
> > 'If an effect [itself], which depends on the transformations of the efficacies that result from [earlier phases of] the causal complex, [is to be inferred from a cause, this cause] is inconclusive [as a logical reason], because an impediment, etc., is possible.'
>
> But if [one is inclined to believe] the second [hypothesis], then it is perfectly correct, because all [human] action that is accompanied by a means of valid cognition is of such a form only. And this is [the reason] why teachers [such as Dharmakīrti] have introduced here a specification (*viśeṣaṇa*) by means of the inference of [a complete cause's] fit-

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ʾ*stīty ataḥ saṃśayapūrvikaiva teṣāṃ pravṛttiḥ /*.

(1)The Pātan (1b, above line 1) and Jaisalmer (2b2, above line 1) MSS read *bījādiṣu* (marginal note); (2)the Pātan (1b, above line 1) and the Jaisalmer (2b2, above line 1) MSS read: *kṛṣīvalānāṃ* (marginal note).

ness [for bringing about the expected effect in the form]: 'This [complete cause] is fit [for bringing about its effect] if there is no impediment.' Furthermore, since in this [very] form the result is also ascertained, it is not the case that only the instrumental means is ascertained. But in an action of this kind, action is also not really (*paramārthataḥ*) established as [being] accompanied by an ascertainment of the result, because [ordinary people] with limited cognition cannot ascertain the absence of an impediment, etc.[102]

2.5.1. In two important studies dedicated to Dharmakīrti's reduction of the *kāraṇahetu* to a *svabhāvahetu*, E. Steinkellner (1991, 1999) has drawn the attention to Dharmakīrti's likely intentions when reinterpreting the inference from cause to effect. E. Steinkellner holds "the true motivation for Dharmakīrti's treating this particular inference 'from cause to effect' in its possibilities to be not logical, but soteriological, the path towards buddhahood itself being at stake."[103] In other words, Dharmakīrti's reinterpretation of the *kāryānumāna* into a logical structure entailing an essential property as logical reason provides the "progression towards buddhahood" with a "theo-

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[102] TSP_K 3,12–22/$TSP_Ś$ 4,4–16: *api ca sādhananiścayo 'pi teṣāṃ bhāviphalāpekṣayā bhavann avaśyam etad anāgatam evaṃvidhaṃ phalaṃ sādhayiṣyatīty evaṃrūpo bhavet / yad vā pratibandhakasahakārivaikalyayor asambhave saty avaśyam abhimataphalasampādanāyālam etad ity evaṃrūpaḥ / na tatra tāvad ādyo yuktarūpaḥ / sambhavatsahakārivaikalyapratibandhakopanipātasya kasyacid upalabdhatathāvidhaphalasyāpi śālyāder anāgataphalaṃ praty asādhanatvadarśanena sarvatrāśaṅkāyā avyāvṛtteḥ / yad āha / sāmagrīphalaśaktīnāṃ pariṇāmānubandhini / anaikāntikatā kārye pratibandhādisambhavād iti / atha dvitīyas tadā yuktataram etat / evaṃrūpatvād eva sarvasyāḥ pramāṇapūrvikāyāḥ pravṛtteḥ / ata eva cācāryās tatra yogyatānumānena viśeṣaṇaṃ vidadhati / asati pratibandhe yogyam etad iti / kiṃtu phalam apy anena rūpeṇa niścitam eveti na sādhanasyaiva niścayaḥ / na cāpy evampravṛttau paramārthataḥ phalaniścayapūrvikā pravṛttiḥ sidhyati / pratibandhādyasattvasyaivāparadarśanair*[(1)] *niścetum aśakyatvāt /*.

[(1)]The Pātan (1b, above line 1) and Jaisalmer (2b2, below line 6) MSS read: *arvāk* (marginal note). Steinkellner's (1991: 718) translation of PV 1.8, except for TSP's *pratibandhādi*° instead of PV's *pratibandhasya*.

[103] Steinkellner 1991: 724.

retical frame,"[104] and mirrors the Buddhist master's concern with investigating "whether a kind of 'progressive, proleptic causality,' necessarily to be acknowledged as a real soteriological fact … was supportable on a rational level too."[105] E. Steinkellner's hypothesis is, then, "that Dharmakīrti's religious presuppositions as a Mahāyānist Buddhist must be considered as the final motivation for his elaborating the logical possibility of an inference of effect."[106] Although E. Steinkellner was unaware (and rightly so!) of any Dharmakīrtian *locus* that would testify to the Buddhist philosopher's conscious connection between the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem and the Buddhist path, he has shown how certain later developments, both within and without the circle of Buddhist scholars, consciously resorted to or at least implied this "structural scheme."[107]

2.5.2. Before I turn to the texts that, in my opinion, provide full corroborative evidence for E. Steinkellner's hypothesis, let me add a few

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[104] Steinkellner 1991: 726.

[105] Steinkellner 1999: 350–351. The progressive, entelechial or proleptic causality (on these expressions, see Steinkellner 1991: 734–735 n. 39 as well as the second thoughts expressed in Steinkellner 1999: 351 n. 16) analyzed in PVSV 6,22–7,12 is indeed, as Inami and Tillemans already hypothesized on the basis of Devendrabuddhi's comments on PV 2.146 (see Inami/Tillemans 1986: 126 n. 10, and more generally 1986: 125–127; see below, §2.5.3), the one "without which the whole 'progression towards buddhahood' as depicted in the *anuloma* section of the *Pramāṇavārttika* would be inconceivable and illusory" (Steinkellner 1991: 726; see also Steinkellner 1999: 351).

[106] Steinkellner 1991: 727.

[107] This seems to be the case in Prajñākaragupta's treatment of rebirth (see Franco 1997: 6–8, 109ff and 176ff), in a Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* in Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyakandalī* (see Steinkellner 1991: 735 n. 47, 736 n. 52, Steinkellner 1999: 354–355, Pemwieser 1991: 43–47 and 109–147), in a short statement by Arcaṭa (HBṬ 2,7ff; see Steinkellner 1999: 355 n. 28, Funayama 1995: 187), and especially in (the pseudo-)Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi* (see Steinkellner 1991: 736 n. 53, Steinkellner 1999: 355–360), where "the whole text was composed by applying Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* theorem as a model logical form" (Steinkellner 1999: 355).

comments. There can be little doubt that the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem, i.e., one's being justified in inferring the *possibility* of the result, served "soteriological" purposes in line with the insight born of rational reflection. In other words, I do believe that the proofs carried out on its basis were also designated to provide practitioners with firm conviction regarding the possibility of the Buddhist path and its result(s). After all, from the BoBh onwards, the *hetuvidyā* was not only expected to defeat non-Buddhist opponents, but also to strengthen the faith of the Buddhists themselves.[108] Moreover,

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[108] The polemical purport of the *hetuvidyā* is emphasized in the MSA tradition (MSA 11.60: *anyeṣām... nigrahaṇ*[*āy*]*a*; MSABh 136,23–24: *dvitīye taddoṣaparijñānaṃ paravādinigrahaś ca* /; MSABh 70,16–17: *nigrahārtham anyeṣāṃ tadanadhimuktānām* /; MSAVBh D *Mi* 203a3: *mu stegs rgyu rig pa'i gtsug lag śes par rlom pa... tshar gcad par bya ba'i phyir*). Whereas the BoBh fully recognizes this polemical purpose (BoBh D68,14–15/W96,22–24: *hetuśāstram api dvyākāram / paropārambhakathānuśaṃsaparidīpanākāraṃ parataś cetivādavipramokṣānuśaṃsaparidīpanākāraṃ ca* /. "The *hetuśāstra* also has two aspects: [first,] it reveals the advantages [that can be drawn] from exhibiting (*kathā*) the faults (*upārambha*, BHSD) of [one's] opponent, and [second,] it reveals the advantages [which result] from escaping (*vipramokṣa*) this kind of critical discourse on the part of an opponent."), it also ascribes apologetic and catechetical aims to the *hetuvidyā*, as the following statement makes clear (BoBh D74,11–13/W105,13–16): *hetuvidyāṃ bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate tasyaiva śāstrasya durbhāṣitadurlapitāyā yathābhūtaparijñānārthaṃ paravādinigrahārthaṃ cāprasannānām asmiñ śāsane prasādāya prasannānāṃ ca bhūyobhāvāya* /. "The *bodhisattva* strives after the *hetuvidyā* (1) in order to get correctly acquainted with the defects and errors of this very science, (2) in order to defeat opponent debaters, (3) in order to [arouse] the faith in this [Buddhist] teaching in those who have no faith [in it], and (4) in order to increase/strengthen those who have faith [in it]." Does *prasannānāṃ bhūyobhāvāya* (or, according to MVy 255,5–6: *abhiprasannānāṃ bhūyobhāvāya* /) mean "in order to increase [the number] of those who have faith [in it]," or rather, "in order to strengthen [the faith] of those who [already] have faith [in it]"? According to *Sāgaramegha (BoBhVy D126a2–3/P153b5–6), the *hetuvidyā* helps those who have already developed faith in Buddhism (whom he also terms *źugs pa rnams*) to strengthen (**sthāpana*?) their own Buddhist position (*svapakṣa*). This interpretation is also the one favoured by Sthiramati in MSAVBh D *Mi* 203a7: *bstan pa 'di la ma dad*

there is evidence that the Buddhist practitioner's appraisal of the possibility of the way *was* an issue in the Yogācāra tradition. Let me adduce two examples. The third section of the (śrāvakayānist) *Bhāvanāmayībhūmi* summarizes the path to (*nirupadhiśeṣa*)*nirvāṇa* according to ten items (*dharma*). The first three, which are transitional between the *śrutamayī* and the *cintāmayī prajñā*s,[109] are described as follows:

> Based (*āgamya*, Tib. *brten nas*) on this very insight born of listening [to the law, there appears] a threefold firm conviction (*abhisampratyaya*) with regard to the path and the result of the path, *nirvāṇa*: conviction (*sampratyaya*) that [they] exist, conviction that [they] are worthy (*guṇavat*), conviction that [they] are possible to obtain (*śakyaprāpti*) and endowed with a convenient means (*sukhopāya*, Tib. *thabs sla ba*) to [the hearer] himself.[110]

The *bahuvrīhi* compound *śakyaprāpti* occurs again in Vasubandhu's commentary on MSA 12.14ab, here clearly associated with the *cintāmayī prajñā*. According to the MSA, "the law is good because it is the cause of devotion, satisfaction and intellectual insight (*buddhi*),"[111] a statement upon which Vasubandhu comments as follows:

> The law is good at the beginning, at the middle and at the end because, by means of audition, [rational] reflection and [mental] cultivation respec-

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pa rnams dad pa bskyed pa daṅ / dad pa bskyed pa rnams dad pa'i phyir źiṅ 'phel bar bya ba'i phyir brtson par byed do //. "[The *bodhisattva*] gives himself up [to the *hetuvidyā*] so that those who have no faith develop faith in the [Buddhist] teaching and that those who have [already] developed faith [in it] intensify [their] faith." On the *hetuvidyā*, see also below, n. 115.

[109] These three convictions are described as instrumental in the rise of the insight born of cultivation (*bhāvanāmayajñānapariniṣpatti*).

[110] *Bhāvanāmayībhūmiḥ* MS 140b3/D *Tshi* 264a3–4: *tām eva śrutamayīṃ prajñām āgamya mārge mārgaphale ca nirvaṇe trividho 'bhisampratyayo 'stitvasampratyayo guṇavattvasampratyaya ātmanaḥ śakyaprāptisukhopāyasampratyayaḥ /*. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Alexander von Rospatt for having made the Sanskrit of this passage available to me.

[111] MSA 12.14ab: *kalyāṇo dharmo 'yaṃ hetutvād bhaktituṣṭibuddhīnām /*.

tively, it is the cause of devotion, satisfaction and intellectual insight. Among these, devotion is faith (*adhimukti*), conviction (*sampratyaya*) [regarding the path and the truths].[112] Satisfaction is the joy [that arises] after one has known, through rational examination (*yuktinidhyāna*), that [the supreme result][113] is possible to obtain (*śakyaprāpti*). [As for] intellectual insight, it consists in the concentrated mind's true knowledge.[114]

As we can see, assessing the possibility of the path, or the attainability of its result, was an issue addressed by earlier Yogācāra scholars in the framework of the insight born of reflection.

2.5.3. This being said, it seems no less certain that the Buddhist epistemologists once again turned a hermeneutic and soteriologically valued item into an apologetic device, thus externalizing it. As *hetuvidyā* specialists, the Buddhist epistemologists were supposed to neutralize their non-Buddhist opponents' attacks on the Buddhist path.[115] Against materialists and Mīmāṃsakas, whose objections

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[112] According to MSAVBh D *Mi* D240b1: *lam*(1) *daṅ bden pa la sogs pa la mos śiṅ yid ches pa la ni dad pa źes bya ste* /.

(1)em. : *las* D.

[113] According to MSAVBh D *Mi* D240b2: *'di ltar sems kyi śes rab kyis ni bla na med pa'i 'bras bu thob ciṅ chos kyi don mthoṅ bar nus te* /.

[114] MSABh 82,1–4: *dharma ādimadhyaparyavasānakalyāṇo yathākramaṃ śruticintābhāvanābhir bhaktituṣṭibuddhihetutvāt / tatra bhaktir adhimuktiḥ sampratyayaḥ / tuṣṭiḥ prāmodyaṃ yuktinidhyānāc chakyaprāptitāṃ viditvā / buddhiḥ samāhitacittasya yathābhūtajñānam* /.

[115] See above, n. 108. MSAVBh D *Tsi* 92b2–4: [*gtan tshigs rig pa*] *des ni mu stegs pa la sogs pa bdag daṅ rtag par yod pa la sogs par grub pa'i gtan tshigs* [*su*] *mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma dag smra ba la tshad mar mi ruṅ ba'i ñes pa yod par rtog pa daṅ / mu stegs pa la sogs pa'i phas kyi rgol ba rnams saṅs rgyas kyi chos la sun 'byin pa dag mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tshad mas tshar gcod ciṅ mu stegs pa'i bdag tu smra ba'i gźuṅ sun 'byin par byed de* /. "[Opponents] such as the outsiders state that the means of valid cognition direct perception and inference are [valid] reasons establishing the self, permanence, etc.; by means of the *hetuvidyā*, [the *bodhisattva*] knows that [these outsiders] make mistakes that do not fit the means of valid cognition. By [resorting to] the means of valid cognition direct perception and inference,

tried to undermine the very possibility of the path (by denying rebirth and the nearly endless development of mental qualities such as compassion and insight), the Buddhist epistemologists shaped arguments that were expected to demonstrate its rationality and realizability. And they consistently grounded their apologetic attempts on the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem. As already suggested by M. Inami and T. Tillemans, this inference was already used by Devendrabuddhi when explaining the dual proof structure of PV 2:

> "So, then, proceeding according to direct order (*lugs las ʾbyuṅ ba = anuloma*) [is as follows:] By means of the respective preceeding causes, 'desiring to benefit the world,' etc., [Dharmakīrti] infers that the respective subsequent [effects] are all possible; and thus it is established that [the Bhagavat's] being a *pramāṇa* is not *a priori* impossible (*śin tu mi srid pa = atyantā*[*sambhava*]). Now, proceeding in reverse order (*lugs pa las bzlog pa = pratiloma*), he intends to prove that the Bhagavat, who has the nature described [in the homage], is a *pramāṇa*, by validly showing that the respectively subsequent causes are proven because their respective subsequent effects are established. Thus he says, 'Or, a protector is one who teaches the four [nobles'] truths'."[116]

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti first demonstrates, on the basis of the reinterpreted *kāryānumāna*, that "desiring to benefit the world" (*jagaddhitaiṣin*) makes it possible to "be a teacher" (*śāstṛtva*), "being a teacher" makes it possible to "be a Sugata" (*sugatatva*), and finally, "being a Sugata" makes it possible to "be a protector" (*tāyitva*) of suffering living beings. The epistemologists'

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he defeats opponent debaters such as the outsiders who criticise the law of the Buddha (*buddhadharma*) and criticises the outsiders' works teaching [the existence of] the self."

[116] PVP D61b6–7/P70b3–6: *de de ltar na lugs las ʾbyuṅ ba la ʾgro ba la phan par mdzad par bźed pa ñid la sogs pa rgyu sṅa ma sṅa mas phyi ma phyi ma thams cad la srid paʾi rjes su dpag pas / tshad ma śin tu mi srid pa med pa rab tu bsgrubs nas / da ni lugs las bzlog pa ʾbras bu phyi ma phyi ma rtogs paʾi sgo nas rgyu phyi ma phyi ma grub pa yaṅ dag par ston pas*(1) *bstan paʾi ṅo bo can gyi bcom ldan ʾdas tshad ma ñid bsgrub parʾdod pas / yaṅ na skyob bden pa bźi ni ston mdzad yin źes bya ba smos te /*.

(1)em. Inami/Tillemans : *pa* D, *par* P

Translation Inami/Tillemans 1986: 126.

apologetic recourse to this theorem can be observed throughout the tradition. It underlies Dharmottara's and Karṇakagomin's account of *nirvāṇa* and omniscience as resulting from uninterrupted mental cultivation:

> Therefore, just as one infers a [given cause's] capacity [in thinking] that the causal complex of a seed is fit for bringing about the sprout, provided there is neither an impediment nor a lack [of cooperating factors], in the same way, one infers the possibility of dispassionateness and omniscience [in thinking] that the vividness of a cognition bearing on selflessness and on all entities is possible due to a long and uninterrupted [mental] cultivation, provided there is neither an impediment nor a lack [of cooperating factors].[117]

The reinterpreted *kāryānumāna* provides Śaṅkaranandana's *Sarvajñasiddhi* with a theoretical foundation:

> Like [any] other effect, a cognition bearing on every [possible] object is possible provided its existence has known causes. [And it is] this possibility [of omniscience that] is stated [in the present treatise]. Here, [causes] such as earth have the capacity, [if they are] assembled [in a complex,] to bring about an unseen sprout, because one has [previously] perceived a sprout after an interval of time when these [causes] are present. Therefore, since this [sprout] possesses known causes, it is possible because that which possesses known causes is produced by the complex of its causes if they are tending to produce it[7]. Therefore, just as one says that such an effect is possible because its causes are known, one [can] state that a cognition that directly realizes objects which are out of [ordinary cognitive] reach, due to location, time or nature, is possible because its causes are discerned. And it is this possibility that is stated [in the present treatise], i.e., [we state here that] what [we] call a known cause is arrived at by means of *pramāṇa*s, [so that] omniscience is possible if one knows that [this] is the cause of per-

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[117] PVinṬ D282a2–5/P338a3–8 (PVSVṬ 70,23–26): *tasmād yathāsati pratibandhavaikalye samartheyaṃ bījakāraṇasāmagry aṅkurotpādāyeti sāmarthyānumānam / tadvad asati pratibandhavaikalye cirakālān nairantaryavataś cābhyāsavaśān*(1) *nairātmyaviṣayasya sarvapadārthaviṣayasya ca jñānasya sphuṭābhatvaṃ sambhavatīti vairāgyasarvajñatvayoḥ sambhavānumānam /*.

(1)PVinṬ : PVSVṬ °*vaśāc ca*.

ceiving all objects. And although it is just as non-cognized as [pseudo-entities] like horns of a rabbit, it cannot be impossible [as they are, because?] one knows about its causes' fitness [for bringing it about when they are] complete.[118]

2.5.4. The credit for a systematic elaboration on soteriological rationality goes once again to Kamalaśīla, whose lengthy commentary on TS 3337(/8) is a fascinating epitome of Dharmakīrti's main religious ideas. Let us consider the kernel of his explanation. Here, Kamalaśīla enumerates eleven (or twelve) reasons that supposedly account for the fact that engagement in mental cultivation (and, therefore, cultivation reaching its highest and *ipso facto* salvational degree) is impossible (*asambhava*):

Neither can [our Mīmāṃsaka opponent] speak as follows: 'A [mental] cultivation of a kind that would result in this sort of perceptual cognition is impossible for anybody,' because [the one who speaks thus] must state a reason for [this] impossibility.

1 – the reason why one does not give oneself up to [mental] cultivation might indeed consist in the fact that it is purposeless to all [people], because the action of a rational [person always] implies purposefulness;

2 – or, even if it is purposeful, a rational [person] does not, due to ignorance of the nature of [the evil] to be eliminated, engage [in mental

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[118] *Sarvajñasiddhi*, k. 2 and part of the autocommentary thereon (MS 1b1–4):

jñātakāraṇasadbhāvā sambhaviny anyakāryavat /
sarvārthaviṣayā samvit sa hi sambhava ucyate //

iha pṛthivyādayaḥ saṃnipatitā adṛṣṭāṅkuranirvartanaśaktayas tadbhāve kālaparivāsenāṅkuropalambhāt / tad ayaṃ jñātakāraṇayoga iti sambhavī bhavati jñātakāraṇayogasya <niṣpād[*an*]*enārthitāyāṃ> tatkāraṇasambharaṇenābhinirvartanāt / tad yathaivamādikāryaṃ sambhavi kathyate jñātakāraṇatvāt tathā deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthasākṣātkārijñānaṃ sambhavy uktaṃ vijñātakāraṇatvāt / ayam eva ca sambhava ucyate yad idaṃ jñātakāraṇaṃ nāma idaṃ pramāṇādhigataṃ sarvārthopalambhakāraṇam iti pratyaye sambhavi sārvajñyam / na ca śaśaviṣāṇādivad apratītam apy asambhavi syāt / <.. ..> samagrāṇāṃ tatkāraṇānāṃ yogyatvāvagamaḥ /*. The Tucci photograph of the MS being badly out of focus, the text provided here as well as my translation remain tentative. For a diplomatic edition of the entire passage, see Eltschinger 2008: 140–141.

cultivation], because one cannot remove [something] whose nature is unknown;

3 – or, even if knowledge of its nature exists, one, seeing that [moral] faults are permanent, does not undertake any effort to eliminate them, because what is permanent cannot be eliminated;

4 – or, even if [moral faults] are not permanent, one abstains [from engaging in action] upon understanding that [moral faults] are without a cause, because what is autonomous cannot be put to an end;

5 – or, even if [moral faults] possess a cause, one does not interest oneself in [mental] cultivation due to uncertainty (*aniścaya*) about the nature of their cause, because one cannot eliminate [something] whose cause (*nidāna*) is unknown, just as an illness [of unknown cause cannot be eliminated];

6 – or, knowledge of their cause may well exist, but, having understood that their cause is permanent, one who acts rationally does not exert himself to eliminate it, because one cannot hamper a complete cause;

7 – or, even if their cause is impermanent, one, having realized (*avetya*) that [moral] faults are the true nature (*dharmatā*) of living [beings], does not strive [for this nature's destruction], because one cannot remove a nature;

8 – or, even if [moral] faults are not a nature [of living beings], one abstains [from engaging in action] for want of a means towards [their] destruction, because one who lacks a means does not reach his goal;

9 – or, even if a means exists, it might be impracticable due to ignorance of it, because what is of an unknown nature cannot be put into practice;

10 – or, even if one knows [the means toward their destruction], one does not apply [oneself to undertake them], thinking it impossible for [mental] cultivation to reach [its] highest [developmental] degree (*atyantaprakarṣa*), because it is of a limited development (*vyavasthitotkarṣa*), just like jumping, etc., or because [the required] rebirth[-series] is impossible;

11 – or, since [mental cultivation] can reach [its] highest [developmental] degree, destroying [moral] faults may well result from the rise of [their] antidote, [but] even so, one does not apply [oneself to undertake it], thinking it possible that [moral] faults [will then] arise again, just as the solidity of copper, etc., [does].[119]

[119] TSP_K 871,12–872,1/$TSP_Ś$ 1054,19–1055,13/Pe56,9–57,17: *na cāpy evaṃ*

To discuss Kamalaśīla's rejection of all these hypothetical reasons for not engaging in mental cultivation would lead us much too far.[120]

śakyaṃ vaktum – saiva tādṛśī bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yā tathābhūtapratyakṣajñānaphalā bhaved iti, yato 'sambhave kāraṇaṃ vacanīyam. tathā hi bhāvanāyām aprayoge sarveṣām evānarthitvaṃ vā kāraṇaṃ bhavet, prekṣāvataḥ pravṛtter arthitayā vyāptatvāt. saty apy arthitve praheyasvarūpāparijñānād vā na pravartate prekṣāvān, anirjñātasvarūpasya doṣasya hātum aśakyatvāt. saty api tatsvarūpajñāne nityatvaṃ vā doṣāṇāṃ paśyaṃs tatprahāṇāya na yatnam ārabhate, nityasya prahāṇāsambhavāt. asaty api vā nityatve nirhetukatvam eṣām avagamya nivartate, svatantrasyāsambhavaducchedatvāt. saty api vā kāraṇavattve tatkāraṇasvarūpāniścayān(1) *nādriyate bhāvanāyām, avijñātanidānasya vyādher*(2) *iva prahātum aśakyatvāt. bhavatu vā tatkāraṇaparijñānam, kiṃ tu*(3) *tatkāraṇaṃ nityam avagamya notsahate tatprahāṇāya prekṣāpūrvakārī, avikalakāraṇasya pratibanddhum*(4) *aśakyatvāt. anityatve 'pi vā tatkāraṇasya doṣāṇāṃ prāṇidharmatām avetya na prayatate, svabhāvasya hātum aśakyatvāt. asvabhāvatve 'pi* (5) *vā doṣāṇāṃ kṣayopāyāsambhavān nivartate, na hy upāyavikalasyopeyasamprāptir asti. sattve 'pi vo*(6)*pāyasya tadaparijñānād asambhavattadanuṣṭhāno bhavet, aparijñātasvarūpasyānuṣṭhānāsambhavāt. parijñāne 'pi vā laṅghanādivad vyavasthito*(7)*tkarṣatayā janmāntarāsambhavena vā bhāvanāyā atyantaprakarṣam asambhāvayan nābhiyogavān bhavati. bhavatu vātyantaprakarṣagamanasambhavāt pratipakṣodayena doṣāṇāṃ kṣayaḥ, tathāpi tāmrādikāṭhinyavat punar api doṣodayaṃ sambhāvayan nābhiyogam ārabhata iti.*

(1)°*āniścayān* em. < Tib. : °*āniścayād api* Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$, Pe; (2)*vyādher* em. : *vyādhir* Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$, Pe; (3)*kiṃ tu* em. < Tib. : *kiṃ* Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$, Pe; (4)*pratibaṃddhum* Jaisalmer MS : *pratibaddhum* Pātan MS, TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$, Pe; (5)'*pi* Jaisalmer MS, Tib. : Pātan MS, TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$, Pe om. '*pi*; (6)*vo*° em. : *co*° Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$, Tib., Pe; (7)°*laṅghanādivad vyavasthito*° Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS : °*laṅghanād iva vyavasthito*° TSP_K, $TSP_Ś$: °*laṅghanādīva vyavasthito*° Pe : *mchoṅs pa la sogs pa bźin du khyad par mi gnas pa ñid kyis* Tib.

[120] Reason 1 is answered in TSP_K 872,1–16/$TSP_Ś$ 1055,14–1056,7; reason 2 is answered in TSP_K 872,16–18/$TSP_Ś$ 1056,8–10; reasons 3 and 4 are answered in TSP_K 872,18–22/$TSP_Ś$ 1056,11–15; reason 5 is answered in TSP_K 872,22–24/$TSP_Ś$ 1056,16–17; reason 6 is not answered separately; reason 7 is answered in TSP_K 872,24–873,19/$TSP_Ś$ 1056,18–1057,18; reason 8 is answered in TSP_K 873,19–22/$TSP_Ś$ 1057,19–22; reason 9 is answered in TSP_K 873,22–24/$TSP_Ś$ 1057,23–1058,2; reason 10 is answered in TSP_K 873,24–28/$TSP_Ś$ 1058,3–6; reason 11 is answered in

Suffice it to say here that a systematic dismissal of the entire list amounts to demonstrating the possibility of mental cultivation and hence salvation.

2.5.5. Kamalaśīla's elaboration on the possibility and rationality of salvational cultivation is indebted to Devendrabuddhi's comments on a key passage of PV 2. In this passage, Dharmakīrti describes the future Buddha's rational reflection on the eve of his long career. Although the terminology that is typical of the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem is absent from Dharmakīrti's and Devendrabuddhi's account, it seems fairly certain that both authors envisioned the *bodhisattva* as an eminently rational person assessing the possibility of eliminating suffering for his own and other beings' sake. And indeed, Devendrabuddhi's commentary on PV 2.131cd–132ab provides us with the earliest explicit association between practical rationality and Buddhist soteriology. In so doing, Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi turned the Buddha into a paradigmatic case of practical rationality and the archetype of their own religio-philosophical programme. In these four *pāda*s, which I interpret as a functional equivalent of the Mahāyānist *bodhicittotpāda*,[121] Dharmakīrti says:

> [Wishing to calm other people's suffering,] the compassionate [*bodhisattva*] engages in [the cultivation of] means [to calm suffering] in order to eradicate [his own] suffering: for whom the goal and [its] cause remain imperceptible, it is indeed a difficult task to [correctly] teach [others] about them.[122]

Devendrabuddhi concludes his commentary with the following remark:

> Since he who ignores the path is not qualified to indicate the correct path [to other people], a rational [person] who wishes to correctly

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TSP_K 873,28–874,16/$TSP_Ś$ 1058,6–1059,1.

[121] See Eltschinger 2011, §5 and especially §5.4.

[122] PV 2.131cd–132ab: *dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate // parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram /*. On this passage, see in general Eltschinger 2005: 397–408.

> teach living beings the [goal] and its cause realizes [them] directly (*sākṣātKṚ*) [himself].[123]

The practical rationality at stake is best shown in the following hierarchical structure of aims (*upeya*) and means (*upāya*). In order to eradicate other beings' suffering, i.e., in order to help other beings, the *bodhisattva* must eradicate his own suffering. But in order to do so, he must realize the path himself, and in order to do that, the *bodhisattva* must investigate this path, especially its very *possibility*. Let me summarize here Devendrabuddhi's account of this rational *bodhisattva*'s initial steps towards the wisdom born of reflection.[124] As we know, the *bodhisattva* wishes to rid himself of his own suffering (defined here as rebirth). He will then wonder first whether this aim is *possible* at all. The removal of suffering can only be achieved if suffering possesses an impermanent and hence destructible cause, for the *bodhisattva* knows from an analysis of causality in general (*hetumātra*) that the only way to destroy an effect is to destroy its cause. If suffering is permanent (*nitya*), then suffering is either causeless (*ahetuka*, *nirhetuka*) or endowed with an agent that makes it permanent (*nityakartṛ*[*ka*]). And if suffering is without a cause (i.e., autonomous, *svatantra*) or possesses a permanent agent (i.e., a

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[123] PVP D54b7–55a1/P62a7–b1: *lam mi śes pas phyin ci ma log pa'i lam ston pa'i skabs med pa'i phyir*(1) *re źig rtog pa daṅ ldan pa ñid sems can rnams la de ñid daṅ de'i rgyu ji ltar gnas pa bźin du 'chad par bźed pas mṅon sum du mdzad pa yin no //*.

(1)Note Vibh. 57 n. 2: *na hy amārgajño 'viparītamārgopadeśe 'dhikriyate /*.

[124] See PVP D55a2–56a1/P62b3–63b4 (Śākyabuddhi's notes in PVṬ *Ñe* P143a2–b5 are very helpful). Devendrabuddhi comments here PV 2.132cd–134a$_1$: *yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate // tasyānityādirūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ / yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati // phalasya…* "Reflecting [on the means and the goal] through reason(ing) and scripture, [the compassionate *bodhisattva*] inquires into the cause of the suffering [that must be eradicated] and, through the properties (*viśeṣaṇa*) of suffering itself, [he also inquires] into the impermanent nature, etc., of the [cause in question. The *bodhisattva* inquires into the cause and its properties], for in this way [he who wishes to eradicate suffering] sees that there is no end to the effect as long as the cause remains."

permanently complete cause, *avikala*), then it cannot be destroyed. The *bodhisattva* can safely conclude that suffering must be impermanent (*anitya*). One can observe that some types of suffering are occasional (*kādācitka*) and hence must have a cause (for if they were causeless, suffering would be either always present or always absent). But if suffering is occasional, then its cause must be occasional too. Now that our rational *bodhisattva* has acquainted himself with the impermanence of the cause and hence with the very possibility of a salvational path, he still has to inquire into the factor (*dharma*) that opposes (*viruddha*, *virodhin*) this cause, in other words, the antidote (*pratipakṣa*, *vipakṣa*, *bādhaka*) whose cultivation (*abhyāsa*, *bhāvanā*) will prove capable of eliminating this cause.[125] This is expressed in the following passage:

> He inquires into the antidote of the cause [of suffering] in order to eliminate it. [As for the factor forming] the antidote to this [cause, this] is also ascertained by the [*bodhisattva*'s] understanding of the nature of the cause [itself. This] cause is attachment to dispositions, [an attachment that] is due to the belief in self and one's own; as for the antidote to this [cause], it is the perception of selflessness (*nairātmyadarśana*), which is incompatible with it.[126]

The *bodhisattva* is well aware of the fact that if a mental state *x* is an antidote to a mental state *y*, then *x* and *y* display contrary modes of grasping a given object (*viparītālambanākāra*).[127] The cause of suffering consists in an attachment or thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) that bears on the (painful, *duḥkhabhūta*) conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*), and grasps them as self and one's own (*ātmātmīya*), although they are entirely devoid of these.[128] The antidote to the cause of suffering must be a factor that grasps these painful mental dispositions as being free of self

[125] See PVP D56a2–3/P63b6–7 and PVP D56a4/P63b8–64a1.

[126] PV 2.134a$_2$–135: *hetor hānārthaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ parīkṣate / sādhyate tadvipakṣo 'pi heto rūpāvabodhataḥ // ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetur virodhi nairātmyadarśanaṃ tasya bādhakam //*.

[127] Note PVP D56a5–6/P64a2–3 and PVṬ *Ñe* P143b5: *dmigs pa ni yul yin la de'i 'dzin pa'i rnam pa yin no //*.

[128] See PVP D56b1/P64a5–6, PVP D56b1–2/P64a7 = PVV 58,5–6, PVP D56b3–4/P64b1–2 as well as PVṬ *Ñe* P144a1–2.

and one's own. It can then only consist in the perception of selflessness, whose uninterrupted cultivation brings about the elimination of suffering through the gradual uprooting (*unmūlana*) of its cause.

Conclusion

The 6th century CE is most likely to have been a time of duress for the Indian Buddhist communities, as they had simultaneously to face brahmanical hostility and compete with Śaivas for patronage. One group of Buddhist intellectuals felt compelled to meet this new challenge by going beyond internecine quarrels and turning to new, non-Buddhist targets and audiences. This involved abandoning earlier methodologies and language and putting less emphasis on soteriological concerns and dogmatic elaboration. From this point in time, significant segments of the Buddhist elites' discourse would be concerned with criticizing doctrinal tenets of non-Buddhists, neutralizing their attacks on Buddhism, and developing apologetic strategies designed to defend Buddhism as the only rational and hence possible path to salvation. These intellectuals evolved entirely new patterns of Buddhist self-assertion that centred on appeals to critical rationality. They turned earlier, mainly Yogācāra hermeneutic devices into evaluative and apologetic tools that they grounded in an epistemologically based anthropology. Ordinary human beings are cognitively limited, hence lack any access to the supersensible realm, and thus are doomed to uncertainty when engaging in action concerning the fulfilment of their practical expectations. In other words, practically rational persons are left with no other possibility than to maximize the probability of everyday as well as religious success by relying on reason(ing). Rational agents are expected to, and actually do infer the possibility of the expected result from the completeness and effectiveness of its causes. This applies of course to everyday actions, but also to scripturally based soteriological practice; indeed, the set of evaluative criteria developed by Dharmakīrti has no other purpose than enabling one to infer the plausibility of a scripture's reliability. But the Buddhist epistemologists' concept of practical rationality was not only meant to apply in the descriptive and nor-

mative framework of anthropology. It also provided their literary production with an ideal addressee that suited the 6th-century rhetorical concern with rationality as the only criterion for deciding between competing truth-claims. Furthermore, this concept provided their apologetic endeavours on behalf of Buddhism with a theoretical and methodological foundation. It is hardly surprising, then, that these philosophers read their epistemological, religious and apologetic programme into the Buddha himself, whose personality and undertakings were now interpreted as the embodiment of practical rationality. In doing this, the Buddhist epistemologists represented Buddhism as an eminently rational religion based on the paradigmatically rational and altruistic person of its founder.

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SNS – *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*. See Lamotte 1935.

ŚrBh – (1) Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group: *Śrāvakabhūmi*. *Revised Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation*. *The First Chapter*. Tokyo 1988: The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism (Taisho University), The Sankibo Press (Taisho University Sogo Bukkyo Kenkyujo Series, 4). (2) Karunesha Shukla: *Śrāvakabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*. Patna 1973: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 14).

ŚrBh_{T} – *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Tibetan version. D 4036, *Dzi* 1b1–195a7/P 5537, *Wi* 1b1–236a8.

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turen Südasiens, 15).

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ŚV – Gaṅgā Sāgar Rāy: *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathimiśra*. Varanasi 1993: Ratna Publications.

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TJ – [*Madhyamakahṛdaya*]*Tarkajvālā* (Bhāviveka/Bhavya) on *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* 9. D 3856, *Dza* 271a3–320b5/P 5256, *Dza* 306a2–367b6.

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TrBh – Hartmut Buescher: *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya. Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation*. Wien 2007: VÖAW (BKGA 57).

TS(P)$_K$ – Embar Krishnamacharya: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the*

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TS(P)$_{Ś}$ – Ś = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalshīla*. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series, 1).

TSP$_{T}$ – *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, Tibetan version. D 4267, *Ze* 133b1–'*E* 331a7/P 5765, '*E* 159b2–*Ye* 405a7.

TS$_{T}$ – *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Tibetan version. D 4266, *Ze* 1b1–133a4/P 5764, '*E* 1b1–159a6.

*UH – **Upāyahṛdaya*. Giuseppe Tucci: *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*. Baroda 1929: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 49).

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Vibh. – Vibhūticandra's notes on PVV. See PVV.

VinSg – *Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. D 4038, *Źi* 1b1–*Zi* 127a4/P 5539, *Zi* 1b1 – '*I* 142b8.

VNṬ – *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* (Śāntarakṣita). Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: "Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya. With the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita." Published as an appendix of the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 21–22, 1935–1936.

VÖAW – Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

VY – Jong Cheol Lee: *The Tibetan Text of the Vyākhyāyukti of Vasubandhu*: *Critically Edited from the Cone*, *Derge*, *Narthang and Peking editions*. Tokyo 2001: The Sankibo Press (Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica, 8).

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WSTB – Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde

WZKS(O) – *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-* (*und Ost*)*asiens*

Yaita 1987 – Hideomi Yaita: "Dharmakīrti on the Authority of Buddhist Scriptures (*āgama*) – an Annotated Translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*." *Nanto Bukkyo* 58 (June), pp. 1–17.

Yaita 1988 – Hideomi Yaita: "Dharmakīrti on the Person Free from Faults, Annotated Translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiḥ* ad v. 218–223." *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 11, pp. 433–445.

YBh – *Yogācārabhūmi*. See BoBh, HV, ŚrBh, VinSg.

Yoshimizu 1996 – Chizuko Yoshimizu: *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka nach dem Tshig gsal stoṅ thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bśad des dByaṅs bźad pa'i rdo rje. Einleitung, Textanalyse, Übersetzung*. Wien: ATBS (WSTB 37).

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Dignāga on air
or
how to get hold of supersensible objects by means of a credible person

With preliminary remarks on the composition of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[1]

Helmut Krasser

1. Introduction

In the second chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(*vṛtti*) which is devoted to the explanation of inference Dignāga supplies us with a discussion on air (*vāyu*) (PS[V] 2.3c–5b) which might be a summary of an independent work entitled *Vāyuprakaraṇa*.[2] There, an unnamed opponent attacks Dignāga's claim that inferences operate only with universals (*sāmānya*) arguing that we also know of inferences whose objects are non-universals (*asāmānya*).[3] Stating that

[1] This paper is a revised and expanded version of the lecture «Das Selbstverständnis der buddhistischen erkenntnistheoretischen Schule und ihr Zugang zu Übersinnlichem,» held in Vienna in 2005.

[2] On the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, see p. 175, Appendix 1.

[3] «If so, you cannot say that all inferences have a universal as their object. Why?

> Because one sees inferences also with regard to non-universals. PS 2.3c

Also in the case of such things (*svabhāva*) as air which are non-univer-

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inferences refer to non-universals could either mean they refer to particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), the objects of perception, or that there is a third kind of object different from the two accepted by Dignāga, namely, particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Since Dignāga does not discuss the latter possibility and concludes this 'airy' discussion with the statement that inference does not refer to particulars,[4] we can understand 'non-universal' in the sense of 'particular.'[5] Towards the end of this somewhat obscure discussion[6]

sals, one sees that they are inferred from temperature (*sparśa*)(1). As it is said: 'And temperature is a logical reason for inferring air, but not the temperature belonging to the substances that can be seen'.» As the text of the PSV is far from being clear, I offer only a free translation.

(1) On the interpretation of *sparśa* as temperature in this context, see Preisendanz 1994: 503–504.

PSV$_V$ 28a1–2: *gal te ʾdi ltar rjes dpag thams cad spyiʾi yul can no źes ni brjod par mi bya ste | ciʾi phyir źe na |*

spyi ma yin laʾaṅ (*asāmānye ʾpi* PSṬ 2 13,13) *mthoṅ baʾi phyir* || PS 2.3c

spyi ma yin laʾaṅ źes bya ba ni mthoṅ baʾi rluṅ la sogs paʾi raṅ bźin (*vāyvādisvabhāve* PSṬ 2 13,14) *reg bya la sogs pas rjes su dpog paʾo || de skad du yaṅ* (*yathāha* PSṬ 2 13,15) (1)*reg bya ni reg bya mthoṅ ba rnams kyi ma yin no*(1) *źes bya ba la sogs pas brjod do źe na |*

PSV$_K$ 109b5–7: *ʾon te thams cad spyiʾi yul can yin no źes bya ba de yaṅ brjod par mi byaʾo | ciʾi phyir źe na*

spyi ma yin la mthoṅ baʾi phyir || PS 2.3c

rluṅ la sogs pa spyiʾi raṅ bźin ma yin pa la yaṅ reg bya la sogs pa rnams kyi rjes su dpag pa mthoṅ ba yin no || ji skad du (1)*reg bya yaṅ mthoṅ ba rnams kyi reg bya ma yin no*(1) *źes bya ba la sogs ba bśad pa lta buʾo ||*

(1) *sparśaś ca, na ca dṛṣṭānāṃ sparśaḥ* VSū 2.1.9–10, PSṬ 2 14,3. For a discussion of these *sūtra*s, see Lasic 2010: 518–519.

4 PSV$_K$ 111a5–6: *deʾi phyir raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can gyi rjes su dpag pa ni med do* || = PSV$_V$ 29a3: *deʾi phyir rjes su dpag paʾi yul ni raṅ gi mtshan ñid ma yin no* ||

5 See also *sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam iti | svalakṣaṇaviṣayam* (PSṬ$_{ms}$ 153a2) referred to below p. 178.

6 A summary of the arguments is given in Onoda 2004 (in Japanese) and

Dignāga gives his definition of a credible person's statements (*āptavāda*), *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumāna-tā/tvam* (PS 2.5ab). While in another paper I have examined this definition in the light of Dharmakīrti's understanding,[7] here I will examine Dignāga's ideas.

2. Dignāga on the statements of a credible person (*āptavāda*)

The definition of a credible person's statements in PS(V) 2.5ab has already been dealt with by a number of modern scholars.[8] Recently, Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on this work has become available in its original Sanskrit. On its basis, we can reconstruct at least parts of Dignāga's PSV and thus get a better understanding. For this reason we will have another look at this definition. I will first present a Sanskrit reconstruction with the two Tibetan translations, then a tentative translation based on that, and finally a discussion of the problems involved. The reconstruction, which I have modified slightly, was kindly put at my disposal by Horst Lasic, who is currently preparing an edition and translation of the entire second chapter.[9]

The reader must be warned here that the Sanskrit reconstruction/retranslation, sometimes following PSV_K, sometimes PSV_V, sometimes being a mixture of both, and sometimes only being based on Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ, represents an artificial text that certainly never existed in this form. Nevertheless, this reconstruction is a necessary first step in order to get at least a rough understanding of the text.

Words that are not based on either Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ or any other Sanskrit source are printed *in italics*.

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in Lasic 2010: 516–520.

[7] See the chapter «2. PVSV 108,1–109,22 on PS 2.5ab» in Krasser 2012b: 84–102.

[8] See, e.g., Eltschinger 2007: 70 (with n. 9) and Lasic 2010: 509–510. Mention should also be made of Onoda 2004.

[9] It goes without saying that any remaining mistakes are my own.

2.1 Reconstruction of PS(V) 2.5ab with Tibetan translations

śābdam api tu[1] sambandhābhāva[2] *asādhāraṇaviṣayatvena dvidhānumānaṃ kalpayitavyam* — dṛṣṭārtham[3] adṛṣṭārthaṃ[3] *ca*. *tatra* dṛṣṭārthe sañjñāvyutpattiḥ[4]. adṛṣṭārthe ʾrthavikalpamātram[5], na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ[6]. kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam[7]. na hi svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate[8].

āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam[9] | PS 2.5ab

āptavacana*tvaṃ* gṛhītvā[10]-arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt[11] tasya[12]-*apy* anumānatvam[12] *uktam*. tathā hy āha[13] – pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt sañjñākarmaṇa[14] iti.

anayā diśā pradhānādi[15]*svabhāveṣv apy anumānaṃ pratiṣedhyam. tasmān na svalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam asti*.

References are, if not otherwise indicated, to PSṬ 2: [1] 26,14–15 [2] 26,15; 27,4; 28,1 [3] 27,5 [4] 27,5–6; 28,3 [5] 27,7–8; 28,6 (quoted PVSV 37,27) [6] 28,6 [7] 28,4 [8] 28,9–10; 28,12 [9] 29,1; 29,3; 30,11 [10] 30,1; 31,4 [11] 30,2–3 [12] 30,2 [13] 31,9 [14] VSū 2.1.19 [15] 31,14

⌘

sgra las byuṅ ba yaṅ ʾbrel pa med par thun moṅ ma yin paʾi yul mthoṅ ba daṅ ma mthoṅ ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gñis su brtag par byaʾo || de la mthoṅ baʾi don la miṅ bstan paʾo || ma mthoṅ baʾi don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ni ma yin no || ji ltar de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin te mtho ris la sogs paʾi sgra rnams kyis don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin no ||

yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba || spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid || PS 2.5ab

yid ches paʾi tshig ñid bzuṅ nas don de la mi bslu baʾi phyir daṅ | mi ʾdra baʾi phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid du bśad pa yin te || de ltar yaṅ miṅ gi las ni mṅon sum sṅon du ʾgro ba can źes bya ba yin no || phyogs ʾdis ni gtso bo la sogs paʾi raṅ bźin rnams la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no || deʾi phyir raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can gyi rjes su dpag pa ni med do || PSV_K 111a1–6

⌘

sgra yaṅ yul thun moṅ ma yin pa daṅ ʾbrel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa gñis ka rjes su dpag pa brtag par bya ste | mthoṅ baʾi don daṅ ma mthoṅ baʾi don no || de la mthoṅ baʾi don la ni mi (read: *miṅ*) *gsal bar byed paʾo || ma mthoṅ baʾi don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam ʾbaʾ źig ste | don gyi bye brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no || gal te mtho ris la sogs paʾi sgras don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin na ji ltar rjes su dpag pa ñid du ʾgyur źe na |*

> *yid ches tshig kyaṅ mi slu bar || mtshuṅs phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid ||* PS 2.5ab

yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuṅ nas kyaṅ mi bslu bar mtshuṅs pa'i phyir de yaṅ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do || de skad du yaṅ | miṅ gi las rnams kyi don du mṅon sum soṅ ba'i phyir ro źes 'byuṅ ṅo || de dag gis ni phyogs daṅ gtso bo la sogs pa'i raṅ bźin la yaṅ rjes su dpag pa dgag par bya'o || de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni raṅ gi mtshan ñid ma yin no || PSV_V 28b7–29a3

2.2 Translation of PS(V) 2.5ab

On the other hand (*api tu*), inference consisting in words (*śābda*) is, due to its having different objects (*asādhāraṇaviṣayatva*), to be conceived as being of two kinds: one whose object has been seen at the time when there was no knowledge of the connection between a word and its referent (*sambandhābhāva*), and one whose object has not been seen. From among these (*tatra*), in the case of the one whose object has been seen, we learn its name (*sañjñāvyutpatti*). In the case of the one whose object has not been seen (*adṛṣṭārtha*) we have a mere conception of the object (*arthavikalpamātra*), but no knowledge of the specific object (*na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ*). How then (*kathaṃ tarhi*) is this latter an inference? Answer: Because (*hi*) it is not (*na*) the case that by words like 'heaven' (*svargādiśabda*) the mere non-specific object (*arthamātra*) is denoted (*ucyate*).

> Because the character of being non-belying of a credible person's statement is the same (*sāmānya*), it is an inference. (PS 2.5ab)

This (*tasya*) too (*api*) has been said to be inference, because, having grasped a statement's being the statement of a credible person, it is equal in not belying with regard to the object (*arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*). For in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* it is said accordingly (*tathā hy āha*): «Because giving a name to something (*sañjñākarmaṇaḥ*) is preceded by its perception (*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt*).»

In this way (*anayā diśā*), also an inference with regard to things such as primordial matter (*pradhānādisvabhāva*) is to be negated (*pratiṣedhya*). Thus, an inference that refers to a particular (*svalakṣaṇaviṣaya*) does not exist.

2.3 Explanation of PS(V) 2.5ab

To distinguish between the two kinds of inferences, Dignāga simply follows the opposing school of Nyāya. In *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 and 8, where one of the four means of knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas[10] is defined and explained, namely «word» (*śabda*), we read:

> *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* // NSū 1.1.7
> ***sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt*** // NSū 1.1.8
>
> The means of knowledge 'word' is the statement of a credible person. This is of two kinds, due to its having an object that has either been seen or not seen.

This is explained in Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya* as follows:

> *yasyeha dṛśyate 'rthaḥ, sa* ***dṛṣṭārtha****ḥ. yasyāmutra pratīyate, so '****dṛṣṭārtha****ḥ. evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṃ pravibhāga iti. kimarthaṃ punar idam ucyate? sa na manyeta «dṛṣṭārtha evāptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam arthasyāvadhāraṇāt» iti, adṛṣṭārtho 'pi pramāṇam, arthasyānumānād iti.* NBh 14,10–13 on NSū 1.1.8
>
> That statement is said to have a seen object, whose object is seen here in this world. The one, whose object is seen above, i.e. not in this world, is said to have an unseen object. In this way one distinguishes between worldly statements and those of the sages.[11] With what purpose has this been said? So that this person (*sa*)[(1)] cannot maintain that only the statement of a credible person whose object has been seen is a means of knowledge, because one can determine the object; also the one whose object is not seen is a means of knowledge, because its object is inferred.
>
> [(1)] *sa* might refer to the one who asked this question (?). In the NVTṬ (172,1–2) it is explained as referring to a non-believer who, however, is remote: ***sa na manyeta*** *dṛṣṭānāṃ vākyānāṃ prāmāṇyam.* ***sa*** *iti viprakṛṣṭo nāstikaḥ parāmṛṣyata iti.*

Although Dignāga does not count the Naiyāyikas' means of knowledge *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa* but subsumes it under inference, there can be little doubt that his distinction between two kinds of in-

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[10] See *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni* // NSū 1.1.3.

[11] On the relation of NSū 1.1.8 with Pakṣilasvāmin's explanation to the *Carakasaṃhitā*, see Preisendanz 2009: 282–285.

ferences, one whose object has been seen and one whose object has not been seen, is the same as the Naiyāyikas' distinction of *śabda*.

Dignāga's explanation contains, however, a bit more information than the NBh's. Although the meaning of the expression *sambandhābhāve* is far from being self-evident, and although Jinendrabuddhi's comments must be used with caution as he generally tries to interpret Dignāga in the light of Dharmakīrti's innovative elucidations, I see no harm in following Jinendrabuddhi here and understanding *sambandhābhāve*, «when the connection is absent,» as «at the time of convention» (*sambandhābhāva iti saṅketakāle* PSṬ 2 26,15). Although the term *sambandha* has not yet been used in this discussion, it is clear from the context that it refers to the connection between words and their referents. This is what this sentence is about. And since such a connection between words and referents exists only in our mind, according to Buddhists, we can understand *sambandhābhāve* as 'when there is no knowledge of the connection between a word and its referent.' Moreover, since Dignāga is talking about 'word' in this sentence, this is what *śābdam anumānam* means, and this word is one that we learn now, this *sambandhābhāve* is restricted to the time when we hear such a word for the first time. Through this, the time before hearing the word for the first time, which is also characterized by the absence of the connection, is excluded. In this way we arrive at Jinendrabuddhi's *saṅketakāle*. Thus, the first kind of inference is one whose object has been seen at the time of convention when we are told its name, *saṃjñāvyutpatti*, e.g. «This is a bread-fruit tree» (*ayaṃ panasa iti* PSṬ 2 27,6). The second kind of inference is different. When we learn the word «heaven» (*svarga*), we do not see heaven and thus, we can only have a conception of it. This seems to imply the problem that we cannot obtain what is taught in the scripture if it is based on mere conceptions, be it heaven or finally *niḥśreyasa* in the case of the Naiyāyikas or *nirvāṇa* in the case of the Buddhists.

In both the NBh and the PSV the problems involved are formulated very vaguely: «With what purpose has this been said?» (NBh) and «How then is this latter an inference?» (PSV).

The answers given to these questions are not very elucidating either. The NBh simply states that, because in both cases of a credible person's statement the object is determined or inferred, both can be regarded as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Dignāga would certainly not agree that we ascertain a real object (*arthāvadhāraṇa*) in the case of a credible person's statement whose object we have seen previously, as is assumed in the NBh. This would imply that words refer to real objects. But for Dignāga ordinary words only refer to the «exclusion» (*apoha*), as he then explains in PS(V) 5.[12] However, in the case of statements of sages regarding supersensible objects, he seems to follow the NBh's explanation, for he tells us that words like heaven are not belying with regard to real objects (*arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*) and do not merely denote an object in general (*arthamātra*).[13] Thus, as in the case of the NBh, we obtain what they teach us.

Because of their «similarity in being non-belying» (*avisaṃvādatulyatvāt*) such words of credible persons can be called inference (*anumāna*). Unfortunately, Dignāga does not tell us with whom or what these words of credible persons share their character of being non-belying. An explanation may have been contained in his *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, but even if this were the case, this is of no help as long as we do not have it. Thus, in order to avoid relying on Dharmakīrti's and post-Dharmakīrtian interpretations and to avoid thereby the risk of being misled by them, it is better to look for possible pre-Dignāgean candidates. As Pakṣilasvāmin has been a good companion so far, he seems a promising candidate for helping us to solve this problem as well. And indeed, in his comments on NSū 2.1.68 we find a few explanations that might shed some light on Dignāga's cryptic formulation in PS 2.5ab. NSū 2.1.68 is located within a series of arguments against the accusation brought forward in NSū 2.1.57 that «word» (*śabda*), in the sense of the credible statements of the sages

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[12] The text of PS(V) 5 has recently been published with an annotated translation in Pind 2009.

[13] This is also explained by Jinendrabuddhi: *tasmān* ***nā****ptaprayuktaiḥ* ***svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate****. kiṃ tarhi. laukikaśabdāsādhāraṇe bāhye 'py artha iti* PSṬ 2 28,12–13.

as available in the Veda, cannot be a means of knowledge, since the Veda contains untrue statements and is full of contradictions and repetitions.[14] NSū 2.1.68 states that the Veda is a means of knowledge in the parts teaching supersensible objects which one cannot check to be true, just as it is a means of knowledge in the parts about mantras or the Āyurveda, which teach perceptible objects that one can see are true. The reason provided is that a credible person is a means of knowledge. How this works is explained by Pakṣilasvāmin in the following way.

> *dṛṣṭārthenāptopadeśenāyurvedenādṛṣṭārtho vedabhāgo ʾnumātavyaḥ «pramāṇam» iti, āptaprāmāṇyasya hetoḥ samānatvād iti.* NBh 97,8–9 on NSū 2.1.68
>
> By means of the Āyurveda, being a teaching by a credible person the objects of which have been seen, that part of the Veda the object of which has not been seen can be inferred as a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇam iti*), because the credible person's authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*), which makes up the logical reason for such an inference, is the same.

If we now compare Pakṣilasvāmin's explanation to Dignāga's formulation *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam*, we can easily see that the credible person's character of being non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*, PS) corresponds to the credible person's authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) in the NBh which is identified as the logical reason (*hetu*). *sāmānyāt* (PS), paraphrased by Dignāga himself as *tulyatvāt*, is the equivalent of *samānatvāt* (Nbh). And since when dealing with inferences with seen and unseen objects Dignāga, from the beginning, follows Pakṣilasvāmin to the degree compatible with his own teachings, we might safely assume that the similarity of the character of being non-belying of this credible person consists in, as the validity in the NBh, a similarity between perceptible and imperceptible objects. We can thus understand Dignāga's definition of *āptavāda* in PS 2.5ab as follows.

> Because the character of being non-belying of a credible person's statement is the same in the case of supersensible objects as in the case of objects that are accessible to us, such a statement is an inference in the

[14] *tadaprāmāṇyam, anṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyaḥ* NSū 2.1.57.

sense of an inferential mark.

If we formulate an inference of this type based on our reading of Dignāga through the lens of Pakṣilasvāmin, it might look like this:

> This statement of this credible person regarding supersensible objects is non-belying, because it is this credible person's statement, like another statement of this credible person concerning perceptible objects.

If we reformulate this in terms of Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvahetu*, we arrive at the following:

> Any statement of a credible person is non-belying, because it is the statement of a credible person.

And this is exactly the formulation we find in the comments of Śākyabuddhi/Karṇakagomin and Jinendrabuddhi, whose understanding is in accordance with Dharmakīrti's interpretation:

> *gaṅ daṅ gaṅ ñes pa zad pa'i tshig de daṅ de ni mi slu ba yin te* PVṬ Je D242b3 = *yo ya āptavādaḥ, so 'visaṃvādī* PVSVṬ 390,16
>
> *yad āptavacanam, tad avisaṃvādi* PSṬ 2 30,7

We thus arrive at the same understanding of PS 2.5ab when guided by Pakṣilasvāmin and when basing ourselves on Dharmakīrti and his commentators.[15] We can therefore safely say that Dignāga was following the Nyāya model when formulating his definition of *āptavāda*.

In the *Vṛtti* on PS 2.5ab Dignāga then answers the first question: *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam*? When we hear the statement of a credible person, we can infer that it is correct and that it finally makes known an external object such as heaven, because its non-belying character is the same as in those cases we can check. Jinendrabuddhi's comments read:

> «**Having grasped the statement of a credible person**» and so forth. It (*tasya*) has been said to be an inference, having grasped the statement of a credible person which is a logical reason (*hetu*) for understanding that it is not belying (*avisaṃvāda*). The question why this (*tasya*) is

[15] For the interpretation of PS 2.5ab based on Dharmakīrti and his commentators, see Krasser 2012b: 99.

> now an inference is to be explained by «**because it is equal in being non-belying with regard to the object**» (*arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*).[16]

The quotation from the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* serves the purpose of proving that a credible person must have seen what he relates and thus, being a credible person, what he tells us must be true. He gave the name «heaven» to something that he has seen, because giving a name to something is preceded by its perception (*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt sañjñākarmaṇaḥ* VSū 2.1.19). Therefore, even if we only have a mere conception of this external object, he finally makes it known. Dignāga is expressing his own opinion by means of this quote. And cleverly, for the Vaiśeṣika remains no possibility to argue against this assumption as otherwise he would contradict his own scripture. Jinendrabuddhi:

> By the words *tathā hy āha* Dignāga corroborates (*saṃsyandayati*) his own view with the other, i.e. Vaiśeṣika, treatise (*śāstrāntara*). Credible persons give the respective name only after having grasped the nature of things such as heaven by perception. «Name giving» is to be understood as a mere synecdoche (*upalakṣaṇamātra*), for they speak of everything only after having seen the object. Otherwise they would not be credible persons at all. Therefore each of their statements is non-belying. And thus their statement is inference.[17]

Dignāga then concludes his refutation by advising his students to follow the procedure found in this entire section if they have to refute other pseudo-entities such as the primordial matter (*pradhāna*) assumed by the Sāṅkhyas. For this, like «air» in the case of the Vaiśeṣika, is also known only from their scriptures.

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[16] ***āptavacanaṃ gṛhītve****tyādi. āptavacanaṃ gṛhītvāvisaṃvādādhigamahetuṃ* ***tasyānumānatvam uktam****. kasmāt punas tasyānumānatvam* ***arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvād*** *iti vyākhyeyam*. PSṬ 2 30,1–3.

[17] ***tathā hy āhe****ty anena svamataṃ śāstrāntareṇa saṃsyandayati. āptāḥ pratyakṣataḥ svargādīnāṃ svabhāvaṃ gṛhitvā sañjñāṃ praṇayanti. upalakṣaṇamātraṃ ca* ***sañjñākarma*** *veditavyam. sarvam eva hi te 'rthadarśanapūrvakam eva vyāharanti. anyathāptā eva na syuḥ. tasmāt teṣāṃ sarvam eva vaco 'visaṃvādi. ataś cānumānam iti*. PSṬ 2 31,9–13

Observations on the composition of the PSV

In the next part, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks on the composition of the PSV. These are only preliminary, because they are not based on an examination of the entire PSV, but only on bits and pieces that attracted my attention.

In Appendix 1, I have indicated two *pāda*s of verses in the translation prepared by the team Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal which are translated as prose in the version of Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab (PSV_V 27b7–28a1/PSV_K 109b5–6 and PSV_V 28a3–4/ PSV_K 102a2); see below p. 176. To this we may add another *pāda* and a half from the Nyāya section of the second chapter which immediately follows *pāda* PS 2.28a:

> *'khrul ba'i phyir na ldan pa min* // PS 2.28a (*na matub vyabhicāritvāt* PSṬ 2 66,12)
>
> *ldan par byed pa ni rigs na || sṅar 'di ru yod do*
>
> *źes 'bras bu sṅa ma daṅ ldan par byed na ni yul de śes pa yaṅ sṅa ma daṅ ldan par 'gyur la* | PSV_V D32b6–7
>
> ⌘
>
> *ldan min 'khrul pa srid phyir ro* // PS 2.28a
>
> *gal te ldan pa byed pa yin na 'bras bu 'di la sṅar rgyu yod do źes bya ba ni sṅa ma daṅ ldan pa yin la | de'i yul can gyi śes par yaṅ sṅa ma daṅ ldan pa yin no* // PSV_K 115a8–b1

Another case is from the Sāṅkhya section of the third chapter, where (an unidentified) verse is attributed to an unnamed teacher (*ācārya*, *slob dpon*) in the PSV. In Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, this teacher is identified as Vasubandhu.

> *gaṅ du slob dpon gyis* |
>
> *naṅ la 'dus bsags ñid ma yin || de bźin gźan don can ma yin ||*
>
> *źes dogs pa bsu ste* | PSV_V D48a3
>
> ⌘
>
> *slob dpon gyis kyaṅ dogs ba bsus nas de ltar naṅ gi bsdus pa rnams gźan don byed par mi 'gyur ro źes brjod pa yin no* // PSV_K 134a6
>
> *yad āśāṅkyācāryavasubandhunā*
>
> *saṅghātā āntarā evaṃ tathā na syuḥ parārthakāḥ ||*

ity uktam. PST_{ms} 137a5[18]

Other cases are reported in Katsura 2009: 159 n. 19

> «V (D49a2; P52a6) inserts one extra line between 3.29ab and 3.29cd: *gcig la nges par zhugs pa dang || log pa min pa*(*'ang*) *rtags su 'gyur ||.* K (135a5) takes this portion as being prose: *mtha' gcig la rjes su 'jug pa dang ldog pa'i shes pa gtan tshigs su 'gyur te.*»

and in Katsura 2009: 161 n. 21

> «Here V inserts an extra *pada*: *gcig gi tshig tu bstan pa'i phyir ||*. K (135a5) does not take it to be part of the verse, and this is supported by Jinendrabuddhi.»[19]

While in this latter case Jinendrabuddhi's exemplar (PSV_{Jin}) of the PSV he was commenting upon supports «K» (Kanakavarman), during our work on the edition of PSṬ 2 we have seen that PSV_{Jin}, although generally closer to K, is sometimes closer to PSV_V. This has also been noted by Katsura in connection with PS 3.27:

> «Generally I prefer to rely on K rather than V when I reconstruct or retranslate Dignāga, for Jinendrabuddhi normally supports K. However, as in the present case, he occasionally supports V, which clearly indicates the existence of more than two distinct recensions of the PS.» (Katsura 2009: 160)

That we are dealing with three quite different versions of the PSV is also supported by the fact that Jinendrabuddhi explains a passage of the PSV which, judged from the context, belongs to Dignāga's comments on PS 2.27d, where the Nyāya *pūrvavat* inference is discussed. This passage cannot be found in either of the two Tibetan PSV versions.

> ***pūrvavaty api ce****ti.* ***pūrvavad*** *ity atra vipakṣe viṣāṇādiliṅgena gavārthānumāne samavāyaḥ sambandhaḥ.* PSṬ 2 69,6
>
> ***sṅa ma daṅ ldan pa la yaṅ*** *źes pa* ***sṅa ma vat*** *ces pa 'di la 'dra ba'i phyogs la rva la sogs pa'i rtags kyi ba laṅ gi don rjes su dpog pa na* | *'du* (P : *du* D) *ba'i 'brel pa yin źiṅ* | PST_{Tib} D108a5–6/P122a6–7

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[18] On this verse, see Watanabe 2008: 64 and Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 156.

[19] More differences between the two Tibetan translations are presented in Katsura 2009: 161.

The material presented so far not only points to three different versions of the PSV, but it also amply reveals that these differences cannot be easily accounted for as being mere errors that crept in during a transmission that started with a single exemplar. While it is clear that some variants in the Tibetan translations such as *gyi*/*gyis*, *la*/*las* or even *yin*/*ma yin* (the latter possibly a misreading of *yin* and *min*, which look very similar in the Tibetan *dbu med* script) can be explained as transmission errors, differences such as verse versus prose cannot. It is hard to imagine that Kanakavarman could not distinguish between verse and prose. But how then can we explain these discrepancies? One possibility, and this is the one I consider the most plausible, certainly would be to assume that these errors were there from the beginning and that these manuscripts do not stem from the pen of Dignāga, but from the pens of different students who were taught *pramāṇa* by Dignāga. At least in the case of Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā* and digressions (*prasaṅga*) in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, we have some evidence that these texts represent notes taken by students.[20] And a paper in which I argue for the same in the case of Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya* is under preparation.[21] Although nowhere in the PSV it is stated that we are dealing with notes by students, there is some evidence for such an assumption.

First we must ask for whom the PSV was composed. To answer this question we have to consider the purpose of this work. At the beginning of the PSV, Dignāga states that he composes this treatise in order to refute the means of knowledge taught by the opponents and to propagate the qualities of his own means of knowledge, because the proper cognition of knowable objects depends on these means of knowledge and because many people understand them incorrectly.[22] While this is the direct purpose, at the end of the PSV

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[20] See the chapter «3. On the authenticity of the *Tarkajvālā*» in Krasser 2012a, and Krasser 2011.

[21] First results of my study on the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya* have been presented in the lecture «On ur-texts and writing styles in Indian philosophy» at the IABS conference in Taipei, June 2011.

[22] *parapramāṇapratiṣedhāya svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanāya ca, yasmāt pra-*

Dignāga formulates, according to the commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a second or indirect (*vyavahita*) purpose (*prayojana*) for having composed the work.[23]

> I composed this work in order to turn those who adhere to (*źen pa rnams*) the assumptions of the non-Buddhist Tīrthikas away from these ideas, because they are without essence as the valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) and their objects (*prameya*), as taught by the Tīrthikas, are not fixed properly. However, by doing as much (*iyatā*) I do not aim at their introduction into the teaching of the Tathāgata, because his *dharma* is not in the realm of logic. But those who have turned away from the assumptions of the Tīrthikas can easily understand *dharmatā* after hearing it, since it is absent/remote from the Tīrthikas' teaching and present in/near the Tathāgata's teaching.[24]

Here we learn that the followers of non-Buddhist teachings should be converted to Buddhism. The non-Buddhist teachings that are refuted in the PSV are those of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Mīmāṃsā. Thus, their followers are the final addressees of the PSV. Among them may have been followers who were well versed in philosophy and philosophical argumentation. These may have included, besides the Brahmins representing these systems, wealthy persons — nobles, kings or wealthy merchants — but also people from the the broad masses. We thus might imagine that Dignāga wrote his PSV in his monastery, whereupon he sent his work to a scriptorium to be copied. Then copies of the PSV were distributed (in a pre-modern bookshop?) to these non-Buddhists.

A quite unlikely scenario. The broad masses, being illiterate, can be excluded. And I think that we are on the safe side when we exclude

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māṇāyattā prameyapratipattir bahavaś cātra vipratipannāḥ PS 1 1,11–13. Instead of *pramāṇāyattā prameyapratipattir,* read *pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamaḥ*, according to a quotation of the passage later in PST$_{ms}$ 243a2–3: *tathā coktam — yasmāt pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamasa* [read: °*ādhigama*] *iti.*

[23] *pramāṇaprameyadurvihitatvenetyādinā śāstrārambhasya vyavahitaṃ prayojanaṃ darśayati* PST$_{ms}$ 258b4.

[24] For the text and the context, see Krasser 2004: 131–135.

the group of wealthy persons, even if they were educated. Who and how many of them would have been qualified to read such a cryptic text, which rarely expresses what it wants to communicate directly? At best it would have caused a headache for the reader. Thus, only a small group of people remains: Brahmins well versed in philosophical argumentation and their students. But if they purchased and read copies of the PSV and if, in turn, Buddhist intellectuals such as Dignāga read their essays, then it is quite certain that Dignāga didn't achieve his aims. Indeed, no Brahmin author showed any indication that he was even slightly impressed by the PSV. On the contrary, the available texts of Dignāga's opponents that react to his criticism dislike his teachings and refute them. Why should these Brahmins give up their home, their family, their religious affiliation, and their income merely because they read some of Dignāga's arguments? And even if essays by contemporary opponents who reacted to Dignāga found their way into Dignāga's hands, at the best this would have remained an intellectual game under elites, with the general public completely excluded.

Moreover, in such a way Dignāga's statement at the end of the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika's *vāyu* inference, «In this way also the inference with regard to things such as primordial matter is to be negated» (see above, p. 151), must be understood as being directed towards his Sāṅkhya opponents: «Friends! Destroy the pillar of your beliefs by yourself, as I have shown you with the example 'air.' Having done so, jump over into my camp!» But what about Dignāga's aim of converting non-Buddhists? Was he a naive intellectual with his head in the clouds; had he lost any or all contact with reality? I don't think so; his works as summarized in the PSV do not give this impression. In this period, there was a lot of competition on the religious market and hostility between the various religious groups.[25] Dignāga's work fits into this socio-religious context very well.

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[25] See, e.g., Eltschinger 2010. Bhāviveka (490/500–570), for example, introduces the Mīmāṃsakas to his students with the harsh words «Certain **evil Tīrthikas** who cannot stand the rays of the *maṇḍala* of the immaculate ten powers of the Buddha to know everything, his unerring teaching that illuminates all places, like those suffering from eye

But if we assume — as is the case with Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā*, the digressions in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, and with Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*[26] — that Dignāga's teaching served the purpose of preparing students for debates[27] with Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiśeṣikas, etc., then the indirect purpose for composing the PSV, namely to turn the followers of the Tīrthikas away from their erroneous beliefs, can be understood. Dignāga is teaching his students how to refute the main pillars of these non-Buddhist religious groups so that their followers might give up their beliefs and eventually follow the Buddha and his teachings, and join his community. Their introduction into

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disease cannot stand the rays of the sun *maṇḍala,* i.e. the disc of the sun, state ...» (Krasser 2011: 53) and teaches them that the Veda is the product of an evil human mind: «Moreover, one can infer this Veda to have been made by an **evil human being**, because it teaches deeds such as harming living beings and drinking wine like the book of the Magas» (Krasser 2012a: 539). The evil Tīrthikas (*mu stegs can ṅan pa*) mentioned here is one group of Dignāga's Tīrthikas. Bhāviveka's accusation finds its counterpart in Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*: «But such things that [you] teach seem attractive [only] to devotees. And we, not being devotees, seek reasoning. And these [teachings] which have flowed out of a wall, etc. cannot have been taught by a trustworthy person. And [we] won't trust the [teachings], [because we have a doubt] 'by whom have these [teachings] been uttered?' [Are they] taught by the Buddha [himself]? Or [are they] taught by those who are playing to deceive brahmins by means of distant echoes? Or [are they] stated by an unseen **evil-minded ghost** and the like? — Therefore those who regard [themselves] as wise men should not trust these [teachings]» (Kataoka 2011: 372–373, nn. 431 and 433, and Krasser 2011: 214–215). And Dharmakīrti concludes his PVSV with a quite telling verse (PV 1.340): «[Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be an agent, seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one's caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination» (Eltschinger et al. 2012: 77–78).

[26] See above, note 20.

[27] Such debates are known from reports of Chinese pilgrims, Tibetan historical accounts and a few inscriptions; see Bronkhorst 2007 and Cabezón 2008.

Buddhism, however, is not the aim of compositions like the PSV, «because his *dharma* is not in the realm of logic» (see above, p. 161).

If the assumption that Dignāga's teachings were addressed to his students is correct, then texts like the PSV were never meant to end up in the hands of his opponents, although they finally did, of course. They even were to be kept out of their reach. Why, after all, would someone provide a rival the arguments with which he intends to refute him? According to my understanding, these texts were meant to be circulated only within an inner circle. Also, they do not provide an account of all the main topics of the opponents' teachings, but only those that are predisposed to criticism. This goes together well with John Taber's observations on Dharmakīrti's arguments against the validity of the Veda:

> «Thus, in the end, we arrive at the not very surprising result that, while Dharmakīrti exhibits broad knowledge of problems of Mīmāṃsā exegesis in PV(SV) 1.312–340, he displays nothing like an expert's command. It is possible he received some training in Mīmāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course.» (Taber 2012: 148)

This statement is qualified a little later (2012: 149):

> «It would have been surprising, however, if matters turned out any differently. Dharmakīrti, after all, is addressing his own community — other Buddhists. He is not trying to convince Mīmāṃsakas or, it would appear, even get at the truth. In general, philosophical debate in classical India was characterized by *jalpa*, "disputation," not *saṃvāda*, "discussion." It was acceptable to raise *prima facie* objections to the views of one's adversaries, as a means of protecting one's own position, without necessarily having to represent those views sympathetically or completely accurately, placing the burden on one's opponent to set the record straight …»

While I agree with this completely, I am not sure whether one can conclude from Dharmakīrti's arguments that «it is possible he received some training in Mīmāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course.» It goes without saying that if one enters a discussion this should be done with solid arguments. We have at least one statement of his to this effect. In his *Vādanyāya* Dharmakīrti scolds one of his students for not being prepared:

tayor abhedād adoṣa iti cet, anuttaraṃ bata, doṣasaṅkaṭam atrabhavān dṛṣṭirāgeṇa praveśyamāno 'pi nātmānaṃ cetayati. VN 12,7–9

Dharmakīrti: If you assume that there is no mistake, because these two are not different, alas, this is not an answer! Although His Worship enters the difficulties of that mistake due to his love of his own view, he himself does not understand it. (German transl. Much 1991: 30; modified slightly)

Coming back now to Dignāga, we must ask how his teaching might have taken place. Did he first write the PSV in his cell or dictate it to a scribe, looking up various passages in his other texts and incorporating them, and then use this manuscript for his teaching? Or did he deliver his lectures without relying on a manuscript, quoting his other texts from memory? Although there are no clear indications for either assumption, I favour the latter.

First of all, this would allow us to explain the differences between the manuscripts, of which two were the basis for Tibetan translations. Another exemplar was used by Jinendrabuddhi. In addition, it better fits the purpose of the PSV as I understand it. Students were to be prepared for discussions with non-Buddhists: oral discussions, not written competitions. Thus, they had to learn to grasp the argument of a rival quickly, arguments that the latter has tried to formulate in a manner as complicated as possible, hoping that the former might not be able to follow. And they have to remember what the other has said, as well, of course, and to consider the context. This is something that must be practiced, either among themselves or under the supervision of an *ācārya*. At least in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, where in the second part of the latter students had to show that they had memorized all the points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) as taught in the *Nyāyasūtra*, in Pakṣilasvāmin's *Bhāṣya* and Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, we have samples of discussions between students and their teacher.[28]

[28] The following examples and others, e.g., from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, will be dealt with in another paper.

1) Student: ... Dharmakīrti: *krīḍanaśīlo devānāmpriyaḥ sukhaidhitaḥ kṛtaṃ kṛtaṃ punaḥ kārayati. tathā hi bījādyupanyāse nirloṭhitam etat*. HB 12,21–13,2, HB_{ms} 10b2

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: The beloved of the gods,[29] whose highest virtue consists in playing and who grew up under circumstances that were too easy (*sukhaidhita*), asks to be done again what has been done and done / to state again what has been stated again and again (*kṛtam kṛtaṃ punaḥ kārayati*). For this has been explained already when discussing a sprout, etc. (4 pages earlier in the text; HB 8,16; German transl. Steinkellner 1967: 49) [How could an opponent who is not present know what Dharmakīrti has explained before?]

2) *... idam evāsmābhir ucyamānaṃ kim atrabhavataḥ paruṣam ivābhāti. tasmāt tīrādarśineva śakuninā dūraṅgatvāpi punar āgantavyam ity alam apratiṣṭhānadikpratipattyā*. HB 26,1–4, HB_{ms} 19a6–b1
Student: ... Dharmakīrti: Why does His Honor look nearly aggressive (*paruṣam iva*) inasmuch as we are saying exactly that which you now claim. Thus, like a bird that does not see a shore even if it has flown far away must return to a boat of the sailors, you have to return again to the starting point.[30] Therefore, enough of going in a direction where there is no ground. (German transl. Steinkellner 1967: 66)

3) *... vismaraṇaśīlo devānāmpriyaḥ prakaraṇaṃ na lakṣayati.* VN 12,1–2
Student: ... Dharmakīrti: The beloved of the gods, whose highest virtue consists in forgetfulness, does not consider the context. (German transl. Much 1991: 30)

Although these passages do not prove anything about Dignāga's PSV, in general they show that students might have been involved in the composition of such texts. And there is at least one passage in the PSV that gives the impression of Dignāga discussing with a student. This passage also clearly shows that the differences in the Tibetan translations can hardly be explained if we assume that at the beginning of the transmission there only was a single manuscript of the PSV.

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[29] Arcaṭa explains *devānāmpriyaḥ* as 'simpleminded or silly one' (***devānāmpriyaḥ*** *ṛjuḥ mūrkho vā* HBṬ 119,11). According to Karṇakagomin, when explaining *devānāmpriyo* of PVSV 104,25–26, the gods are the silly ones (***devānāṃ*** *mūrkhāṇāṃ* ***priyo*** PVSVṬ 380,29)

[30] On this example, see Steinkellner 1967: 177 n. 63.

From verse 14 of the fifth chapter, which deals with *anyāpoha*, the exclusion from others, Dignāga explains how compounds such as *nīlotpala*, blue lotus, can refer to one and the same referent and have a qualifier-qualified relation under the assumption that this *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word.[31] In the course of his explanation he states that if taken alone, the words *nīla* and *utpala* do not have a referent, but together they do, just as the phonemes *nī* and *la* (of the word *nīla*) alone are without a referent but when taken together as *nīla* they have a referent. It is here that an opponent, my alledged student, disagrees with Dignāga's example, stating that Dignāga has said that the word *nīla* has a referent, whereas in a compound *nīla* alone is without a referent. To the opponent this seems contradictory. This disagreement is expressed in quite different words in the two Tibetan translations.

[31] For the restored text and translation, see Pind 2009: A5f. and 86f.

Vasudhararakṣita

(V1) *gal te kha dog brjod pa la* ni *daṅ* la *yis cuṅ źig kyaṅ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do źes pa ni brgal źiṅ brtag pa spaṅ ba ste |*

kha dog gi don cuṅ zad kyaṅ ||
min naʾaṅ tshig gñis la de yis ||
brjod bya rtogs na de la yaṅ ||
yan gar ba de rtogs pa yin || PS 5.16

Kanakavarman

(K1) *mi mtshuṅs pa bkod pa yin te | yi ge brjod pa na don ʾgaʾ źig rtogs pa ma yin gyi | sṅon po źes bsdus pa na rtogs pa yin no ||*

yig la don ʾgaʾ med ce na |
deʾi brjod bya źes bya ba |
tshig gñis la rtogs de la yaṅ |
de ʾbaʾ źig la rtogs par byed || PS 5.16

varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye |
tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate || PS 5.16

⌘

(V1) Opponent: If you say (*gal te ... źes pa ni*): «If the phonemes (*kha dog, varṇa*) are stated alone, on account of *nī* and *la* no cognition of any referent whatsoever arises,» you give up (*spaṅ ba*, **hāni*), what you have been questioning (*brgal źiṅ brtag pa*, **paryanuyukta*) in my position.

(K1) Opponent: What you say is incorrect (*mi mtshuṅs pa bkod pa yin, viṣama upanyāsaḥ*): «If the phonemes are stated alone, no referent whatsoever is known. But if they are stated together as *nīla,* the referent is known.»

In the case of a phoneme (*varṇa*) no referent whatsoever is known. However, in the case of the two words *nīla* and *utpala* the referent of *nīla* is known. Answer: In the latter case, too (*tatrāpi*), only the referent (*sa*) that is known alone (*kevalam*) is to be denoted by that (*tadvācya iti*). PS 5.16 (translation of the Sanskrit)

Vasudhararakṣita

(V2) *ji ltar* ni*'i sgra daṅ* la*'i sgra dag* ni la*'i sgras stoṅ pa de bźin du* u tpa la *daṅ sṅon po'i sgra dag kyaṅ 'dus pa'i sgras stoṅ ste* | **(V3)** *ji skad du* ni *daṅ* la*'i sgra* (read: *sgras*) *cuṅ zad kyaṅ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do źes pa bźin no źe na* | **(V4)** *de la yaṅ rigs sṅon po ni sgra'i brjod bya'o źes yan gar ba rtogs par bya ste* | **(V5)** *yon tan de'i brjod bya daṅ ldan pa yin nam na ni* (read: *yin nam*) *rdzas ldan pa'i* (read: *pas*) *ldan pa yaṅ yin pas* **(V6)** *kha dog don gyis stoṅ pa ñid bźin du 'dus pa la* (read: *las* ?) *yaṅ tha sñad de go bar bya ba yin no* || **(V7)** *sgra tha dad kyi brjod pa* (read: *brjod bya* ?) *yin na ni don gyi śugs kyis don tha dad do źes brjod pa yin no* || **(V8)** *de'i phyir gźan sel ba'i sgra'i don la gźi mthun pa daṅ* | *khyad par du byed pa daṅ khyad par du bya ba dag 'thad pa yin no* || PSV_V D69a7–b4 / P73b4–8 (PSV 5 116–118)

Kanakavarman

(K2) *ji ltar* ni*'i sgra daṅ* la*'i sgra dag phyi rol gyi* (read: *brjod bya'i*) *don gyis stoṅ pa de bźin du* u tpa la (add: *daṅ*) *sṅon po'i sgra dag bsdus pa* (read: *pa'i*) *don gyis stoṅ pa yin no* || **(K3)** *sṅon po'i sgras don 'ga' źig rtogs pa yin no źes gaṅ bśad pa* **(K4)** *de la yaṅ rigs 'ba' źig sṅon po'i sgras brjod pa'i* (read: *bya'i*) *phyir 'ba' źig rtogs pa yin no* || **(K5)** *de'i yon tan daṅ ldan pa daṅ rdzas daṅ ldan par brjod bya yin par rigs pa'i phyir* **(K6)** *yi ge bźin du don gyis stoṅ pa'i bsdus pas kyaṅ rtogs par byed do* || **(K7)** *sgra tha dad pa'i brjod par bya ba'i don gyis don tha dad pa źes brjod pa yin no* || **(K8)** *de'i phyir sgra'i don gźan sel ba la gźi mthun pa daṅ khyad par daṅ khyad par gyi gźi dṅos po 'thad pa yin no* || PSV_K P159b3–8 (PSV 5 117–119)

⌘

(V2) Just as (*ji ltar*) the word *nī* and the word *la* are empty of the word *nīla*, in the same way also the two words *nīla* and *utpala* are empty of the two words combined (*'dus pa'i sgra*, **samuhaśabda*). **(V3)** As has been said (*ji skad du*) in the introduction to PS 5.16: «by *nī* and *la* no cognition of any referent whatsoever arises.» **(V4)** In that case too, the blue genus (*rigs sṅon po*, **nīlajāti*) alone (*yan gar ba*, **kevalam*) is known to be denoted by the word (*sgra'i brjod bya'o źes*, **śabdavācya iti*).

(K2) Just as the words *nī* and *la* are empty of the referent to be denoted (*brjod bya'i don, vācyārtha*) by the word *nīla*, in the same way the words *utpala* and *nīla* are empty of the referent of them combined. **(K3)** It has been said in the introduction to PS 5.16: «On account of the word blue no referent whatsoever is known.» **(K4)** In that case too, the genus (*rigs*, **jāti*) alone (*'ba' źig*, **kevalam*) is known, because it is denoted by the word blue alone (*'ba' źig sṅon po'i sgras brjod pa'i phyir*).

(V5) Either the quality (*yon tan*, **guṇa*) is connected with the genus that is denoted by the word blue, or (*nam ... yaṅ*) the substance (*rdzas*) is connected with that quality that is connected with the genus (*rdzas ldan pas ldan pa, *yuktena yuktaṃ dravyam*). **(V6)** Therefore (**tasmāt*), as in the case of the phonemes (*kha dog*, **varṇa*) that each alone lacks the referent of the two together, in the case of / on account of the compounded words *nīla* and *utpala* (*'dus pa la/las*), too, this expression (*tha sñad de*), i.e. *nīlotpala*, is understood to denote the blue lotus (?). **(V7)** Words like *nīlotpala* have been said in PS 5.14a to have referents different (*don tha dad do źes brjod pa/bya yin*) from words like *nīla* and *utpala* alone by implication (*don gyi śugs kyis*) under the condition that ... (*sgra tha dad kyi brjod bya yin na ni*). **(V8)** Therefore, co-referentiality (*gźi mthun pa*, **sāmānādhikaraṇya*) and qualifier-qualified relation (*khyad par du byed pa daṅ khyad par du bya ba dag*) are justified (*'thad pa*) under the assumption that this *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word (*gźan sel ba'i sgra'i don la*).

(K5) It is correct that this genus is denoted (*de'i ... brjod bya yin par rigs pa'i phyir, *tasya .... vācyatvopapattiḥ*) inasmuch as it is connected with its quality (*de'i yon tan daṅ ldan pa*) and (*daṅ*) with its substance (*rdzas daṅ ldan par*). **(K6)** Therefore (**tasmāt*), like in the case of the phonemes (*yi ge*, **varṇa*), on account of the compounded words *nīla* and *utpala* (*'dus pas*), too, which are empty of the referent of the words alone, the blue lotus (?) is known. **(K7)** Words like *nīlotpala* have been said in PS 5.14a to have referents different (*don tha dad do źes brjod pa yin*) from the referent that is denoted by the different words alone (*sgra tha dad pa'i brjod par bya ba'i don gyis*). **(K8)** Therefore, co-referentiality (*gźi mthun pa*, **sāmānādhikaraṇya*) and the qualifier-qualified relation (*khyad par du byed pa daṅ khyad par gyi gźi dṅos po*) are justified (*'thad pa*) under the assumption that this *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word (*sgra'i don gźan sel ba la*).

(1) — In the *pūrvapakṣa*, the opponent's critique is formulated in quite different wordings, although the content is the same: If *nīla* in contrast to the phonemes *nī* and *la* has a referent, it is contradictory to say that *nīla* in the compound *nīlotpala* does not have a referent. Jinendrabuddhi's exemplar of the PSV is closer to (K1), but his identification of this mistake as *abhyupetahāni*, giving up one's own assumption, might reflect *brgal źiṅ brtag pa spaṅ ba* (**paryanuyukta-*

hāni) in (V1). *cuṅ źig kyaṅ* of (V1) cannot be construed, but according to (K1) it should qualify the referent (*don*, **artha*). The reason for the adduced example's being incorrect is introduced, according to Jinendrabuddhi, with the words *na hi*. *hi* is not reflected in either of the two Tibetan translations. In verse 16, I understand, following Jinendrabuddhi, *pāda*s 16ab as summarizing the opponent's statement, and *pāda*s 16cd as representing the answer. This understanding is not reflected in the Tibetan translations. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation:

> PSṬ$_{ms}$ 201b1–2: ***viṣama upanyāsa*** *iti dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyam āha. kathaṃ viṣama ity āha —* ***na hī****tyādi. etenābhyupetahānim āha, nīlaśabdasya kevalasyāpy arthavattvenābhyupagamāt.*
>
> ***varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye*** **|** PS 16ab
>
> *naiṣa doṣaḥ, yasmāt*
>
> ***tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate*** **||** PS 16cd
>
> ***tatrāpi*** *nīlaśabde yo 'rtho gamyate,* ***sa*** *nīlaśabda****vācya iti kevalaṃ pratīyate****, na tu samudāyārtho nīlaśabdavācyatvena pratīyata ity arthaḥ.*
>
> The phrase «**what you say is incorrect**» indicates the incorrectness of the example. The question why it is incorrect he answers with the words ***na hi***. By this the opponent is stating that Dignāga gives up his assumption, because he assumes the word «blue» to have a referent also alone.
>
> **In the case of a phoneme no referent whatsoever is known. However, in the case of the two words *nīla* and *utpala* the referent of *nīla* is known.**
>
> Answer: This mistake does not apply, since
>
> **In this latter case too, it is only that referent that is known alone to be denoted by that word *nīla*.**
>
> **In that case too**, i.e. in the case of the word blue, it is only **that** referent which is understood **that is known alone to be denoted by** the word blue. It is not, however, the referent of the two together (*samudāyārtha*) that is known to be denoted by the word blue. This is the meaning.

(2) — The prose explanation is introduced with *yathaiva hi*, according to Jinendrabuddhi (PSṬ 201b3). *eva* and *hi* are not reflected in either (V2) or (K2). (K2), with the correction of *phyi rol gyi* to *brjod*

bya'i[32] and two other minor corrections, seems to offer a proper beginning of the explanation of the answer in the verse. (V2) is meaningless in this context unless we understand it as a short note in which «the referent» has to be understood from the context. Then (V2) and (K2) cover the same meaning.

(3) (4) — (3) is introduced with the words *yat tūktam* (*ji skad du ... bźin* V, *gaṅ bśad pa* K) which, according to Jinendrabuddhi, repeat the opponent's argument in the introduction to PS 5.16ab. The following sentence (4), beginning with *tatrāpi* (*de la yaṅ* KV), explains the second half of the verse, i.e., PS 5.16cd, beginning with *tadvācya iti*.[33] While in (V3) the first part of the *pūrvapakṣa* in (V1) is repeated (ni *daṅ* la'*i sgras cuṅ zad kyaṅ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do*), in (K3) it is the latter part (*sṅon po'i sgras don 'ga' źig rtogs pa yin no*) of (K1). In (K4), where the first *'ba' źig* seems to be superfluous, we learn that it is only the genus alone that is known, because it is denoted by the word blue. The ablative clause *brjod bya'i phyir* seems to reflect K's interpretation of *tadvācya iti* of the verse. While (K4) tells us that the genus is known because it is denoted by the word «blue,» in (V4) we read that the blue genus is known to be denoted by a word. It must be understood from the context that the blue genus is denoted by the word «blue.»[34]

(5) and **(6)** show, if we follow Jinendrabuddhi, that irrespective of whether the word «blue» refers to the quality blue that is connected to the genus to be denoted by the word «blue» — since the genus is inherent in the quality or refers to the substance that is connected with the quality, the latter being connected to the genus — none of

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[32] The Tibetan *phyi rol gyi don* reflects a Sanskrit *bāhyārtha*. I consider this to be the result of an erroneously transmitted or misread *vācyārtha*.

[33] ***yat tūktam*** *ityādinā pūrvapakṣaṃ pratyuccārya* ***tatrāpī****tyādinā* ***tadvācya*** *ityāder uttarārdhasyārtham ācaṣṭe* PST$_{ms}$ 210b3.

[34] «Genus,» so Jinendrabuddhi, is the blueness that inheres in the blue quality. The word «alone» (*kevalam*) indicates that the word blue lacks the referent of the two words *nīla* and *utpala* together (***jātir*** *nīlaguṇasamavāyinī nīlatvam.* ***kevala****grahaṇena samudāyārthaśūnyatām āha* PST$_{ms}$ 210b3–4).

the referents of the word «blue» is identical with the referent of the words *nīla* and *utpala* together. Thus, the lack of the referent was stated in the example with regard to the referent of the two phonemes together. In the same way, the lack of a referent of *nīla* alone in the compound *nīlotpala* was meant as the lack of the referent of *nīlotpala*, and therefore the example is not incorrect and Dignāga has not given up his position.[35] *'dus pa la* in (V6) might be a translation of *samudāyaiḥ*, the reading that was available to Jinendrabuddhi; see also *bsdus pas* in (K6). In this case, a correction to *'dus pa las* might be taken into account.

(7) and **(8)** finally show why a co-referentiality and qualified-qualifier relation is justified under the condition that the *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word. This, however, is not my concern here. *sgra tha dad kyi brjod pa/brjod bya yin na ni don gyi śugs kyis* of (V7) might reflect a Sanskrit *bhinnaśabdavācye 'rthena*, a corruption of an original *bhinnaśabdavācyenārthena*. If so, (V7) would have the same meaning as (K7).

⌘

The material presented here in connection with the explanation of how co-referentiality is possible in the case of words such as *nīlotpala* clearly shows that the differences in the Tibetan translations cannot be explained if we assume that a single Sanskrit manuscript was the starting point of the Sanskrit transmission of the manuscripts used for the translations.[36] And using the phonemes *nī* and *la* as an example for illustrating that the words *nīla* and *utpala* of the compound

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[35] *nīlaśabda**vācyayā** jātyā **yukto guṇo vā** yatra sā samavetā, jāti**yukte**na guṇena **yuktaṃ dravyaṃ vā** yatra nīlaguṇaḥ samavetaḥ. sarvaṃ cedaṃ na samudāyasyārthaḥ. tad evam ubhayatrāpi samudāyavācyenārthenānarthakatvasyābhisaṃhitatvān nāsti vaiṣamyam upanyāsasya. nāpy upetabādhā pratijñāyā iti. **tasmād arthaśūnyair** iti samudāyārthaśūnyaiḥ. **samudāyair** iti nīlādiśabdaiḥ* PST_{ms} 210b4–6. *tasmāt* seems to be reflected in *yin pas* at the end of (V5) and *rigs pa'i phyir* at the end of (K5).

[36] A nice example for the fact that two quite different Tibetan translations might nevertheless go back to similar Sanskrit versions is presented in Lasic 2011.

nīlotpala, when taken alone, do not have a referent indicates that this text served an educational purpose, at least in my understanding. I do not see any other meaningful explanation. If we assume that Dignāga sat in his cell and wrote a text about *anyāpoha*, he could simply have stated from the beginning that the example was meant with regard to the referent of the word *nīla*. Then it would have been clear that individually *nīla* and *utpala* do not refer to the same thing as the two words together. Or Dignāga could have used a different example. But it seems odd to suppose that Dignāga wrote this example and then realized that it might be misunderstood (which is really contrary to the purpose of an example), and then started a discussion about why it nevertheless is correct. This does not contribute anything to the understanding of *anyāpoha*, which is the topic of the chapter. If, on the other hand, this example was used in the process of Dignāga teaching students we can assume that it was intentionally formulated to be misleading. The student to whom we might attribute the *pūrvapakṣa* fell into Dignāga's trap. In PS 5.16ab Dignāga recapitulated his mistake and then taught him a lesson: Be careful when you accuse an opponent of arguing in the wrong way. You yourself might be the loser!

If we accept that (at least parts of) works such as Dignāga's PSV or Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* consist of notes taken by students during classes given by the respective teacher, notes that also include discussions between the teacher and his students, it is clear that these are not pure philosophical works structured according to philosophical needs. Sometimes the structure of certain discussions follows the — not always intelligent — questions of the student(s). Thus, not every theory of an opponent as presented in Buddhist works has necessarily to correspond to a theory that was really held by a follower of an opposing school. They might also be ad hoc ideas of students. Nonetheless, we still have the philosophical theories of the teachers, since I do consider these works as having been authored by them.[37] But they are also documents that allow a fascinating glimpse

[37] See the chapter «Methodological considerations» in Kellner 2010: 181–185, where she, among other problems, also considers the practices of textual production and transmission of Buddhist *pramāṇa* texts.

into Buddhist teaching classes during the fifth to sixth centuries, a teaching the purpose of which seems to have been to introduce students to the art of argumentation and rhetoric.

Appendix 1 — *Vāyuprakaraṇa*

Based on a quotation from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV_V D28a5–6 on PS 2.3d = PSV_K 110a5) in PVSV 14,20–21 (= PVin 2 97,8–9), in connection with which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin refer to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*,[38] the section PS(V) 2.3c–5b dealing with air (*vāyu*) as taught by the Vaiśeṣika has been identified by Steinkellner (1979: 130 n. 499) as being this *Vāyuprakaraṇa.* The relevant passage by Dharmakīrti reads:

> PVSV 14,20–15,1 (= PVin 2 97,8–9): *yady adarśanamātreṇa dṛṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yukta iti*. This has been identified by Gnoli in his edition as coming from the PSV.(1)
>
> (1) *ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis mthoṅ ba las log par grub pa'i phyir ro || de ltar yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te* | PSV_V D28a5–6 (on PS 2.3d) = *gal te ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis ma mthoṅ ba 'gag pa byed na de yaṅ mi rigs te* | PSV_K 110a5

Karṇakagomin identifies this quotation as stemming from Dignāga without giving the name of the source text :

> … *ity ukte vaiśeṣikeṇa*, *tatrācāryadiṅnāgenoktam — yady adarśanamātreṇa dṛṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yukta iti. yad etad uktam, tad virudhyata iti vārttikakāro darśayann āha — **dṛṣṭe**tyādi* (= PV 1.20). PVSVṬ 66,25–27

In his explanation, Karṇakagomin, following Śākyabuddhi, then refers to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*:

> *tad vyācaṣṭe — **yadī**tyādi* (PVSV 14,20). ***yad āhā**cāryo vāyuprakaraṇe — yady adarśanamātreṇa dṛṣṭebhyaḥ* pṛthivyādibhyaḥ sparśasya *pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate* vaiśeṣikeṇa*, na ca so 'pi yukta iti* PVSVṬ 67,11–13 = *de bstan pa'i phyir **gal te** źes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | slob dpon gyis rluṅ gi rab tu dbye ba las gal te* bye brag pas *ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis mthoṅ ba* sa la

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[38] The *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is also referred to by Vibhūticandra (PVV 291) in note 8 (continued from 290). There, Vibhūticandra seems, in part, to base himself on material coming from PVṬ/PVSVṬ.

sogs pa las reg pa *ʾgog par byed na de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no źes* ***bśad pa gaṅ yin pa*** / PVṬ Je D34b1–2

The words *pṛthivyādibhyaḥ sparśasya* and *vaiśeṣikeṇa* (*sa la sogs pa las reg pa, bye brag pas*), which are neither found in Dharmakīrti's quotation nor in the PSV, might indicate that the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is a work independent from this *vāyu* section in the PSV. We otherwise must interpret these additional words as explanatory glosses. The strange clause *yadi ... na ca* might indicate that the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* was a *miśraka* text with *na ca so ʾpi yuktaḥ* being part of a verse and the *yadi* sentence being the introductory prose. This might be an example for what Lasic (2010: 515) calls Dignāga's «method of copy-and-paste.» Also, in one translation of the PSV we have parts of verses that are not considered as belonging to the PS. While on the one hand this reveals that the two Tibetan translations are based on quite different Sanskrit manuscripts, it might also indicate that these verses stem from another work by Dignāga, namely, the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*.

1) *raṅ gi mtshan ñid bstan bya min ||*

źes byas pas na rtogs par bya baʾi don gyi bdag ñid mṅon sum gyi yul yin źiṅ spyi rjes su dpag paʾi yul ñid du mṅon par brjod pas mṅon par brjod do || PSV_V 27b7–28a1

raṅ gi mtshan ñid ni bstan par bya ba ma yin paʾi phyir bdag ñid rtogs pa ñid kyi don du mṅon sum yin la | rjes su dpag pa ni spyiʾi yul can yin te de brjod par byed pas brjod byaʾi phyir de ñid rnam pa gñis su phye ba yin no || PSV_K 109b5–6

2) *gal te kun gyi rjes thogs las ||*

grub ste ʾdi ltar ***kun gyi rjes thogs las*** *rluṅ la sogs paʾi raṅ bźin rjes su dpag par grub paʾo* || PSV_V 28a3–4

gal te yoṅs su lhag pas grub pa yin te yoṅs su lhag pa las rluṅ la sogs paʾi raṅ bźin rnams la rjes su dpag pa ʾdi ʾgrub par ʾgyur te | PSV_K 102a2

In the Tibetan tradition, too, the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is referred to as an independent work. Go rams pa bSod nam seṅ ge (1429–1489) lists a *Vāyuprakaraṇa* with *Vṛtti* among the works of Dignāga that were

translated into Tibetan and that Sa skya Paṇḍita studied with his teacher Śākyaśrībhadra.[39]

Also gTsaṅ Paṇḍita (1738–1780) treats the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* as though it were a work independent from the PSV. In his (*rGyas pa'i bstan bcos*) *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi raṅ don le'u daṅ gźan don le'u gñis kyi dka' ba'i gnad gsal bar byed pa chos kyi grags pa'i dgoṅs rgyan*[40] he distinguishes explicitly between two contradictions, one to the PSV (*kun btus kyi raṅ 'grel*) and the other to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* (*rluṅ gi rab byed*): *daṅ po luṅ drug daṅ 'gal tshul la gsum | rigs sgo daṅ 'gal tshul |* kun btus kyi raṅ 'grel *daṅ 'gal tshul |* rluṅ gi rab byed *daṅ 'gal tshul lo ||* (11a1–2). In order to show a contradiction to the PSV, gTsaṅ Paṇḍita refers, among other things, to *kun btus las | gaṅ yaṅ gal te ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis mi snaṅ ba dag la 'gog par byed na de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no | źes pa'i luṅ daṅ 'gal lo |* (21a5–6). And for a contradiction to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, he refers to *rluṅ gi rab byed las | gal te ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis mthoṅ ba dag la 'gog bar byed na de yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no || źes pa'i luṅ luṅ tshad mar khas blaṅs pa daṅ 'gal lo ||* (20b2–3). The difference between the two passages seems to be the perceptibility (*Vāyuprakaraṇa*) and imperceptibility (PSV) of the object in question. This, however, is not our concern here. That the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is an independent work is also supported by dGe ba rgyal mtshan (1387–1462) who in his PS commentary *Tshad ma kun las btus pa źes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa'i rgyan* tells us that the PS is a summary of the *Nyāyamukha*/*Nyāyapraveśa* (*rigs pa'i sgo*), the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* and other works of Dignāga (*rigs pa'i sgo daṅ* rluṅ gi

[39] Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dka' ba'i gnas rnam par bśad pa sde bdun rab gsal*, in bSod nams rgya mtsho (compiled), *The Complete Works of Go ram bSod nams seng ge* (The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. 12), Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1969, pp. 1–167: *bod du 'gyur ba la yaṅ |* rluṅ gi rab byed 'grel pa *daṅ bcad pa | dmigs pa brtag pa 'grel pa daṅ bcas pa | dus gsum brtag pa … rnams yod do ||* 3a3; see also *rluṅ gi rab byed rtsa 'grel sogs* 5a2.

[40] Cited from the ACIP version; Catalog Number: S0300; http://www.asianclassics.org/release6/flat/S0300N_T.TXT ; last visited 2.3.2013.

rab byed *sogs raṅ gi gźuṅ kun las rdzogs par btus te ʾdir bstan bcos kyi lus gcig tu bya ba yin paʾi phyir* | 11a2–3.[41]

Another quotation can be added to the one from the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* in PVṬ/PVSVṬ treated above.[42] At the beginning of the *Sāṅkhyaparīkṣā* of the PSV's third chaper, *parārthānumāna*, Dignāga, when refuting the existence of primordial matter, refers to another statement of his. The passage reads in its two versions:

gal te gtso bo yod pa ñid bsgrub bya yin na de ni mi bden te |

tshad maʾi yul ni mi śes phyir ||

spyiʾi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ma yin paʾi rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin no źes bstan zin to || PSV_K 141b4–5

gal te ʾdir gtso boʾi yod pa ñid bsgrub bya yin no (*yin no* P : *yin* D) *źe na | de ma yin te |*

tshad maʾi yul ma śes paʾi phyir ro ||

spyiʾi mtshan ñid ma yin paʾi yul la (*yul la* D : *yul* P) *rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin no źes bstan zin to* || PSV_V D54a5/P57b6–7

On the basis of Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* this passage can be reconstructed as follows.

yady atrāstitvaṃ pradhānasya sādhyam, tad asat,

pramāṇaviṣayājñānāt ||

na hy asāmānyaviṣayam anumānam astīty upapāditam. (1)

(1) PST_{ms} 153a1–2: ***yady astitvaṃ pradhānasya sādhyam***, ***tad asat***, *ayuktam. kuta ity āha —* ***pramāṇaviṣayājñānād*** *iti.* ***pramāṇa****śabdenātrānumānaṃ vivakṣitam. tasya viṣayaḥ sāmānyam. tadajñānāt.* ***asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam*** *iti svalakṣaṇaviṣayam.* ***upapāditam*** *iti vāyuprakaraṇe pratipāditam.*

Later, Jinendrabuddhi refers to this passage again and adds *sākṣāt* (PST_{ms} 157b7): *tatrāpi yadi sākṣāt pradhānāstitvaṃ sādhyam, tad asat, pramāṇaviṣayājñānāt. na hy asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam astīti.*

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[41] In *Collection of works of the ancient Sa-skya-pa scholars* [4 vols.] vol. 1, Dehradun: Sakya College 1999.

[42] Whether Dharmakīrti's phrase *adṛṣṭārthe ʾrthavikalpamātram* (PVSV 37,27), already identified by Gnoli as coming from the PSV,(1) has a counterpart in the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, we cannot say.

(1) PSV_V 29a1 (on PS 2.5ab): *ma mthoṅ baʾi don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam ʾbaʾ źig ste* = PSV_K 111a2–3: *ma mthoṅ baʾi don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi*

The wording *na hy asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam asti* is not found in PS(V) 2.3c–5b, but its content is implicitly stated there as well.

Abbreviations and primary sources

HB — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ.* Teil 1 – Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Wien 1967.

HBṬ — Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji (eds), *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Baroda 1949.

NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya* — Anantalal Thakur (ed.), *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* New Delhi 1997.

NSū — *Nyāyasūtra* — see NBh

NVTṬ — Anantalal Thakur (ed.), *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra*. New Delhi 1996.

P — *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking edition,* ed. D.T. Suzuki. Tokyo/Kyoto 1955–1961.

PS 1 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 1*. (April 2005) http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last visited: 2.3.2013)

PSṬ 1 — Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic (eds), *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, *chapter 1*. Part I: Critical edition. Part II: Diplomatic edition with a manuscript description by Anne MacDonald. Beijing/Vienna 2005.

PSṬ 2 — Horst Lasic, Helmut Krasser, Ernst Steinkellner (eds), *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, *chapter 2*. Part 1: Critical edition. Part 2: Diplomatic edition. Beijing/Vienna 2013.

$PSṬ_{ms}$ — Manuscript B of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. See the description by A. MacDonald in PSṬ 1, Part II.

$PSṬ_{Tib}$ — *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi). D Tshad ma vol. 20, no. 4268, *Ye* 1–314a7/P vol. 139, no. 5766, *Re* 1–355a8.

PSV 5 — Masaaki Hattori (ed.), *The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Chapter five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣa. Tibetan text with Sanskrit fragments.* (Kyoto 1982) (Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters,

Kyoto University, 21).

PSV_K — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Kanakavarman and (Mar thuṅ) Dad pa(ʾi) śes rab. P vol. 130, no. 5702, *Ce* 93b4–177a7. No equivalent in D.

PSV_V — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Vasudhararakṣita and (Źa ma) Seṅ (ge) rgyal (mtshan). D Tshad ma vol. 1, no. 4204, *Ce* 14b1–85b7/P vol. 130, no. 5701, *Ce* 13a6–93b4.

PVin 2 — *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 2 — Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2*. Beijing/Vienna 2007.

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* — Raniero Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The first chapter with the autocommentary. Text and critical notes*. Rome 1960.

PVSVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* — Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Karṇakagomin's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*. Kyoto 1982 (reprint).

PVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi) — D Tshad ma no. 4220, vol. 3, *Je* 1b–328a7, vol. 4, *Ñe* 1–282a.

PVV — Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with commentary by Manorathanandin*. Published as an appendix to the *Journal of the Bihar Oriental Research Institute* 24–26 (1938–1940).

VN — Michael Torsten Much (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāyaḥ. Teil I – Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1991.

VSū — Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Candrānanda.* Baroda 1961.

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On the role of *abhyupagama* in Dharmakīrti's scripturally based inference

Shinya Moriyama

0. Introduction

As is well known, Dharmakīrti's central tenet for establishing scriptural authority is the so-called threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*), which is used for sorting out reliable from unreliable scriptures with regard to radically inaccessible states of affairs (*atyantaparokṣa*). This analysis is done by means of perception, inference functioning by the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), and scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*). For a person who is searching for a reliable scripture that will definitely lead him to the final spiritual goal, this procedure, which will be described in the following, seems quite reasonable in order to examine various scriptures.

According to Dharmakīrti's PV 1.215–216, a person who is striving for a spiritual goal can determine which scriptures are unreliable by dividing their contents into three categories, namely, perceptible states of affairs (*pratyakṣa*), imperceptible states of affairs (*parokṣa*), and radically inaccessible states of affairs (*atyantaparokṣa*). These three categories are then examined by means of perception, inference functioning by the force of real entities, and scripturally based inference, respectively. Applying this process, perception, for instance, invalidates the Sāṃkhya's notion of pleasure (*sukha*) inherent in substances such as sounds, but it establish-

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 183–207.

es the Buddhist notion of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*); the *vastubala* type of inference invalidates the Brahmanical notion of *ātman*, but it establishes the Buddhist notion of the four noble truths; and scripturally based inference invalidates the thesis that demerits (*adharma*) are purified by ablutions (*snāna*).[1]

Of the threefold analysis, the first two stages are not particularly problematic because it is commonly known that Dignāga accepted perception and inference as means of valid cognition. However, if one recalls that Dignāga rejected scriptural authority (*āgamapramāṇa*) as an independent means of valid cognition, one faces difficulties when trying to understand scripturally based inference precisely. Examples of scripturally based inference are found only twice in Dharmakīrti's entire opus: it is first used to invalidate the opponent's thesis "ablutions, etc., purify demerits," and second, mentioned with regard to two inferences using antinomic reasons (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) regarding the omnipresence of universals (*sāmānya*). Although the two examples appear in different contexts, we find a common feature in how they use scripturally based inference if we focus on the concept of *abhyupagama*, "hypothetical acceptance." The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed examination of Dharmakīrti's arguments with regard to scripturally based inference, together with the historical background of this type of inference.[2]

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[1] Cf. PVSV (ad PV 1.215) 108,15–109,3. An English translations of this section can be found in Yaita 1987 and Dunne 2004: 362f. The above summary is based on Tillemans 2000: 79. For more details on the threefold analysis, see Tillemans 1993: 9–15, Tillemans 1999: chap. 1 and chap. 2, and Keira 2006.

[2] The second chapter, "How Much of a Proof is Scripturally Based Inference?" of Tillemans 1999 examines the threefold analysis of scripture, but not this inference in particular. For a detailed analysis of the inference together with its interpretations by Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Dharmottara and Vinītadeva, see Eltschinger 2007: 105–109.

1. Scripturally based inference and the fallacious thesis opposed to authoritative words

The first example of scripturally based inference is found in the following passage of PVSV ad PV 1.215:

> [Text 1] *āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam abhyupagamya tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ.* PVSV 109,1–3
>
> "Regarding scripturally based inference, too, [it functions for invalidating propositions concerning radically inaccessible states of affairs.] For instance, after one has hypothetically accepted (*abhyupagamya*) demerit as being of the nature of desire, etc., and as arising from such things, it cannot be taught that bathing in holy water, the *agnihotra*-sacrifice or other things [can] suspend [demerit]."[3]

In the same manner, PVSV ad PV 1.333 refers to a similar example:

> [Text 2] … *āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena bādhitam agnihotrādeḥ pāpaśodhanasāmarthyādikam*. PVSV 174,22–23
>
> "… Moreover, [the proposition:] 'fire-sacrifices, etc., can purify sins' is invalidated by a scripturally based inference."

In order to refute a scripture that accepts physical practices such as ablutions and fire-sacrifices as being able to purify sins and demerits, by relying on scripturally based inference, one can point out that this proposition is contradictory to another proposition in the same scripture, which considers demerits to be characterized by desire or born from it. In this case, since Dharmakīrti does not mention a logical proof (*prayoga*) in the above texts, it remains unclear how the term "inference" is being used in the expression "scripturally based inference."

This point becomes clear when reading Śākyabuddhi's commentary on text 1:

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[3] For a French translation, see Eltschinger 2007: 223. Scripturally based inference is mentioned again in PVSV 174,22f.: … *āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena bādhitam agnihotrādeḥ pāpaśodhanasāmarthyādikam*. "… and [it] is invalidated by the scripturally based inference that *agnihotra*-sacrifice, etc., has the capability of purifying sins, etc."

[Text 3] (a-*dngos po stobs kyis zhugs pa'i tshad ma gnyis kyis lung rnam par dag pa'i dus phyis tshad ma khas len pa can gyi bstan bcos kyi chos can rnam par gzhag nas / snga phyi 'gal ba rjes su dpag pa'i phyir / gang gi tshe khyad par dpyod pa la 'jug pa de'i tshe* ***lung la ltos pa'i rjes su dpag pa*** *ste*-a) */ lung la ltos pa'i rjes su dpag pa de la* (b-*gnod pa med pa zhes bya ba'i skabs yin no*-b) // PVṬ D 245a1–6 = P 289a3–5[4]

"[First of all,] one purifies a scripture by two means of valid cognition that occur by the force of real entities (i.e., perception and *vastubala*-type inference). After that, in order to infer contradictions between previous and posterior [propositions in a scripture,] after having determined a [supersensible] subject/property-possessor of the scripture that is hypothetically accepted to be a *pramāṇa*, **the scripturally based inference** [occurs] at the time when one commences an investigation of [that subject's] specific features. It is contextually connected: "[If the scripture is reliable, then] there is no invalidation [within it] in the case of the scripturally based inference."[5]

As Eltschinger has pointed out, Śākyabuddhi's exposition is mainly based on PV 4.48–51 and 106–108, where Dharmakīrti discusses the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*), which is unopposed by authoritative words (*āpta*).[6] According to Śākyabuddhi's exposition, it is possible to accept a scripture only when one has examined it on the basis of perception and *vastubala*-type inferences. One commences an investigation of a scripture primarily to discover contradictions between its propositions. In this investigation, scripturally based inference is used for forming a counter-proposition to the scripture's propositions concerning supersensible subjects or property-possessors (*dharmin*). In the process, one must hypothetically accept the scripture as a *pramāṇa* that teaches supersensible subjects, even though its reliability remains doubtful.

With regard to a scripture's role as a presupposition for inferring supersensible subjects, it might be worthwhile to examine an ex-

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[4] (a) Cf. PVSVṬ 393,15–17: *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye 'tyantaparokṣe cāgamaviṣaye paurvāparyavirodhena yasmin cintāṃ pravartayati tasminn āgamāpekṣam anumānam api.* (b) PVSVṬ 393,17: *abādhanam iti prakṛtam*.

[5] Cf. Eltschinger 2007: 106.

[6] Eltschinger 2007: 106.

cursive argument in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 3 vv. 26–27, which Dharmakīrti added to his earlier argument in PV 4.106–108. Instead of Dignāga's example: "There is no means of valid cognition that concern their objects" (*na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni*), Dharmakīrti's argument starts with an example of a fallacious thesis that is opposed to scripture (*śāstra*): "Merit (*dharma*) does not bring happiness after one dies" (*pretya dharmo 'sukhapradaḥ*). He explains this as follows:

> [Text 4] *dharmivyavasthites tadāśrayāt tatprabādhane 'dhikaraṇapratyastamayān na viśeṣacintāpravṛttir ity avaśyam evaṃvidhe viṣaye śāstraṃ pramāṇayitavyam*. PVin 3 30,11–31,1[7]
>
> The determination of a [supersensible] subject [i.e., merit] relies on the [opponent's scripture]. Thus, if one rejects the [scripture], there is no locus [for an inference], and [if there is no locus,] the investigation of specific features (*viśeṣacintā*) [of the locus] does not occur. Thus, concerning such kind of objects, scripture is necessarily to be accepted as being a means of valid cognition.[8]

To investigate whether merits (*dharma*) provide happiness after one's death or not, it is first necessary to accept such supersensible subjects by acknowledging scripture as being a *pramāṇa*. For from the Buddhist point of view, no scripture is accepted as a means of valid cognition concerning *dharma* in the sense of a quality (*guṇa*) as assumed by the Vaiśeṣika, or the correctness of the Veda. However, if the opponent's scripture is not invalidated by perception or the *vastubala*-type inference, one must hypothetically accept the scripture as a means of valid cognition. On the basis of the scripture, one proceeds to investigate whether merits provide happiness after death or not, namely, whether the opponent's thesis is justified by his own scriptural propositions or not.[9]

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[7] PVin D 196b7–197a1 = P 294b7–8: *chos can rnam par gzhag pa de la brten pa'i phyir / de la gnod na gzhi med pas khyad par (D : pa P) la dpyod pa mi 'jug pa'i phyir rnam pa de lta bu'i yul la ni gdon mi za bar bstan bcos tshad mar 'gyur dgos so //*

[8] Cf. PVA 525,27: *avaśyam evaṃvidhe viṣaye śāstram abhyupagantavyam iti.*

[9] Regarding the above example, it can be assumed that the scripture be-

In this context, Dharmakīrti provides an objection, saying that the above procedure is also applicable for a correct thesis, as for instance: "Demerit is not purified by performing ablutions, etc." This is because the thesis is opposed by the opponent's scriptural statement that admits the purification of demerits by verbal and bodily actions such as ablutions.[10] On this objection, which is closely relat-

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ing referred to here is not a specific scripture but scripture in general, namely, widely accepted scriptures that teach merit as the cause of happiness after death. Thus, the structure is the same as the fallacious thesis called *āgamavirodhin* that is explained by Praśastapāda and Uddyotakara with the example: "The Brahmin should drink *surā* liquor," which is invalidated by widely accepted scriptures. Praśastapāda classified the fallacious thesis into five kinds according to five invalidators, namely, (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) what is accepted (*abhyupagata*), (4) one's own scripture (*svaśāstra*), and (5) one's own statement (*svavacana*). Of these, the third is also called *āgamavirodhin* by Praśastapāda, and the thesis *brāhmaṇena surā peyā* is presented as its example. The same example is also mentioned by Uddyotakara in his NV 108,3–8 (ad NSū 1.1.33) as an example of *āgamavirodha*. As for the *āgama* in this context, Preisendanz has suggested understanding it as "kulturelle Tradition" and to differentiate it from scripture in its narrow sense, namely, one's own scripture (*svaśāstra*). Cf. Preisendanz 1994: 322. Consequently, the fallacious theses (3) and (4) in Praśastapāda's classification can be understood as being concerned with two different kinds of scripture.

[10] Although the opponent who claims that demerits can be purified by bathing, repetition, etc., is not identified, it is noteworthy that *snāna* (bathing in ash) and *japa* (mantra repetition) are included in the Pāśupata *vrata* or religious vows. Dharmakīrti's rejection of Śaiva exercises for liberation is also found in PV 2.257–261. On the Pāśupata *vrata*, see Oberhammer 1984: 169–178. Moreover, Kamalaśīla refers to the name of Kapila and suggests that the practice of ablution, etc., is fully acceptable for the Sāṃkhya that accepts desire as a kind of the material. Cf. TSP (ad TS 3342) 1063,15–17: *atra rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ vādharmam uddiśya tatprahāṇāya tannidānātmadarśanavirodhena nairātmyadarśanam eva pratipakṣo deśitaḥ, na tu kapilādiśāstravat tannidānāviruddhaḥ snānāgnihotrādir upadiṣṭaḥ*. "To this, after having presented *adharma* as having the nature of desire and so on and as arising from them (i.e., desire, etc.), only the observation of selflessness is taught as the antidote for abandoning the [*adharma*], because [it] is con-

ed to PVSV ad PV 1.215,[11] Dharmakīrti emphasizes the importance of *abhyupagama* for determining that a scripture is an invalidator (*bādhaka*) of a thesis. He says:

> [Text 5] *katham idānīṃ na tīrthasnānādir adharmaśodhana iti nābhyupetabādhā. sarveṣām adṛṣṭapratipattiśāstrāṇām evam avacanān na pratiṣedhe doṣaḥ. svopagamāśrayaṃ hi śāstraṃ virundhāno vihanyate, nāparam, anabhyupagamāt. tasyāpi snānāc chuddhivādinaḥ śāstrasya svavacanenāpy asyārthasya pratibādhanāt.* PVin 3 31,1–5[12]
>
> [Objection:] Now,[13] in the case of [the thesis] "performing ablutions, etc., do not purify demerits" (*na tīrthasnānādir adharmaśodhanaḥ*), why is it not [considered] to be an invalidation by the accepted [scripture] (*abhyupetabādhā*)?
>
> [Reply:] Since [except for the opponent's scripture,] no scripture that teaches the unseen [*adṛṣṭa*, i.e., merit and demerit][14] proclaims this (i.e., that performing ablutions, etc., purify demerits),[15] there is no fallacy in the negation [of the opponent's thesis].[16] For the basis [i.e., scripture]

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tradictory to the observation of self, the cause of the [*adharma*]. However, different from the teachings of Kapila and so on, [religious practices] such as bathing in holy water and the *agnihotra* sacrifice, which are not contradictory to the cause of the [*adharma*], are not taught."

[11] See above "Text 1."

[12] PVin 3 D 197a1–3 = P 294b8–295a1–3: *da ni ji ltar 'jug dngogs su khrus byas pa la sogs pa chos ma yin pa dag par byed pa ma yin no zhes bya ba khas blangs pas* (P : *pa'i* D) *gnod pa ma yin nam zhe na / ma mthong ba rtogs par byed pa'i bstan bcos thams cad de skad mi* (P : *ma* D) *brjod pa'i phyir bkag pa la skyon yod pa ma yin no // rang gi khas len pa'i rten gyis bstan bcos dang 'gal ba gnod par 'gyur gyi / gzhan ni ma yin te / khas ma blangs pa'i phyir ro // khrus kyis* (P : *kyi* D) *dag par smra ba'i bstan bcos de'i rang gi tshig gis kyang don de la gnod pa'i phyir ro //*

[13] PVinṬ D 45a4 = P 52b1–2: *gal te bstan bcos las grub pa'i chos can la / bstan bcos las 'gal ba smra na bstan bcos kyis gnod na / **da ni** …*

[14] PVinṬ D 45a6 = P 52b5: ***ma mthong ba** chos dang chos ma yin zhes bya bar …*

[15] PVinṬ D 45a7 = P 52b6: *khrus kyis* (em. : *kyi* D, P) *chos ma yin pa sbyong bar byed do …*

[16] PVinṬ D 45a6 = P 52b5–6: *chos ma yin pa khrus la sogs pas bzlog par bya ba ni bkag par gyur du zin kyang skyon med do //*

> of [the proponent's] own acceptance [would] oppose the [thesis] that is contradictory to the scripture, but not other [scriptures], because [they] are not accepted [by the proponent]. It is because [otherwise] the object [would] be invalidated even by the own scriptural statements of the [opponent,] who claims the purification [of demerits by performing ablutions, etc.].

According to this exposition, the Buddhist claim that demerits cannot be purified by ablutions, etc., is not invalidated by the non-Buddhist scripture. A fallacy of the thesis would only occur if a scripture that the Buddhist accepts as a means of valid cognition were to invalidate the Buddhist claim. However, if one depends on the opponent's scriptural thesis, the claim cannot be refuted because the scripture is not accepted by the Buddhist. In this manner, a scripture's coherency becomes the subject of investigation. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:

> [Text 6] *lobhādimūlo 'dharma iti sarvaśāstreṣu vyavasthā, alubdhādviṣṭāmūḍhānāṃ pāpānabhyupagamāt. sā vyavasthā snānādīnāṃ pāpaśodhanavādaṃ bādhate, nidānāpraśamanena nidānino 'vicchedāt, madhuraśītalasnigdhair iva vyādheḥ ślaiṣmikasyeti. ata eva śāstradṛṣṭeṣv artheṣu virodhodbhāvanaprāyā cintā. yac chāstraṃ vastubalapravṛttena pramāṇena svavacanena cābādhitaṃ dṛśyādṛśyayor viṣayayoḥ, tad grāhyam iti*. PVin 3 31,6–11[17]
>
> In every scripture it is determined that demerits are rooted in desire, etc., because no sin is accepted as existing in those who have no desire, anger or ignorance. This determination invalidates the [scriptural] statement which says that performing ablutions, etc., purifies demerits, because the effect (*nidānin*) is not destroyed without cessation of its

[17] PVin 3 D 197a4–7 = P 295a3–6: *chos ma yin pa ni bstan bcos thams cad las chags pa la sogs pa'i rtsa ba can du rnam par gzhag pa yin te / ma chags pa dang / sdang ba med pa dang / ma rmongs pa rnams la ni sdig par khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // rnam par gzhag pa des ni khrus la sogs pa sdig pa dag par byed bar smra ba* (P cf. PVinṬ[D] 46a1 : *sna ba* D) *la gnod pa yin no // rgyu ma zad na 'bras bu mi zlog* (D : *ldog* P) *pa'i phyir te / mngar ba dang / bsil ba dang / snum pa dag gyis bad kan las gyur pa'i nad bzhin no // de nyid kyi phyir lung gis mthong ba'i don dag la ni 'gal ba brjod pa la cher sems pa yin te / bstan bcos gang zhig mthong ba dang ma mthong ba'i yul dag la dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'i tshad ma dang / rang gi tshig gis mi gnod pa de gzung bar bya ba yin no //*

> cause (*nidāna*), just as a phlegmatic disease [is not purified] by sweet, cold or oily [things]. And for this precise reason, the investigation (*cintā*) consists mainly in pointing out incoherencies (*virodhodbhāvanā*) with regard to objects observed in scriptures. A scripture that is not invalidated by means of a valid cognition functioning through the force of real entities and [the scripture's] own words with regard to empirical objects and transempirical objects [, respectively,] is to be accepted.

In opposition to the scriptural thesis "demerits are not purified by performing ablutions, etc.," on the basis of the same scripture, one can formulate the counter-thesis "demerits are rooted in mental factors such as desire, etc." While these two theses indirectly contradict each other, the second is justified by the empirical rule that no effect ceases without the cessation of its cause. As Eltschinger has pointed out, the example of the causal relationship together with the example of phlegmatic disease is used by both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, the former when presenting two pervasion formulas (*vyāpti*) and the latter when formulating a proof based on *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*.[18]

Dharmakīrti concludes this section (PVin 3 31,10–11) with a statement resembling PV 4.108, where it is described how to determine which scriptures are reliable and which are unreliable by using ordinary means of valid cognition and the scripture's own words. The latter is glossed "scripturally based inference" by the commentator

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[18] Eltschinger 2007: 109, fn. 134. Cf. PVṬ D 245a5f.: *gang zhig gang gi rgyu la gnod pa mi byed pa de ni de'i gnod pa can ma yin te / dper na bad kan can gyi nad la mngar ba dang bsil ba dang smus pa'i rjes dag gnod pa can ma yin pa dag lta bu'o // khrus la sogs pa ni sdig pa'i rgyu la gnod pa byed pa ma yin no zhes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //* "[*Vyāpti*:] Whatever does not remove the cause of a certain thing (x) does not remove the thing (x), for example, sweet, cold or oily things do not remove phlegmatic disease. [*Pakṣadharmatā*:] Bathing in holy water and other things (e.g., the *agnihotra* sacrifice) do not remove the cause of demerits. [Type of reason:] This is on the basis of the reason of cognition of the contradictory to the pervader (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*)." This proof is also mentioned by the Tibetan philosopher mKhas grub rje in his commentary on the PV 4; cf. *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, f. 61a5f. For the reason, see also NB 2.38: *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nātra tuṣārasparśo vahner iti //*

Manorathanandin.[19] Here, scripturally based inference, based on the same scripture, is used to invalidate a thesis that refers to supersensible objects. This style of invalidation is basically the same as that demonstrated by Dignāga in his *Nyāyamukha* with the example: "For the Aulūkya [i.e. Vaiśeṣika, who does not accept the permanence of sound but nevertheless claims that] 'sound is eternal,' [the thesis] is invalidated by [his] previously accepted position (*pūrvābhyupagama*)."[20] For Dharmakīrti's division between supersensible objects and other objects, the thesis is not concerned with radically inaccessible states of affairs. Dharmakīrti's example of purification of demerit is seemingly an updated version of the fallacious thesis called *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*.[21]

To summarize, the scripturally based inference possesses the following characteristics:

1 In order to investigate the specific features of an opponent's scripture that teaches a supersensible subject (*dharmin*), an inference is made that is based on a hypothetical acceptance of that scripture.
2 This inference consists in a thesis that is contradictory to the opponent's thesis on the subject.
3 Other than the thesis, the elements of a logical proof (*prayoga*) are not mentioned in the above discussions.[22]

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[19] Manorathanandin glosses the word *svavācā* in PV 4.108 as "by scripturally based inference." Cf. PVV 450,16: ***svavācā****gamāśrayeṇānumānena*.

[20] Cf. Katsura 1977: 113–114. For the Sanskrit text, see PVA 526,19f.

[21] This fallacy is defined in Dignāga's NMu: 或先所立宗義相違、如獯狐子立声為常. Cf. Katsura 1977: 113. Note that in its Sanskrit fragment (cf. PVA 526,19f.: *pūrvābhyupagamena vā, yathaulūkyasyānityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ*.), there is no equivalent for 宗義 (**siddhānta*?). Praśastapāda calls the fallacy *svaśāstravirodhin* and presents the example: *vaiśeṣikasya sat kāryam*. Uddyotakara rejects Dignāga's idea of this fallacy and regards it as a fallacious thesis that is opposed to inference. Cf. NV 108,3–8. In contrast, Kumārila accepts the fallacious thesis as a kind of contradiction with words (*śabdavirodha*); cf. ŚV *anumāna* 61cd–65ab. For *pakṣābhāsa*, see Inami 1991.

[22] The inference in the present context functions as an equivalent of the scripture's statement itself. In this case, since we know only the thesis

2. Antinomic reasons (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) and scripturally based inference

Another example of scripturally based inference is found in a discussion on the fallacious reason called *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, or "antinomic reason", an example that may help us understand the formal structure of this type of inference. In NB 3.110–120, an excursive argument on the three kinds of fallacious reasons, Dharmakīrti discusses the *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, which Dignāga counts as a type of inconclusive reason (*anaikāntika*).[23] According to Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3 vv. 23–24 and its *Vṛtti*, if two reasons concluding two contradictory propositions to be proved are stated together, these two reasons cause doubt (*saṃśaya*). To this, Dharmakīrti claims that a non-deviant reason (*avyabhicārin*), namely, a correct reason, is only possible if an inference occurs that is based on reasons of effect (*kārya*), essential property (*svabhāva*), or non-cognitions (*anupalabdhi*), which are all dependent on real entities (*vastu*).[24] The fallacious reason *viruddhāvyabhicārin* arises when applying scripturally based inference. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:

> [Text 7] *tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ*. NB 3.114
>
> Therefore, [Dignāga] has [taught] the fallacious reason [called] *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the case of the investigations of [scriptural] objects

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to be invalidated and that which functions as the invalidator, it is uncertain whether their reasons and triple characteristics are also based on scripture or not. According to PV 4.92, the invalidator (*bādhaka*) is considered a kind of *kāryahetu*. Cf. Tillemans 2000: 126–130.

[23] I follow Tillemans' translation of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as "antinomic reasons". As for Dharmakīrti's treatment of the fallacy, see Tani 1987b, Tillemans 2000: 92–94. For Dignāga's argument on the fallacy, cf. PS 3.23–24 and its *Vṛtti*; Kitagawa 1973: 192–199. Regarding the example of PS 3.23–24, Dharmakīrti comments that Dignāga used it only to indicate the direction (*diṅmātradarśana, phyogs tsam bstan pa*) in which to proceed. Cf. PVin 3 130,13 (D 228a4 = P 327a5; PSṬ P 192b2).

[24] NB 3.110–113.

by relying on scripturally based inference, which functions without the observation of real entities.[25]

If one formulates an inference based on observing real entities (*vastudarśana*), in Dharmakīrti's system of logic this can only involve inferring a cause from its effect (e.g. fire from smoke), inferring a property from a related property of one and the same entity (e.g. tree-ness from *śiṃśapā*-ness), or formulating negative inferences on the basis of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). In these cases, an entity/property is related to another entity/property either through a causal relationship (*tadutpatti*), or full or partial identity (*tādātmya*). In contrast to the *real* world (at least for the Buddhist), in the other worlds or metaphysical systems that have been conceptually constructed by authors of heretical scriptures (*śāstrakārāḥ* = *tīrthikaśāstrapraṇetāraḥ*), it is possible that two contradictory properties have been wrongly ascribed to one and the same entity.[26] In this case, two contradictory

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[25] Cf. also PVin 3 128,4–5 (D 227a4). According to Kamalaśīla, this statement is against certain Buddhist insiders who claim that the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as a kind of inconclusive reason occurs even in an inference that functions through the force of real entities. Cf. NBPS D 98b3–5 = P 121a8–b2: *rang gi sde pa kha cig ni dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa la yang 'gal ba mi 'khrul pa can zhes bya ba ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs yod do zhes brjod de / de la dper brjod pa ni dper na sgra mi rtag pa ste byas pa'i phyir bum pa lta bu'o zhes bya ba la yang* (D : *yang* om. P) *gang gi tshe gzhan zhig gis brgal te / sgra ni rtag pa ste mnyan par bya ba yin pa'i phyir sgra nyid lta bu'o zhes smras pa de'i tshe sbyor ba snga ma ma nges pa yin no zhes zer ro zhes grags te / de dgag pa'i phyir 'gal ba mi 'khrul ba can yang zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so //*. On the other hand, in the *anumānaparīkṣā* chapter of the TSP, he discusses this kind of fallacy by arguing against the author of the *Tattvaṭīkā*, Aviddhakarṇa, who rejects the inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) for the reason that the fallacy of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is possible in every inference. To this, Kamalaśīla answers that this fallacy does not apply in the case of objects of *vastubala*-type inferences. Cf. TSP ad 1458 and 1473. On the difference between the *vastubala*-type inference and scripturally based inference, see also HBṬ 216,15–18.

[26] Cf. NB 3.115: *śāstrakārāṇām artheṣu bhrāntyā viparītasvabhāvopasaṃhārasambhavāt*. Cf. PVin 3 128,5–6 (D 227a4). Durvekamiśra comments on *śāstrakārāḥ* as *tīrthikaśāstrapraṇetāraḥ* (DhPr 227,17).

inferences occur with respect to the same subject. Their reasons are considered *viruddhāvyabhicārin.* Dharmakīrti presents as an example of this the following two proofs concerning universals (*sāmānya*), which are both based on the Vaiśeṣika system of metaphysics.

> [Proof 1]
>
> [*Vyāpti*:] Whatever is simultaneously connected with its relata that reside everywhere is omnipresent, like the ether (*ākāśa*).
>
> [*Pakṣadharmatva*:] And universals are simultaneously connected with their relata residing everywhere.[27]
>
> [Proof 2]
>
> [*Vyāpti*:] Whatever is not cognized, despite its fulfilling the conditions for being cognized, does not exist there, like a pot that is absent from a certain place.
>
> [*Pakṣadharmatva*:] And universals are not cognized in the intervals between particulars (*vyaktyantarāla*), despite their fulfilling the conditions for being cognized.[28]

According to Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla, these two proofs were constructed by two different Vaiśeṣika authors, Pailuka and Paiṭhara, who are both said to have been pupils of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system.[29] In the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Dharmottara introduces the first proof as follows:

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[27] NB 3.117: *yat sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyate tat sarvagatam, yathākāśam. abhisambadhyate ca sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapat sāmānyam iti*. Cf. PVin 3 128,8–9 (D 227a4–6 = P 326a6f.).

[28] NB 3.120: *yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ san nopalabhyate na tat tatrāsti, tadyathā kvacid avidyamāno ghaṭaḥ. nopalabhyate copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sāmānyaṃ vyaktyantarāleṣv iti*. Cf. PVin 3 129,12–130,1 (D 227b5f. = P 326b6f.). The proof is originally considered to be a refutation of omnipresence of the universals. However, later Buddhist logicians such as Paṇḍita Aśoka and Mokṣākaragupta considered the proof as a refutation of the existence of the universals. Cf. TBh 56,15–57,4; Kajiyama 1998: 129f. and fn. 351.

[29] Cf. NBṬ 228,7f., 231,6; NBPS D 98b5f. = P 121b2–4. Jitāri also mentions the two authors' names, but this is probably due to Dharmottara's influence. Cf. HTU 267,5–16.

[Text 8] *iha sāmānyaṃ kaṇādamaharṣiṇā niṣkriyaṃ dṛśyam ekaṃ coktam. yugapac ca sarvaiḥ svaiḥ sambandhibhiḥ samavāyena sambaddham. tatra pailukena kaṇādaśiṣyeṇa vyaktiṣu vyaktirahiteṣu ca deśeṣu sāmānyaṃ sthitaṃ sādhayituṃ pramāṇam idam upanyastam*. NBṬ 228,7–229,1

Here, Kaṇāda, the great sage, has claimed universals to be immovable (*niṣkriya*), perceptible (*dṛśya*) and singular (*eka*). Moreover, [universals] are simultaneously connected to all their relata by [the relation of] inherence (*samavāya*). On this [i.e., Kaṇāda's claim], Pailuka, Kaṇāda's pupil, states the means of valid cognition [i.e., inference of the proof 1] in order to prove that universals exist in particulars and places without particulars.

In this explanation, Dharmottara states that Kaṇāda, the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, considers the universals to be motionless, perceptible and singular. Furthermore, the reason formulated in proof 1, namely, being simultaneously connected to their relata, also derives from Kaṇāda's statements. However, in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*'s descriptions, these characteristics are not explicitly mentioned. As Halbfass has pointed out, "Kaṇāda does not introduce *sāmānya* with a definition" and "apart from the dubious Sūtra 1,1,4, it is not even listed, or referred to, as a category (*padārtha*)."[30] Therefore, it is uncertain how much of Dharmottara's explanation really reflects the Vaiśeṣika's historical background on universals.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that following the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Praśastapāda defines *sāmānya* as being omnipresent in its objects (*svaviṣayasarvatraga*),[31], but mentions that it is non-designated in the interval (*antarāla*) between particulars. This is paraphrased by the commentator Śrīdhara as "non-existence in the ether or space or immobile wind or the absence of corporeal substances."[32] If this in-

[30] Halbfass 1992: 116.

[31] Cf. PDhS 81,2f.

[32] Cf. PDhS 83,3: *antarāle ca saṃyogasamavāyavṛttyabhāvād avyapadeśyānīti*. Śrīdhara's commentary on this part is as follows. NKand 677,18–678,3: *antarālam ity ākāśaṃ vā digdravyaṃ vā stimitavāyur vā mūrtadravyābhāvo vā, teṣu gotvādisāmānyānāṃ na saṃyogo nāpi samavāyaḥ. na cāsambaddhānām eva teṣām avasthāne pramāṇam asti. ato* ***'ntarāle na sāmānyāni vyapadiśyante*** *na santīty arthaḥ.*

terpretation is correct, Praśastapāda's system seemingly holds two incompatible positions regarding the issue of the omnipresence of *sāmānya*.

How, then, can one understand the role in these two proofs of a scripture included in Praśastapāda's system? First of all, the subject or property-possessor of the two proofs, *sāmānya*, is taken as being supersensible and a subject that is only established by scripture.[33] In proof 1, *pakṣadharmatva* is also known from scripture, as for instance, from Praśastapāda's definition of universals being present in many substances (*anekavṛtti*). But, in the same manner, in proof 2, *pakṣadharmatva* seems to be based on another passage of Praśastapāda, namely that universals are not designated in the space between particulars because there is no occurrence of their connections and inherences.[34]

Consequently, if one accepts Praśastapāda's metaphysical system, these two proofs guarantee the validity of both theses: the omnipresence of universals but also their non-omnipresence. Since these theses are mutually incompatible with regard to one and the same subject, this causes doubt in the mind of the audience.

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[33] From the Buddhist viewpoint, the *sāmānya* of the Vaiśeṣika is categorized as a kind of radically inaccessible object. Cf. NBṬ 227,1f.: *tasyāgamasya yo 'rtho 'tīndriyaḥ pratyakṣānumānābhyām aviṣayīkṛtaḥ sāmānyādis tasya vicāreṣu prakrānteṣv āgamāśrayam anumānaṃ sambhavati*. From the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint, however, it is a perceptible object. Cf. TBh 57,2f.: *idaṃ tu [sāmānyaṃ] cakṣurvijñānagrāhyam, arthadharmatvāt. pratyakṣaṃ ca parair iṣṭam iti*. A question arises on this point: If *sāmānya* is a kind of radically inaccessible object, then why are the opponents' other dogmatic objects such as *ātman* and *īśvara* not considered radically inaccessible in the same manner? In PVSV ad PV 1.215, these objects are considered invalidated by the *vastubala*-type inference, not by scripturally based inference. Of these objects, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's proofs of *īśvara* are structured such that the proof of a general property to be proved implies the proof of the special property to be proved. The former proof is based on the connection of real entities.

[34] PDhS 83,3: *antarāle ca saṃyogasamavāyavṛttyabhāvād avyapadeśyānīti*.

If compared with what we have seen in the argument on scripturally based inference as invalidating the scriptural thesis on the purification of *adharma*, the present argument on *viruddhāvyabhicārin* shares the following common features:

1' The scripturally based inference occurs by force of the hypothetical acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of scriptural statements on supersensible matters such as *sāmānya* and its properties.[35]

2' The two theses of the proofs on the *sāmānya*'s omnipresence contradict one another.

In addition, the present argument makes the structure of the inference clear, as follows:

3' The scripturally based inference fulfils the triple conditions of a valid reason, as long as one accepts the world view constructed in the scripture.

3. Scripturally based inference and NSū 1.1.31 and 1.2.6

In Dharmakīrti's discussions on scripturally based inference, we have so far seen two common characteristics, namely, the hypothet-

[35] Cf. PVin 3 130,12: *tad ayam abhyupagamabalapravṛttaḥ* (D 228a4 = P 327a4f.: *de bas na 'di ni khas blangs pa'i stobs kyis 'jug pa yin no //*). Cf. also PVinṬ D 171b3 = P 201b3: *de bas na 'gal ba mi* (*mi* P : *ni mi* D) *'khrul pa can 'di ni khas blangs pa'i stobs kyis 'jug pa yin gyi / dngos po la brten pa ni ma yin no //*. Cf. NBṬ 233,2–5: *yataḥ sāmānyasyaikasya yugapat sarvadeśāvasthitair abhisambandhitvaṃ cābhyupagatam, dṛśyatvaṃ ca, tataḥ sarvasambandhitvāt sarvagatatvam, dṛśyatvād antarālānupalambhād* (DhPr 233, fn. 5 : *antarālād anupalambhād* ed.) *asarvagatatvam. tataḥ śāstrakāreṇaiva viruddhavyāptatvam apaśyatā viruddhavyāptau dharmāv uktvā viruddhāvyabhicāryavakāśo datta iti*. "Since [the author of scripture] has accepted that a single universal is simultaneously connected with [particulars] residing everywhere and that [the universal] is perceptible, [one can infer] that [the universal] is omnipresent because [it] is connected to everything and that [the universal] is not omnipresent because it is perceptible but not perceived in the spaces in between. Therefore, after the author of scripture, who does not see that [the universal] is pervaded by two contradictory [properties], has claimed two properties, of which both are pervaded by contradictory [properties], the occasion of antinomic reason is given."

ical acceptance of an opponent's scripture that teaches a radically inaccessible state of affairs, and the inference's nature of invalidating a thesis of the opponent by that thesis being contradictory to the opponent's own position. Although the inference itself is valid in its internal coherency regarding the reason and examples, one can show that it is contradictory by introducing a piece of external evidence based on a second inference. While this idea of scripturally based inference can be traced back to Dignāga's treatments of fallacies of thesis and reason, namely, *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, if one searches further, its origin can be seen in the ancient debate tradition of India, especially in the concepts of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* and *viruddha* in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

First of all, let us start by defining *abhyupagamasiddhānta*, the fourth type of *siddhānta* after the other three, namely, *sarvatantrasiddhānta*, *pratitantrasiddhānta*, and *adhikaraṇasiddhānta*. The definition of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* in the NSū is as follows:[36]

> [Text 9] *aparīkṣitābhyupagamāt tadviśeṣaparīkṣaṇam abhyupagamasiddhāntaḥ* // NSū 1.1.31
>
> The hypothetical tenet is [used in] the investigation of specific features of the [subject] after having hypothetically accepted [the subject] that has not yet been examined.

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[36] On the *abyupagamasiddhānta* in NSū 1.1.31 and its interpretation by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, Prof. Hiroshi Marui (2012) presented a detailed analysis at the international conference "World view and theory in Indian Philosophy" held in Barcelona on 28 April 2009. In the presentation Marui pointed out that Jayanta's interpretation of the *abhyupagamasiddhānta* does not differ from that of Pakṣilasvāmin. After Uddyotakara's new interpretation, the dialectical role of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* was lost in the Nyāya tradition. Marui's final remark says that Jayanta's interpretation of NSū 1.1.31 "represents a certain historical phase of the shifting process of Nyāya System from the science of dialectics to the *pramāṇaśāstra* in which more and more emphasis was laid on the dependence of *siddhānta* upon the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇamūlatva*), whereas less and less stress was placed on its implications for the dialectical dynamism which presupposes the lively tension of the multi-doctrinal world of debate." I would like to thank Prof. Marui for sending me the paper he read at the conference, which will be published soon.

According to Pakṣilasvāmin's commentary, a tenet is hypothetically adopted, for instance, in the debate on sound's eternity between the Naiyāyika, who accepts sound to be a quality of the ether (*ākāśaguṇa*), and the Mīmāṃsaka, who declares that sound is a substance. In the debate, the Naiyāyika starts by hypothetically accepting the subject of the examination, "Let sound be a substance" (*astu dravyaṃ śabdaḥ*), and examines the specific feature whether sound is eternal or non-eternal. In this case the hypothetical acceptance of the Mīmāṃsaka's tenet of sound's substance-ness is called a "hypothetical tenet." Pakṣilasvāmin comments that one uses such hypothetical tenets in order to display one's more distinguished knowledge and to look down on the knowledge of the opponent.[37]

We find a similar procedure regarding scripturally based inference, that is, a hypothetical acceptance of an opponent's tenet or scripture on the subject of a proof for investigating its specific features in the proof.

With regard to presuming the hypothetical tenet, the author of the NSū further defines the fallacious reason called *viruddha* as follows:[38]

> [Text 10] *siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ* // NSū 1.2.6
>
> After one has hypothetically accepted the [opponent's] tenet, [the reason] which is contradictory to the [hypothetical tenet] is [called the fallacy of] contradiction.[39]

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[37] Cf. NBh (ad NSū 1.1.31) 29,15–30,2.

[38] Preisendanz 1994: 321 has pointed out the correspondence between Dignāga's definition of the fallacious thesis being opposed to authority and this passage in the NSū as follows: "Am Rande sei hier bemerkt, dass (3) (Nr. 2 in NMukha = *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*) eine Entsprechung in der sicherlich älteren Definition des *viruddhahetvābhāsa* in NSū 1.2.6 hat (*siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ*; Verweis schon bei Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika-System*, p. 322), die verdeutlicht, dass die *hetvābhāsa* des NSū ursprünglich in den Bereich der Disputationsregel und der Verstösse gegen sie gehörten."

[39] Cf. Tillemans 2000: 71, fn. 245 (ad PV 4.43). Matilal (1985: 44) says that the *viruddha* is "enigmatically defined in NSū 1.2.6" and that "most probably, it meant something very different from what the later tradi-

As P. P. Gokhale has pointed out, this type of fallacy "can be compared with *siddhāntaviruddha* of Caraka,"[40] who classified three kinds of *viruddha*s as points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), namely, *dṛṣṭāntaviruddha*, *siddhāntaviruddha*, and *samayaviruddha*, under the fallacy of a claim (*vākyadoṣa*). Although later Naiyāyikas interpret this fallacy as being the reason contradicting the thesis (*pratijñā*) of the same proof, the NSū's original meaning should be understood differently: the reason is incoherent with regard to a tenet of the opponent that is external to the proof itself. This is explained by Pakṣilasvāmin, for instance, by using the Sāṃkhya-Yoga's two proofs of primordial matter (*pradhāna*):[41]

[Proof 3]

[Thesis:] Transformed matter (*vikāra*) withdraws after it has manifested [itself],

[reason:] because permanence is denied.

[Proof 4]

[Thesis:] Even if transformed matter withdraws, it exists,

[reason:] because destruction is denied.

In this case, the reason in proof 3, "denial of permanence" (*nityatvapratiṣedha*), that is, impermanence, is incoherent with regard to the opponent's tenet shown in the thesis of proof 4: "transformed matter exists even if it withdraws." For the Naiyāyika who supports the position of *asatkāryavāda*, both proofs are basically unacceptable. Nonetheless, if the opponent's tenet is hypothetically accepted,[42] the

tion in Nyāya understood as *viruddha*."

[40] Gokhale 1992: 24.

[41] NBh 43,11–14: *yathā so 'yaṃ vikāro vyakter apaiti, nityatvapratiṣedhāt. na nityo vikāra upapadyate. apeto 'pi vikāro 'sti vināśapratiṣedhāt. so 'yaṃ nityatvapratiṣedhād iti hetur vyakter apeto 'pi vikāro 'stīty anena svasiddhāntena virudhyate.* Cf. YBh 247,2f. (ad YS 3.13): *tad etat trailokyaṃ vyakter apaiti, nityatvapratiṣedhāt. apetam apy asti, vināśapratiṣedhāt*; YD 128,22–129,1: *tathā ca vārṣagaṇāḥ paṭhanti "tad etat trailokyaṃ vyakter apaiti na sattvāt. apetam apy asti, vināśapratiṣedhāt."* Cf. also Oberhammer 2006: 147f.

[42] Cf. NBh 43,11–44,2.

Naiyāyika can point out the fallacy of *viruddha* in the opponent's proof. In other words, even if one accepts proof 3 as showing valid reasoning, it becomes invalid by the force of proof 4, which functions as an invalidator, just as scripturally based inference does.

In this manner, the main structure of Dharmakīrti's scripturally based inference is shared in part with the two early Nyāya concepts of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* and *viruddha*, which both should be understood in the context of the *vāda*-tradition. There, the debater could refute his opponent's proof not only by means of its internal incoherency, but also by means of its incoherency with regard to the opponent's tenets or the system of his scripture. Although Dharmakīrti's scripturally based inference does not seem to be used in the actual debate and its scope is limited to radically inaccessible states of affairs, its function is essentially the same as these early Nyāya concepts. Accordingly, unlike the *vastubala*-type of inference, scripturally based inference only functions for invalidating the opponent's scriptural propositions by the force of other propositions within the same scripture. It cannot be used for proving one's own scriptural propositions.

4. Conclusion

From the above examination, I believe that the significance of *abhyupagama* in scripturally based inference has become clear. One of Dharmakīrti's contributions to the development of Dignāga's logic consists in his efforts to distinguish radically inaccessible states of affairs from the real entities upon which our ordinary judgments of truth depend. Owing to this distinction, he succeeds in establishing a logical system based on *svabhāvapratibandha*, the necessary relationship between real entities and their properties. As a result, however, certain concepts relating to radically inaccessible states of affairs are expelled from the realm in which usual inferences occur. The scripturally based inference relates to the realm of super-sensible matters and presupposes a world or a system based on the *abhyupagama* of a certain scripture. By assuming the internal co-

herency of such a scriptural world or system, it becomes possible to point out the inconsistencies in scriptural descriptions.[43]

As we have seen when comparing this to the early Nyāya concepts of *abhyupagamasiddhānta* and *viruddha*, in the *vāda*-tradition the notion of *abhyupagama* functions as a means for introducing a hypothetical negative argument that is then used to refute the opponent's philosophical system. Dharmakīrti's notion of scripturally based inference is also understood in this line. Consequently, even if one does not accept an opponent's dogmatic subject, it is possible to formulate a hypothetical reasoning based on the *abhyupagama* of the opponent's philosophical system in order to finally reject that system by pointing out the fallacies of *śāstraviruddha* or *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. In the process, the *abhyupagama* of the opponent's tenet forms a possible world that is different from reality, and becomes the basis for finding an invalidating factor in the opponent's thesis. It might now be interesting to examine Dharmakīrti's treatment of counterfactual conditionals, known by the technical term *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, as a variation of such an *abhyupagama* argument, but its analysis is beyond the scope of this presentation.

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D – J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima (eds.), *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ḥgyur – preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tshad ma* 1–21. Tokyo 1981ff.

DhPr – *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): See NB.

HBṬ – Hetubinduṭīkā (Arcaṭa): S. Sanghavi & Muni Shri Jinavijayaji (eds.), *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary entitled Āloka of*

[43] However, whether the Buddhist scriptures are really free of the fallacies of *śāstraviruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* still remains to be examined. For instance, we know that Kumārila attacked the Yogācāra proof of *vijñaptimātratā* by pointing out various fallacies, including *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Cf. ŚV *nirālamba*, vv. 69–73 (*pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*, *buddhābhiprāyaviruddha*) and vv. 77–78 (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*).

Durveka Miśra. Baroda 1949.

HTU – *Hetutattvopadeśa* (Jitāri): G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts.* Part I. Roma: IsMEO 1956, pp. 261–274.

NB – *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): D. Malvania (ed.), *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1955.

NBh – Nyāyabhāṣya (Pakṣilasvāmin): A. Thakur (ed.), *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1997.

NBPS – *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepa* (Kamalaśīla): *Rigs pa'i thigs pa'i phyogs snga ma mdor bsdus pa*. D no. 4232, P no. 5731.

NBṬ – *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See NB.

NKand – *Nyāyakandalī* (Śrīdhara): J. S. Jetly (ed.), *Nyāyakandalī, being a commentary on Praśastapādabhāṣya, with three sub-commentaries*. Vadodara: Oriental Institute 1991.

NSū – *Nyāyasūtra*: See NBh.

P – Daisetz T. Suzuki, *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking edition*. Tokyo/Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute 1957.

PDhS – *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (Praśastapāda): J. Bronkhorst and Y. Ramseier (eds.), *Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya: A Complete Word Index to the Printed Editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers 1994.

PV 1 – *Pramāṇavārttika*, *svārthānumāna*-chapter (Dharmakīrti): See PVSV.

PV 4 – *Pramāṇavārttika*, *parārthānumāna*-chapter (Dharmakīrti): See Tillemans 2000.

PVA – *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute 1953.

PVin 3 – *Pramaṇaviniścaya*, *parārthānumāna*-chapter (Dharmakīrti): Pascale Hugon & Toru Tomabechi (eds.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *chapter 3*. With a preface by Tom J.F. Tillemans. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2011
= *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa*. D no. 4211, P no. 5710.

PVinṬ – **Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara): *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i 'grel bshad*. D no. 4227, Tshe 1b1–178a3 (Commentary on PVin 3) = P no. 5227.

PVP – **Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi): *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi*

'grel pa. D no. 4217, P no. 5717.

PVSV – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārtttikam of Dharmakīrti.* Roma 1960.

PVṬ – **Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi): *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad*. D no. 4220, P no. 5718.

PVV – *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin*. Appendices to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24/3–26/3, 1938–1940.

Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho – *rGyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher 'shad pa rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (mKhas grub rje): *mKhas grub rje'i gsung 'bum*, Vol. Da (Commentary on PV 4), 1b1–132a4. lHa sa edition.

ŚV – *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila): D. Shāstrī (ed.), *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Varanasi: Tara Publications 1978.

TBh – *Tarkabhāṣā* (Mokṣākaragupta): H. R. R. Iyengar (ed.), *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. Mysore: The Hindusthan Press 1952.

TSP – *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): S. D. Shastri (ed.), *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā'.* Vol. 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1981.

YBh – *Yogabhāṣya* (Vyāsa): P. S. R. Sastri & S. R. K. Sastri (eds.), *Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya Vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda*. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library 1952.

YD – *Yuktidīpikā*: A. Wezler & Sh. Motegi (eds.), *Yuktidīpikā*. Vol. I. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1998.

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Marui 2012 – Hiroshi Marui, The Meaning of a Diversity of Established World Views or Tenets (*siddhānta*) in the Science of Debate: With Special Reference to Jayanta's Interpretation of the *Abhyupagamasiddhānta* (NS 1.1.31) and its Evaluation in the Development of Nyāya System. In: Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.), *World View and Theory in Indian Philosophy*. New Delhi : Manohar, pp. 407–432.

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Recently, Prof. Takashi Iwata has published an article concerning the role of scripture in Dharmakīrti's logic, which contains several remarkable investigations on his concept of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* and scripturally based inference: Takashi Iwata, Mujun tairitsu suru meidai no hitei wa ika ni kanō ka – syōgon ya ronsho nado ni motozuita hitei no ronri [How is the negation of contradictory propositions possible? The logic of negation based on authoritative words and scripture], *Tōyō no shisō to shūkyō* 27 (2010) 1–45. Unfortunately, I was not able to take his results into consideration in the present paper.

Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Eli Franco and Prof. Helmut Krasser for their valuable comments on the previous versions of this paper

Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita on scripture and reason

The limits and extent of "practical rationality" in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*

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If there is a real distinction between theoretical and practical reason, it does not appear to have been particularly troubling to classical Indian philosophers. The concept of pure reason, devoid of practical concerns or implications, was never explicitly entertained in ancient India – just as it was never explicitly entertained in ancient Greece. Indeed, rationality in all its forms is connected in India with a number of fundamental human goals (*puruṣārtha*), and one might thus be tempted to say that Indian rationality *just is* practical rationality. Saying this does not preclude our recognition that Indian systematic texts contain within them a great deal of highly theoretical reflection – termed *ānvīkṣikī* in many Indian contexts – on ontological, epistemological, logical, and other such philosophical themes.[1] Rather, it is just to emphasize that all theoretical reflection in India is connected with practical aims, a fact that should in no way diminish its worth in our eyes. Instead, we should seek to attune ourselves, in my view, to the ways in which *all* rational reflection is connected in some way to practical concerns, as well as to the particular ways in which various forms of Indian rational reflection are connected to particular practical concerns. It is only by paying close attention to the connections between practical aims and theoretical reflection,

[1] On *ānvīkṣikī*, see Chakrabarti 1997 and Halbfass 1981.

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as well as to indigenous theoretical thinking concerning those same connections, that we can come to appreciate the contributions of Indian, or indeed any, philosophical thought.

One excellent resource for considering the contours of practical rationality in the post-Dharmakīrtian Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition is the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, Kamalaśīla's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*. In particular, the opening section of this massive work of Buddhist polemics contains sustained theoretical reflection on the relationship between rationality and action, a point that Vincent Eltschinger has also noted.[2] This extended passage, which is styled as commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*'s six opening verses, offers a developed account of the rationality of both ordinary and religious action. The ingenuity of the passage is striking, integrating as it does a more general theory of rational action with Kamalaśīla's more specific concerns as a Buddhist apologist seeking to offer a rational foundation for the practice of Buddhism.[3] In my book on the arguments for omniscience in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, I draw on this and other passages to argue that for Kamalaśila, the ultimate goal of all rational inquiry is the religious goal of supreme liberation, defined in these works as perfect buddhahood or omniscience (*sarvajñatā*). Not surprisingly then, one of the most important tasks of rational discourse is, for Kamalaśīla and others like him, to provide rational persons with rational justification for seeking this soteriological goal.

Critical to this project is the demonstration that omniscience, as understood by these thinkers, is in the first place *possible*, since the rationality of pursuing an impossible goal is clearly questionable. As Eltschinger observes, Kamalaśīla's approach to demonstrating the possibility of attaining this religious aim depends heavily on

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[2] Eltschinger 2007. See also McClintock 2010 and Eltschinger's essay in the present volume.

[3] Eltschinger (2007: 137) remarks on the basis mainly of this passage that Kamalaśīla is "likely to be the one Buddhist philosopher who laid theoretical foundations in order to argue for the rationality of embarking on the Bodhisattva path."

Dharmakīrti's reworking of the so-called *kāryānumāna,* or "inference of an effect from a cause,"[4] accepted by certain other Indian philosophical schools. According to Dharmakīrti, the *kāryānumāna* cannot be accepted as a true means of trustworthy awareness (*pramāṇa*), since an intervening obstacle could always prevent the arising of the effect from the cause (or, more precisely, causal complex). Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti holds that one *can* infer the suitability (*yogyatā*) of a particular causal complex to give rise to a particular effect, thus allowing for a more limited use of the *kāryānumāna* structure. The upshot is that although one cannot infer the *inevitability* of particular Buddhist practices to give rise to the perfect wisdom of a buddha (since an intervening obstacle can always arise), one can infer the *suitability* of such practices to do so.[5] A rational person may therefore be justified in setting out on the Buddhist path, knowing that her goal is indeed attainable.

Now the rational person that we have been discussing thus far is the *prekṣāvant* or "person who possesses investigation," known also as the *prekṣāpūrvakārin* or "person who undertakes an investigation prior to acting." The qualities of this person – to whom I will refer from this point forward as the judicious person to reflect the practical aspects of their rational nature – are not laid out in any one place but can be gleaned from comments made throughout the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*.[6] For our present purposes, the following qualities are most important. First, the

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[4] Eltschinger 2007: 142–150. Eltschinger notes also the contribution of Ernst Steinkellner, who earlier had already understood the *kāryānumāna* theory as a key to Dharmakīrti's religious philosophy. See Steinkellner 1999.

[5] Eltschinger (2007: 153–57) treats Kamalaśīla's long excursus at TSP ad TS 3337 which attempts to demonstrate the possibility of the perfection of wisdom. See also my discussion at McClintock 2010: 192–219.

[6] See McClintock 2010: 58–62 for a longer list of many of the qualities associated with this figure, whom I consider to be the "embodiment of rationality" for these thinkers and others of their era. A comparative study of this figure across traditions is a clear desideratum in the field of classical Indian rationality.

judicious person is one whose actions are always directed toward some goal, and that goal (*upeya*) must be one the means (*upāya*) for attaining which the judicious person has completed a suitable investigation.[7] A suitable investigation is one that relies entirely upon perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) – the only means of trustworthy awareness these authors accept – and this means also that the judicious person does not resort to mere proclamations to clear up doubt about the goal or the means to attain it.[8] Finally, and perhaps most important, the judicious person is antidogmatic, in that he will necessarily accept *any* position that is established through reasoning (*nyāya*), even if that position does not accord the dogmas of the community in which he stands.[9]

The combined effect of these requirements is to reinforce the idea that the ideal audience for the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* is comprised of judicious persons who proceed on the basis of rational inquiry and not on the basis of the authority of a teacher or scriptures. Although this sentiment is expressed throughout the work, it is epitomized in a famous verse preserved in both the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*:

> Just as wise persons accept gold, having first tested it through heating it, cutting it, and rubbing it on a touchstone, so too, O monks, you

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[7] See, e.g., TSP ad TS 155 (Ś 97,16–17): *prekṣāpūrvakāripravṛtteḥ prayojanavattayā vyāptatvāt* /. "[Śāntarakṣita has asked for what reason the supreme person (*puruṣa*) created the world] because the actions of judicious persons necessarily have a purpose." See also TS 169 (*puruṣaparīkṣā*): *yathākathaṃcid vṛttiś ced buddhimattāsya kīdṛśī / nāsamīkṣya yataḥ kāryaṃ śanako'pi pravartate* //. "If the action of [the supreme person (*puruṣa*)] were to be haphazard (*yathākathaṃcit*), then what kind of intelligence would he have? For even a fisherman does not act without considering the effect [of his action]." Kamalaśīla glosses *yathākathaṃcit* by *abuddhipūrvakam*, "without prior intention."

[8] See, e.g., TSP ad TS 3009–16 (Ś 957,11–12): *na hy ākrośamātreṇaiva vinā pramāṇaṃ prekṣāvatām āśaṅkānivṛttir yuktā* /. "In the absence of a means of trustworthy awareness (*pramāṇa*), a mere proclamation alone is incapable of eliminating doubt for judicious persons."

[9] See below n. 30.

should accept my words only after testing them, and not out of respect [for me].[10]

This maxim emphasizes the need for judicious persons to test the Buddha's doctrines, and it is further confirmation of the practical rationality at the heart of these texts. But, later in the commentary, Kamalaśīla explains that the metaphors of "heating it, rubbing it on a touchstone, and cutting it" stand for testing the Buddha's words through perception; through inference that functions through the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*); and through scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*; *āgamāśritānumāna*).[11] Here the expected tests of perception and inference are augmented by the category of scripturally based inference, an apparent subset of inference more generally, but one that, like the *kāryānumāna* discussed above, does not rise to the level of an actual means of trustworthy awareness.[12] But if scripturally based inference is not a true *pramāṇa*, and thus is incapable of eliminating doubt, then what role does it play for rational persons? Is it in fact necessary? And if so, in what capacity and to what end? In what follows, we will address these questions in an attempt to explore more precisely the role of scripture (*āgama*) for Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita's practical rationality.

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[10] TS 3587 and TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 15,23–24): *tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ / parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṃ madvaco na tu gauravāt //*.

[11] TSP ad TS 3343: *yathā kaladhautaṃ suvarṇam amalaṃ sarvadoṣarahitaṃ parīkṣyamāṇaṃ tāpādibhir na vikriyāṃ pratipadyate tathā bhagavadvacoratnaṃ pratyakṣeṇa tāpasadṛśena vastubalapravṛttānumānena nikaṣaprakhyeṇāgamāpekṣānumānenāpi chedadṛṣṭāntasūcitena na vikriyate /*. Cf. also Kamalaśīla's comments on the verse in the *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣa-saṅkṣipti/saṅkṣepa* (D no. 4232, *tshad ma* vol. 16, *ve* 93a4ff.).

[12] That scripturally based inference is not an actual inference is well-attested in Dharmakīrti's thought. See, e.g., Tillemans 1999 and Krasser 2011.

Faith and judicious persons

Unlike ordinary inference, which these thinkers insist functions through the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛtta*), Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita are not so clear concerning the precise rules of operation for scripturally based inferences. That is, in the case of ordinary inferences, the authors follow Dharmakīrti in presenting clear rules for determining the existence of the natural relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) that pertains between the evidence (*hetu*; *liṅga*) and that thing which is sought to be established (*sādhya*) by means of the evidence. In the case of scripturally based inference, however, while we do have some guidelines for *when* such an inference may be used, we find no special rules for determining the relationship between the evidence and that which is sought to be established. If we understand that scripturally based inference is not a true inference, this situation is perhaps not very surprising. But this still leaves vague the question of how such a scriptural inference is supposed to *function*. The most that we seem to be able to assert is that, on the analogy with ordinary inference, in a scripturally based inference, one takes the words of a particular scripture as evidence for the truth of the state of affairs to which those words refer, even if that truth cannot be established with the certainty associated with the true means of trustworthy awareness, perception and ordinary inference.

Now, the usual thinking has it that when a person accepts some state of affairs on the basis solely of the words of a scripture, that person may be said to have faith in the authority of that scripture. So one initial way to get at the role of scripturally based inference for Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita's practical rationality is to investigate the place of faith in the theory of rational action espoused in these texts. Once again, the opening pages of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* provide important clues, with the very first sentence extolling the importance of faith for judicious persons. Kamalaśīla is commenting on Śāntarakṣita's opening verses, which contain both an enumeration of the content of the work and an homage to the Buddha. Kamalaśīla indicates that the presentation of the content is to allow

judicious persons engage with the text, and the homage is for the purpose of generating faith in the Buddha or Blessed One. He says:

> Having perceived that judicious people act toward a text having first determined its subject matter (*abhidheya*) and aim (*prayojana*) and that the primary cause of obtaining the highest good is faith in great beings, [Śāntarakṣita] states the subject matter and the aim of the treatise, preceded by the act of honoring his own teacher, by means of the first six verses [literally: "the verses that begin with *prakṛti* and end with the word *Tattvasaṃgraha*"] in order to generate faith in the Blessed One and to cause the listener to respectfully engage with this text.[13]

How are we to understand this passage? Clearly, we are being told that judicious persons engage with a text only after determining that it concerns a worthy subject and aim. Yet we also see faith extolled as the primary cause for obtaining the highest good, or liberation. Does this mean that judicious or rational persons should cultivate faith? And if so, in what fashion should they do so? Ordinary faith clearly does not play a role for such persons, as we see from statements made throughout the work. For example, as we have already seen, Kamalaśīla asserts that judicious persons rely on the *pramāṇa*s of perception and inference to clear up doubt; they do not resort to mere proclamations.[14] The rationalist bent is very clear.

It turns out that while judicious persons do need faith, that faith must be understood to be of a very particular kind. We glean this from another passage early in the *Pañjikā*. Here, Kamalaśīla divides the audience for the text into two categories: those who are inclined toward faith (*śraddhānusārin*) and those who are inclined toward wisdom (*prajñānusārin*). He explains that for those with a nature that is inclined toward faith, a mere statement proclaiming the greatness

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[13] TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 2,5–8): *iha hi śāstre prekṣāvatām abhidheyaprayojanāvasāyapūrvikā pravṛttir mahatsu ca prasādaḥ sarvaśreyoʾdhigateḥ kāraṇaṃ prathamam ity ālocya bhagavati prasādotpādanārthaṃ śāstre cāsminn ādareṇa śrotuḥ pravṛttyarthaṃ svaśāstṛpūjāvidhipūrvakam asya śāstrasya prakṛtītyādibhiḥ ślokais tattvasaṃgraha ityetatparyantair abhidheyaprayojane prāha /.*

[14] See note 7 above.

of the Buddha is sufficient to give rise to unshakable faith.[15] But for those with a nature that is inclined toward wisdom, producing faith requires that one first ascertain through rational means that the qualities attributed to the Buddha are actually possible. He says:

> But those who are inclined toward wisdom, not seeing any refutation (*bādha*) of these kinds of [qualities], and understanding that good qualities such as wisdom and so on [can reach] perfection (*prakarṣa*) through habituation (*abhyāsa*), [will determine] – through the means of trustworthy awareness that will be stated [and] which establishes the seer of supersensible objects – that "certainly these kinds of sages are possible in the world." [And] having determined this, they indeed produce faith in the Blessed One.[16]

The means of trustworthy awareness or *pramāṇa* which establishes the seer of supersensible objects refers to the work's final chapter, the "Investigation of One Who Sees Supersensible Objects" (*atīndriyārthadarśiparīkṣā*). The idea is that the final chapter of the work was written so that judicious persons might ascertain the possibility of supersensible seeing, which in this text is a gloss for a Buddha's complete knowledge of Dharma and Adharma, or everything that is necessary to the soteriological aim of liberation. For Kamalaśīla, then, it is this certainty concerning the real possibility of their spiritual goal, and not blind adherence to scriptures, that is termed "faith" for those judicious persons who are inclined toward wisdom. This is clearly related to the *kāryānumāna* discourse of Dharmakīr-

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[15] TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 9,1–3): *śāstṛpūjāvidhānaṃ tu bhagavati sarvaśreyo'dhigatihetoḥ prasādasyotpādanārtham / tathā hi guṇagaṇākhyānavidhināmunā bhagavato'tiśayo*(1) *māhātmyam udbhāvyate / tad upaśrutya ca śraddhānusārimanasāṃ tāvad asaṃśayaṃ bhagavati jhagiti cittaprasādaḥ samudeti /.*

(1) *atiśayaḥ* TSP ms. Patan (no. 6680) fol. 69a below line 17, ms. Jaisalmer (no. 378) fol. 5b1 : no equivalent in $TSP_{K\acute{S}}$

[16] TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 9,4–6): *ye'pi prajñānusāriṇas te'pi tathāvidheṣu bādham apaśyantaḥ prajñādīnāṃ ca guṇānām abhyāsāt prakarṣam avagacchanto vakṣyamāṇād apy atīndriyārthadṛksādhakāt pramāṇān nūnaṃ jagati sambhāvyanta eva tathāvidhāḥ sūraya ity avadhārya bhagavati prasādam upajanayanty eva /.*

ti and his followers, and does not explain the need for scripturally based inference.

Judicious action on the basis of mere statements

Again we are left wondering about the role of scripturally based inference for judicious persons. Kamalaśīla first explores this question in another passage from the early pages of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, ostensibly in the context of a debate concerning the necessity for stating the aim of the treatise at the outset of the composition.[17] The larger argument, attributed to Arcaṭa, is that it is pointless to state the aim of a treatise because mere statements, not being suitable for engendering certainty in judicious persons, cannot motivate such persons to engage with the text. Kamalaśīla disagrees, holding that while judicious persons know they cannot attain certainty on the basis of mere statements, they also understand that to categorically refuse to act on the basis of all statements is not rational either. Echoing Dharmakīrti, and invoking the theme of scripturally based inference, Kamalaśīla says:

> However, if it were established that no judicious person whatsoever acted on account of a statement, only then would it be true [that judicious persons only act out of certainty] for all [cases]. For some people, having heard about the great blessings and dangers of acting or not acting in relation to some results that are not directly perceptible, being unable to abide without relying on the authority of a scripture, are observed to act on account of a statement. And to that degree there is not any loss of their judiciousness, because their action is just as an expedient means (*abhyupāyena*). For apart from scripture there is no other expedient means for action with regard to an object that is a radically inaccessible entity (*atyantaparokṣārtha*). And one must necessarily act according to scripture (*āgama*) [when it comes to such extremely inaccessible entities]. That is, those who accept a contradictory scripture

[17] In his article on practical rationality, Eltschinger traces a line of development from Dharmakīrti through his earliest commentators Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, on to Arcaṭa to show that Kamalaśīla relies on the logic of the *kāryānumāna* when he rejects Arcaṭa's idea that judicious persons act out of certainty alone.

> would be injudicious; but when there is action through reliance on a noncontradictory scripture, how could the [persons] not be judicious, since that [kind of scripture] is a proper means (*samyagupāya*)?[18]

The implication is clear: acting on the basis of a mere statement is not necessarily irrational when there is no other way. Action induced by a scripturally based inference is one example of rational action that arises not from the certainty produced by a true means of trustworthy awareness but rather just through a statement. Another example is engaging with a text that claims to be about a topic that is germane to one's goals – a fact about which one cannot be fully certain until one has actually read the text! But proceeding to read a text on the basis of, say, its title and table of contents, cannot be considered a breach of judiciousness. To deny this would result in paralysis.

It seems then that Kamalaśīla accepts the validity of scripturally based inference as a justification for action in relation to radically inaccessible entities, at least under circumstances which involve "the great blessings and dangers of acting or not acting in relation to some results that are not directly perceptible." But what exactly does this imply? The notion that judicious persons, having heard of such matters, are "unable to abide without relying on the authority of a scripture" lends an air of urgency to the matter, such that we get the impression that a judicious person's spiritual progress will be

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[18] TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 4,21–5,4): *kiṃ tu yadi vākyān na kasyacit prekṣāvataḥ pravṛttir astīty etat siddhaṃ bhavet tadā sarvam evaitat syāt / yāvatā dṛśyante hi kecid apratyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāṃcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṃsāpāyaśravaṇād*[a] *anāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum aśaknuvanto vacanāt pravartamānāḥ / na caitāvatā teṣāṃ prekṣāvattāhānir abhyupāyenaiva pravṛtter na hy āgamād ṛte'tyantaparokṣārthaviṣaye pravṛttāv anyo'bhyupāyo'sti / avaśyaṃ ca pravartitavyaṃ tv āgamāt / vyāhatāgamaparigrahaṃ hi kurvāṇā aprekṣāpūrvakāriṇaḥ syuḥ / avyāhatāgamasamāśrayeṇa tu pravṛttau kathaṃ na prekṣāvanto bhaveyus tasyaiva samyagupāyatvāt /*. Cf. PVSV ad PV 1.214: *nāyaṃ puruṣo'nāśrityāgamam āsituṃ samarthaḥ / atyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāṃcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṃsāpāpaśravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca / tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti /*.

[a] °*āpāya*° PVSV$_{ms}$ 25a2 (TSP 4,22–23; PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 140b6; *ṅan soṅ* PVSV$_{t}$ D322a4/P478b3; see Yaita 2005: 443 n. 159) : °*āpāpa*° PVSV, PVSVṬ 390,25..

severely hampered if scripturally based inference is disallowed in this case. But while a number of radically inaccessible matters are discussed in these texts, it is really only in relation to one of them that we find any hint that one might need to rely on a scripture in order to make spiritual progress. I speak of the connection between karmic causes and their effects (*karmaphalasambandha*).

We find evidence of this again in the opening pages of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. The context remains the problem of judicious persons acting on the basis of a mere statement, in this case the statement of the aim of the treatise. Kamalaśīla is arguing that under certain circumstances it is entirely appropriate for judicious persons to act out of uncertainty or doubt (*saṃśaya*). He says:

> And it should definitely be understood in this manner. Otherwise, the promulgation of a scripture whose object is a radically inaccessible entity would be pointless, because even before the promulgation of the scripture there exists doubt concerning that [radically inaccessible] entity on the part of a person who desires a particular result, due to the lack of any probative or contravening trustworthy awareness in relation to [the ascertainment of] giving and so on [as a means for accomplishing the goal]. But this doubt does not even arise for those who have not learned about results such as heaven and so on, because the desire for the particular result that is the cause of that [doubt] is not apparent [to them]. But even for those in whom [the doubt] does arise, because it would be a cause for action with regard to all things, including even eating rocks and so on, it is a [cause for action] in general; therefore, [it] is not a cause for taking up specific [means] such as giving, while avoiding the eating of rocks and so forth. Thinking this, the scripture is quoted by the one quoting it for the sake of those [persons]. Likewise, the author of the treatise makes the statement of the aim. This is undeniable.[19]

[19] TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 7,1–7): *avaśyaṃ caitad evaṃ vijñeyam / anyathātyantaparokṣārthaviṣayāgamapraṇayanam api vyarthaṃ syāt / prāg apy āgamapraṇayanād dānādiṣu phalaviśeṣārthināṃ sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāvena tatsaṃśayasya vidyamānatvāt / kiṃ tv asāv avyutpannasvargādiphalānāṃ naivotpadyate / tatkāraṇabhūtāyāḥ phalaviśeṣārthitāyā asaṃmukhībhāvāt / yeṣāṃ copajāyate teṣām api sarvatropalādibhakṣaṇe'pi pravṛttihetutayā sādhāraṇatvād upalādibhakṣaṇaparihāreṇa na pratiniyatadānādiparigrahahetur bhavatīti matvā tadartham āgamapraṇetṛbhir āgamaḥ praṇīyate tadvat prayo-*

The point here seems to be that when judicious persons are wondering about which actions to take in order to attain certain karmic goals, the existence of which remains a radically inaccessible entity, the only choice is to resort to scriptures. The example here is that of the practice of giving (*dāna*), one of the chief practices of the Buddhist laity and a virtue extolled on the bodhisattva path, the results of which are consistently stated to be rebirth in one of the higher destinies (i.e., as a god or human). The point is that before one has heard about the fact that certain actions will lead to a higher rebirth, one will not even wonder about it. But even once one has determined that a higher rebirth is a worthy goal, there is still the question of which particular actions will bring it about. Without the guidance of scripture, one has no way to decide between undertaking acts of giving and simply eating rocks.

Further evidence that the connection between certain actions and certain destinies is the primary object of scripturally based inference may be found in the "Investigation of Scripture" chapter (*śrutiparīkṣā*). The context here is a discussion of a Mīmāṃsaka claim that the words of the Veda are true because they give rise to an awareness that is free from doubt, just as a direct perception of a real entity, such as a fire, gives rise to the certain conviction that one is, in fact, experiencing fire.[20] Śāntarakṣita's initial response is

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janavākyam api śāstrakārair ity acodyam etat /.

[20] The argument here is related to another Mīmāṃsaka claim, namely that of the "intrinsic trustworthiness" (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) of all means of trustworthy awareness. The Mīmāṃsaka's point is that in order for an awareness to be false, there must arise a second, sublating awareness in relation to the first awareness that conclusively shows that awareness to be wrong (as, for example, when after seeing a mirage one arrives at the place and discovers that there is no water there). When no such sublating awareness arises, the original awareness may be accepted as true. Regarding the Vedic sentences, as for example, "one who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice" (*svargakāmo yajeta*), no contravening awareness ever arises in any place, with regard to any person, in any situation, or at any time. Thus, the awareness that arises upon hearing the statement must be true. See, e.g., *Śābarabhāṣya* 1.1.2 (quoted in TSP ad TS 2386–2387, Ś 795): *na ca svargakāmo yajetety ato*

to deny that certainty arises from such Vedic statements as concern supersensible entities.[21] He then seems to soften somewhat and to grant the possibility that a kind of psychological certainty, or "unshakability" (*niṣkampya*), may arise in the minds of Vedic scholars. But he states that this unshakability is the result of faith (*śraddhā*) and that it does not differ from the unshakable convictions of Buddhists concerning the misfortune that will arise in future lives due to the sacrifice of animals. He says:

> But that unshakable opinion that arises for the Vedic scholars (*śrotriya*) whose minds are under the control of faith is the same [as that which arises] for others due to other [statements]. That is, for Buddhists and so on, there arises the unshakable conviction that there is the production of misfortune and suffering [in a future life] due to sacrifices that involve the slaughter of animals.[22]

This passage can probably be considered a clincher for the hypothesis that Śāntarakṣita accepts that the details of karmic causality cannot be proven by belief-neutral reasoning, but are a matter of faith. If this is correct, then we have at least one radically inaccessible

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vacanāt saṃdigdham avagamyante bhavati vā svargo na vā bhavatīti / na ca viniścitam avagamyamānam idaṃ mithyā syāt / yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate naitad evaṃ sa mithyāpratyayaḥ / na caiṣa deśāntare puruṣāntare'vasthāntare kālāntare viparyeti / tasmād avitathaḥ //. See also D'Sa 1980.

[21] See TS 2388–2389: *naivaṃ saṃśayasaṃjāter viparītānyavākyavat / prekṣāvanto hi naiteṣāṃ bhedaṃ paśyanti kaṃcana // nātīndriye hi yujyete sadasattāviniścayau / niścayo vedavākyāc ced anyādṛṅ na kim anyataḥ //*. "It is not the case [that certainty ensues from Vedic sentences] since there is the arisal of doubt, just as in the case of another sentence that asserts the opposite [i.e., that heaven is not the result of sacrifice]. Indeed, judicious persons do not perceive even the slightest difference between these two [cases]. For the definitive determinations of existence and nonexistence do not apply to supersensible [entities]. If there were certainty from a Vedic sentence, then why would there not be [certainty] from another [sentence] that was otherwise [i.e., that stated things to be otherwise]?"

[22] TS 2390–2391: *śrotriyāṇāṃ tu niṣkampyā buddhir eṣopajāyate / śraddhāvivaśabuddhīnāṃ sānyeṣām anyataḥ samā // tathā hi saugatādīnāṃ dhīr akampyopajāyate / apāyaduḥkhasambhūtir yāgāt prāṇivadhānvitāt //*.

matter that could be a candidate for something in need of grounding through scripturally based inference.

But does the judicious person really *need* to determine the details of karma in order to engage in the Buddhist path? We know from the "Investigation of the Connection between Actions and Effects" (*karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā*) that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla hold that the *basic principle* of the connection between karmic causes and their results is *not* a radically inaccessible matter for ordinary persons. Here, the authors respond to the argument that, on the Buddhist view of selflessness, there would be no incentive for people to undertake ethically positive actions, since there is no person who endures over time to enjoy the fruits of those actions. The answer is that even ordinary persons, if they are sufficiently skillful, can determine the restrictions (*niyama*) that pertain between karmic actions and their effects, such that they will understand that ethically positive actions will bring about positive mental states, while ethically negative actions will not. Kamalaśīla says:

> But skillful ordinary persons, due to correctly understanding momentariness and selflessness through reasoning and scripture in this manner realize reality (*tattva*); they establish that [things have] the nature of dependent arising. Having determined the restrictions that pertain between causes and their effects, [such persons recognize that] "momentary mental formations (*saṃskāra*) capable of giving rise to benefit for oneself and others arise, one after the other in succession from giving and so forth when these are preceded by compassion and so on, but [such mental formations] do not arise from harm and so on." Therefore, they engage in actions that are good and so on.[23]

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[23] See TSP ad TS 540–541 (Ś 228,12–16): *yeʾpi pṛthagjanakalyāṇā evaṃ yuktyāgamābhyāṃ yathāvat kṣaṇikānātmatayor avabodhād abhi*[a]*sambuddhatattvās teʾpy evaṃ pratītyasamutpādadharmatāṃ pratipadyante / karuṇādipūrvakebhyo dānādibhyaḥ svaparahitodayaśālinaḥ saṃskārāḥ kṣaṇikā evāparāpare paramparayā samutpadyante / na tu hiṃsādibhya ity atas te hetuphalapratiniyamam avadhārya śubhādikriyāsu pravartante /.*

[a] The reading *kṣaṇikānātmatayor avabodhād abhi* instead of *kṣaṇikātmatayor avabodhābhi* in K and Ś is based on TSP$_t$ *ze* 256a2: *skad cig ma dang bdag med pa dag rtogs paʾi phyir*

This passage makes reference to the doctrine of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*), according to which each moment of the mind is conditioned by and conditions the next moment. The idea here is that through introspection, an ordinary person *can* determine that certain actions, when they are preceded by certain mental states like compassion, give rise to certain other mental states which bring about the benefit of both self and others. And, conversely, though introspection the ordinary person can also determine that certain other actions, such as harm and so on, which are not accompanied by mental states like compassion, do not bring about benefit for oneself or others. Knowing the radically inaccessible details of the karmic results in the next life is not necessary to convince the skillful person to take up giving and renounce harm; it is enough to recognize within one's own mind stream that these actions bring about benefit for both self and others.[24]

At the same time, Kamalaśīla's use of the phrase "through reasoning and scripture" (*yuktyāgamābhyām*) in this passage is conspicuous as it is, I believe, the only place in the *Pañjikā* where it is found, despite being a standard Buddhist trope.[25] We know that Kamalaśīla generally does not put much stock in scripture. As he states in the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*, scripture is a mere "ornament" (*alaṃkāra*; Tibetan: *rgyan*) for reasoning that a philosopher must employ so that uneducated people will not think the reasoning to be the concoction of a subtle or sophistic logician and thus come to despise his work.[26] The reference to scripture in this context, then, is proba-

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[24] The demonstration of past and future lives occurs in the "Investigation of the Lokāyatas" (*lokāyataparīkṣā*), but it is too complex for us to enter into here.

[25] At least, I have not so far been able to locate this phrase in any other section of the TSP. It is interesting as well that this phrase also occurs at PV 2.133 and appears to refer to the methods that a person must use to attain liberation. But see, however, the comments of Devendrabuddhi (PVP 55a) and Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *ñe* 117a), who seem to interpret the meaning to be that one might use scriptures to prompt one's initial investigation but that the final justification for one's actions must be reasoning alone. See also Franco 1997: 33 n. 43.

[26] See MA 21,12–21: *dad pas rjes su 'brang ba rnams kyang nges pa mi skye*

bly a way of confirming what we have already seen: that the details of the connection between karmic actions and their effects are radically inaccessible and may only be affirmed through scripture. Nevertheless, it does not appear necessary for judicious persons to gain knowledge of these radically inaccessible details in order to set out on the spiritual path, and to be rationally justified in doing so. The "faith" that is required is not faith in radically inaccessible entities but rather a kind of certainty concerning the benefit that will come through the practice of actions like giving accompanied by the cultivation of mental states such as compassion. We still have not found any truly critical way, then, in which judicious persons need to rely on scripture in order to engage with the Buddhist path. Knowing the details of karma is irrelevant so long as one can confirm the basic principles of karma and the real possibility of buddhahood.

Scripturally based inference as rhetorical tool

Well, then, does Kamalaśīla advocate any *other* use for scripturally based inference? I think the answer is yes. That is, we find a kind of rhetorical use of scripturally based inference, or something like it, that can be used in the context of an argument in which the opponent has himself offered what amounts to nothing more than a scriptural proclamation to defend a point. The logic here is the logic of debate: if the opponent strays from the realm of belief-neutral reasoning, offering nothing more than a scriptural passage as evidence for some supersensible matter, then the proponent, too, shall have the right to rely upon a scriptural statement of his choosing, without being required to offer belief-neutral evidence.

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bas yongs su tshim par mi 'gyur ro // kyang zhes bya ba'i sgras ni sems log pa rnams lta smos kyang ci dgos zhes ston par byed do // dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa smos pa ni lung las grags pa'i rjes su dpag pa bsal ba'i phyir te / de yang lung dang 'dra bas de dang bcas te de yang nges par mi byed pa'i phyir tshim par mi 'gyur ro // rigs pa ni nges pa skyed par byed pas yongs su tshim par byed pa yin no // ji ste gal te de lta na go ba rigs pa kho nas chog mod / lung gis ci zhig bya zhe na / ma yin te / lung ni rigs pa'i rgyan yin pa'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na 'di ni rtog ge pa sgam pos brtags pa yin no zhes mi mkhas pa kha cig gis brnyas par yang 'gyur ro //.

We find at least one such example in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā*. The context is a discussion of the *pralaya,* the universal destruction that many Indian traditions, including Buddhist traditions, accept as occurring on a cyclical basis. It is, by its nature, clearly a radically inaccessible entity. The background for the discussion is the Mīmāṃsaka claim that the meaning of words is eternally fixed, and does not depend upon the establishment of a convention (*vyavahāra*) by a creator god at the start of a new cycle. As part of upholding this view, the Mīmāṃsakas deny the existence of the *pralaya,* at least in the sense of a truly universal destruction, since a universal destruction would entail that the meaning of words also be destroyed.[27] In that case, they argue, the term *pralaya* can refer only to some limited form of destruction, as in the destruction of particular families or locales.[28]

Śāntarakṣita counters that the Mīmāṃsaka cannot refute the possibility that the Veda or the meaning of its words could be destroyed, whether by a limited form of destruction or by the universal destruction as depicted in Buddhist scriptures. Kamalaśīla explains as follows:

> But you describe destruction in the form of the destruction of a locale and so on; but that [destruction] Buddhists describe as having the nature of destruction in the form of fire, water, and wind reaching to the limits of the billionfold world system – downward to the limit of the elemental wind sphere [and] upward successively to the limits of the first, second, and third *dhyānas* – because it is not refuted by any means of trustworthy awareness, is therefore "unrefuted" (*avyāhata*); so that because it cannot be negated, it is doubtful [i.e., possible] even in relation to Brahmā and so on. Therefore, the destruction of the Veda is

[27] See ŚV, *sambandhākṣepaparihāra,* 42: *pratyuccāraṇanirvṛttir bhāṣya eva nirākṛtā / sargādau ca kriyā nāsti tādṛk kālo hi neṣyate //*. Cited in a variant form at TS 2273: *pratyuccāraṇanirvṛttir na yuktā vyavahārataḥ / sargādau ca kriyā nāsti tādṛk kālo hi neṣyate //*.

[28] TS 2274–2276: *iṣyate hi jagat sarvaṃ na kadācid anīdṛśam / na mahāpralayo nāma jāyate pāramārthikaḥ // rātrir vā pralayo nāma līnatvāt sarvakarmaṇām / divasaḥ sṛṣṭisaṃjñaś ca sarvaceṣṭātisarjanāt // deśotsādakulotsādarūpo vā pralayo bhavet / pralaye tu pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvocchedātmake na hi //*.

> possible in the case of both these two forms of *pralaya*, and there is the uncertainty (*kalpana*) of an erroneous meaning [in the sense that the original meaning of the Veda could have been lost].[29]

In this passage, Kamalaśīla refers to the theory of universal destruction as found in Buddhist scriptures, calling it unrefuted (*avyāhata*). As a radically inaccessible matter, it cannot be negated (nor can it be affirmed) by belief-neutral reasoning. It thus remains a matter of doubt.

Nevertheless, Kamalaśīla appears to feel that raising the Buddhist theory of the *pralaya* is a legitimate move in this debate, since it highlights the radically inaccessible nature of the Mīmāṃsaka's claim that *no* universal destruction occurs. While it is not explicitly named as a scripturally based inference, I think we can see it as such, though it is perhaps more akin to a *prasaṅga* than to an ordinary *anumāna* in the way that it functions. What is interesting, though, is that this seems to be a case where a scripturally based inference is used even in the absence of any pressing soteriological need for the judicious person to rely upon scripture. Rather, there is instead a rhetorical need for this use of scripture. That is, this is an occasion where one's opponent in debate has resorted to an unverifiable claim (i.e., there is no universal destruction), which then opens the door for the Buddhist authors to draw equally on their own tradition's unverifiable claims in the course of the argument. Of course, one could argue that it is soteriologically necessary to the Mīmāṃsaka's spiritual progress to be refuted in this way.

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[29] TSP ad TS 2670–2672: *kiṃ tu yo'yaṃ bhavatā deśotsādādirūpapralayo varṇito yaś ca bauddhair agnyambuvāyusaṃvartanīyasvabhāvaḥ paryantatas trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātumaryādo'dhastād vāyumaṇḍalāvadhir upariṣṭād yathākramaṃ prathamadvitīyatṛtīyadhyānaparyantaḥ so'yaṃ pramāṇenābādhitatvād avyāhato'śakyaniṣedhatvād brahmāder api śaṅkyate / ato'smin dvividhe'pi pralaye vedasya dhvaṃsaḥ sambhāvyate viparītārthakalpanaṃ ca /.*

The extent and limits of practical rationality

How far, then, is Kamalaśīla willing to go in the defense of his practical rationality? Consider the section in which he responds to a position, articulated by Kumārila in the *Ślokavārttika*, as part of his defense of the authorlessness (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the Veda. According to Kumārila, passages in the Veda in which sages are identified as authors must be interpreted as a kind of eulogistic embellishment or "propaganda" (*arthavāda*). That is, such passages add prestige in the Veda, but are not to be taken literally. But Kamalaśīla (following Śāntarakṣita) counters that there is no reason then why the same could not be said of other scriptures, including those attributed to the Buddha. He says:

> If it is correct that this thing is to be accepted, then why would the Buddhist not accept it? For it is not correct for a judicious person not to accept a thing that has been proved through reasoning. Even if judicious Buddhists do not accept [this interpretation], nevertheless we state that this [argument] falls to you on the basis of reason alone.[30]

At first it seems that Kamalaśīla speaks purely tongue-in-cheek, because of course he does not really want to suggest that the Buddha is not the author of the Buddhist scriptures. Yet there may be something more to this rhetorical move. That is, while Kamalaśīla does claim that Buddhist scriptures – like all texts – have an author, his commitment to that view is not in service of any claims about the authority of those scriptures. For, it is not the personality or the trustworthiness of the Buddha that allows the judicious person to rely on the Buddhist scriptures. Rather judicious persons may rely upon the

[30] TSP ad TS 2790–2791 (Ś 897,21–23): *yady ayam artho yuktyupetaḥ syāt / tadā kim iti bauddho nābhyupagacchet / na hi nyāyopapanne'rthe prekṣāvato'nabhyupagamo yuktaḥ / mā bhūd bauddhasya prekṣāvato'bhyupagamaḥ / tathāpi nyāyād evam āpadyate bhavata iti brūmahe //*. A similar principle can also be seen at work in Dharmakīrti's PV 4, the chapter on inference-for-another (*parārthānumānapariccheda*), where Dharmakīrti holds that proponents in a debate should not be considered responsible for every position accepted by the system or school to which they belong, but only for the thesis they advance in the current dispute. See PV 4.42 and PV 4.53ff.

Buddhist scriptures in the limited ways we have seen only because their statements on perceptible and inferable matters accord with the findings of ordinary perception and inference, and because their statements on radically inaccessible matters do not contradict these other findings. Scripturally based inference only may add some color and rhetorical flair to an otherwise rational assessment of the truth, but it is entirely unnecessary for the generation of faith.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla follow Dharmakīrti in their resistance to grounding the authority of the Buddhist scriptures in the authority of the Buddha. Considering the conditions under which a statement may serve as a scripturally based inference, Dharmakīrti offers a verse setting out an initial set of criteria that must be in place:

> A statement (*vākya*) that is a worthy subject of examination is one that is coherent (*sambaddha*), offers a suitable method, and cites some human aim. Other statements are not worthy subjects of examination.[31]

By themselves, however, these criteria do not suffice to render a statement eligible to be relied upon as a scripturally based inference. Further restrictions are announced in *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.215, which is the locus of a method that comes to be called the *threefold analysis*[32] for testing whether an author's statements may be considered reliable when it comes to radically inaccessible entities. The verse states:

> Its [i.e., a scripture's] trustworthiness consists of not being contradicted by perceptual awareness and by the two kinds of inference with regard to both the observable (*dṛṣṭa*) and unobservable (*adṛṣṭa*) things (*artha*) that are the objects (*artha*) of those statements.[33]

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[31] PV 1.214: *sambaddhānuguṇopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam / parīkṣādhikṛtaṃ vākyam ato'nadhikṛtaṃ param //*. Translation from Dunne 2004: 361–62. Also cited at TSP ad TS 1–6 (Ś 2,18–19).

[32] The term *tshul gsum gyi brtag pa* comes from Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*; see Keira 2006: 181–184. In the Tibetan commentarial tradition it is known as *dpyad pa gsum*.

[33] PV 1.215: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhakam / dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ //*. The two kinds of inference are the ordinary *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* form of inference and

According to this method, a scripturally based inference requires that one first determines whether the statements in question are reliable in matters that are independently verifiable through perception and inference. That is, using ordinary perception one first determines that everything the statements claim concerning perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) matters is true; and then, using ordinary inference, one further verifies that everything said about inferable (*parokṣa*) matters is also true. The third step is to verify that none of statements' claims concerning radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*) matters contradict either these other, independently verifiable propositions or each other. If the statements pass all three of these tests, then the statements are said to be "purified," and one is justified in relying on their claims concerning radically inaccessible matters. Notice that according to this method, the criterion for testing the reliability of the scripture is not the credibility of the author but rather the overall trustworthiness of the scripture itself.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla advocate this method as well. In the last chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā* they apply this method to the speech of the Buddha. We can start by citing the relevant verse:

> [The Sugata's speech] is coherent (*sambaddha*), with a suitable method [for achieving its aims]; it sets forth that which is useful for humans (*puruṣārtha*); it does not in the least contradict the two means of trustworthy awareness with regard to the object that is seen as well as [that which is unseen].[34]

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scripturally based inference. Regarding the terms observable (*dṛṣṭa*) and unobservable (*adṛṣṭa*), my understanding is that the observable refers to the objects of both perception and ordinary inference while the unobservable (or "nonempirical") refers to the supersensible objects of scripturally based inference.

[34] TS 3342: *sambaddhānuguṇopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam / dṛṣṭe'py arthe pramāṇābhyām īṣad apy aprabādhitam //*. Cf. PV 1.214, cited just above. The term *dṛṣṭa* here refers to that which is empirically observable, either through perception or inference; its counterpart is *adṛṣṭa*, the nonempirical.

The first half of this verse is clearly modeled on *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.214, cited above. The second half of the verse represents a shorthand way of referring to the threefold analysis as presented in *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.215. This becomes clear in Kamalaśīla's commentary, which starts off with a question about whether the speech of non-Buddhist teachers such as Kapila might not be acceptable as scripturally based inference, since they are also coherent and are oriented toward a human aim. The question and the relatively lengthy response are as follows:

> [Question:] Well, is not all this the case for the speech of Kapila and the others? [Answer:] Here he says, "It does not in the least contradict" and so on. In saying "with regard to the [object that is] seen" he intends that which is the object as well as that which is not the object of perception and inference. "The two means of trustworthy awareness" are perception and inference. "It does not contradict [them]" since things exist in the way that they are taught [by him]. That is, the [Buddha] maintained that the five aggregates, which are characterized as (1) blue and so on; (2) happiness, suffering, and so on; (3) the grasping of cognitive signs; (4) attachment and so on; and (5) awareness are perceptible. And it is not possible for it to be otherwise. And those things that are held to be not perceptible are indeed not perceptible – things that others maintain are perceptible, such as the happiness as the conjunction (*saṃniveśa*) with form, sound, and so on, and substance, activity, universals, conjunctions, and so on. Likewise, those things that he maintained to be the objects of inference that operates through the force of a real entity (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) are indeed like that (*tathābhāva eva*); for example, the nobles' four truths. And those things that he asserted are not the objects of that [kind of inference] indeed are not its objects – things such as the Self (*ātman*) and so on that others maintain are the objects of inference that operates through the force of real things. The words "as well as (*api*)" show that the [speech of the Sugata] is also not mistaken with regard to that which is not seen. That is, he first explained the nature of attachment and so on and the nonvirtue that arises from it. Then, in order to eliminate that [attachment and its effect] by means of what contradicts the vision of the self that is that cause of that [attachment], he taught the antidote, which is just the vision of selflessness. But such is not the case for scriptures like those of Kapila and

the others, which do not contradict the cause of that [attachment] and which advise such things as ritual bathing and fire sacrifice.[35]

Here we see all three elements of the threefold analysis: there is the test by perception in which all that is claimed to be perceptible is shown to be perceptible and all that is claimed to be not perceptible is shown to be not perceptible. There is the test by inference in which all that is claimed to be inferable is shown to be inferable and all that is claimed to be not inferable is shown to be not inferable. And finally there is the test of the statements on radically inaccessible matters, in which such statements are shown to be not in contradiction with the findings of the two means of trustworthy awareness or among themselves.[36] As we can see, on the "purification" or threefold analy-

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[35] TSP ad TS 3342 (Ś 1063,6–17): *nanu caitat sarvaṃ kapilādivākyeṣv apy astīty āha dṛṣṭe'pītyādi / dṛṣṭe pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvenābhiprete / pramāṇābhyāṃ pratyakṣānumānābhyām / aprabādhitaṃ yathānirdiṣṭasyārthasya tathābhāvāt / tathā hi nīlādisukhaduḥkhādinimittodgrahaṇarāgādibuddhilakṣaṇasya skandhapañcakasya pratyakṣatvenābhimatasya nānyathātvaṃ sambhavati / apratyakṣatvena cābhimatānām apratyakṣataiva*[a] */ yathā paraiḥ pratyakṣābhimatānāṃ rūpaśabdādisaṃniveśānāṃ sukhādīnāṃ dravyakarmasāmānyasaṃyogādīnāṃ ca / tathā vastubalapravṛttānumānaviṣayatvenābhipretānāṃ tathābhāva eva / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām atadviṣayatveneṣṭānāṃ cātadviṣayatvam eva / yathā parair vastubalānumānaviṣayatvenābhimatānām ātmādīnām / apiśabdād adṛṣṭe'pi na vikriyeti darśitam / tathā hy atra rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam*[b] *uddiśya tatprahāṇāya tannidānātmadarśanavirodhena nairātmyadarśanam eva pratipakṣo deśito na tu kapilādiśāstravat tannidānāviruddhaḥ snānāgnihotrādir upadiṣṭaḥ //*. Cf. PVSV ad PV 1.215, on which this passage is clearly based.

[a] The reading *apratyakṣataiva* in place of K and Ś: *apratyakṣateva* is based on TSP_t *'e* 302a4: *mṅon sum ma yin pa kho na yin*.

[b] The reading *cādharmam* in place of K and Ś: *vā dharmam* is based on TSP_t *'e* 302a6–7: *de ltar 'dod chags la sogs pa'i ngo bo dang chos ma yin pa de las byung bar bstan nas*

[36] As we see here, although the process has been characterized as a "threefold analysis," it might be better thought of as an analysis consisting of five steps. That is, for both perception and inference, the scripture must in fact be "purified" in *two* ways, one positive and one negative. The final test is the test of noncontradiction between the statements made about radically inaccessible entities (i.e., the nonempirical) and entities

sis model, the credibility of the author does not play any overt role in determining whether a statement may be used as a scripturally based inference.

Speaking from walls

It thus would seem that for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, there is an extremely limited use for scripturally based inference. But is this really so? For occasionally these authors seem to move away from this rationalist approach. Consider the way in which they respond to a criticism of a Buddhist position that we can describe as the "spontaneous Buddha model." According to this model, the Buddha has neither desire to speak nor dualistic knowledge of any kind. His teachings are therefore explained through the mechanism of his regency (*ādhipatya*). They proceed spontaneously, as if from a wish-fulfilling gem, in accord with the needs of sentient beings and powered, as it were, by the Buddha's previous vows (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*). This idea, common in Mahāyāna Buddhism, is raised in the final chapter, where it is attributed to the otherwise unknown Mīmāṃsakas, Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa. Kamalaśīla summarizes their supposed characterization of the Buddhist doctrine as follows:

> Someone [i.e., some Buddhist] might think: He does not teach anything at all, because he remains always in a nonconceptual meditative concentration (*samādhi*). But, through his regency (*ādhipatya*), representations (*vijñapti*) of various teachings of the Dharma appear to the fortunate. As it is said, "On a certain night, the Tathāgata awakened, and on a certain night he attained *parinirvāṇa*. Between these [two nights] the Tathāgata did not utter or speak even a single syllable. Why is that? It is because the Tathāgata is always absorbed in meditative concentration. But those who are to be disciplined through teachings that are given voice through syllables hear words issuing from the mouth, the *uṣṇīṣa*, and the *ūrṇā* of the Tathāgata."[37]

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that are amenable to perception and inference (the empirical).

[37] TSP ad TS 3240–3242: *syād etat / naivāsāv upadiśati kiñcit sarvadā nirvikalpasamādhisthitatvāt / kiṃ tu tadādhipatyena vicitradharmadeśanā pratibhāsā vijñaptayo bhavyānāṃ bhavanti / yathoktam / yasyāṃ rātrau*

In some verses attributed to Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa, reference is made as well to teachings that issue spontaneously through the Buddha's regency even from inanimate objects like walls and so on.[38] Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa are then made to say that such doctrines may be fine if one is already imbued with faith, but for those who lack such faith, some reasoning should be provided.[39]

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's response to this challenge amounts to a rather cheap trick. Rather than answering the substance of the charge – namely, that the doctrine of the spontaneous Buddha sounds good to those who have faith, but lacks convincing evidence for rational persons – they instead complain that their opponents have incorrectly applied the rules of reasoning. The gist of the complaint is that the opponents have not followed through on the implication of their objection. As Śāntarakṣita states:

> For here, the context is the statement, "And thus not possessing all objects [of knowledge], he is not able to teach." And in this regard, wise persons say, "If he were to have no capacity to teach, then what?" At this point, you should say "Then there would be no scripture." But [in fact,] you then say, "Let it be thus [that the Buddha has no capacity to speak]; but have you seen the speaker [of those scriptures]?" If you urge an objection through the means of a *prasaṅga,* then the undesired consequence is this: "If speakerhood is not accepted, then there would be no scripture. But if a scripture promulgated by that one [is accepted], then you must accept his speakerhood."[40]

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tathāgato'bhisambuddho yasyāṃ ca parinirvṛtaḥ / atrāntare tathāgatenaikam apy akṣaraṃ nodāhṛtaṃ na pravyāhṛtam / tat kasya hetoḥ / satatasamāhito hi tathāgataḥ / api tu ye'kṣararutadeśanā vaineyikās te tathāgatasya mukhād uṣṇīṣād ūrṇāyāḥ śabdaṃ niḥsarantaṃ śṛṇvantītyādi /.

[38] TS 3240–3241: *tasmin dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavad āsthite / niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kuṭyādibhyo'pi deśanāḥ // tābhir jijñāsitānarthān sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ / hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ kṣipram āsādayanti te //*. Reading *dhyānasamāpanne* with K in place of *jñānasamāpanne* as found in Ś.

[39] TS 3242: *ityādi kīrtyamānaṃ tu śraddadhāneṣu śobhate / vayam aśraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe //*.

[40] TS 3601–3604: *tathāvyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ śakto naivopadeśane / ity*

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla sidestep the charge that the spontaneous Buddha model sounds good only to those who have faith.[41] Instead, they claim that the Mīmāṃsakas have bungled their argument by not offering a clear undesired consequence for the doctrine that the Buddha's teachings arise spontaneously without desire or conceptuality.[42] But neither here nor in the other sections of the work where this model is introduced do Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla attempt to rationally demonstrate the possibility of such a model. The spontaneous Buddha model represents their answer to the question of how to reconcile a Buddha's lack of desire and conceptuality with his status as a speaker of scriptures. But the *kāryānumāna* style of reasoning that we see elsewhere applied to the Buddha's perfection of mental qualities and that would justify the rational person's faith in such an astounding doctrine is nowhere to be found. Unless those arguments are uncovered, I think it is safe to say that Kamalaśīla reaches the limits of his practical rationality in the conundrum of the possibility of the Buddha's speech.

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etat prakṛtaṃ hy atra tatra cāhur mahādhiyaḥ // tasyopadeśane śaktir na syāc cet kiṃ tadā bhavet / tato bhavadbhir vaktavyam āgamo na bhaved iti // tatrāpy āhur bhavatv evaṃ kiṃ dṛṣṭo'sau tvayā vadan / prasaṅgasādhanenedam aniṣṭaṃ codyate yadi // na ced vaktṛtvam iṣyeta nāgamopagamo bhavet / tatpraṇetāgameṣṭau tu tasya vaktṛtvam iṣyatām //.

[41] Although Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also present the model of the spontaneous Buddha in the "Investigation of External Objects" (*bahirarthaparīkṣā*), the question of how one can rationally demonstrate that such a model actually applies is never raised. The spontaneous Buddha model represents the answer that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla give to their fellow Buddhists when pushed on the question of the actual nature of the Buddha's awareness. It is the only scenario that resolves the tensions inherent in the problem of how the Buddha can be a speaker if he has eliminated all desire (including, presumably, the desire to speak).

[42] See TS 3605–3609 with TSP.

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PV 4 – see Tillemans 2000.

PVP – *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi). D 4217, *che* 1–326b4.

PVSV – Raniero Gnoli: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-Commentary*. Roma 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 23).

$PVSV_{ms}$ – Manuscript B used by Gnoli for his edition of PVSV. For a description see PVSV introduction, XXXVII–XXXVIII.

$PVSV_{t}$ – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Tibetan version). D no. 4216, Ce 261b1–365a7/P no. 5717a, Ce 404b3–535a4.

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$TS(P)_K$ – K = Embar Krishnamacharya: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. 2 vols. Baroda 1984: Oriental Institute.

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TSP_t – *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, Tibetan version. D 4267, *ze* 133b1–*'e* 331a7.

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Transmission of scripture

Exegetical problems for Kumārila and Dharmakīrti*

Kei Kataoka

1 The notion of lost scripture in Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā

Looking from a broad perspective at exegetical problems concerning the transmission of scripture, one soon notices that not only Mīmāṃsakas but also Buddhists used the notion of lost scripture as a strategy to justify their teachings. The Vaibhāṣikas sometimes claim that their abhidharmic teachings are based on lost *sūtra*s. According to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra was able to observe lost passages by the force of *praṇidhijñāna*. Here the Vaibhāṣikas postulate lost *sūtra*s in order to justify their *śāstra*s.[1]

Ironically, as Honjo 1989 points out, the introduction of this theory allows their Mahāyāna opponents to use the same logic against them. Mahāyānikas can also claim that their teachings of a collection of dharmas (*dharmaskandha*), though they look newly fabricated, are in fact based on lost *sūtra*s.

Vaibhāṣika:	lost *sūtra*	←	*abhidharma*
Mahāyānika:	lost *sūtra*	←	*dharmaskandha*

* I would like to thank George Cardona, Arlo Griffiths, Shaman Hatley and Harunaga Isaacson for their comments.

[1] For the Buddhist notions of 'the Buddha's words' and 'lost *sūtra*,' see Honjo 1989.

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 239–269.

This ironical situation is somewhat parallel to that which Kumārila faced with reference to his Buddhist opponents. The exegetical device of lost scripture can equally be used by his opponent. It is also conceivable, at least chronologically speaking, that Kumārila knew the Buddhist sectarian arguments developed by Vasubandhu and other teachers. Then, how did Kumārila use the theory and develop it in his own way?

In this paper I shall first investigate Kumārila's theory of scriptural transmission with particular attention to the notion of lost scripture, and then compare it with Dharmakīrti's criticism of the Mīmāṃsā theory, because, as is often the case, Dharmakīrti's criticism can be best understood as being aimed against Kumārila.[2]

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[2] The following is the list of instances in which Dharmakīrti's earliest work, PV I and its commentary PVSV, seems to presuppose (or criticize) ŚV or TV. I omit instances from BṬ and PV II–IV, because including them would lead to the complicated problem of their relationship.

- ŚV *anumāna* 12: ***bhūyodarśanagamyā*** *ca vyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmayoḥ / jñāyate bhedahānena kvacic cāpi viśeṣayoḥ* // → PV I 31: *kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na* ***na darśanāt*** // (Cf. Steinkellner 1997, Kataoka 2003a)
- ŚV *codanā* 137: ***rāgādi****rahite cāsmin nirvyāpāre vyavasthite / **deśa**-**nā**nyapraṇītaiva syād ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt* // → PV I 12: *vipakṣe 'dṛṣṭimātreṇa kāryasāmānyadarśanāt / hetujñānaṃ pramāṇābhaṃ* ***vacanād rāgitādivat*** // (Cf. Dunne 1996:527, Kataoka 2003a, 2003b)
- TV ad 1.3.2, 163.21–22: *bhrānter anubhavād vāpi puṃvākyād vipralambhanāt / dṛṣṭānuguṇyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghīyasī* //, 164.16: *śiṣṭatraivarṇikadṛḍhasmaraṇ****ānyathānupapatti****labhyatvāc chrutyanumānasya*; 1.3.4, 186.8–9: *itaś ca na pramāṇatvaṃ mūlahetvantarekṣaṇāt / vyabhicāre hi notpattir* ***arthāpattyanumānayoḥ*** //; 1.3.3–4, 195.29–30: *śākyādayaś ca sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām / hetujālavinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate* // → PV I 216: *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā / buddher* ***agatyā****bhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare* // (Kataoka 2011)
- ŚV *vākya* 366: *vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā* // → PVSV 124.27–28: *tasmād adhyayanam adhyayanāntarapūrvakam adhyayanād iti bhāratādhyayane 'pi bhāvād vyabhicāri*; 125.4–5: *yat kiṃcid vedādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ tad adhyayanāntarapūrvakam ity api vyāptir na sidh-

2 Dharma and scripture in the Mīmāṃsā tradition

Jaiminisūtra 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 presuppose that the Veda alone is the valid source of religious information and that human beings do not have direct access to dharma.[3] Perception is incapable of telling you that

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yati. (Cf. Eltschinger 2007:471) *It is also possible to regard this as representing general Mīmāṃsā view and not necessarily Kumārila's.

- ŚV *apoha* 1: ***agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyaṃ*** *vācyaṃ yaiḥ parikalpitam / gotvaṃ vastv eva tair uktam ago'pohagirā sphuṭam //* → PV I 64: *tenānyāpohaviṣaye* ***tadvatpakṣopavarṇanam*** */ pratyākhyātaṃ pṛthaktve hi syād doṣo jātitadvatoḥ //*, PVSV 32.17: *tasmād yaiva vyāvṛttiḥ sa eva vyāvṛttaḥ.* (Cf. Hattori 1975:52)
- ŚV *apoha* 83–85ab: *siddhaś cāgaur apohyeta goniședhātmakaś ca saḥ / tatra gaur eva vaktavyo nañā yaḥ pratiṣidhyate // sa ced agonivṛttyātmā bhaved* ***anyonyasaṃśrayaḥ*** */ siddhaś ced gaur apohyārthaṃ vṛthāpohaprakalpanā // gavy asiddhe tv agaur nāsti tadabhāve ca gauḥ kutaḥ /* → PV I 113cd–114: *avṛkṣavyatirekeṇa vṛkṣārthagrahaṇe dvayam //* ***anyonyāśrayam*** *ity ekagrahābhāve dvayāgrahaḥ / saṃketāsambhavas tasmād iti kecit pracakṣate //* (Cf. Hattori 1975:52)
- ŚV *apoha* 144: *ananyāpohaśabdādau vācyaṃ na ca nirūpyate /* ***prameyajñeyaśabdāder*** *apohyaṃ kuta eva tu //* → PV I 122–123: *kvacin niveśanāyārthe vinivartya kutaścana / buddheḥ prayujyate śabdas tadarthasyāvadhāraṇāt // vyartho 'nyathā prayogaḥ syāt taj* ***jñeyādipadeṣv*** *api / vyavahāropanīteṣu vyavacchedyo 'sti kaścana //* (Cf. Hattori 1975:52)
- ŚV *abhāva* 1: *pramāṇapañcakaṃ yatra vasturūpe na jāyate / vastusattāvabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāvapramāṇatā //*, 11: *pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva ucyate / sātmanaḥ pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastuni //* → PV I 3: *apravṛttiḥ pramāṇānām apravṛttiphalāsati / asajjñānaphalā kācid dhetubhedavyapekṣayā //* (Cf. Kellner 2003)

[3] JS 1.1.4: *satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittaṃ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt /* "When there is a connection of the sense-faculties [with objects], a cognition arises for a person. That is perception. [It is] not the cause [for knowing dharma], because [it] perceives [only] a present [object]." (See Franco & Preisendanz 1995 and Taber 2006 for possible interpretations of this *pratyakṣasūtra*.)

JS 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe tat pramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt /* "On the other hand, the relationship of speech with a meaning is innate. [Therefore] a [Vedic] teaching is the means of knowing that [dharma]. In addition, [a Vedic teaching] does not devi-

such and such an action will bring you a quantity of cows or heaven after death.

prameya		*pramāṇa*
ϕ	←	perception
dharma	←	Veda

Dharma in the Mīmāṃsā tradition is *yāgādi*, i.e. sacrifice and such. But ritual action by itself does not constitute dharma. The essential nature of dharma lies in its capacity of being the cause of accomplishing the desired result. In other words, dharma is not ritual action itself but ritual action qualified as being the cause of heaven, etc.[4] Essentially, dharma can be regarded as consisting in the causal link between a particular ritual and particular result.[5]

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ate from [the object even] when the object is not perceived. [Therefore] that [teaching] is a [primary, independent] *pramāṇa*, according to Bādarāyaṇa, because it does not depend on [another *pramāṇa*]. (A straightforward interpretation.)

According to Śabara's interpretation, this *sūtra* can be translated as follows: "On the other hand, the innate [and eternal] relationship of speech with a meaning is the means of knowing that [dharma] when that object [i.e. dharma] is not perceived, [because there is] a [Vedic] teaching. And [the cognition produced by the teaching] does not deviate [from the object]. [Therefore] that [cognition produced by a Vedic teaching] is a [primary, independent] *pramāṇa*, according to Bādarāyaṇa, because it does not depend on [another *pramāṇa*]."

[4] ŚV *codanā* 13–14: *dravyakriyāguṇādīnāṃ dharmatvaṃ sthāpayiṣyate / teṣām aindriyakatve 'pi na tādrūpyeṇa dharmatā // śreyaḥsādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyate / tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmān nendriyagocaraḥ //* "It will be established later that material, action, quality and so on are dharmas. Though they are perceptible, they are not dharmas as such[, i.e. ordinary objects of perception]. For, that these are the means of accomplishing the supreme end is always understood from the Veda [alone], and [they are] dharmas as such. Therefore [a dharma is] not an object of the sense-faculties."

[5] TV ad 1.3.1, 160.14: *tad ihāṣṭakādīnāṃ svargādisādhyasādhanabhāvaṃ pratyakṣādīni tāvan na gṛhṇantīti sādhitam.* "In this case, however, it is already established that perception, etc., at least do not grasp the causal relationship between the Aṣṭakā ritual, etc., and heaven, etc."

	sādhana		*sādhya*
dharma:	ritual	→	fruit

Heaven, for example, will be obtained in the future after death and therefore cannot be perceived by human beings, because perception grasps only present things through the connection between the sense faculty and an object.[6] As Śabara remarks, "a human being is not able to know it without a Vedic statement" (*aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt*).[7] Human beings have to rely on Vedic teachings in order to know dharma.

3 Manu and the Buddha with regard to religious matters

This is the case for any human being. Even sages such as Manu, the author of the *Manusmṛti*, cannot directly perceive dharma, not to speak of heretical teachers, such as the Buddha, the Jina and Kapila.[8] Those heretical teachers who claim to be omniscient (*sarvajña*) and to be able to cognize dharma (*dharmajña*) are liars. They are motivated by evil causes such as passion (*rāgādi*). They speak of dharma out of mundane desires. They may give lip service to teaching moral duties such as *ahiṃsā*. But these are mixed with pseudo-dharmas (*dharmābhāsa*) and therefore useless and unreliable, like milk contained in a drinking skin made of dog leather (*śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravat*).[9]

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[6] ŚBh ad 1.1.4, F 22.14–15: *bhaviṣyaṃś caiṣo 'rtho na jñānakāle 'sti. sataś caitad upalambhanam, nāsataḥ. ataḥ pratyakṣam animittam.* "And this object [i.e. dharma], being future, is not present at the time of cognition. Moreover, this [perception] is a means of apprehending something that is present, not one that is absent. Therefore, perception is not the cause [of knowing dharma]."

[7] ŚBh ad 1.1.2, F 18.5–6.

[8] For the arguments of this section, see Kataoka 2011.

[9] TV 203.13–14: *tadabhiprāyakalpitadharmābhāsamadhyapatitaṃ sanmūlam apy ahiṃsādi śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravad anupayogy aviśrambhaṇīyaṃ ca tanmātropalabdhaṃ bhavati.* "Therefore, because *ahiṃsā* and so forth, though based on a correct source, has fallen among pseudo-

Manu, on the other hand, is not motivated by any evil cause. His dharmic knowledge therefore must have derived from his direct experience of hearing the Veda. For *smṛti* is based on *śruti*; recollection is preceded by the direct experience of hearing.[10] As Kumārila clarifies, it is *arthāpatti* that distinguishes Manu's teaching from the Buddha's. Manu's teaching of dharma is not explicable, i.e. *anyathā nopapadyate*, unless we assume that it is based on Vedic injunction (*codanā*), whereas the Buddha's teaching can be well explained without assuming that, *anyathāpy upapadyate*, because it is based on evil causes such as *rāga*. Manu's teaching suggests the existence of original Vedic passages, whereas the Buddha's teaching suggests something else, such as deception motivated by human desire.[11]

		hetu		*pauruṣeyavacana*
dharma	←	*śruti*	←	*Manusmṛti*
ϕ	←	*rāgādi*	←	Buddhavacana

4 Postulation of lost scripture

The exegetical problem lies here. The Vedic passage postulated on the basis of Manu's teaching is not directly accessible to us. The passage in question is not perceivable but only to be inferred. It is not a *pratyakṣaśruti* but an *anumitaśruti*. The Vedic passage may have

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dharmas fabricated by their [creators'] own intention, it is neither useful nor reliable, like milk contained in a [drinking] skin [made] of dog [leather]. It is perceived only by the [Buddha and so on without relying on a correct source]."

[10] For the status of human speech in Mīmāṃsā exegesis, see Kataoka 2007.

[11] Dharmakīrti's reply is that the Buddha is rather motivated by compassion. PVSV 9.11: *na yuktaḥ, vītarāgatvād iti cet. na, karuṇayāpi vṛtteḥ.* "[Opponent:] It is impossible, because he is free of desire. [Reply:] No, because [it is possible that] he acts [being motivated] by compassion." See Dunne 1996.

been available to the ancient sages but is so no longer. The passage in question is imperceivable. Śabara phrases the problem as follows:[12]

> The next problem is: Suppose that we do not perceive a Vedic statement with regard to some [dharma] but nonetheless have recollection/tradition [such as the *Manusmṛti*] on it in such a way: "This is to be done in this way and for this purpose." Should that [object not explicitly enjoined in a Vedic injunction] be [regarded as something to be done] exactly as [it is taught in the *smṛti*]?

Manu teaches the Aṣṭakā ritual and other that have to be performed (*kartavya*). But an original Vedic passage is no longer available. We do not have a *śruti* passage but only a *smṛti* passage. *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.2 concludes that *anumāna* is the valid source (*pramāṇa*) in this case.[13] Manu's recollection (*smṛti*) functions as an inferential reason (*anumāna*) that leads us to infer the original Vedic source that is not directly perceivable.

Kumārila specifies this procedure of postulation as a kind of *arthāpatti* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam*.[14] But wait! Couldn't this procedure be similarly applicable to the Buddha's teaching? If Mīmāṃsakas claim that a Vedic source, though imperceptible, is to be postulated from Manu's teaching, then Buddhists can similarly claim that the Buddha's teaching of dharma is in fact based on a lost Vedic passage.[15]

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[12] ŚBh ad 1.3.1, 159.10–12: *athedānīṃ yatra na vaidikaṃ śabdam upalabhemahi, atha ca smaranti "evam ayam artho 'nuṣṭhātavyaḥ, etasmai ca prayojanāya" iti, kim asau tathaiva syān na veti.*

[13] JS 1.3.2: *api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt /*

[14] TV ad 1.3.1, 161.18–19 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *yadi hi śrutikalpanena vinā smṛtir nopapadyate, tataḥ samyaṅmūlā syāt. sambhavati tu svapnamūlatvena. tenānaikāntyād arthāpatteḥ sāmānyatodṛṣṭasya vānavakāśaḥ.* "If the *smṛti* were not explicable without postulating a *śruti*, it could be based on a correct [Vedic] source. But it can also be based on a dream. Therefore, due to inconclusiveness, there is no room for *arthāpatti* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam* [*anumānam*]."

[15] This argument is parallel with another argument of Kumārila about the postulation of the *dharmajñas*' original experience. If someone claimed, on the grounds that the teaching would be impossible other-

lost scripture		dharmic teaching
(scripture)	→	Manu's recollection
(scripture)	→	Buddha's teaching

5 Kumārila's anxiety

This anxiety is real for Kumārila. He is well aware of the possibility that his Buddhist opponents may counter against him by using the same logic.[16]

> On the other hand, if it were postulated that [the tradition promulgated by Manu and other orthodox teachers] is based on lost branches of the Veda, then it would undesirably be possible that any tradition (*smṛti*) promulgated by the Buddha and other [heterodox teachers] are also valid through the same procedure [of postulating a lost Veda]. And one could make anything one wants valid by casting it into the mouth of a lost Vedic branch.

In this way, the notion of "a lost branch of the Veda" (*pralīnaśākhā*), though it looks very convenient at first glance, can lead to problems. In using it, Mīmāṃsakas need to somehow set up a restriction in

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wise (*arthāpatti*), or by *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam*, that Manu and other orthodox teachers must have directly perceived dharmas, heretical opponents could similarly counterattack that their teachers such as the Buddha must have directly perceived dharmas.

postulated		dharmic teaching
(scripture)	←	Manu's recollection
(perception)	←	Buddha's teaching

Kumārila explains this possibility in ŚV *codanā* 156–157 and BṬ (TS 3216–20). Both prove the human experience of dharma on the ground that it would be otherwise impossible or do so by analogical inference. See Kataoka 2011.

[16] TV ad 1.3.1, 163.8–10: *yadi tu pralīnaśākhāmūlatā kalpyeta, tataḥ sarvāsāṃ buddhādismṛtīnām api taddvāraṃ prāmāṇyaṃ prasajyate. yasyaiva ca yad abhipretam, sa eva tat pralīnaśākhāmastake nikṣipya pramāṇīkuryāt.*

order to be able to defeat heretics without allowing a parallel counterargument. But what exactly is the criterion that can allow them to use the device safely?

6 Background of Kumārila's criticism

Although the commentator Śabara and the subcommentator Kumārila discuss the same topic, i.e. the authoritativeness of *smṛti*s, they differ very much in their attitude and perspective. Let me first give an overview of Śabara's 'traditional' interpretation of JS 1.3.1–7.

1.3.1 (*pūrva*): *dharmasya śabdamūlatvād aśabdam anapekṣyaṃ syāt*
1.3.2 (*uttara*): *api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt*
1.3.3 (*uttara*): *virodhe tv anapekṣyaṃ syād asati hy anumānam*
1.3.4 (*uttara*): *hetudarśanāc ca*
1.3.5 (*uttara*): *śiṣṭākope 'viruddham iti cet*
1.3.6 (*pūrva*): *na śāstraparimāṇatvāt*
1.3.7 (*uttara*): *api vā kāraṇāgrahaṇe prayuktāni pratīyeran*

1.3.1 Dharma is defined in JS 1.1.2 as a desirable object the means of knowing which is a Vedic injunction (*codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ*). That is, dharma is based on scripture (*śabdamūla*). This might imply that ritual elements taught only in *smṛti*s but not in the original Veda cannot be considered proper dharma. They lack scriptural bases (*aśabda*) and therefore are to be disregarded.

1.3.2 But this is not the case. In this case *smṛti*s function as inferential grounds (*anumāna*) by which one can postulate Vedic injunctions. People can infer a Vedic passage although they do not observe it (ŚBh 165.5–6: *anupalabhamānā apy anumimīran*). Therefore *smārta* dharmas are not baseless.

1.3.3 But this procedure of inference is allowed only when the *smṛti* passage in question does not contradict *śruti*s (*asati hy anumānam*). When it contradicts (*virodhe*), it is not to be considered authoritative.

1.3.4 Also it is disregarded, because it has an evil motivation such as greed as its cause (*hetudarśanāt*). It does not have a Vedic injunction as its source.

1.3.5 Inasmuch as ritual elements enjoined by the Veda (*śiṣṭa*) are not 'irritated' (*akope*) or obstructed,[17] *smārta* elements are not considered contradictory.

1.3.6 Some of them might look as if they obstruct the sequence (*krama*) or time (*kāla*) of ritual elements explicitly taught in the Veda. They would prevent the sequence fixed by the Vedic scripture (ŚBh 197.3–4: *śāstraparicchinnaṃ hi kramaṃ bādheran*).

1.3.7 But in fact there is no contradiction. These elements that are not found to be motivated by evil causes are authoritative (ŚBh 198.4–5: *agṛhyamāṇakāraṇā evaṃjātīyakāḥ pramāṇam*) and are to be performed.

The first *adhikaraṇa*, 1.3.1–2, defines *smṛti* as being a secondary source of dharma. The second *adhikaraṇa*, 1.3.3–4, explains an exceptional case to the first principle: the case of contradiction between *śruti* and *smṛti*. The third *adhikaraṇa*, 1.3.5–7, discusses ambiguous cases in which contradiction is suspected. As one can see, the theme discussed here is concerned about the contradiction between *śruti* and *smṛti*. It has nothing to do with Buddhist scriptures.

Whereas Śabara never mentions heretics such as Buddhists in this context, Kumārila often mentions them. But why is it necessary to refute Buddhists and so on in technical Mīmāṃsā arguments? Expecting such a question, Kumārila justifies his way of discussion as follows in TV ad 1.3.3–4:[18]

> To explain: If out of indifference one did not prove that these [heterodox scriptures] are not a means of obtaining correct knowledge, other people would come to have the same view [as the heretics], reasoning that [the lack of the property of being such a means] is impossible [to prove].

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[17] The straightforward interpretation of *śiṣṭākope* may be: "Unless qualified persons get angry." But Śabara glosses it as *vaidikaṃ kiṃcin na kupyati* (197.1).

[18] TV ad 1.3.3–4, 194.17–18: *yadi hy anādareṇaiṣāṃ na kalpyetāpramāṇatā / aśakyaiveti matvānye bhaveyuḥ samadṛṣṭayaḥ //*

Kumārila fears that indifference to opposing heretics would allow them to spread their wrong view. Of course, it is not the main task for a Mīmāṃsaka to refute heterodox teachings under the topic of *smṛti*. As Kumārila states, "This has not been examined in any other chapter" (*na caitat kvacid adhikaraṇāntare nirūpitam*). There is no chapter in the *Jaiminisūtra* that aims at discussing it. However, it is also not the case that such digressive argument is forbidden.

After commenting on Śabara's traditional view in the first place and proposing his own solutions for JS 1.3.3–4, Kumārila finally introduces an alternative interpretation of the *sūtra*s and starts refuting these heterodox *smṛti*s. As Kumārila confirms, "Dharmic cleansing is not accomplished until one has refuted all those [heretics] who[se views] are absolutely incompatible with the orthodox path of the three Vedas."[19]

Kumārila's excuse for introducing an alternative interpretation suggests that in the Mīmāṃsā tradition before him there had been no argument against heretics in the chapter discussing the authoritativeness of *smṛti*s. It is probably justifiable to guess that it is Kumārila who newly introduced the criticism of the Buddhists and other heretics in the present context. His fear is also clear from the following words: "And against [Mīmāṃsakas], who accept that *smṛti*s by Manu, etc., are also based on a lost branch of the Veda, even Buddhists and other [heretical teachers] can easily insist that [their teachings, too,] are similarly based on it. For who can define the extent of topics discussed in lost [scriptures]?"[20]

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[19] TV ad 1.3.3–4, 194.25–26: *trayīmārgasya siddhasya ye hy atyantavirodhinaḥ / anirākṛtya tān sarvān dharmaśuddhir na labhyate //*

[20] TV ad 1.3.3–4, 194.30–195.1: *yaiś ca mānavādismṛtīnām apy utsannavedaśākhāmūlatvam abhyupagatam, tān prati sutarāṃ śākyādibhir api śakyaṃ tanmūlatvam eva vaktum. ko hi śaknuyād utsannānāṃ vākyaviṣayeyattāniyamaṃ kartum.*

7 Kumārila's theory of lost scripture

Why are the original Vedic sources not perceived, *kimarthaṃ codanā nopalabhyante*?[21] Kumārila replies to this question by assuming several possibilities.

1. nityānumeya

- The original *śruti* passage has never existed in the Veda and therefore never been vocalized. It is always to be inferred (*nityānumeya*).[22]

Kumārila rejects this view attributed to "some people" (*kecit*), because it does not postulate a definite Vedic passage as an original source. *Smṛti* is not authoritative in its own right. It always requires a Vedic source for verification.[23] It is difficult to insist that a Vedic injunction existed despite the fact that it has never been vocalized

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[21] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.7.

[22] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.7–8: *tatra kecid āhuḥ – nityānumeyās tā na kadācid uccāryante.* "With regard to this, some say that those [injunctions] are necessarily to be inferred, they are never uttered."

[23] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.11: *tat tv ayuktam, andhaparamparānyāyād eva.* "But that is impossible precisely because of the maxim of the [beginningless] succession of those who are blind [from birth with regard to their knowledge of color]." The maxim *jātyandhaparamparānyāya* is explained in ŚBh ad 1.3.1. A person blind from birth insists that he knows a particular color. When one asks him about the source, he points out another person who is also blind from birth. He too points out yet another blind person as the source of his knowledge. In this way they have no ultimate source of their knowledge with regard to a particular color. In the ŚBh thereon the opponent uses this maxim in order to claim that *smṛti*s which teach the Aṣṭakā, etc., are based on erroneous cognition. ŚBh ad 1.3.1, 162.4–6: *tad yathā kaścij jātyandho vadet "smarāmy aham asya rūpaviśeṣasya" iti. "kutas te pūrvavijñānam" iti ca paryanuyukto jātyandham evāparaṃ vinirdiśet. tasya kutaḥ. jātyandhāntarāt.* "This is similar to the following: a person who is blind from birth says: 'I have a recollection of this particular color.' And when he is asked 'From where [does] your original knowledge [come]?', he points out yet another person who is also blind from birth. From where [does the knowledge] of the latter [come]? From yet another person who is [also] blind from birth."

and therefore never witnessed by anyone.[24] This view rather proves that the *smṛti* is invalid as being baseless.[25] Therefore it is better to assume another possibility.

2. pralīna

- The original Vedic passage is lost (*pralīna*). It is conceivable that some parts of the Vedic tradition disappeared (*pralaya*) due to human carelessness, laziness or the like (*pramādālasyādibhiḥ*) and due to the extinction of transmitting people (*puruṣakṣayāt*), causing the diminishment of Vedic traditions.[26]

Kumārila defends this view against a possible objection that any scripture then could be made authoritative. "And even if this is the case, it does not result that anything would be authoritative" (*na caivaṃ sati yat kiṃcit pramāṇam āpatsyate*).[27] Why? Kumārila answers: this is because the inference of a *śruti* source is possible through *anyathānupapatti*, i.e. being inexplicable otherwise. Only when a firm tradition (*dṛḍhasmaraṇa*) in the brahmanical circles is inexplicable without postulating a Vedic source is one allowed to do so. Otherwise it is not allowed.[28] In this way, heretics are not autho-

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[24] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.11–12: *yā hi codanā na kadācid uccāryate, tasyāḥ sarvapuruṣapratyakṣādiprasarābhāvād durlabhataram astitvam.* "It is very difficult [for us] to obtain [and insist upon] the existence of a Vedic injunction that has never been vocalized, because nobody's perception, etc., [with regard to it] has ever arisen."

[25] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.12–13: *tathā ca smṛter api saiva vandhyādauhitratulyatā.* "And so *smṛti* remains similar to the grandson of a barren woman."

[26] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.14–15: *tena varaṃ pralīnaśrutyanumānam eva. na ca pralayo na sambhāvyate. dṛśyate hi pramādālasyādibhiḥ puruṣakṣayāc cālpaviṣayatvam.* "Therefore it is better to infer a lost *śruti*. And its loss is not unthinkable, for one observes [today] that topics [dealt with in the Veda] diminish due to human carelessness, laziness or the like and due to the extinction of transmitters."

[27] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.15–16.

[28] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.16: *śiṣṭatraivarṇikadṛḍhasmaraṇānyathānupapattilabhyatvāc chrutyanumānasya.* "This is because the inference of a [source] *śruti* is attained through 'being otherwise inexplicable,' i.e. because the

rized to appeal to the procedure of postulating a Vedic source. Their tradition can be explained in other ways.

The second view accords well with that of Śabara, who concludes that it is possible that later people in the brahmanical tradition may have forgotten the source text. *vismaraṇam apy upapadyate*.[29] Kumārila seems to follow Śabara here. He has developed the traditional view and elaborated it in detail. "Even today it is seen that [only] the content is remembered but the text is lost" (TV 165.21: *dṛśyate hy adyatve 'py arthasmaraṇaṃ granthanāśaś ca*).

3. anupalabdhi

Kumārila introduces the third view as an alternative to the second, using the expression *yad vā*.

- The original Vedic passage is still available somewhere in the extant Vedic branches (*vidyamānaśākhā*) but not recognized by us.[30]

This is possible. But why is a source not perceived, *katham anupalabdhiḥ*?[31] If the source were still available, all people would learn the matter directly from the Vedic source and not from the *Manusmṛti*.[32] Kumārila argues that "the source of the *smṛti* is not observed because Vedic branches are scattered (*viprakīrṇa*), human beings are careless, and [the matter at stake] is [mentioned] in various chapters."[33]

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firm tradition of the qualified aryans would be otherwise inexplicable."

[29] ŚBh ad 1.3.2, 165.6.

[30] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.16–17: *yad vā vidyamānaśākhāgataśrutimūlatvam evāstu.* "Alternatively, let it be the case that [the *smṛti*] is precisely based on a *śruti* passage of a certain branch that is still extant."

[31] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.17.

[32] TV ad 1.3.1 (*pūrvapakṣa*), 163.10–11: *atha vidyamānaśākhāgatā evaite 'rthāḥ, tathāpi manvādaya iva sarve puruṣās tata evopalapsyante.* "If these things are precisely taught in a certain extant branch, still, all people will learn them directly from it just as Manu, etc., did."

[33] TV ad 1.3.2, 164.18–19: *śākhānāṃ viprakīrṇatvāt puruṣāṇāṃ pramādataḥ / nānāprakaraṇasthatvāt smṛter mūlaṃ na dṛśyate //*

Summary: *Kumārila's view*

The first view assumes that the source *śruti* never existed from the beginning, whereas the second and the third assume that the source was perceived by the *smṛti* authors. The second further assumes that the source passage, once existent, was lost (*pralīna, antarhita*[34]) due to various reasons, whereas the third assumes that the source is not perceived today although it is still available somewhere in the scattered Vedic branches.

	before	transmission	after
1	*anumeya*	⇢	*anumeya*
2	*upalabdha*	>>>	*pralīna*
3	*upalabdha*	⇢	*anupalabdha*

8 Dharmakīrti's criticism: Transmission and interpretation of the Veda

In the last portion of his earliest work, the *Pramāṇavārttika* with its *Svavṛtti*, which Frauwallner tentatively calls *Hetuprakaraṇa*, Dharmakīrti refutes the authoritativeness of the Veda.

One of his arguments runs as follows: a speaker can explain the meaning of the word he uses, but this is not the case for Vedic statements, which are claimed to be authorless (*apauruṣeya*) by Mīmāṃsakas. Then what are the grounds ensuring the correct interpretation of Vedic sentences? "Therefore, what kind of evidence is there to say that 'one should eat dog meat' is not the meaning of the *śruti* passage, *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*?"[35]

Reciters and interpreters of the Veda may tell lies. Mīmāṃsakas themselves claim that human beings are not reliable. Dharmakīrti

[34] Kumārila uses the word *antarhita* in TV ad 1.3.11, 229.21: *antarhitaviprakīrṇānumeyaprāyaśrutimūlasmṛti*[*ni*]*bandhanebhyaḥ …*

[35] PV I 318, Gnoli 167.9–10: *tenāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti śrutau / khādec chvamāṃsam ity eṣa nārtha ity atra kā pramā //*

sarcastically formulates it as follows:[36]

> Furthermore, here **you** (*bhavān*)[37] must have forgotten the complexion of your own face because of the attachment to your own doctrine. [You said:] A statement by a human being is not reliable because he may tell a lie being afflicted **by desire and so on** (*rāgādi*). Therefore, with regard to the present case, too, why don't you examine whether or not this is the case? "The person, when teaching, may teach the Veda or its meaning incorrectly out of affliction."

As reflected in the Vedic sentence *anṛtavādinī vāk* quoted in ŚBh ad 1.2.11 and Kumārila's general statement that clearly presupposes it,[38] it is traditionally accepted in Mīmāṃsā that in most cases human beings are liars.

But we can better understand Dharmakīrti's sarcastic counter-argument by taking into consideration Kumārila's criticism of the omniscient Buddha. Kumārila criticizes the teaching Buddha as being motivated by desire, etc. This is stated in ŚV *codanā* 137, where Kumārila presupposes the causal relationship between *rāgādi* and *vyāpāra*. If one has no desire, one does not undertake an action. Therefore the Buddha cannot be the speaker of the teaching.[39]

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[36] PVSV ad I 319, Gnoli 168.26–4: *api cātra **bhavān** svam eva mukhavarṇaṃ svavādānurāgān nūnaṃ vismṛtavān – "puruṣo **rāgādibhir** upapluto 'nṛtam api brūyād iti nāsya vacanaṃ pramāṇam" iti. tad ihāpi kiṃ na pratyavekṣyate "sambhavati na vā" iti. sa evopadiśann upaplavād vedaṃ vedārthaṃ vānyathāpy upadiśed iti.*

[37] It may be possible that there is a double meaning here and that *atra bhavān* could sarcastically be used, in addition, as an honorific pronoun "your Honor," although Karṇakagomin takes *atra* of *atra bhavān* as referring to what a Mīmāṃsaka holds as tenet regarding the Veda.

[38] ŚBh ad 1.2.11: *prāyāc cānṛtavādinī vāg iti*; ŚV *codanā* 144ab: *sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtavādinaḥ*. "And, at any time, human beings are in most cases liars."

[39] ŚV *codanā* 137: *rāgādirahite cāsmin nirvyāpāre vyavasthite / deśanānyapraṇītaiva syād ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt //* "And because he was devoid of any desire, etc., and [therefore] remained without activity [e.g. of speaking], his teaching must have been composed by someone else without [proper] reflection." See Kataoka 2003a: 180ff. and 2003b: 55ff. for further discussion regarding this verse. Kataoka 2003a (written in Japanese)

rāgādi ⇨ *vyāpāra* (*deśanā*)
~~*rāgādi*~~ ⇨ ~~*vyāpāra* (*deśanā*)~~

Not only in the *Ślokavārttika* but also in the *Tantravārttika* Kumārila repeats the same view.[40] The Buddha and other heretical teachers al-

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discusses in detail the correspondence between ŚV *codanā* 137 and PV I 12, in particular Dharmakīrti's general discussion concerning *śeṣavad anumānam* and *vipakṣe 'dṛṣṭimātreṇa* and its particular application to the Buddha's speech. The same theme is dealt with recently by Pecchia 2008, who apparently has not noticed the existence of Kataoka 2003a. In connection to PV I 12 Pecchia 2008: 165, n. 5 quotes Kataoka 2003b and states: "In analyzing *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) 3156–3157 and the *Pañjikā* (TSP) thereon, Kataoka (2003: 60f.) suggests that Dharmakīrti's commentary *ad* PV I.12 addresses *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) Codanā 137, while Taber (forthco., n. 22) states that TS 3156 may be taken from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, which is very similar to ŚV *codanā* 132. It would seem to me that Ratnakīrti's exposition in SS 23,19f. (see Bühnemann 1980: 142, n. 512) supports this latter hypothesis: the *kārikā* corresponding to TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* and is followed by the quotation of ŚV *Codanā* 132." But nowhere in Kataoka 2003b: 60f. can I find the analysis of TS 3156–3157 and the *Pañjikā* which Pecchia claims Kataoka analyzes. Furthermore, it is not clear at all what kind of Kataoka's hypothesis she criticizes. Pecchia implies here that Kataoka 2003b: 60f. denies the claim that TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (BṬ). But, again, nowhere in Kataoka 2003b: 60f. is it denied. Furthermore, I cannot understand why Kataoka's claim "that Dharmakīrti's commentary ad PV I.12 addresses *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) *Codanā* 137" is incompatible with Taber's claim that "TS 3156 may be taken from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*." In fact Kataoka 2003a fully agrees with the claim that TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to BṬ. Kataoka 2003b generally agrees to the hypothesis by Frauwallner 1962 that TS quotes from BṬ and not ŚV. In order to make sense of Pecchia's statement, one has to postulate that Pecchia presupposes in general that Dharmakīrti's PV I criticizes Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* and never *Ślokavārttika*. Does she really presuppose this? It seems to be the case that Pecchia's understanding of Kataoka 2003b relies on a brief note of Taber's article (2011:445, n.23). Taber's note itself is correct but Pecchia seems to have misunderstood its implication. She criticizes Kataoka 2003b without reading it properly, by relying on and misunderstanding the implication of Taber's note.

[40] TV ad 1.3.3–4, 195.27–30: *lobhādi kāraṇaṃ cātra bahv evānyat pratīyate / yasmin sannihite dṛṣṭe nāsti mūlāntarānumā // śākyādayaś ca*

ways teach dharma out of greed and other evil motivations (*lobhādi kāraṇam*).

It is possible to explain Dharmakīrti's counterattack as addressed to Kumārila. First Kumārila criticizes the Buddha and says: the Buddhist scripture is not reliable, because it is composed by a human being who by his very nature often tells lies, being motivated by desire, greed and other evil causes. Dharmakīrti repeats the same argument back to Kumārila and criticizes him as follows: even if we admit your thesis that the Veda is not composed by any human being, the Veda nonetheless remains invalid, because its reciters and interpreters are not trustworthy, as you pointed out yourself. Defective factors derived from human beings may well have crept into the Veda in its transmission and interpretation, even if they are not originally inherent in the Veda itself.

	author		scripture				
B:	Buddha	⇨	*sūtra*	⇢	transmission	+	*śāstra*
K:	**Buddha**	⇨	*sūtra*				
D:	ϕ	⇨	Veda	⇢	**transmission**	+	**interpretation**

(B: Buddhist; K: Kumārila; D: Dharmakīrti)

Recall also the parallel structure of the Buddhist theorization of *sūtra* and *śāstra*. Dharmakīrti's insulting address to "You (*bhavān*)" may have been aimed at Kumārila and not Mīmāṃsakas in general. This impression is further strengthened by an argument that follows immediately afterwards in PVSV.

9 Transmission of the Veda

Dharmakīrti continues his argument as follows:

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sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām / hetujālavinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate // "Here [in the teaching of the Buddha, etc.], many other causes such as greed are understood. Where they are seen to be present, another cause [such as the Vedas] cannot be inferred. And whenever the Buddha and so forth deliver a teaching of a dharma, they never deliver [one] which is free of [evil] causes."

(1) "For we learn that there are some branches of the Veda that were once lost but have been recovered (*utsannoddhṛta*) by some people [such as Yājñavalkya]."[41]

(2) "Even today some branches have few reciters (*viralādhyetṛka*)."[42]

Here and in the following Dharmakīrti describes the situation of the Vedic transmission and points out its unreliability. The Vedic tradition sometimes shrinks and sometimes grows. This must always have been the case, as we witness today. Remember that Kumārila makes reference to the shrinkage of the Vedic traditions[43] and contemporaneous loss of scriptures.[44]

(3) Even the major branches (*pracurādhyetṛka*) may have been minor ones at some point.[45]

Thus it is quite conceivable that this limited number of propagators might have incorrectly transmitted Vedic scriptures.

(4) Even today we witness that devotees (*bhakta*) thoughtlessly put faith in the most revered of the many transmitters.

The whole tradition, although major today, might have derived from a single 'respected' teacher (*sambhāvitāt puruṣāt*). Deception (*vipralambha*) easily happens.[46]

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[41] PVSV ad 319, Gnoli 169.4–5: (1) *śrūyante hi kaiścit puruṣair utsannoddhṛtāni śākhāntarāṇi*; cf. also PVSVṬ 596.11–12: *kaiścit puruṣair* ***yājñavalkya****prabhṛtibhir utsannoddhṛtāni.*

[42] PVSV ad 319, Gnoli 169.5: (2) *idānīm api kānicid viralādhyetṛkāṇi.*

[43] See n. 26.

[44] TV ad 1.3.2, 165.21: *dṛśyate hy adyatve 'py arthasmaraṇaṃ granthanāśaś ca.* "Even today it is seen that [only] the content is remembered but the texts is lost."

[45] PVSV 169.6–10: (3) *tadvat pracurādhyetṛkāṇām api kasmiṃścit kāle kathaṃcit saṃhārasambhavāt. punaḥ sambhāvitapuruṣapratyayāt pracuratopagamanasambhāvanāsambhavāt. teṣāṃ ca punaḥ pratānayitṝṇāṃ kadācid adhītavismṛtādhyayanānām anyeṣāṃ vā sambhāvanābhraṃśabhayādinānyathopadeśasambhavāt.*

[46] PVSV 169.10–13: (4) *tatpratyayāc ca tadbhaktānām avicāreṇa pratipatter bahuṣv adhyetṛṣu sambhāvitāt puruṣād bahulaṃ pratipattidarśanāt. tato 'pi kathaṃcid vipralambhasambhavāt.*


1	*śākhā*	>>>	ϕ	<<<	recovered	(*utsannoddhṛta*)
2	*śākhā*	>>>	shrink	>>>	minor	(*viralādhyetṛka*)
3	*śākhā*	>>>	shrink	<<<	major	(*pracurādhyetṛka*)
4	*śākhā*	>>>	a teacher	<<<	major	(*pracurādhyetṛka*)

10 Comparison between Dharmakīrti and Kumārila concerning the transmission of the Veda

Here and above, Dharmakīrti points out problems inherent to the transmission of the textual form and meaning of the Veda. The Veda and *vedārtha* can be easily transmitted in a wrong way. Transmission of the correct form and correct interpretation of Vedic words are not as certain as Mīmāṃsakas optimistically claim. Dharmakīrti's criticism can be better understood if we compare it with Kumārila's description of Vedic transmission.

TV ad 1.3.1 (*pūrvapakṣa*) compares the safety of transmission of the Veda with the uncertainty of that of *smṛti*s. The Veda has been passed down to the successive generations with certainty. A particular form of the Veda, which is perceivable like a pot, was uttered by a reciter, perceived by another and then recollected by itself (Generation *n*). The next generation perceived the Veda recollected by the preceding generation and then itself recollected it (Generation *n*+1). The same process has repeated itself continuously. Thus, the correct form of the Veda has been transmitted with certainty in the regular cycle of perception and recollection.[47]

[47] TV ad 1.3.1, 162.11–14: *vedaḥ punaḥ saviśeṣaḥ pratyakṣagamyaḥ. tatra ghaṭādivad eva puruṣāntarastham upalabhya smaranti. tair api smṛtam upalabhyānye 'pi smaranto 'nyebhyas tathaiva samarpayantīty anāditā. sarvasya cātmīyasmaraṇāt pūrvam upalabdhiḥ sambhavatīti na nirmūlatā.* "Furthermore, the Veda, which has a particular form, is perceptible. This being the case, [it is possible that] just as one recalls something such as a pot [which another person possesses, so does] one recall [the Veda] which someone else possesses. Yet another person, too, after having perceived [the Veda] recalled by a [previous generation], passes it on to another [generation] in the same way. Thus [the transmission] is beginningless. And [their recollection] is not baseless,



In this way the *Tantravārttika* describes the continuity of Vedic tradition. Kumārila's optimistic view on the Vedic transmission is also clear in the *Ślokavārttika*. Here he compares the widespread transmission of the Veda with that of heretical scriptures.[48]

> In the case of the Veda, because it resides in many people and it is [first] learned and [then] recollected in only one life, its independence [and reliability] is not nullified. And, if [someone] changed the [Veda], [the change] would be prevented from many [sides].

The Veda has been correctly transmitted because its transmission has been sustained by many people, whereas the correctness of a heretical tradition is doubtful because it ultimately originated in a single person, the originator of the tradition. Kumārila's main argument is the widespread dispersal of the Veda transmitted by "many people" (*anekapuruṣa*). This reason is exactly the target of Dharmakīrti's criticism. He points out that in fact the Vedic tradition is not so secure. It is possible that the tradition might have declined considerably, the tradition we have today might have been transmitted by a single person at some point, and changes or mistakes might have been left uncorrected. Dharmakīrti's criticism of an anonymous Mīmāṃsaka (in sections 8 and 9) exposes Kumārila's optimism.

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because everyone perceived [the Veda] before recalling their own."

[48] ŚV *codanā* vv. 149–150ab: *anekapuruṣasthatvād ekatraiva ca janmani / grahaṇasmaraṇād vede na svātantryaṃ vihanyate // anyathākaraṇe cāsya *bahubhyaḥ syān nivāraṇam /*

> *For *bahubhyaḥ* there is a variant reading *bahubhiḥ*, which is more straightforward and which is supported by Pārthasārathi. But I adopt here the inferior reading *bahubhyaḥ*, which is supported by many manuscripts and other testimonies such as NKC 724.6, because it seems more likely that *bahubhiḥ* is a secondary attempt to make the text smoother than that it is original and *bahubhyaḥ* an alteration of it.

11 Limited tradition: *śāstraparimāṇa*

The correspondence between Dharmakīrti's arguments and Kumārila's is further confirmed by a criticism that immediately follows in the PVSV. Dharmakīrti states as follows:[49]

> Furthermore, I hear even from you (*bhavatām api śṛṇumaḥ*) the [brahmanical] tradition of only a limited number of interpreters [of the Veda]. Among them, someone might be either hostile, ignorant, or rogues. Therefore [we have] no confidence [in this tradition].

Dharmakīrti claims here that the Vedic exegetical tradition is in fact not sustained by many people, as the Mīmāṃsakas claim. The Veda has been interpreted by a limited number of people. Here Dharmakīrti is referring to the Mīmāṃsā claim that the number of proper interpreters of the Veda (*vyākhyātṛpuruṣa*) is limited (*parimita*). Only a limited number of people (such as Jaimini) can be orthodox interpreters. In other words, the Vedic exegetical tradition is limited. But where did Dharmakīrti *hear* the brahmanical tradition of the limited number of interpreters (*parimitavyākhyātṛpuruṣaparamparām ... śṛṇumaḥ*)?

The view is in fact found in the *Tantravārttika*, commenting on JS 1.3.6, *na śāstraparimāṇatvāt*. A traditional interpretation, which Śabara presents, and Kumārila as well in his first interpretation, takes this as referring to the measurement of time taught in the Veda concerning ritual elements (*śāstritaṃ parimāṇam*), such as temporal proximity (*pratyāsatti*), time of performance (*prayogakāla*) and sequence (*krama*). "Measurement taught in Vedic injunction" (*śāstritaṃ parimāṇam*) is the meaning of *śāstraparimāṇa*. This, of course, does not match Dharmakīrti's description.

It is Kumārila's second interpretation that fits Dharmakīrti's reference. As I have pointed out, Kumārila reinterprets JS 1.3.3–4 in a unique way. The focus of argument is changed from Manu, etc., to the Buddha, etc. "Contradiction" mentioned in JS 1.3.3 (*virodhe tv ana-*

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[49] PVSV 169.13–15: *kiṃ ca parimitavyākhyātṛpuruṣaparamparām eva cātra bhavatām api śṛṇumaḥ. tatra kaścid dviṣṭājñadhūrtānām anyatamaḥ syād apīty anāśvāsaḥ.*

pekṣyaṃ syāt) is not the contradiction of the Veda with the *Manusmṛti*, but with the heretical scriptures. The evil causes or motivations mentioned in JS 1.3.4 (*hetudarśanāt*) are not those of Manu and other orthodox teachers but of the Buddha and other heretical teachers. Note that Kumārila himself makes excuses for introducing a new interpretation of JS 1.3.3–4.

		traditional view	reinterpretation
1.3.3	*virodha*	Manu, etc.	Buddha, etc.
1.3.4	*hetu*	Manu, etc.	Buddha, etc.
1.3.6	*śāstraparimāṇa*	*krama*, etc.	14 or 18 branches

Similarly, Kumārila reinterprets *śāstraparimāṇa*, mentioned in JS 1.3.6. *Parimāṇa* is not "measurement" but "limitation." Authoritative teachings are limited (*parimitāni ca śāstrāṇi*). Therefore, the heretical scriptures are not regarded as proper *śāstra*s. Only the brahmanical *śāstra*s, e.g. the fourteen branches of science (*caturdaśavidyāsthāna*), are proper teachings.[50]

> For only limited branches of science, either fourteen or eighteen, are accepted by the learned as the valid source of dharma. Namely, those called *veda, upaveda, aṅga, upāṅga*, eighteen *dharmasaṃhitās, purāṇaśāstra, śikṣā* and *daṇḍanīti*. And among them, scriptures of Buddhists, Jainas, etc., are neither listed nor accepted.

Judging from the manner of Kumārila's presentation, it seems unlikely that Kumārila's reinterpretation of *śāstraparimāṇa* goes back to some unknown predecessor between Śabara and Kumārila. It is likely that Dharmakīrti is referring to Kumārila's unique interpretation of *śāstraparimāṇa* when he states that Mīmāṃsakas accept only a limited number of exegetical traditions. Kumārila uses the word *parimita* intending that dharmic teaching (*śāstra*) is 'limited' to the elite tradition and thus excludes heretical traditions. But this also implies that secondary literature based on the Veda is limited and

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[50] TV ad 1.3.5–7, 201.23–25: *parimitāny eva hi caturdaśāṣṭādaśa vā vidyāsthānāni dharmapramāṇatvena śiṣṭaiḥ parigṛhītāni vedopavedāṅgopāṅgāṣṭādaśadharmasaṃhitāpurāṇaśāstraśikṣādaṇḍanītisaṃjñākāni, na ca teṣāṃ madhye bauddhārhatādigranthāḥ smṛtā gṛhītā vā.*

that interpreters of the Veda are in fact not many.[51] Dharmakīrti reinterprets *parimita* as referring to 'a limited small number' and then counterattacks Kumārila by making this argument of *vedavyākhyāna* parallel to the shrinkage of Vedic transmission.[52]

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[51] For Kumārila *śāstra* in *śāstraparimāṇa* refers to the Vedas and other dharmic teachings, i.e. fourteen or eighteen branches of science, which are transmitted only by the brahmanical tradition represented by learned *śiṣṭa*s. It is dharmic teachings (*śāstra*) that are limited (*parimita*) for him. For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, it is *vyākhyātṛpuruṣa* that is limited (*parimita*). Therefore, there is a difference between their understandings with regard to the object being limited. But it is not the case that Dharmakīrti's criticism does not hold. If it is claimed by a Mīmāṃsaka that the number of *śāstra*s (brahmanical dharmic teachings) is limited, it implies that the number of *vyākhyāna* (such as *smṛti* literature) and *vyākhyātṛpuruṣa* (such as Manu) is also limited. Therefore, Dharmakīrti's twist is not a mere distortion. Rather he skillfully trips up Kumārila's argument. And we can better understand the process of Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *śāstra* that he claims hears from a Mīmāṃsaka by taking into consideration the Buddhist usage of *śāstra*. In the Buddhist tradition *śāstra* is often contrasted with *sūtra*. It refers to *vyākhyāna* kind of literature such as *abhidharma*. Therefore one can imagine that when Dharmakīrti heard *śāstraparimāṇa* from a Mīmāṃsaka, he interpreted it as referring to the limitation of *vyākhyāna* literature. Thus Dharmakīrti's argument of *parimitavyākhyātṛpuruṣa* makes sense in the context of the present discussion of scriptural transmission.

[52] The relevant portion of PVSV (ad PV I 319) can be analyzed as follows. Note that 5.2 (on *vedavyākhyāna*) is an argument parallel to 5.1 (on *veda*). Both provide with the reason for unreliability due to a limited number of people.

1 It is impossible to know the meanings of Vedic words either by *loka*, *sampradāya* or *yukti*. 168.3–4
2 *Lokavyavahāra* is not reliable with respect to supersensible meanings. 168.5–15
3 The exegetical tradition of the Vedas is not reliable either. 168.15–22
4 Human faults may creep into the transmission of the textual form and of the interpretation of the Vedas. 168.22–26
5 Mīmāṃsakas agree that human beings are not reliable. 168.26–169.4
5.1 Shrinkage, etc., of the transmission of the Vedas do happen. 169.4–13

JS 1.3.6:	*śāstraparimāṇatvāt*
ŚBh:	*śāstraparicchinnaṃ hi kramaṃ bādheran*
TV 1:	*śāstritaṃ* (*padārthānāṃ*) *parimāṇam*
TV 2:	*śāstrāṇi parimitāni*
PVSV:	*parimitavyākhyātṛpuruṣaparamparā*

12 History reconstructed

Just as Buddhists normally conceptualize *sūtra*s as being more authoritative than *śāstra*s, Mīmāṃsakas generally regard *śruti*s as superseding *smṛti*s.[53]

	primary		secondary
Buddhism:	*sūtra*	>	*śāstra*
Mīmāṃsā	*śruti*	>	*smṛti*

The latter are secondary criteria for dharma and therefore not independently authoritative. If they contradict *śruti*s, *smṛti*s are disregarded. Only when there is no contradiction is it allowed to postulate an unobservable *śruti* passage from a *smṛti*. The Mīmāṃsā idea

5.2 Mīmāṃsakas do agree that the exegetical tradition is limited. 169.13–15

6 Conclusion: it is impossible to know the meanings of the Vedas either by *vyākhyāna* or *lokavyavahāra*. 169.16–17

7 One cannot decide a correct meaning out of many by reasoning (*na yukteḥ*). 169.17–24

[53] Kumārila finally solves the problem concerning contradiction between *śruti* and *smṛti* by denying the existence of contradiction itself. He claims that there is no contradiction at all between the two. See TV ad 1.3.3–4, A 193.11. This peculiar view of his, which is quite different from Śabara's traditional view, is clearly motivated by the desire not to nullify the authoritativeness of *smṛti*. He thinks that the authoritativeness of *smṛti* should not easily be discarded. In Kumārila's time circumstances concerning the authoritativeness of *smṛti* are different from those in Śabara's time.

of *avirodha* and *pralīna* roughly corresponds to the Buddhist theory of *aviloma* and *antarhita*.[54]

		postulation	
Buddhism:	(*sūtra*)	←	*śāstra*
Mīmāṃsā:	(*śruti*)	←	*smṛti*

In both traditions postulation of a lost scripture is required to verify some of their teachings. But this strategy also allows a counterargument for their opponents, such as Mahāyāna for Vaibhāṣikas and heretics for Mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila is well aware of this danger when he defends the Brahmanical tradition of the Veda and its subordinate literature such as *smṛti*s. Opponents can similarly claim that their doctrine, too, is based on the lost scripture that proponents resort to.

		postulation	
Heretics:			doctrine
		↙	
Mīmāṃsā:	(*śruti*)	←	*smṛti*

Kumārila refutes this argument in two ways. The heretical doctrines that are clearly contradictory to the Veda are easily disregarded. On

[54] The Abhidharma *śāstra* can be regarded as the Buddha's own words, because it does not contradict (*na vilomayati*) *dharmatā*. Some Abhidharma doctrines that are not found in the original *sūtra*s are defended by recourse to the theory of 'lost *sūtra*' (*antarhita*). See Honjo 1989 and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* explained there (Taisho 27,1a–2a11). Cf. MSABh 1.10.1: *buddhavacanasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam, yat sūtre 'vatarati, vinaye saṃdṛśyate, dharmatāṃ ca na vilomayati.* "The defining characteristic of the Buddha's words is as follows: it appears in the *sūtra*, it is observed in the *vinaya*, and it does not contradict *dharmatā*." AKBh ad 2.55d, 91.22–23: *yady api noktaḥ, na tu pratiṣiddhaḥ. sūtrāṇi ca bahūny antarhitānīti katham etan nirdhāryate nokta iti.* "Although it is not taught [that *asaṃskṛta* is a *hetu*], still, it is not denied. Furthermore, since many *sūtra*s are lost, how can one determine that it is not taught [in *sūtra*s]?" Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā*, AKBhV 320.26–27: *na tu pratiṣiddhaḥ. dharmatāyā avirodhān na doṣa ity abhiprāyaḥ.* "[When the author states] 'It is not denied,' what he has in mind is that there is no problem because it does not contradict *dharmatā*."

the other hand, those heretical doctrines that do not explicitly contradict the Veda can also be excluded by limiting the Vedic tradition. Only a limited number of teachings, 14 or 18 branches of science, are authorized as being Vedic. Therefore Buddhists, etc., cannot appeal to the Veda.

Heretics:				doctrine	(*bāhya*)
		⇙			
Mīmāṃsā:	(*śruti*)	←		*smṛti*	(*parimita*)

Dharmakīrti most probably presupposes Kumārila as his Mīmāṃsaka opponent. Instead of claiming that the Buddha's teaching is based on a lost Veda, Dharmakīrti chooses a different strategy when criticizing Mīmāṃsā views. He argues against Kumārila by using Kumārila's own arguments concerning the authoritativeness of the orthodox traditions and the unauthoritativeness of the heterodox traditions.

Kumārila contends that the Vedic tradition is secure and free of human errors because many people transmitted this beginningless scripture and checked each other, whereas the Buddhist tradition ultimately originates in a single person. Kumārila criticizes the Buddha as being motivated by *rāga*, *lobha*, etc.

source				*paramparā*
Buddha	⇨	*sūtra*	⇨	transmission+interpretation
ϕ	⇨	Veda	⇨	transmission+interpretation

Dharmakīrti presents the counterargument that Kumārila's attribution of *rāgādi* to the Buddha applies similarly to the transmitters and interpreters of the Veda. The Vedic tradition is not free of human errors and defects. Here the focus of debate is not on the original source but the successive transmission.

Dharmakīrti points out that the present tradition of the Veda, even though transmitted and interpreted by many, might be traced to just a single person. He also points out that Mīmāṃsakas themselves claim that the tradition is limited (*parimita*). Some interpreters might be ignorant or rogues. Then how could one trust such a

limited tradition? Thus it is impossible to know the original meaning of the Veda (PVSV 169.17: *na vedārthasiddhiḥ*).

The Veda might be non-human-made (*apauruṣeya*). But its transmission, concerning its form and interpretation, is not free of human defects. Mīmāṃsakas themselves claim that human beings are in most case liars. Here there is a chance that human errors creep into the Vedic tradition.

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Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

AKBh *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1967.

Jaiminisūtra

JS See ŚBh.

Tantravārttika

TV See ŚBh.

Nyāyakumudacandra

NKC *Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra of Śrīmat Prabhācandrācārya. A Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva's Laghīyastraya.* 2 vols. Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1991.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti

PVSV *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*: *The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente 1960.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā

PVSVṬ *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam* (*Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ*) *Svopajñavṛttyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad 1943.

Śābarabhāṣya

ŚBh *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇītaṃ mīmāṃsādarśanam*. Ed. Subbāśāstrī. 6 parts. Poona: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya 1929–34.

F See Frauwallner 1968.

Ślokavārttika

ŚV *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāsa

Śāstrī. Varanasi: Tara Publications (or Ratna Publications, according to the cover) 1978.

Sphuṭārthā

AKBhV *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Ed. Dwārikādās Śāstrī. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1987.

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Action theory and scriptural exegesis in early Advaita-Vedānta (1)

Maṇḍana Miśra on *upadeśa* and *iṣṭasādhanatā*[1]

Hugo David

In what is presumably his last work, the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, written in Benares around 1640,[2] Khaṇḍadeva Miśra, the great 17th-century Mīmāṃsaka, reports an interesting opinion he attributes to *tārkikāḥ*, the exponents of "New Logic" or Navya-Nyāya.[3]

The context is the classical discussion about the cause of human activities (*pravṛttihetu*). According to these late "logicians," an action (the action of cooking for instance) would take place only once the agent has come to know three distinct properties of the action

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[1] This article is the partial outcome of a seminar held at the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, during the Autumn-term 2010, under the supervision of Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani and Dr. Eivind Kahrs. Although this study greatly benefitted from the comments of these two scholars, I take the entire responsibility for its conclusions. I also heartily thank Dr. S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma and Dr. Maṇi Drāviḍa, with whom I had the privilege to read and discuss large portions of the *Vidhiviveka* and the *Nyāyakaṇikā* during my stay at the Pondicherry Centre of the École française d'Extrême-Orient in 2010.

[2] See Gode 1940: 13. It is widely accepted that Khaṇḍadeva (a younger contemporary of Appayya Dīkṣita according to Ramaswami Sastri 2009: 68) was born around 1600 and died in Benares in 1665 (see Edgerton 1986: 18, Ramaswami Sastri 2009: 68 and Kane 1977: 1199).

[3] See *Bhāṭṭarahasya* p. 8.4–21.

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 271–318.

he is about to undertake: it should be feasible or realizable by means of an act (*kṛtisādhya*), it should be useful or, in other words, it should be a means of bringing about something suitable to the agent's wish (*iṣṭasādhana*) and it should not entail any strong undesired consequence (*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhin*). A knowledge of the whole set of three properties (without hierarchy between them) would be needed, in their opinion, in order to explain why people do not normally undertake actions such as touching the moon (*candrasparśa*), which is harmless and might be desirable but is unfeasible, going round in circles (*maṇḍalīkaraṇa*), which is certainly possible and harmless but useless, or eating a mixture of honey and poison (*madhuviṣasampṛktānnabhojana*), an action at the same time possible and beneficial (inasmuch as eating honey is a means to experience pleasure) but entailing a strong undesired consequence, namely death.

This theory, strongly criticized by Khaṇḍadeva himself in the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, is indeed a strange juxtaposition of philosophical ideas that had been considered for centuries in India as mutually exclusive. Leaving aside the last property, probably introduced into the discussion much later, one can easily recognize behind the first two properties the leading positions of the two main theoreticians of action of classical Mīmāṃsā in the second half of the first millennium: Śālikanātha Miśra, the major proponent of Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā in the 8th/9th century (?),[4] and Maṇḍana Miśra. To explain how both antagonist ideas came to be conflated by these late authors into a single "mixed" theory of action is not an easy task, as it presupposes a precise understanding of these doctrines as they were elaborated in their own particular intellectual context, and this is precisely what Khaṇḍadeva, in spite of all his accuracy, does not provide us

[4] The equivalence between the two concepts of *kṛtisādhya* ("realizable by [means of] an act") and *kārya* ("to be done," "compulsory"), the second more commonly used by Prabhākara himself in his works, can be seen from Śālikanātha's definition of *kārya* in the *Vākyārthamātṛkā* [VAM] 2.13ab: *kṛtisādhyaṃ pradhānaṃ yat, tat kāryam abhidhīyate |*; "That which is realizable by [means of] an act and prevails [over this act] is what [we] call *kārya*" (p. 431.13). See also VAM 2.7c: *kāryatā kṛtisādhyatvam*; "to be *kārya* is to be realizable by [means of] an act" (p. 428.11).

with. Leaving aside Śālikanātha, I will limit myself to a few remarks on the case of Maṇḍana.

The Indian tradition is unanimous in crediting Maṇḍana Miśra (660–720?)[5] with an original theory of action, according to which the cause of all human activities is the knowledge of their "being a means for realizing a desired [end]" (*iṣṭasādhanatā*).

Following this well-known theory, first exposed in the *Vidhiviveka* ("A reflection on *vidhi*,"[6] henceforth ViV), rational beings under-

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[5] The most exhaustive discussions of Maṇḍana's date are found in Schmithausen 1965: 216, who assigns him "um 700, höchstens ein wenig früher, keinesfalls später" (n. 150), and in Thrasher 1993: 111–128, who surveys most of the available opinions (see especially n. 1 and 2 [p. 152]) and proposes the similar date 660–720. The main landmarks circumscribing Maṇḍana's period of activity are, on the one hand, Kumārila, Prabhākara and Dharmakīrti, whom he repeatedly refers to, and, on the other, Umbeka, who reports variant readings of the *Bhāvanāviveka* in his commentary thereon. According to Thrasher, Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* presupposes Śaṅkara's work (see Thrasher 1993: 114–121), but the evidence he provides in favour of this hypothesis is not sufficient, in my opinion, to establish a more precise dating on this basis.

[6] The Sanskrit word *vidhi* is used in (Pūrva- and Uttara-)Mīmāṃsā texts to express (at least) three different meanings, that should not be confused. 1. According to Pāṇini's use of the term in A. 3.3.161 (***vidhi****nimantraṇa … prārthaneṣu liṅ*), *vidhi* is a "command," understood as the particular act or intention of a speaker, justifying the use of the optative and other related verbal forms. This and similar grammatical *sūtra*s are frequently referred to by Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, who generally avoid though using *vidhi* in this first sense and favour equivalent (sometimes equally Pāṇinian) terms, such as *ājñā*, *praiṣa* or *preṣaṇa*. 2. In the most widely and anciently accepted classification of Vedic sentences into *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*, a *vidhi* (syn. *codanā*) is a kind of *brāhmaṇa*, namely the direct "injunction" of a particular ritual act. 3. In a more technical sense, already found in Kumārila's work (see David 2012), *vidhi* is the cause of human activity (*pravṛttihetu* or *pravartaka*), especially when it is the result of a speaker's utterance, regardless of its being a particular speech-unit (*śabda*), its operation (*vyāpāra*) or a particular meaning (*artha*). On the identification of *vidhi* with *pravṛttihetu*, see for instance ViV 1 (*Vṛtti* [S 66.1–70.1 – quoted below]) and VAMV

take activities if and only if they know that their action will lead to an expected good.[7] This evaluative principle of action is claimed to provide a universal explanation for human activity, regardless of its being the result of an independent reflection on the part of the agent or the response to a speaker's utterance such as a command, a request, etc., in the context of an inter-subjective or collective action. Correlatively, this property of actions is also considered to be a specific meaning (*artha*)[8] conveyed by verbal suffixes present in

2.3–4ab (p. 419.10–11: *śabda eva pravṛttihetubhūto vidhiḥ, tadvyāpāro vā* ...). See also Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's definition of *vidhi* in the fifth *āhnika* of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (*vidher lakṣaṇam etāvad apravṛttapravartanam* /; "the distinctive characteristic of *vidhi* amounts to this, that it induces the activity of [someone who is still] inactive" [vol. 2, p. 92]), obviously a paraphrase of the *Brahmasiddhi* (p. 116.17: [...] *tasyā apravṛttapravar tanālakṣaṇatvāt*). I have chosen not to translate the term *vidhi* when it is used in this third sense, as it is clearly the case in the title of Maṇḍana's work or in that of later works concerned with the same topic and closely dependent on the ViV, like Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Vidhinirṇaya* or the *Vidhivāda* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A work such as Appayya Dīkṣita's *Vidhirasāyana*, on the other hand, is a discussion of different categories of injunctions (*vidhi*, in the second sense) and as such lies, to a large extent, outside the intellectual tradition inaugurated by Maṇḍana's treatise.

[7] I am using the expression "rational being" as an equivalent of the Sanskrit term *prekṣāvant*, denoting an individual who is capable of undertaking an action on the basis of a reflection on the goals he wishes to accomplish and on the means to achieve them. See Biardeau 1969: 83, who appropriately paraphrases the Sanskrit term *prekṣā* as "un regard porté en avant et en fonction duquel l'action sera déterminée." The importance of this concept in Maṇḍana's system was rightly pointed out by M. Biardeau, but her claim (*ibid.*) that the use of this term is specific to him is certainly an exaggeration. On *prekṣāvant* and related terms denoting (practically) rational agents/persons, see V. Eltschinger's contribution in the present volume.

[8] The Sanskrit word *artha*, when it is used in Mīmāṃsaka or Vedāntic texts, is often advantageously translated by the English word "object," for in the case of nouns like *ghaṭa* ("pot") for instance it always refers to the pot itself or to the corresponding universal ("pot-ness"), none of which is, strictly speaking, the "meaning" of this word: "le terme sanskrit *artha* ne désigne jamais autre chose dans la Mīmāṃsā que l'objet

injunctive sentences, such as the optative (*liṅ*) and imperative (*loṭ*) endings, or suffixes involved in the derivation of gerundives (*kṛtya*).[9] For instance, in an imperative sentence such as *gām ānaya* ("Bring the cow!"), the function of the imperative is, according to this theory, to indicate that the specific action referred to by the verbal root (the bringing of a cow) is the means for realizing (*sādhana*) a desired end (which, in that particular case, can only be supplied).

Prescriptions found in religious texts (Maṇḍana discusses mostly, if not exclusively, Vedic examples) are no exception to this general scheme, their elements being understood, according to an old exegetic principle already found in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*, along the lines of worldly usage.[10] Hence, a Vedic injunction such as the archetypal *svargakāmo yajeta* ("Let him who desires heaven sacrifice!") should be interpreted, just like its worldly counterpart, as indicating the existence of a causal relationship between a certain means (*sādhana*) – the sacrifice, expressed by the verbal root √*yaj* – and its expected result (*sādhya*), a relationship which, when this result or "fruit" (*phala*) is a desired one (*iṣṭa*/*samīhita*), alone justifies the actual undertaking of the prescribed sacrifice. This analysis clearly

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lui-même en tant que perçu et non une idée de l'objet" (Biardeau 1964: 161). In the context of Maṇḍana's thought, I nonetheless prefer to keep the more general translation "meaning," insofar as the word *artha* is used by him to refer to any kind of import of a word or a sentence, be it the "thing-meant" (Brough 1951: 29 [n. 1]) in the case of nouns, or the particular intention of a speaker, i.e. what is "meant" by him while uttering a certain word or sentence. This nuance does not fundamentally invalidate M. Biardeau's remark, since, for a Mīmāṃsaka like Maṇḍana, speech is in any case directly related to entities of both kinds (things-meant and intentions), and not to the corresponding idea.

[9] These three categories of suffixes, to which the Vedic *leṭ* is sometimes added, are generally summed up in the compound *liṅādi* ("[Suffixes] such as *liṅ*") often used without further precision or analysis.

[10] See *Śābarabhāṣya* 1.3.30 (*lokaveda*°): *ya eva laukikāḥ śabdāḥ, ta eva vaidikāḥ, ta evaiṣām arthāḥ*; "The [words] of the Veda are the same as the words of ordinary [Sanskrit]; [hence,] their objects must [also] be the same" (A_2 231.6–232.1). Similar statements are found elsewhere in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*. See Kataoka 2011$_2$: 441–442 (n. 564).

involves the presupposition that each and every act prescribed in the Veda, including perpetual (*nitya*) and occasional (*naimittika*) rites, could be linked with a desired fruit, a presupposition that is not shared by all Mīmāṃsakas.[11]

The general idea lying at the heart of Maṇḍana's analysis is certainly not entirely new within Mīmāṃsā around that time. His great predecessor, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600–650?), states more than once in his work that the specific teaching of an injunction (*codanā*) indicates the causal relationship between an action and its expected result. As he writes in the *Ślokavārttika*: "a relationship between what is to be accomplished and the means of accomplishing [it] is [what is] made known by an injunction" (*sādhyasādhanasambandh*[*o*] *vidhinā pratipādit*[*aḥ*]).[12] Nonetheless, the characterization of *iṣṭasādhanatā* as the specific object of injunctive suffixes (*liṅ*, *loṭ* and the *kṛtya*s), the consequent identification of the knowledge of this property as the instrument (*karaṇa*) of "verbal effectuation" (*śabdabhāvanā* or *abhidhābhāvanā*),[13] as well as the project of a general explanation of

[11] See VAMV 2.30 (p. 445.1–7). See also Stcherbatsky 1926 and Nakamura 1994.

[12] *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) *k.* 220ab (text in Kataoka 2011_1: 50; translation in Kataoka 2011_2: 472 [I am slightly altering the syntax of Kumārila's verse]). At the beginning of the *codanā*-section of his *Ślokavārttika* (*k.* 14ab), in a passage which is quoted by Maṇḍana in the ViV (T 224.2–3), Kumārila similarly states that the specific teaching of the Veda is, according to him, that substances, actions and qualities constituting the sacrifice are "means of accomplishing the supreme" (*śreyaḥsādhana*) (see Kataoka 2011_2: 206–209). The same idea is repeated in *k.* 190–191 of the same section, where Kumārila explicitly identifies "that which brings about the supreme" (*śreyaskara*) with *dharma* (see Kataoka 2011_2: 440–441).

[13] I have emphasized elsewhere (see David 2012) the relative obscurity of the concept of *vidhi* in the framework of Kumārila's theory of verbal effectuation as exposed in the "chapter on *arthavāda*s" (*arthavādādhikaraṇa*) of the *Tantravārttika* (under *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.7). It seems highly plausible that the ViV was initially written by Maṇḍana with the overt intention to dispel such an obscurity by a thorough examination of the concept of *vidhi*. If this hypothesis is correct, one can directly correlate Kumārila's statement in the *Tantravārttika* (A_2 12.25) according

human activity on this basis, are undoubtedly Maṇḍana's own original contribution, and were clearly recognized as such by the later tradition.

Nonetheless, if nearly all major Mīmāṃsakas writing after the 7th century extensively discussed Maṇḍana's position, all of them did not, by far, adhere to it. As one might expect, Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas from Śālikanātha onwards unanimously rejected it,[14] but more surprisingly, even within the Bhāṭṭa-tradition, the ideas of Kumārila's most skilled disciple failed to reach full consensus, and remained unfailingly attached to his name throughout the history of the school.[15] If some Mīmāṃsakas like Āpadeva (early 17th century?) showed no overt hostility towards his ideas,[16] others, like Someśvara Bhaṭṭa (12th century?) and Khaṇḍadeva himself, explicitly refuted them.[17] It is not even sure whether Pārthasārathi Miśra

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to which the instrument of verbal effectuation is "the consciousness of *vidhi*, dependent on the prior knowledge of a relationship [between a verbal element and its object]" (*pūrvasambandhānubhavāpekṣa*[*ṃ*] *vidhivijñāna*[*m*]), with the inaugural statement of the ViV (*Vṛtti* on *k.* 1): *sa khalu śabdabhedo vā liṅādis tadvyāpārātiśayo vā pravṛttihetur upeyate 'rthabhedo vā, yadabhidhānāc chabdo 'pi tathā vyapadeśyaḥ*; "Sure enough, this [= *vidhi*] is either a particular speech-[unit], [namely] *liṅ*, etc., or a specific operation of this [speech-unit], accepted to be the cause of [an agent's] activity, or else a particular meaning, by the expression of which the [corresponding] speech-[unit] would also deserve to be called [*vidhi*]" (S 66.1–70.1 [≈ T 4.1–2]).

[14] Maṇḍana's opinion is reported in Śālikanātha's *Vṛtti* on VAM 2.5–6 (p. 427.15–428.5). A detailed refutation is found in VAM and VAMV 2.7–9 (p. 428.6–430.6).

[15] See for instance Khaṇḍadeva's statement in the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*: *iṣṭasādhanatvam eva pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vede liṅādyartha iti maṇḍanamiśrāḥ*; "[The opinion according to which] the quality of being a means for realizing a desired [end], in the form of an impelling, is the meaning of *liṅ* and other [injunctive suffixes occurring] in the Veda, is [known to be] Maṇḍana Miśra's" (p. 16.13–14).

[16] See *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (§ 368–382) in Edgerton 1986: 179–185.

[17] See Someśvara's *Nyāyasudhā* 1.2.7 (p. 64.14–66.16) and the *Bhāṭṭarahasya* (p. 16.17–17.4), where Khaṇḍadeva mentions Someśvara by

(1050–1120?[18]), traditionally considered as a supporter of Maṇḍana's thesis, held an absolutely consistent position on this topic.[19]

In sharp contrast to the very limited success of Maṇḍana's ideas within the line of thought directly claiming Kumārila's heritage, his thesis quickly became the standard view of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, better known as Vedānta, at least in its "non dualistic" (*advaita*) trend of which Maṇḍana is a major exponent. If Śaṅkara does not seem to have been aware of it,[20] Sureśvara (8th century?) supports the

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name. On Someśvara, see also Edgerton 1986: 179–182.

[18] See Verpoorten 1987: 41.

[19] In his independent treatise on *vidhi*, the *Vidhinirṇaya*, Pārthasārathi unequivocally supports Maṇḍana's thesis against Śālikanātha. See *Vidhinirṇaya k.* 2: *na kāryāvagatiḥ kvāpi pravṛtteḥ kāraṇaṃ matā | kartur iṣṭābhyupāyatvabodhāt sā sarvadā yataḥ ||*; "The knowledge of an obligation is never accepted to be the cause of an activity, for this [activity] always [arises] because the agent knows [the action] to be the means for realizing what [he] desires" (p. 41.6–7). It is on the basis of this work that Edgerton (1986: 182 [n. 242]) identified the holders of the second explanation of verbal effectuation (*śabdabhāvanā*) in Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* as "the school of Pārthasārathi Miśra." In the *Bhāṭṭarahasya* (p. 16.14–16), however, Khaṇḍadeva expresses a different opinion. He confronts Maṇḍana and Pārthasārathi (both mentioned by name) and rather considers the author of the *Śāstradīpikā* as an upholder of the interpretation of *vidhi* as *abhidhā* ("expression"), taken into consideration but rejected in ViV 4: *liṅādiniṣṭhaśakter evābhidhākhyāyāḥ … liṅvācyatvaṃ parikalpya tajjñānasya pravṛttiṃ prati kāraṇatvamātraṃ kalpyata iti tu pārthasārathiḥ*; "But Pārthasārathi [thinks as follows:] having supposed that the [expressive] power abiding in *liṅ*, called 'expression' … is [itself] expressed by *liṅ*, one [should also] suppose that the knowledge of this [operation] is the only cause of an activity" (p. 31). A closer examination of Pārthasārathi's works, especially the *Śāstradīpikā*, would be necessary to identify Khaṇḍadeva's exact source and to decide what Pārthasārathi's final position might have been.

[20] W. Halbfass's claim that "Śaṅkara may be called the most radical advocate of the *iṣṭasādhanatā* interpretation of the Vedic injunctions" (Halbfass 1992: 153) thus seems to be largely anachronistic, since not a single reference to this view can be found in his work.

iṣṭasādhanatā-theory in the introductory part of his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika.*[21] More significantly, an elaborate defence of Maṇḍana's thesis against Śālikanātha's attacks is found in Prakāśātman's *Śābdanirṇaya*, probably written towards the end of the 10th century.[22] Prakāśātman's stance is perpetuated by his most direct successor within Advaita-Vedānta, Ānandabodha (11th century?), both in the corresponding parts of his commentary on the *Śābdanirṇaya*, the *Nyāyadīpikā*,[23] and in an independent treatise, the famous *Nyāyamakaranda*.[24] Jñānaghana, whose date is still uncertain,[25] advocates this thesis in the tenth *prakaraṇa* of his *Tattvaśuddhi*,[26] and the same position is again advocated in the 13th/14th century in the

[21] See *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* (*sambandha*°) *k.* 637–638 (p. 128.2–3), quoted below (see fn. 100). It is not the place here to discuss the much debated hypothesis of Maṇḍana's "conversion" to Advaita under the name of Sureśvara (for a bibliography on this vexed question, see Thrasher 1993: 155–156), against which decisive arguments have already been brought by Hiriyanna 1923/24 and Kuppuswami Sastri 1937. Various attempts to rehabilitate this theory have been made since then (e.g. Balasubramanian 1983: 11–42), that fail to bring, as far as I can see, any further positive evidence in favour of their identity.

[22] See *Śābdanirṇaya k.* 52–61 (p. 43–63). A complete French translation of this work, along with a new edition of Ānandabodha's commentary, is currently under preparation as part of my doctoral dissertation (David [forthcoming]).

[23] See *Nyāyadīpikā* ad *Śābdanirṇaya k.* 52–61 (p. 325–371).

[24] See *Nyāyamakaranda* p. 179–257.

[25] Both Thangaswami 1980: 344 and Potter 2006: 163–164 estimate that Jñānaghana lived around 1000 on the basis of arguments put forth in Srikantha Sastri 1938. I shall demonstrate elsewhere the weakness of the evidence provided by this last author for such a determination of Jñānaghana's date.

[26] See *Tattvaśuddhi* p. 44–46. For a summary of this section, see Potter 2006: 197–200.

works of Citsukha[27] and Ānandapūrṇa (*alias* Vidyāsāgara),[28] both commentators of Maṇḍana's work.

This article is a first attempt at explaining this remarkable though largely unnoticed historical fact,[29] by a close examination of a few selected portions of the ViV (especially *k.* 26–28 and their *Vṛtti*) and of the corresponding parts of Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā* ("A drop of reasoning," henceforth NK), the only preserved commentary thereon.[30]

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[27] See *Tattvapradīpikā* p. 91–105.

[28] See *Nyāyacandrikā* 1.30–32 and *Vṛtti* thereon (p. 223–231).

[29] Although I hold the preponderance of Maṇḍana's thesis of *iṣṭasādhanatā* in Advaita literature in comparison with the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka tradition as highly significant, I am aware that many factors may contribute to artificially exaggerate this disproportion. First of all, our knowledge of the history of Mīmāṃsā is still very deficient, and many texts are still awaiting publication, let alone a serious examination of their contents. Moreover, a close dependency of the above-mentioned Advaitic works on Prakāśātman is particularly obvious in the case of Ānandabodha and Ānandapūrṇa, and is certainly not to be excluded in the case of Jñānaghana and Citsukha, even though further research would be required to gauge its importance.

[30] Modern studies on the ViV are astonishingly scarce given the importance of this text in the history of Indian thought. No translation of it has ever been published in any language whatsoever, including Indian languages and Japanese (Stern 1988: IV acknowledges the borrowing of drafts of a full French translation by M. Biardeau, to which I did not have access). Since E. Frauwallner unfortunately never published the second part of his epoch-making article on Maṇḍana's theory of *bhāvanā* and *vidhi* (Frauwallner 1938), that should have dealt specifically with the ViV, the only available study of this text remains K. Natarajan's meritorious (but very incomplete) monograph (Natarajan 1995). For the *pūrvapakṣa*, I am quoting the ViV and NK in E. Stern's critical edition along with two sub-commentaries by Parameśvara I (Stern 1988 [= S]), which also provides a brief summary of the contents of the ViV (Stern 1988: 16–45). Since the present study is mainly concerned with Maṇḍana's *siddhānta*, I am generally quoting the ViV in Mahāprabhulāl Gosvāmī's edition (Benares, Tārā Publications, 1978 [= T]). Variant readings from the *editio princeps* (Benares, reprint from "The Pandit," 1907 [= P]) are added for all translated passages.

My main hypothesis is that the core of Maṇḍana's contribution while formulating his theory of action and injunction is to achieve a *depersonalization* of injunctive discourse, as opposed to the theory of injunction elaborated by the grammarians of his time (maybe directly against Bhartṛhari), and a consequent *reduction* of this kind of discourse to a particular instance of descriptive discourse, conveying a necessary causal link between certain classes of entities – actions, substances and qualities –, the affirmation of which might be true or false. In the following pages, I will also try to show how these two radical innovations, without any prejudice of their theoretical value, directly served an *apologetic* as well as *exegetical* purpose: to inscribe the Mīmāṃsaka thesis of the Veda's impersonality (*apauruṣeyatā*) into linguistics, and to pave the way for a specifically Vedāntic interpretation of the nature and object of the Vedic *corpus* as a whole.

Maṇḍana's reinterpretation of upadeśa in ViV 27

Maṇḍana developed his explanation of human activity on two occasions in his work: once in the ViV, of which it forms the main topic, and once in the second book of his presumably later *Brahmasiddhi* ("A proof of *Brahman*," henceforth BS),[31] traditionally known as the *Niyogak*[*āṇḍa*] ("The section on *niyoga*").[32] In the architecture of the

[31] The order of succession of the ViV and the BS can be fixed with relative certainty from the explicit reference to the former in the latter, as already noticed by Vetter 1969: 16 and Thrasher 1993: 130. See BS p. 117.6–8 and p. 118.14–15. One sentence of the ViV (T 327.8) is directly quoted in the BS (p. 116.9–10). On the general chronology of Maṇḍana's work, see especially Thrasher 1993: 129–133.

[32] See BS 2.101–104 (*Vṛtti*) p. 116.17–118.14. This passage has been translated into French by M. Biardeau as part of her full French translation of the BS (Biardeau 1969). Since its first edition by S. Kuppuswami Sastri in 1937, the BS has generally been believed to be a work in four chapters (the so-called *Brahma*°, *Tarka*°, *Niyoga*° and *Siddhikāṇḍa*s). This general structure of the work is accepted in most classical studies on the BS (see e.g. Biardeau 1969, Vetter 1969, Balasubramanian 1983 and Thrasher 1993) and it is also admitted by all Indian commentators with the exception of the oldest one, Vācaspati Miśra

Niyogak°, the concerned passage occurs at the beginning of Maṇḍana's examination of the possibility, for a knowledge consisting of a

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(9th–10th century). The recent discovery of Vācaspati's *Tattvasamīkṣā* in a Nepalese manuscript by D. Acharya and his subsequent critical edition of the preserved part of the text (Acharya 2006) allow a complete reconsideration of the problem of the construction of Maṇḍana's work with respect to older accounts such as Balasubramanian 1983: 4–5. In his introduction (see Acharya 2006: XXXIII–XXXV), the editor convincingly argues for a three-fold division of the BS, a first section grouping the first two "*kāṇḍa*s" of the *editio princeps* into one single chapter (named by him *prathamakāṇḍaḥ* without any further title). His main arguments are based on Vācaspati's commentary: 1. the absence of a colophon in the manuscript of the *Tattvasamīkṣā* at the end of the so-called *Brahmakāṇḍa*; 2. the mention of the *Niyogakāṇḍa* as "the second section" (*dvitīya*[*ḥ*] *kāṇḍa*[*ḥ*]) of the work by Vācaspati himself (see *Tattvasamīkṣā* p. 153.1: *dvitīyaṃ kāṇḍam āripsuḥ* ...). Hence, the fact that Vācaspati, at least, considered as one single *kāṇḍa* what was to become the first two sections of the BS in S. Kuppuswami Sastri's edition seems to be beyond doubt in the light of this new evidence. Two further arguments, based on Maṇḍana's own text, confirm that this structure must have been the original one: 3. the presence of a concluding verse at the end of all *kāṇḍa*s except the "*Brahmakāṇḍa*;" 4. the correlative presence of introductory remarks at the beginning of all *kāṇḍa*s except the "*Tarkakāṇḍa*." It is thus plausible, as D. Acharya himself suggests (p. XXXV), that the four-fold division of the *Brahmasūtra* as interpreted by Śaṅkara into *Samanvaya*°, *Avirodha*°, *Sādhana*° and *Siddhyadhyāya*s was superimposed on the original structure of the BS, a major discrepancy being the very existence of the third *kāṇḍa*, by far the largest (183 *kārikā*s out of 231), which does not consider primarily the "means" (*sādhana*) towards liberation, but the possibility for these means to be the object of an injunction. The evidence put forward by D. Acharya makes it possible to look at the BS as a treatise having, as Maṇḍana himself repeatedly underlines, an essentially exegetical purpose, namely the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the sentences of the Vedānta (*vedāntavākya*), considered under three different aspects successively taken up in the three *kāṇḍa*s: 1. the congruency of an understanding of *vedāntavākya*s in their primary sense with other means of knowledge (*śrutārthaparigrahe prāmāṇyam*); 2. their capacity to make an existent object known (*bhūtārthe prāmāṇyam*); 3. their validity in general (*prāmāṇyam eva*).

direct perception (*sākṣātkaraṇa*), to be the object of an injunction.[33] The connection between both themes in the BS is certainly not adventitious, as it becomes manifest from a comparison with the ViV, where the discussion that was to become the main topic of the *Niyogak*° – the possibility of an injunction to know (*pratipattividhi*) – is taken up by Maṇḍana in his auto-commentary (*Svavṛtti*) on *k.* 29.[34] Both works are essentially concordant with each other in what regards Maṇḍana's theory of action,[35] the shorter exposition of the BS being, for the most part, a summary of the ViV. I will hence concentrate on the earlier exposition of the ViV, and only occasionally have recourse to the BS, whenever it allows a better understanding of the arguments.[36]

Maṇḍana begins the section of the ViV identified by Vācaspati as his *siddhānta*,[37] from *k.* 26 onwards, with a reflection on the concept

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[33] In the *Niyogak*°, Maṇḍana successively considers the possibility that three kinds of knowledge could be achieved as the result of an injunction to know (*pratipattividhi*), which constitute three stages in the Advaitic path to liberation: a cognition arising from speech (*śabdāt pratipattiḥ*), i.e. verbal knowledge obtained through the study of the Veda, a cognition consisting of the continuous flow of such cognitions (*tatsaṃtānavatī pratipattiḥ*), diversely named *dhyāna* ("meditation"), *bhāvanā* ("cultivation") or *upāsanā* ("contemplation"), and finally a cognition consisting of a direct perception (*sākṣātkaraṇarūpā pratipattiḥ*). On the distinction between these three kinds of knowledge, see BS 2.1 (*Vṛtti* – introduction) p. 74.10–13.

[34] T 192.4–202.3 (= P 269.4–283.6).

[35] This was already pointed out by M. Biardeau, who rightly insists on the fact that the ViV and the BS should be read "dans la perspective d'un même système" (Biardeau 1969: 86). This clearly goes against the traditionally accepted division of Maṇḍana's work into "Mīmāṃsaka" and "Vedāntic" works. See e.g. Balasubramanian 1983: 14–17 and Thrasher 1993: VIII, who nonetheless acknowledges that "the consistency of Maṇḍana's doctrine is visible even in those works which are not on Vedānta" (*ibid.*).

[36] A preliminary study of ViV 26–28 will be found in Natarajan 1995: 63–76.

[37] See NK ad ViV 26: *siddhāntam upakramate – ucyate* "[With the words]

of *upadeśa* ("instruction").[38] This term is of particular importance for the tradition of Vedic exegesis. It is already used in the fifth *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* to designate the instruction by sacred texts, which is, according to Mīmāṃsakas at least since the time of Śabara,[39] the only source of our knowledge of *dharma*: … *tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ* …; "the [cause of our] knowledge of it [= *dharma*] [is] the instruction [given by the Veda]."[40] Surprisingly enough, Śabara defines *upadeśa*

'[we] reply,' he begins [the exposition of] the accepted view" (T 169.20 [= P 238.8]).

[38] On the early history of the term *upadeśa*, see Oberhammer & al. 1996: 33–36 (*sub voce*). The range of meanings covered by this term is too wide to be rendered by a single English word. It encompasses all kinds of (worldly or religious) "instruction" or "teaching," but also simple "indication" or "advice." In any case, the practical aspect of the teaching referred to by the term *upadeśa* was apparently prevalent (although not exclusive) since its oldest occurrences, as for instance in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (15.1): *evaṃ vartitavyam ity upadeśaḥ*; "*upadeśa* is [the statement] that one should behave in such and such a manner" (quoted in Oberhammer & al 1996: 33–34, who quote a similar statement from the *Suśrutasaṃhitā*).

[39] See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2 (*codanā*°): *aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt*; "For a human being cannot cognize that [heaven arises from the Agnihotra offering] without [resorting to] a [Vedic] statement" (F 18.5–6; translation in Kataoka 2011_2: 320 [n. 355]).

[40] *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (*autpattika*°). The full text of the *sūtra* is as follows: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas* ***tasya jñānam upadeśo*** *'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe, tat pramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasya, anapekṣatvāt* (text and punctuation according to Frauwallner 1968: 22–24). This *sūtra*, especially its syntax, can be interpreted in more than one way. This is Frauwallner's rendering of the aphorism: "Die naturgegebene Verknüpfung des Wortes mit dem Gegenstand ist vielmehr **dessen Erkenntnis(ursache),** (**denn sie ist**) **Belehrung** und kein Fehlgehen – bei einem nicht wahrgenommenen Gegenstand; und dies ist nach Bādarāyaṇa Erkenntnismittel, weil es unabhängig ist" (Frauwallner 1968: 23–25). Maṇḍana seems to understand the syntax of the *sūtra* in a slightly different way, since the fragment *tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ* is quoted independently in the ViV (T 171.2 [= P 240.3–4]). A similar choice is made by G. Oberhammer, E. Prets and J. Prandstetter in their rendering of this *sūtra*: "Die Verknüpfung des Wortes

in his commentary on this *sūtra* in a comparatively vague way: *upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasyoccāraṇam*; "Instruction is the utterance of a determinate speech-[unit]."[41]

The obvious difficulty of Śabara's definition, which is not commented upon by Kumārila in the corresponding part of the *Ślokavārttika*,[42] is his ambiguous use of the adjective *viśiṣṭa* ("determinate"). Does he mean by this that the uttered sentence (or group of sentences) called *upadeśa* should be different from any other sentence? Then, this is true of each and every sentence. Or does he mean that it should be different from other kinds of sentences because it possesses a particular characteristic? But then, what is this characteristic? If it pertains to speech itself, how come someone who does not know the concerned language does not act after hearing such a sentence? Maṇḍana's answer to these questions is found in the first half of ViV 27:

> [Speech] is "determinate" when it states the means for realizing a pure goal of men.[43]

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mit dem Gegenstand aber ist naturgegeben. **Die ihr** [**entsprechende**] **Erkenntnis ist** im Falle eines nicht wahrnehmbaren Gegenstandes ***upadeśa*** und geht nicht fehl; und dies ist nach Bādarāyaṇa Erkenntnismittel, weil es [von anderem] unabhängig ist" (Oberhammer & al. 1996: 35). Both interpretations of the *sūtra* appear to me as equally possible, and the fact that the second one is favoured by Maṇḍana does not prove by any means that it is closer to the *sūtrakāra*'s intention. Frauwallner's rendering comes closer to Śabara's *Bhāṣya*, as does his understanding of *jñāna* as **jñānanimitta* ("[the cause of] knowledge"). See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (F 24.3–7).

[41] *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (*autpattika*°) (F 24.7).

[42] Kumārila simply identifies the three terms *vidhi*, *codanā* and *upadeśa*. See *Ślokavārttika* (*autpattika*°) *k.* 11cd: *codanā copadeśaś ca vidhiś caikārthavācinaḥ* //; "[The words] *codanā*, *upadeśa* and *vidhi* refer to one and the same object[, namely injunction]" (p. 151).

[43] ViV 27ab: *viśiṣṭaḥ puruṣārthasya śuddhasyopāyam āha yaḥ* / (T 171.5 [= P 240.8]). The exact meaning of *śuddha* ("pure") in this verse is uncertain. This term is not commented upon by Maṇḍana in the *Vṛtti*. According to Vācaspati's commentary, the adjective *śuddha* would be used by Maṇḍana to refer to the fact that the means of realization is of use only

The same idea is further explained in the corresponding *Vṛtti*:

> A speech-[unit, i.e. a sentence or group of sentences] is said to be "determinate," because of its excellence, when it conveys the means for realizing a goal of men, [hitherto] unknown. Otherwise, each and every speech-[unit] being distinct from another speech-[unit], [the word *viśiṣṭa* used in Śabara's definition] would just fail to be a determinant. Therefore, someone who does not know the meaning [of the uttered words] will not undertake [any action].[44]

As Vācaspati rightly points out, Maṇḍana's last remark is allowed by the fact that the sentence or group of sentences defined as an *upadeśa* is not specified in its mere phonic form (by which it closely resem-

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to the enjoined person (*niyojya*), not to the person who enjoins (*niyoktṛ*). See NK ad ViV 27: *śuddhasyeti niyojyārthasyaiva, na niyoktrarthasyety arthaḥ*; "[The word] 'pure' means that [the goal of men for which *upadeśa* teaches the means is] for the sake of the enjoined [person] only, not for the sake of the [person] who enjoins" (T 172.22 [= P 242.14]). In spite of Vācaspati's opinion, I do not hold a moral connotation of the term *śuddha* as too implausible. In his *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsutra* 1.1.2, Śabara differentiates ritual acts leading to something desirable (*artha*) for the sacrificer, like the Jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice, etc., from those leading him to an evil, i.e. to something undesired (*anartha*), like the Śyena-sacrifice, etc., and does not deny the existence of a Vedic teaching (*upadeśa*) concerned with the second category of sacrifice. See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2 (F 20.17–18 [quoted below]). However, as we will see later on, Śabara does *not* accept such harmful sacrifices to be taught by the Veda as something that "ought to be done" (*kartavya*) (F 20.17). A further problem for Maṇḍana is, however, that he himself denies, in ViV 32, the existence of any substantial difference between the idea that an action ought to be done (*kartavyam iti*) and the idea of this action as being the means for realizing a desired end (*iṣṭasādhanatā*). Obviously enough, this denial potentially invalidates Śabara's distinction concerning the Śyena-sacrifice. It is thus not impossible that Maṇḍana uses the term *śuddha* in order to exclude harmful acts such as the Śyena-sacrifice from Śabara's definition of *upadeśa*.

[44] ViV 27 (*Vṛtti*): *puruṣārthasyopāyam anavagatam avagamayann utkarṣād viśiṣṭaḥ śabda uktaḥ. anyathā sarva eva śabdaḥ śabdāntarād bhinna*[a] *ity aviśeṣaṇam eva syāt. ato nāviditārthasya pravṛttiḥ* (T 171.7–172.1 [= P 241.1–4]).

[a] *bhinnaḥ* ViV_{T+P} : *bhidyate* NK_{T+P}.

bles any other verbal utterance), but only inasmuch as it expresses a particular meaning (*artha*), namely the fact that the action which is taught is the means for realizing a goal that is desired by human beings.[45] The fact that speakers of Sanskrit sometimes designate this meaning itself by the word *upadeśa* is not an objection against this state of fact, but rather the consequence of the breadth of usages of this word in ordinary language. Just as the English word "teaching" is used, in some situations, to designate a sentence or group of sentences uttered by a teacher and, in other cases, to refer to the content of his/her teaching (that which is taught), to the operation by which a teaching is taught, or to the particular speech-act that is performed by the teacher, so the Sanskrit word *upadeśa* is used, according to the will of the speaker, to designate a verbal unit (*śabda*), its meaning (*artha*), the expressive operation (*abhidhā*) by which it is conveyed or the utterance (*uccāraṇa*) of this determinate speech-unit:

> And this [= Śabara's definition of *upadeśa* in the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*] is meant as a [mere] indication. Therefore, the word *upadeśa* ("instruction") [might] express a [certain] meaning, the [corresponding] speech-[unit], [its] expressive [operation], [its] utterance [by a speaker], etc., or else knowledge,[46] depending on which factor of action [is insisted upon]

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[45] NK ad ViV 27: *yataś cārthaviśeṣeṇopadeśatā śabdasya, tasya ca nānavagatasaṅgatinā puruṣeṇa pratītiḥ, ato 'pi vyutpatter apekṣā*; "Moreover, a [certain] speech-[unit] is an 'instruction' inasmuch as it [expresses] a particular meaning, and a person who does not know the relationship [between words and their meaning] does not understand this [meaning]; it is for this reason also that linguistic competency is required [for instruction to produce its effect]" (T 171.26–27 [P 241.11–13]).

[46] The phrase *jñānaṃ ca* is problematic. Both editions (ViV and NK alike) read it in a compound with what precedes (*arthaśabdābhidhoccāraṇādijñānaṃ ca*), but I think it is preferable to read it independently, for it does not correspond to anything in the following list of four "factors of action" (*sādhana*). This reading of the sentence is confirmed by Vācaspati, who clearly considers *jñāna* as a separate import of the word *upadeśa*: *kva cij jñānam – "śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asaṃnikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam" iti*; "Sometimes, [the words *upadeśa* or *vidhi* refer to] knowledge, [as in the passage] 'instruction (*śāstra*) is the knowledge, [born] of the consciousness of a speech-[unit], of an object that is not in contact [with the senses]'" (T 172.7 [= P 241.17–18]). The quote is from Śabara's

– the object (*karman*), the agent (*kartṛ*), the instrument (*karaṇa*)[47] or the process (*bhāva*) –, just like [the word] *preṣaṇa* ("command"), etc., by which one also indicates a meaning, etc., according to his will.[48]

A depersonalization of injunctive discourse

Maṇḍana's first characterization of "instruction" in ViV 26, however, is not based on a consideration of its meaning. It is also quite independent of the technical use of this concept in canonical texts of classical Mīmāṃsā. In the initial portion of his *siddhānta*, Maṇḍana rather attempts to define *upadeśa* on a purely linguistic level, on the basis of the experience of ordinary speakers of Sanskrit. In this perspective, instruction appears as a certain kind of *act* carried out by a speaker while uttering a definite category of injunctive sentences (in the case of Vedic instruction, as an act carried out by the Veda itself), or as the *intention* presupposed by such an act. His main effort is thus to circumscribe the type of pragmatic situations in which such sentences are used, leaving temporarily aside the question of the meaning of their constitutive elements.

His insistence on the dynamic relationship between a speaker involved in instruction and a hearer to whom it is addressed, as well as the stress laid on the particular intentions of a speaker while he uses certain categories of sentences, are quite unique within Mīmāṃsā (and, of course, within Vedānta) at that time, and strongly suggest that he was not addressing an audience exclusively composed of specialists of Vedic exegesis. Rather, one gets the impression from

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Bhāṣya ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (F 32.3).

[47] Even though both editions of the ViV read here *kāraṇa* ("cause"), one should definitely adopt the reading *karaṇa* ("instrument") found in both editions of the NK.

[48] ViV 27 (*Vṛtti*): *pradarśanārthaṃ cedam. ato 'rthaśabdābhidhoccāraṇādi jñānaṃ ca*[a] *karmakartṛkaraṇabhāvasādhanenopadeśaśabdena*[b] *yathāyatham*[c] *ucyate, preṣaṇādivat. tair api hi yathāvivakṣam*[d] *arthādayo nirdiśyante* (T 172.1–3 [= P 241.4–242.1]).

[a]°*uccāraṇādi jñānaṃ ca* emend. : °*uccāraṇādijñānaṃ ca* Edd; [b]°*karaṇa*° NK_{T+P} : °*kāraṇa*° ViV_{T+P}; [c]*yathāyatham* NK_{T+P} : Ø ViV_{T+P}; [d]*yathāvivakṣam* NK_{T+P} : *yathāvivakṣitam* ViV_{T+P}.

this and similar passages that Maṇḍana is trying to justify the point of view of exegesis to a wider circle of intellectuals, by engaging on its own turf with the Pāṇinian tradition of linguistic analysis as represented by its foremost thinker in the 5th century: Bhartṛhari. His most evident and explicit purpose while doing so is to provide a linguistic basis for one of Mīmāṃsā's most fundamental assumptions, the Veda's impersonality (*apauruṣeyatā*), that might appear to thinkers less committed to the cause of Vedic exegesis as a matter of pure philosophical dogma.

In this section of the ViV, instruction is compared to a group of three meanings (*artha*), supposedly encompassing everything a speaker might wish to convey when he utters an injunctive sentence: "command" (*ājñā/praiṣa/preṣaṇa*), "request" (*abhyarthanā/adhyeṣaṇa/adhyeṣaṇā*) and "permission" (*anujñā/abhyanujñā*).[49]

Maṇḍana already mentioned this list of three meanings on two occasions in his work, in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 3 and ViV 5. There, he defined them as three "properties of a speaker" (*prayoktṛdharma*),[50] an expression already used by Bhartṛhari in one place in the *Vākyapadīya*,[51] as "particular intentions" (*abhiprāyātiśaya*) of a speaker, or

[49] On the presumably grammatical origin of this three-fold classification, see below. There is every reason to consider the distinction of these three meanings as an attempt to rationalize the more exhaustive, but less systematic, list of significations found in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See especially A. 3.3.161 (*vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhīṣṭasampraśnaprārthaneṣu liṅ*) and A. 3.3.163 (*praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāś ca*).

[50] It is not impossible, in the context of ViV 5 (quoted below), that the term *prayoktṛ* stands, with the meaning of "instigator," as a synonym of the term *niyoktṛ*, used by Maṇḍana in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 26. The parallel with Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (see following note) and Helārāja's *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (see below), where *prayoktṛ* clearly points to the speaker in general, makes me doubt, however, of this possibility.

[51] See *Vākyapadīya* 3.9.105 (*kāla*°): *āśaṃsyamānatantratvād āśaṃsāyāṃ viparyayaḥ | prayoktṛdharmaḥ śabdārthe śabdair evānuṣajyate ||*; "In the case of expectation the opposite [occurs] because of the predominance of what is wished for. It is only through words [i.e. the linguistic context] that [expectation, which is] a property of the speaker can be associated to the meaning of the expression" (part 2 p. 85 – I thank Vin-

else as "properties of a person" (*puruṣadharma*/*nṛdharma*). His insistence on the *personal* dimension of command, etc., is quite understandable in the context of the *pūrvapakṣa*, where such meanings are mentioned to serve two distinct (though closely related) purposes, namely to deny that operations such as command, etc., could be "operations of speech" (*śabdavyāpāra*) regardless of its speaker (ViV 3)[52] and to contest that the allegedly authorless Veda could convey such "particular meanings" (*arthabheda*) (ViV 5).[53]

The distinction between these three meanings is made, in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 26, along two criteria: 1. Command and request benefit the *speaker* or, in Maṇḍana's favoured terminology, the person who enjoins (*niyoktṛ*), and not the hearer, whose action does not necessarily entail any benefit for himself, while permission clearly benefits the *hearer*, i.e. the person who is enjoined (*niyojya*); 2. Command and request are meant to start a *new* action; in other words, the agent that is commanded or requested is "not [yet engaged] in activity" (*apravṛtta*), while permission simply triggers an action that

cenzo Vergiani, from whom I borrow this translation, for having drawn my attention to this verse). As recently argued by V. Vergiani, it is not impossible that a treatment of *prayoktṛdharma*s occurred in the lost part of Bhartṛhari's *Vṛtti* on the second *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. On the grammatical distinction between meanings that are "properties of a speaker" (*prayoktṛdharma*) and those that are "properties of an expressed [meaning]" (*abhidheyadharma*), see *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 329.6–7.

[52] See ViV 3 (*Vṛtti*): *na hi preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇābhyanujñālakṣaṇaḥ śabdasya prayogo nirūpyate, tasya puruṣadharmatvāt*; "Surely, an operation that would consist of a command, a request or a permission is unthinkable for speech, for such an [operation] is the property of a person" (S 155.3–156.1 [≈ T 12.9–13.1]).

[53] See ViV 5ab: *apauruṣeye praiṣādir nṛdharmo nāvakalpate |*; "Properties of a human being such as command, [request or permission] do not suit the impersonal [Veda]" (S 195.1 [= T 17.6]). See also ViV 5 (*Vṛtti*): *loke hi pratītaḥ preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇābhyanujñālakṣaṇo 'bhiprāyātiśayaḥ prayoktṛdharmo liṅarthaḥ. tasyāpauruṣeyeṣu vedavākyeṣv asambhavaḥ*; "Surely, it is perceived in worldly [usage] that a specific intention or property of a speaker consisting of command, request or permission is the meaning of *liṅ*. Such [an intention] does not occur in impersonal Vedic sentences" (S 195.3–196.1 [= T 18.2–3]).

is already started (or as if started), where the agent is thus "[already engaged] in activity" (*pravṛtta*).[54]

While making this distinction, Maṇḍana apparently introduces only slight modifications and further elaboration into a linguistic theory that is found in grammatical texts of his time.[55] In the *Sādhanasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya* (*k.* 3.7.125–126), Bhartṛhari already considered command (*preṣaṇa*) and request (*adhyeṣaṇa*) as the two main operations of a *hetu* ("causal agent" or "prompter")[56] or, more generally, of an "instigator" (*prayojaka*).[57] The presence of these

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[54] This dimension of permission may not be immediately manifest. One should keep in mind here that an authorization is generally given as the result of a request (be it explicit or implicit) from the agent, who thus already took the firm decision to carry out the action for which he is asking permission, just as he would remove an obstacle standing on his way.

[55] The questions of chronology are here particularly delicate to solve because of the time gap between Bhartṛhari and his commentator, Helārāja. Bhartṛhari is a very frequent interlocutor of Maṇḍana, and is commonly accepted to have lived about one or two centuries before him (see Iyer 1969: 2, who accepts Frauwallner's dating of Bhartṛhari around 450–510), whereas Helārāja is generally considered to have lived in the 10th century (see Iyer 1969: 40 and Vergiani [forthcoming]). However, it is hard to differentiate, in his commentary, what is fully original and what could have been borrowed from an earlier source, like the lost parts of Bhartṛhari's *Vṛtti* to the second *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.

[56] The two terms *preṣaṇa* and *adhyeṣaṇa* are already used by Patañjali in the section of his *Mahābhāṣya* (ad A. 3.1.26: *hetumati ca*) where he discusses the concept of *hetu* (I thank V. Vergiani for this information).

[57] See *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.125: *preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇe kurvaṃs tatsamarthāni cācaran | kartaiva vihitāṃ śāstre hetusaṃjñāṃ prapadyate ||*; "It is indeed an agent, giving an order or making a request or bringing about [the conditions] that are suitable for that [i.e. a given action], who receives the name *hetu* ('causal agent') prescribed in grammar" (p. 326 – V. Vergiani's translation). In *k.* 125, Bhartṛhari speaks only of a *hetu*, and not of an instigator in general. This technical term (*saṃjñā*) does not fit in all cases of instigation (*prayojanā*). For instance, in a sentence formed around a verb in the imperative, the instigator (*prayojaka*), who

two operations justifies, according to him, both the use of the causative (*ṇic*) and of the imperative (*loṭ*), which is also Maṇḍana's main concern in the ViV. In his commentary on this *kārikā*, Helārāja gives additional precision about the difference between the use of the imperative and the use of the causative.[58] He himself proposes two criteria to establish this difference: 1. In a sentence whose verb is in the causative, like the sentence **rāmaḥ kṛṣṇaṃ pācayati* ("Rāma causes Kṛṣṇa to cook"), the instigator (*prayojaka*) who gives the command (Rāma) is *expressed*, along with his command, while in a sentence in the imperative – **paca* ("Cook!") or, to use Helārāja's own example, *pṛcchatu* ("Ask!") – the instigator is *not* expressed, as he is none but the speaker in person;[59] 2. In a sentence making use of the causative, the direct agent (Kṛṣṇa) is mentioned *as being already the agent* of cooking, whereas in the second set of sentences, making use of the imperative, the agency of the person who is instigated is not presupposed; rather, in this last case, the purpose of the speaker while uttering a command is to start a new action, or, in other words, to incite the hearer to *become* an agent.[60] Helārāja's second distinction thus amounts to saying that the agent of a sentence in the causative is expressed as being already "[engaged] in an activity" (*pravṛtta*),

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is none but the speaker himself, does not fall under *hetusaṃjñā*. Nonetheless, his operation is also describable as a command, a request, etc., as Bhartṛhari himself makes clear by distinguishing between the use of the causative and the use of the imperative in *k.* 126 (quoted below – see following note).

[58] See *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 327.19–330.3. The main point of Helārāja's distinction is present *in nuce* in the *Vākyapadīya* itself. See *k.* 3.7.126: *dravyamātrasya tu praiṣe pṛcchyāder loḍ vidhīyate | sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viṣayo ṇicaḥ ||*; "However, when the command is [addressed] to a mere substance, *loṭ* is prescribed after [verbal roots] such as √*prach*-, but when there is prompting of what is [already] possessed with action, that is the domain of [the causative marker] *ṇic*" (p. 329 – V. Vergiani's translation, with a few modifications]). I will however concentrate here on Helārāja's remarks, which offer closer similarity with Maṇḍana's own analysis.

[59] See *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 328.25–329.4.

[60] See *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 328.21–23.

while the person who is instigated by a sentence in the imperative is only *about to* start an action and is thus still inactive or "not [yet engaged] in an activity" (*apravṛtta*).[61]

Nowhere in his work does Maṇḍana reject the overall legitimacy of these or similar distinctions that might have occurred in grammatical texts prior to the time of Helārāja. His analysis of command and request when they are conveyed by an injunction is indeed very close to Bhartṛhari's and Helārāja's determination of the pragmatic conditions in which an imperative mood should be used. The only real discrepancy I can see between Maṇḍana's and Bhartṛhari's understanding of injunctive discourse (apart from the case of *upadeśa*) is Maṇḍana's definition of "permission" (*abhyanujñā*) as the instigation of somebody who is already engaged in an activity, which, following the grammarian's criterion, would forbid the use of the imperative in a sentence such as *kuru yathābhimatam* ("Do whatever you like!"), the agent being already "possessed with action" (*sakriya*).[62]

Nonetheless, one thing he does contest is the pretension of this threefold classification to cover *all* possible meanings of an injunction, for there are indeed pragmatic situations where an action is enjoined by a speaker for the sole benefit of the hearer, even though he is not yet engaged in any kind of activity. A typical example is when we ask our way: "Which way is it to Benares? – Take left!" In this situation, we do not feel either commanded, requested or given permission, but simply "advised" or "instructed." Unlike the person who is waiting for permission, the person who is asking for his/her way cannot already be engaged in an activity precisely because he/

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[61] See *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 329.12–15.

[62] It is noteworthy that this definition of permission is a difficulty even from the point of view of the internal consistency of Maṇḍana's doctrine, as it contradicts his own general definition of *vidhi* as *apravṛtta-pravartanā* ("the activation of [someone who] is not [yet] in activity") in the BS (p. 116.16–17), which apparently denies the relevance of this concept in the case of permission. I cannot see any immediate solution to this problem in Maṇḍana's work or in its commentaries, except if one considers that a sentence expressing permission, unlike a sentence expressing command or request, simply does not express *vidhi.*

she does not know which kind of activity he/she should undertake (should he/she take left or right?). Nonetheless, advice is given for the sake of the hearer, and does not necessarily entail any benefit for the speaker.

Maṇḍana's proposal is thus to add a *fourth* possible meaning of injunctive sentences to the proposed list, which is none but *upadeśa*, redefined on this pragmatic basis. He does so in ViV 26, where his intention to reconcile linguistic analysis with the possibility of an injunction by the authorless Veda, against the argument put forward in ViV 5, is particularly obvious:

> "Instruction" is the instigation [of an agent who] has not started [to act yet] to [undertake] an action for his own sake. It is widespread among teachers and doctors, and even for the eternal [Veda] it is not unconceivable.[63]

The same idea is further explicated in the corresponding *Vṛtti*:

> Truly, command, request and permission cannot be accounted for in the Veda, but instruction is thinkable [even there]. Moreover, [instruction] is acknowledged from worldly [usage] to be a fourth kind of instigation, along with [command, request and permission]. To explain: as we all know, command and request are about an act that is [accomplished] for the sake of the [person] who enjoins, regardless of the fruit [expected by] the [person who is] enjoined, whereas instruction is [done only] for the sake of the [person who is] enjoined. As for permission, it is indeed such[64] in some cases, [but] even then, it is not [identical with] instruction, for it addresses a person who is [already engaged] in an activity, [and] the wise ones call "instruction" the activation [of somebody] who is not [yet engaged] in an activity [when it is] about an action [undertaken by] the [person who is] enjoined for his own sake.[65]

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[63] ViV 26: *upadeśo niyojyārthakarmāprasthitacodanā | prathito guruvaidyādau nitye 'pi na*[a] *na kalpate ||* (T 196.2–3 [= P 238.2]).

[a] *na* ViV_{T+P} NK_P : *ca* NK_T.

[64] That is: "[accomplished] for the sake of the [person who is] enjoined" (*niyojyārtha*).

[65] ViV 26 (*Vṛtti*): *yady apy ājñābhyarthanānujñā*[a] *vede 'nupapannāḥ, upadeśas tu yujyate. so 'pi tadvad eva preraṇātmakaś caturtho loke prajñāyate. tathā hi*: *ājñābhyarthane hi niyoktrartham anādṛtaniyojyapha-*

The criterion applied to justify this fourth value of an injunction is not different from that which probably gave rise to the initial list, namely the subjective linguistic feeling or "perception" (*pratīti*) of the hearers of an injunction, which Maṇḍana illustrates with a wealth of examples and undeniable linguistic insight:

> For [when we hear sentences like] "Bind the cow!," "Please take this child as your student!" [or] "Do whatever you like!" we do not perceive [that they would be pronounced for the sake of] instruction. Correlatively, [when we hear sentences like] "He should wander for alms" or "The sick should eat suitable food" we do not perceive [that they would be pronounced for the sake of] command, [request or permission]. Moreover, [instruction] is repeatedly acknowledged in worldly [usage] without even a hint (*anārūṣita*) of command, etc., as [for instance] in [treatises authored] by a person such as the *Kāma-* and *Arthaśāstra*, and [even] in the words of a cow-herd, etc., [when he says] "Take this path!" intending to show the way. For a [person] of lower condition[66] cannot [afford to give] command, there is no point in making a request for the sake of somebody else and no permission is ever given [to somebody] who is not [yet engaged] in activity.[67]

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laṃ[b] *karma gocarayataḥ. niyojyārthaṃ tūpadeśaḥ. anujñā tu yady apy evaṃ kva cit, tathāpi pravṛttapuruṣaviṣayatvān nopadeśaḥ. niyojyārthakarmagocaram apravṛttapravartanam upadeśam ācakṣate*[c] *dhīrāḥ* (T 169.4–170.3 [= P 238.4–239.2]).

[a]*ājñābhyarthanānujñāḥ* NK_{T+P} : *ājñābhyarthanāḥ* ViV_{T+P}; [b]*anādṛta*° ViV_T NK_T : *anāhata*° ViV_P NK_P; [c]*ācakṣate* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : *ācakṣīte* ViV_P.

[66] Maṇḍana clearly has in mind the situation of the cow-herd showing the way to a prince, for instance.

[67] ViV 26 (*Vṛtti*): *na hi gām abhyāja*[a]*, māṇavakam adhyāpaya, kuru yathābhimatam*[b] *ity upadeśapratītiḥ. nāpi bhaikṣaṃ caret*[c]*, jvaritaḥ pathyam aśnīyād ity ājñādipratītiḥ*[d]*. bhūyasā caiṣa*[e] *pauruṣeyeṣu kāmārthaśāstrādiṣv ājñādibhir anārūṣito loke prajñāyate, gopālādivacaḥsu ca mārgākhyānapareṣv anena pathā gaccheti. na hi hīnasyājñā, anātmārthe*[f] *karmaṇy abhyarthanā, anujñānam apravṛttasya.* (T 170.3–171.1 [= P 239.2–240.2]).

[a]*abhyāja* ViV_{T+P} : *ānaya* NK_{T+P}; [b]°*abhimatam* ViV_{T+P} : °*īhitam* NK_{T+P}; [c]*caret* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : *cet* ViV_P; [d]*ājñādi*° ViV_T NK_{T+P} : Ø ViV_P; [e]*eṣaḥ* ViV_{T+P} NK_P : *eva* NK_T; [f]°*arthe* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : °*ākhye var.*(ViV_T) ViV_P.

Maṇḍana's redefinition of *upadeśa* in ViV 26 thus integrates the possibility of an injunction which does not entail any substantial participation of the speaker, which is consequently fully compatible with the hypothesis of the Veda's impersonal injunction (*codanā*). Hence, while apparently maintaining the theoretical framework elaborated by the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition to account for injunctive discourse, Maṇḍana silently introduces a major exception to the grammarians' conceptualization of injunction as it appears from Helārāja's commentary to the *Vākyapadīya*: even though instruction does entail specific pragmatic characteristics, it does not imply the manifestation – Helārāja speaks here of "suggestion" (*dyotana*), contrasting it with "expression" (*vacana*)[68] – of the speaker (*prayoktṛ*) or of any of his properties to the mind of the hearer, who thus experiences instigation in an impersonal, though unmistakably dynamic, way.[69]

Beyond pragmatics: *Maṇḍana's universalization of iṣṭasādhanatā*

Maṇḍana's exclusion of the speaker from his explanation of instruction could be nothing but a slender modification introduced into a globally accepted linguistic framework. A closer look at his further

[68] See *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 328.25.

[69] Notwithstanding the apologetic use Maṇḍana himself acknowledges for his depersonalized concept of instruction in the context of a defence of the Veda's impersonality, his analysis is not strictly limited to the Vedic domain. As a matter of fact, we do experience injunction in an impersonal way in a host of worldly situations, as rightly pointed out by A. Chakrabarti (commenting on the *Vidhivāda* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, which holds a position very close to Maṇḍana's): "When we come to think of it, we do quite naturally learn from instruction … in printed manuals without bothering to bring in the speaker. … When I read commands (in a manual or a computer screen), I know that I am supposed to remove the lid or press the start key. … Thus the awareness generated by the imperatives doesn't have to bring in the speaker" (Chakrabarti 1992: 429). The distinction between the *practical* necessity of a speaker in the worldly domain and his/her intervention *within the linguistic process*, whose relevance is particularly obvious in such examples, will give rise to important developments in later Vedāntic literature. See for instance *k.* 7 of Prakāśātman's *Śābdanirṇaya* and the author's own *Vṛtti* thereon (p. 3.12–4.15).

elaborations in the ViV is enough, however, to show that this is not the case. In fact, his modification of the grammarians' analysis of injunctive discourse turns out to be only a preliminary step towards its radical subversion.

This becomes clear from the consideration of Maṇḍana's further developments in ViV 27 and 28. There, his attention moves from the pragmatic determination of instruction to the question of its *content* or meaning. As we saw earlier while discussing the evolution of the concept of *upadeśa* in the early tradition of Mīmāṃsā, Maṇḍana first considers the possibility that "being a means for realizing a desired [end]" (*iṣṭasādhanatā*) could be the specific content of an instruction in the context of his interpretation of the adjective *viśiṣṭa* ("determinate") in Śabara's definition of *upadeśa* in the *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5. According to Maṇḍana's understanding of this definition, a sentence is "determinate" (and therefore deserves to be called "instruction") insofar as it teaches the means (*upāya*) to attain a goal of men (*puruṣārtha*) (ViV 27ab). In other words, the specific import conveyed by a speaker when he enunciates a sentence characterized as instruction is the causal link between a certain type of action and a certain kind of expected result. This is clearly the case in all the above-mentioned examples of instruction (the cowherd showing the way indicates direction as the means to reach a certain point in space, the physician teaches how to recover health, etc.), while such a causal link is not so prominent in the case of command or request which, as Maṇḍana repeatedly urges, are not pronounced for the benefit of the person to whom they are addressed (*niyojyārtha*).

By saying so, Maṇḍana does not really depart from the letter of Śabara's text. Some passages in the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* indeed clearly corroborate his interpretation. This is notably the case of Śabara's statements on sacrifices consisting of an evil or "something undesired" (*anartha*), such as the Śyena-sacrifice, resulting in the curse of one's enemy, potentially leading to his death and to the sacrificer's consequent downfall (*pratyavāya*). Describing the Veda's instruction

about this sacrifice in the *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2,[70] Śabara clearly insists on the Veda's teaching the relationship between the object of the sacrificer's desire (*icchā*) – the death of an enemy – and the means (*abhyupāya*) to achieve it: "For the instruction about the [Śyena-sacrifice, etc.,] is [as follows]: for whomever wishes to harm [his enemy by casting a spell on him], this is the means."[71]

The reason why Śabara gives such a description of *upadeśa* in this particular passage is, however, not the will to generalize it to all kinds of Vedic injunctions (let alone to any kind of instruction!) but, precisely, to absolve the Veda from a *positive* prescription of this sacrifice: "Of course, [one should] not understand [by the Veda's injunction] that [sacrifices] such as the Śyena[-sacrifice really] ought to be done (*kartavya*)!"[72] Hence, according to Śabara, the Vedic injunction *śyenenābhicaran yajeta* ("Whoever [wishes to] cast a spell [and thereby cause the death of his enemy] should sacrifice by [means of] the Śyena[-sacrifice]")[73] does not really prescribe such a sacrifice, but merely indicates, in a neutral and "impartial"[74] way, that this is the right way to kill an enemy by sorcery. Śabara's distinction thus clearly points to a substantial difference between the simple *description* of the causal relationship between a certain action and its result

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[70] On this passage, see also Halbfass 1992: 89–90.

[71] *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2: *yo hi hiṃsitum icchet, tasyāyam abhyupāya iti hi teṣām upadeśaḥ* (F 20.17–18).

[72] *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2: *naiva śyenādayaḥ kartavyatayā vijñāyante* (F 20.17). I am not taking into account Kumārila's intentionally unfaithful reading of this passage in the *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°), *k.* 225cd–231ab. See K. Kataoka's illuminating explanation and translation of these verses in Kataoka 2011_2: 162–163 and Kataoka 2011_2: 476–481.

[73] *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* 22.4.13 according to Edgerton 1986: 255 (n. 320) and Frauwallner 1968: 20. Benson 2010: 67 (n. 117) mentions a similar passage in the *Ṣaḍviṃśabrāhmaṇa* (4.2.1–2), that would make the sentence "Vedic" *stricto sensu*, but the phrasing of Śabara's quote is much closer to that which is actually found in Āpastamba's treatise.

[74] See Kataoka 2011_2: 476 (n. 660).

on the one hand, and, on the other, the positive *prescription* of this action by a speaker (or by the Veda itself).

Quite on the opposite, Maṇḍana's final position appears as a complete denegation of the difference between these two levels, and as a simple *reduction* of prescription to description: not only does he consider the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* as the specific content of *all* cases of instruction (including Vedic instruction about beneficial sacrifices, such as the Jyotiṣṭoma); he also extends the causal efficiency of the knowledge of this property to all kinds of behaviour resulting from an injunction (including, as we will see, command, request and permission) and, finally, to any kind of action whatsoever,

> …, for there is no other cause of an activity than [an entity's] being desired (*iṣṭatā*) or [an action's] being the means for realizing it (*tatsādhanatā*).[75]

Correlatively, the role of the speaker uttering an injunction (*vidhātṛ*) is reduced by him to its strict minimum, namely the mere transmission of a piece of information about a means of realization and its relationship to an expected result. This is Maṇḍana's statement in BS 2.104, which mainly reassesses the conclusions of the ViV:

> For the learned ones think that the operation (*vyāpṛti*) of the author of an injunction (*vidhātṛ*) amounts to showing the means for realizing the [expected fruit[76]], [and] hold *vidhi* to be nothing but [the property of] being the means for realizing what [the agent] aspires to.[77]

However appealing such a hypothesis might be in terms of parsimony, still, one is allowed to wonder whether it really accounts for

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[75] BS 2.101–104 (*Vṛtti*): … *iṣṭatāyās tatsādhanatāyāś cānyasya pravṛttihetor abhāvāt* (p. 116.18–19).

[76] *tad* refers, by *anuvṛtti*, to the expected "fruit" (*phala*) explicitly mentioned in BS 2.103cd: *svātmasthitiḥ supraśāntā phalam, tan na vidheḥ padam /*; "The fruit [of the knowledge of reality] is the abiding in one's self, well-appeased, [and] injunction does not set foot on such a [fruit]" (p. 115.9).

[77] BS 2.104: *tatsādhanāvabodhe hi vidhātṛvyāpṛtir matā | apekṣitopāyataiva*[a] *vidhir iṣṭo manīṣibhiḥ //* (p. 115.10–11).

[a] *eva* BS : *iva var.* (BS).

all human activities resulting from an injunction. One could easily object, on the basis of ordinary experience, that Maṇḍana's analysis fails to account for the positive instigation we feel when we hear an injunction. This instigation, which is not completely absent even from a simple advice,[78] is what Indian authors (Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians alike) generally call *pravartanā* ("impelling"), that makes us immediately react to an injunction like "Close the door!" or "Bind the cow!," most of the time without any serious conscious consideration of our desires or of the means to realize them. In fact, it is not the same thing to say to somebody "This medicine is good for your health" and to advise him "You should take this medicine!," even less to command him "Take this medicine!" In the first case, the speaker neutrally states the relationship between a means (the medicine) and its expected result (good health), without committing him/herself into direct advice or command, while such a personal

[78] That instruction (*upadeśa*) itself can have such a nuance of positive instigation in certain contexts is what clearly appears from a passage of Maṇḍana's *Vṛtti* on ViV 11. The hypothesis under consideration in that section of the *pūrvapakṣa* (ViV 9–11) is the equation of *vidhi* with the relationship between an action and an agent (*kriyākartṛsambandha*), which potentially gives rise to an activity when the agent ascertains his/her own relationship with the action through an idea like "This is your task [for] today!" (*adya tavedaṃ karma*). See ViV 9 (*Vṛtti* – introduction), S 279.3–4 (= T 30.1–2). In the course of his refutation of this hypothesis in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 11, Maṇḍana makes the following statement, in which the impelling nature of instruction is clearly put into evidence: *upadeśakaṃ hi śāstram. na cettham upadeśakā yajetetyādayaḥ śabdāḥ. na hy ebhir idaṃ kurv ity upadiśyate, api tu svargakāmāder yāgasambandho 'vagamyate, daṇḍyādiśrutibhir iva daṇḍādisambandhaḥ*; "For Scripture is a source of instruction, and speech-[units] like *yajeta* ('[He] should sacrifice!'), etc., [as you interpret them] are not such sources of instruction. In fact, by these [injunctions] one is not instructed 'Do this!' Rather, one is made to understand the [mere] relationship of a [person] who desires heaven with the sacrifice, just as one would understand by a word like *daṇḍin* ('staff-bearer'), etc., the relationship of [the bearer] with the staff" (S 297.3–6 [≈ T 34.10–35.3]). On the interpretation of the verbal form *avagamyate* as a causative, parallel to *upadiśyate*, see NK: *gamyata iti ṇici rūpam*; "[the verbal form] *gamyate* is [to be taken] in [its] causative form" (S 297.16–17 [= T 35.11–12]).

commitment is at the heart of what is conveyed by the second set of sentences. Following Maṇḍana's hypothesis, these three sentences would be rigorously equivalent as far as their meaning is concerned. It is nonetheless possible (and potentially meaningful) to combine them into a single utterance such as "This medicine is good for your health, you should take it!" This sentence is not only syntactically correct, but also it does not suffer of any redundancy, since the first, descriptive proposition rather states the reason that justifies the subsequent advice or command.[79] In other words, what was secured by the grammarians' pragmatic analysis and what seems to be, on the contrary, completely lost in Maṇḍana's final understanding of injunction, is the dynamic and inter-subjective dimension of speech which is particularly perceptible in the case of injunctive discourse.

It appears, though, from the objection that Maṇḍana himself formulates on the threshold of ViV 28, that he was acutely conscious of these difficulties in his own position:

> [Objection:] Still, while [hearing] *liṅ*, etc., one feels impelled [to undertake an action], and this [feeling] you are brushing aside [when you say

[79] A similar objection, established on the basis of a Vedic example, is actually found in Mīmāṃsaka texts, and might be as old as Someśvara's *Nyāyasudhā*. It is found, again, in Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (§ 368): *yat tv iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ vidhyartha iti, tan na. tathā satīṣṭasādhanam iti śabdasya vidhiśabdaḥ paryāyaḥ syāt. na ca paryāyatvaṃ yujyate, saṃdhyopāsanaṃ ta iṣṭasādhanam, tasmāt tat tvaṃ kurv iti sahaprayogāt, paryāyānāṃ ca sahaprayogābhāvāt*; "It is not true that the indication of an instrument of a desired result is the meaning of the injunction. If that were the case, the [verbal] injunctive expression [the optative or equivalent form] would be a synonym of the word 'instrument of desired result.' And it is impossible that they should be synonyms, because they are used together in the sentence 'The twilight-worship is thy instrument of desired result, therefore perform thou that,' and because synonyms are never used together" (text in Edgerton 1986: 268–269; translation in Edgerton 1986: 179–180).

that] "instruction is the instigation [of an agent who] has not started [to act yet] to [undertake] an action for his own sake"[80]![81]

Impelling (*pravartanā*), isolated by Maṇḍana earlier in the ViV as an invariable (*avyabhicar*[*ita*]) feature of command, request and permission,[82] is thus well-recognized by him as a fundamental datum of our experience as hearers and as agents, even in cases of simple instruction or advice. This, however, does not lead him to renounce his main thesis on the nature of *upadeśa*, but rather encourages him to develop it until its ultimate consequences: what we feel when we hear an injunction and designate as "impelling" is not the specific operation of a speaker; nor is it an obscure potency belonging to speech itself, as many later Mīmāṃsakas will argue.[83] Rather, it is just a certain property (*dharma*) of the action expressed by the verbal root, a "supplement in [its own] nature" (*bhāvātiśaya*)[84] that one is free to

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[80] This is, as one will remember, Maṇḍana's own definition of *upadeśa* in ViV 26ab (see above).

[81] ViV 28 (*Vṛtti* – introduction): *nanu liṅādibhyaḥ pravartanāvagamyate, parāhataṃ cedam upadeśo niyojyārthakarmāprasthitacodaneti*[a] (T 172.6–173.1 [P 242.4–243.1]). [a]°*codanā* $\text{ViV}_{\text{T+P}}$: °*pracodanā* $\text{NK}_{\text{T+P}}$.

[82] See ViV 5 (*Vṛtti* – *pūrvapakṣin*'s discourse): *avyabhicārāt pravartanāmātraṃ loke liṅādyarthaḥ*; "In worldly [usage], mere impelling is the meaning of *liṅ*, etc., for it is invariably [present when *liṅ* is uttered]" (S 203.2–204.1 [= T 19.2]).

[83] On these two hypotheses, see especially Someśvara's *Nyāyasudhā* 1.2.7: *kā punaḥ pravartanā? pravṛttihetubhūtaḥ pravartayitur dharmaḥ kaś cid iti brūmaḥ. … vede tu puruṣābhāvena liṅāder eva pravartakatvāt taddharmo bhaviṣyati*; "But what [do you mean by] 'impelling'? We answer that it is a certain property of the instigator, which causes the [agent's] activity. … In the Veda, however, since there is no personal being [who could be such an instigator], the cause of [an agent's] activity is none but *liṅ*, etc.; hence, [impelling] has to be a property of [suffixes such as *liṅ*]" (p. 64.20–25). The same view is advocated by Āpadeva at the beginning of his *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (§ 4). See Edgerton 1986: 40.

[84] The identity of meaning of both expressions is confirmed by the NK (T 173.26–27 [= P 243.25–244.2]), where Vācaspati glosses *bhāvātiśaya* with the compound *bhāvadharma* ("a property of the nature [of an entity]"). An interpretation of *bhāva* in the sense of "action" is contra-

call its "operation" (*vyāpāra*),[85] knowable by means of speech just as the property of a substance is knowable through sentences like "The lotus is blue" or "The earth is round." The function of speech is then, in all cases, a purely theoretical one, namely to help us recognize a certain property of an entity or, in other words, to teach us *how it really is*. Injunction thus loses most of its specificity with respect to a simple assertion. Its function, similar to that of any other descriptive sentence, is to unveil in the eyes of the hearer to whom it is addressed a hitherto unrecognized[86] relational property of the action

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dicted by Vācaspati's commentary, who illustrates Maṇḍana's use of the expression *bhāvātiśaya* with the example of the contact with the mind (*manaḥsaṃyoga*) which, when it functions as a supplement in the nature of the self (*ātmano bhāvātiśayaḥ*), allows the self to produce determinate ideas (*buddhi*), etc. See NK ad ViV 28 (T 173.26–27). A similar use of the compound *svabhāvātiśaya* is made by Dharmakīrti to designate a presumed property of *mantra*s, which makes them capable of producing an expected result (*phaladāyin*). See *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.295 (*Vṛtti*) in Gnoli 1960: 157 (l. 9). On this passage, see Eltschinger 2001: 93, who translates *svabhāvātiśaya* as "une propriété supplémentaire de [la] nature propre [des *mantra*]." It is on the basis of this parallel that I understand *bhāva* as the "nature" of an entity, and not as the entity itself, which is also a possible interpretation.

[85] The qualification of *iṣṭasādhanatā* as an "operation" (*vyāpāra*) of the action expressed by the verbal root presupposes a considerable broadening of the normal application of the concept of *vyāpāra*, and must have been as disconcerting for the first readers of the ViV as it is to a modern reader of Maṇḍana's work. In the NK, Vācaspati justifies this equation as follows: *na vayaṃ parispandam evaikaṃ vyāpāram ācakṣmahe, yenāspandātmanaḥ samīhitasādhanatāyā apravartanātmatvena paryanuyujyemahi, api tu bhāvadharma eva kaś cit samīhitasādhanānuguṇo vyāpārapadārthaḥ*; "We do not claim that movement is the only [existing] operation; if we did, [you] might indeed contradict [us by saying] that the [property of] being the means for realizing a desired [end] does not consist of a movement, and [thus] cannot be identical with impelling. Rather, [we claim that, in the present case,] the word *vyāpāra* ('operation') only refers to a certain property of the nature [of an entity], which suits the realization of a desired [result]" (T 173.24–26 [= P 243.23–244.4]).

[86] One might object that, if this were the case, the repeated use of an

(its causal efficiency) by means of a statement that might, like any other declarative statement, be true or false.

Such a reduction is the main achievement of ViV 28, probably the most famous and oft-quoted *kārikā* of the whole treatise:

> For a human being, there is no other incitement towards actions than [their] being a means for realizing what he desires (*iṣṭābhyupāyatva*), and what [people] call "impelling" is [nothing but this same] property (*dharma*) [of an action], which is the cause of [their] activity.[87]

Maṇḍana's intention is further explained in the corresponding *Vṛtti*:

> Impelling, as we know, is a certain supplement in the nature [of an entity] (*bhāvātiśaya*), called [its] "operation" (*vyāpāra*), capable [of giving rise] to an activity. And this is nothing but the actions' being means for realizing a desired [end], for nobody undertakes an [action] if he does not know it to be such [a means].[88]

In these passages, Maṇḍana makes a move from the purely linguistic plane where he stood until now to a more general reflection on action and its causes. We may better understand his somewhat inexplicit argument with the help of the NK.

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injunction – the daily instructions of a master to his servant, for instance – would be vain, since the specific property of the concerned action would already have been manifested by the preceding occurrences of this injunction. I cannot see any answer to such an objection in Maṇḍana's work, but it is found in the work of some of his successors like Prakāśātman, who deals with this objection in the *Śābdanirṇaya* (see *k.* 53 and *Vṛtti* thereon [p. 47.20–50.13]). A detailed discussion of his arguments would exceed, however, the ambition of the present study.

[87] ViV 28: *puṃso neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyaḥ pravartakaḥ | pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām ||* (T 173.2–3 [= P 243.2–3]). The second half of this verse could be understood in more than one way, but the comparison with its paraphrasis in the BS seems to confirm the present interpretation: … *pravṛttihetoś ca dharmasya pravartanāśabdābhidheyatvāt*; "… and because the property that is the cause of an activity is what is expressed by the word 'impelling'" (p. 116.17–18).

[88] ViV 28 (*Vṛtti*): *pravṛttisamartho hi kaś cid bhāvātiśayo vyāpārābhidhānaḥ pravartanā. sā ca kriyāṇām apekṣitopāyataiva. na hi tathātvam apratipadya tatra pravartate kaś cit* (T 173.4–174.1 [= P 243.4–244.1]).

According to Vācaspati's commentary, Maṇḍana's reasoning would be based on a record of the intrinsically painful nature of action, which always involves a certain amount of effort (*prayatna*): "the world's experience is that an action is [in itself] painful."[89] Hence, no action is ever undertaken unless its inherently painful nature is overcome by an attraction toward possible future beneficial consequences: "only the [property of] being a means for realizing pleasure can incite [a rational person to undertake] actions that are intrinsically painful, because it arouses desire."[90] No impelling would be powerful enough to provoke by itself a desire to undertake an action, and no action can ever be undertaken – so is, at least, Maṇḍana's and Vācaspati's assumption in this passage – without being grounded in the agent's desire (*rāga*/*icchā*). Activities resulting from a verbal exchange are no exception to this universal rule. Injunctions (be they worldly or Vedic) thus owe their efficiency to the transmission of this same property of actions, for "if, on the other hand, speech did not convey that [an action] is the means for realizing pleasure, it would never incite a human being to [undertake any] action."[91]

The obvious consequence of this desire-centred explanation of action is that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā*, which is the immediate outcome of Maṇḍana's analysis of *upadeśa*, is by no means limited to this particular pragmatic situation, but can rightly be extended to other interlocutory situations, such as command, request and permission:

> Even when an activity is the effect of a command[, a request or a permission,] it cannot [take place] unless [the agent] somehow resorts to

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[89] NK ad ViV 28ab: *kriyā … duḥkhety anubhavo lokasya* (T 173.14.15 [= P 243.16]). Cp. VAMV 2.8bc–9: *svabhāvena hi karmāṇi duḥkhotpādahetubhūtāni*; "As we all know, actions are naturally responsible for the arising of [a certain amount of] pain" (p. 428.4). Vācaspati's commentary on ViV 28ab is largely based on this particular section of Śālikanātha's *Vṛtti* (p. 428.4–429.6).

[90] NK ad ViV 28ab: *duḥkharūpāsu kriyāsu sukhasādhanataivecchopahāramukhena pravartayati* (T 173.17–18 [= P 243.16]).

[91] NK ad ViV 28ab: *yadi punaḥ śabdaḥ sukhasādhanatāṃ na pratipādayen na kriyāyāṃ puruṣaṃ pravartayet* (T 173.18–19 [P 243.17–18]).

> [the action's] being conducive to what he aspires to, for [an activity] never takes place otherwise.[92]

Hence, a command such as "Bring the cow!" even if it is pronounced by an authoritative person like one's master – or even by the king in person! – would be completely inefficient if the agent could not somehow make it match his own personal motivational complex, the minimal motivation possibly being, as Vācaspati suggests, the will to please (*pari-√tuṣ*) the person who gave the order.[93]

This fundamental statement concludes the discussion started in ViV 26–27 in a rather unexpected way. The distinction of *upadeśa* as a fourth possible "meaning" (*artha*) of injunctive suffixes (ViV 26) and the consequent determination of *iṣṭasādhanatā* as its specific import (ViV 27) were nothing but provisional achievements, whose

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[92] ViV 28 (*Vṛtti*): *yāpy*[a] *ājñādibhyaḥ pravṛttiḥ, sāpi kathaṃ cid apekṣitanibandhanatvam*[b] *upāśrityaiva, anyathābhāvāt* (T 174.1–2 [= P 244.1–2]).

[a]*yā* ViV_{T+P} NK_{T+P} : *yadi var.* (ViV_{T+P}); [b]°*nibandhanatvam* ViV_{T+P} : °*nibandhanatām* NK_{T+P}.

[93] Vācaspati's explanation in the NK (ad ViV 28 [*Vṛtti*]) deserves to be quoted at length: *nanv anapekṣitopāye 'py ājñayā rājñaḥ pravartante prekṣāvanta iti katham apekṣitopāyataiva pravṛttihetuḥ? … yady apy ājñādayo niyoktrarthakarmāṇaḥ, tathāpi tadviṣayasampādanasya kathaṃ cin niyojyāpekṣitanibandhanatvam apy asti. tathā hi*: *tatsampādanaparitoṣita ājñāpayitā samīhitam asmai prayacchaty ahitaṃ vā na vidhatte. tad idam apekṣitam upāśritya bhṛtyasya pravṛttiḥ*; "[Objection:] Still, rational persons [sometimes] undertake [actions] which are not the means for realizing what [they personally] desire, because of an order [promulgated] by the king [for instance]; how, then, could [an action's] being the means for realizing what [the agent] desires be the only [possible] cause of an activity? … [Answer:] Even though command [and request] are about actions [accomplished] for the sake of the [person] who enjoins, the accomplishment of [the actions that are] their content is also somehow conducive to [something] that is desired [for himself] by the [person] who is enjoined. To explain: when he is pleased by the accomplishment of the [commanded action], he who gave the order [generally] bestows on him what he wishes, or [at least] does not impose on him anything disadvantageous. Hence, [it is assumed that] the activity of the [king's] servant [takes place] resorting to this [favourable treatment] he wishes [for himself]" (T 174.4–9 [= P 244.9–15]).

ultimate function was to manifest the essentially identical content of *all* (Vedic or worldly) injunctions. In those injunctions where the speaker apparently prevails (command, request and permission), *iṣṭasādhanatā* remains concealed; in instruction, however, it is conspicuous. This, of course, does not mean that these distinctions become completely obsolete after the establishment of Maṇḍana's final point, but their validity is nonetheless limited to a very superficial level of linguistic analysis, which does by no means amount to a correct description of the effective process leading from a verbal utterance to an activity, or to the display of its real *cause*. To put it another way, the four values of injunctive moods (command, request, permission and instruction) are not really, in Maṇḍana's opinion, different "meanings" of suffixes such as *liṅ*, etc., but are better understood as different modes of presentation of a single, universal meaning, which does not always appear with the same degree of clarity, but the presence of which one might always infer from the bare fact that an agent undertakes an activity while he is not physically forced to.

Conclusion: *a Vedāntic theory of action*?

Can we inscribe Maṇḍana's theory of action and injunction in the wider context of his philosophical and exegetical system? In the final part of this essay, I would like to briefly suggest possible consequences of his theory of *iṣṭasādhanatā* for his Vedāntic interpretation of the Vedic *corpus*, particularly for the exegetical foundation of the distinction between "injunctions" (*vidhi*), "explanatory statements" (*arthavāda*) and "sentences of the Vedānta" (*vedāntavākya*) as three separate categories of Vedic sentences.

As is well-known, this comparatively recent[94] distinction delimits the specific object of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (= Vedānta), and thus le-

[94] To this date, the question whether Maṇḍana inherited or created the exegetical category of *vedāntavākya*s remains unanswered. Kumārila, whose vicinity with certain aspects of later Vedāntic thought has recently been underlined (see Mesquita 1994 and Yoshimizu 2007), repeatedly mentions separately *arthavāda*s and *upaniṣad*s in the *Tantravārttika* (see Pashupatinath Sastri 1980: 140–141 and Halbfass 1992: 150), but this does not mean that he associates with the

gitimates its existence as an independent discipline, distinct from Jaimini's Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.[95] Beyond a mere descriptive classification of Vedic sentences, it involves a proper exegetical thesis, namely the claim that *vedāntavākya*s possess validity (*prāmāṇya*) independently of injunctions. This, especially, excludes their simple assimilation to *arthavāda*s, despite the fact that these two categories of sentences share common linguistic features, such as the accomplished/realized (*bhūta/siddha*) nature of their object[96] (in the case of *vedāntavākya*s, the eternally present *Brahman* and its equally eternal identity with the individual self [*ātman*]). Hence, "sentences of the Vedānta" as conceived by Uttara-Mīmāṃsakas may roughly be defined as those Vedic sentences speaking of an accomplished object (*bhūtārtha*) and which possess independent validity (*nirapekṣaṃ prāmāṇyam*).

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term *upaniṣad* the same thing as Maṇḍana. In any case, this distinction does not seem to be well-established for Bhartṛhari (see *Vākyapadīya* 1.8 and *Vṛtti* thereon; see also W. Halbfass's remarks on this passage [*op. cit.*]). Even Prabhākara apparently ignores the second category of sentences, as the following passage from the *Bṛhatī* 1.1.2 tends to show: *yadi kārya eva cārthe*[a] *vedasya prāmāṇyam, kathaṃ tarhi bhūtādyarthāvagatir mantrārthavādeṣu* ([a]*ca* C : Ø M); "Moreover, if the Veda's validity is limited to an object [that is] to be done, then how does one apprehend an object [that is] past, [present or future] in the case of *mantra*s and *arthavāda*s?" (C 18.1–2 [= M 23.5–6]). Had Prabhākara known the category of *vedāntavākya*s, he would probably not have failed to mention them at that crucial point of his commentary, that was to become the *locus classicus* for a discussion of this type of Vedic sentences for later Prābhākaras from Śālikanātha onwards. See *Ṛjuvimalā* 1.1.2 (C 18.29–32 [≈ M 23.11–14]) and *Nayaviveka* 1.1.2 (p. 44.6–46.1). It is not impossible that the occasion for the introduction of this theme into the Prābhākara debate was precisely the appearance of Maṇḍana's work, a very common target of Śālikanātha's attacks. This question would certainly deserve closer attention from historians of Indian exegetical schools.

[95] On the early denominations of this discipline and the signification of "Vedānta," see David 2012.

[96] See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.1 (*arthavāda*°): … *bhūtam artham ācakṣate*: *ruditavān rudraḥ* …; "… [*arthavāda*s] speak of an accomplished object, [like the fact that] Rudra wept, etc." (A_2 1.6–7).

The isolation of this separate exegetical category could not fail to constitute, for many a Mīmāṃsaka, a major infringement to the strict delimitation of the Veda's competence to supra-sensory matters, i.e. to objects that are to be done/to be realized (*kartavya/sādhya*), "for," as urged by one of Śaṅkara's opponents in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.4, "an existent entity (*pariniṣṭhitavastu*) [like the eternal *Brahman*] lies [as such] within the realm of perception, etc."[97] In other words, the Vedāntic extension of the scope of the Veda from actions to existent entities, if not tempered by their strict "agreement" (*ekavākyatā*) with an injunction as in the case of *arthavāda*s,[98] would mar the specificity of its object, which is the foundation of its impersonality and, finally, of its very authority.[99]

The exact determination of Maṇḍana's attitude towards this fundamental exegetical problem in the ViV and in the *Niyogak*° of the BS will require a separate study. It is possible, though, to sense the use he could make of his theory of action and injunction in this context and the potential appeal it could hold for later Vedāntic audiences.

Two aspects of Maṇḍana's theory have been underlined in the course of this study: his depersonalization of injunctive discourse and his subsequent reduction of prescription to description. Both go

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[97] *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* ad *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.4 (*samanvaya*°): … *pratyakṣādiviṣayatvāt pariniṣṭhitavastunaḥ* (p. 100.10). See also Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* thereon: … *bhūtārthatvena ca pratyakṣādibhiḥ samānaviṣayatayā laukikavākyavat tadarthānuvādakatvenāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt*; "Moreover[, if sentences of the Vedānta were really meant to express *Brahman*,] their content would be similar to that of perception, etc., inasmuch as [*Brahman*] is an accomplished object. Hence, they would, alas, lose all [independent] validity, just like any worldly sentence, for they would be [mere] reiterations of an object of [perception, etc.]" (p. 100.18–19).

[98] See *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.7: *vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhināṃ syuḥ*; "But thanks to [their] agreement with an injunction, [*arthavāda*s] might [occur] for the purpose of praising injunctions" (A_2 10.1).

[99] On the Veda's teaching only supra-sensory matters, see for instance *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) *k.* 13–14 (translation in Kataoka 2011_2: 206–209). On the Veda's impersonality as the foundation for its authority, see for instance *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) *k.* 63 (translation in Kataoka 2011_2: 272).

in the same direction: the assimilation of the understanding of injunctions to a particular case of *theoretical* comprehension.[100] Hence, following Maṇḍana's hypothesis, two worldly sentences such as "The pot is blue" and "Hurry up!," in spite of superficial differences, share an essentially identical function, namely to communicate relevant features of a certain entity (the colour of the pot in the first case, the useful character of an action in the second) for the (direct or indirect) benefit of the hearer.

The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for two Vedic sentences such as the typical Vedāntic sentence *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma* ("*Brahman* is consciousness, [it is] bliss")[101] and an injunction like *svargakāmo yajeta* ("Let him who desires heaven sacrifice!"). The first one, an "essential definition" (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) of *Brahman*, grants the hearer the salvific knowledge of its object, diffracting its unique and unspecified nature into a plurality of non-synonymous designations. The second positively qualifies the sacrifice, the instrument of "objective effectuation" (*arthabhāvanā*), manifesting its causal efficiency (*sādhanatva*) towards heaven. In spite of many differences between these two sentences (first among them, the relational or non-relational nature of their object), their function is thus quite similar: both bestow on the hearer the knowledge of a certain exis-

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[100] This aspect of Maṇḍana's theory is pretty well seized by its earliest advocate in post-Śaṅkara Advaita, namely Sureśvara, in *k.* 637–638 of his *Sambandhavārttika*: *ataḥ samīhitopāyatayā vastv avabodhayan | abuddhaṃ prerako vedo, jñāpanā preraṇā matā || tathā ca vastuyāthātmyajñāpanena pramāṇatā | na prerakatayā sā syāt pratyakṣāder anīkṣaṇāt ||*; "Hence, the Veda instigates [human beings to undertake sacrificial actions] by making known [to them] a [particular] entity (*vastu*) as the means for realizing what [they] wish, [an entity that was hitherto] unknown [to them as being such a means]. By 'instigation' (*preraṇā*) [we] mean 'teaching' (*jñāpanā*). Accordingly, [the Veda] has to be a means of valid knowledge inasmuch as it teaches *how* [this particular] entity *is* (*vastuyāthātmya*), not insofar as it instigates, for this is not seen in the case of perception, etc." (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* p. 128.2–3).

[101] *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.9.28.

tent entity, for his own good.[102] This is, essentially, the appropriate design of an instruction.

Hence, following Maṇḍana's interpretation of *vidhi*, it is not only vain to exclude the possibility of a teaching about existing entities in the Veda: *all* Vedic sentences should be understood precisely in this way. Vedāntic pluralism, rooted in the denial of the Veda's unity of object and purpose, splitting it into two (*dharma* on the one hand,

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[102] Although the inclusion of *iṣṭasādhanatā* under the category of existing entities or "accomplished objects" (*bhūtārtha*) appears to me as a logical consequence of his theory, it is difficult to find a clear statement in this sense in Maṇḍana's work. Two passages of the NK seem, nonetheless, to corroborate such an interpretation. The first one is found in Vācaspati's commentary on ViV 28 (*Vṛtti* – introduction). As we have seen, the main objection addressed to Maṇḍana's theory of *upadeśa* in this portion of his own *Vṛtti* was that the mere teaching of a relationship between a means and its expected result lacked "impelling" (*pravartanā*) and consequently could not be the cause of an agent's activity. Elaborating on this objection, Vācaspati makes the following remark he attributes to Maṇḍana's *pūrvapakṣin*: … *na punaḥ puruṣārthopāyatā, na khalu bhūtārthapratītiḥ pravṛttihetuḥ*; "… but the [quality] of being a means for realizing a goal of men is not [what is understood by *liṅ*, etc.]; sure enough, the knowledge of an existing object [cannot] be the cause of an activity!" (T 173.7–8 [= P 242.25–243.6]). By this objection, which is not taken up in the corresponding *siddhānta*, Vācaspati clearly implies that, for him at least, *iṣṭasādhanatā* should be included under the category of *bhūtārtha*s, and that injunctions should be understood as statements about an existing entity. In the second passage, the identification of *iṣṭasādhanatā* with a *bhūtārtha* is found, once again, in the mouth of a *pūrvapakṣin* protesting against Maṇḍana's identification of the two properties *iṣṭasādhanatā* and *kartavyatā* ("[the quality of] what ought to be done") in ViV 32. Paraphrasing Śālikanātha's VAM and VAMV 2.7–8ab (p. 428.10–15), Vācaspati raises the following objection: *na ca sādhanatākartavyatayos tādātmyam, siddhasādhyatvena dahanatuhinavat svabhāvavirodhāt*; "Besides, the [quality of] a means of realization and [the quality of] what ought to be done cannot be identical, because what is realized and what ought to be realized are opposed by nature, just like fire and snow" (T 215.13–14 [P 302.14–16]). This remark, again, presupposes that the knowledge of an action's being a means of realization is comparable in nature to the knowledge of any other existent entity. Although Vācaspati later refutes this objection, his refutation never bears on this apparently well-admitted point.

Brahman on the other), had everything to gain from this major crack into one of classical Mīmāṃsā's main presuppositions: the functional centrality of Vedic injunction.

References and abbreviations

1) *Sanskrit texts*:

A. = *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini.

Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra: see *Bṛhatī*.

Tattvapradīpikā (= *Citsukhī*) of Citsukha:
Tattvapradīpikā (*Citsukhī*) *of Paramahaṃsa Citsukhācārya, with the Commentary Nayanaprasādhinī*. Ed. Kâshinâth Shâstrî. Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan (The Vrajajivan Pracyabharati Granthamala 19) 1987.

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Tattvaśuddhi (*prakaraṇa 6–11*). Ed. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and E.P. Radhakrishnan. *Annals of Oriental Research* 2.1: 29–51. 1937/38.

Tattvasamīkṣā of Vācaspati Miśra: see Acharya 2006.

Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: see *Śābarabhāṣya* (A_2).

Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha Miśra:
Mīmāṃsānayaviveka of … Bhavanātha, with Ravideva's Vivekatattva for pāda 1 and, up to chapter 2, *Dīpikā commentary by … Varadarāja*. Ed. S. Subrahmanya Sastri. New Delhi: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan 2004.

Nyāyakaṇikā [NK] of Vācaspati Miśra: see *Vidhiviveka*.

Nyāyacandrikā of Ānandapūrṇa (*alias* Vidyāsāgara):
Nyāyacandrikā of Ānandapūrṇamunīndra, *with the commentary Nyāyaprakāśika of Svarūpānandamunīndra*. Ed. N.S. Anantakrishna Sastri and K. Ramamurthi Sastri. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (Government Oriental Series 154) 1959.

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Prakīrṇaprakāśa of Helārāja: see *Vākyapadīya*.

Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra:

C = *Bṛhatī* (*a commentary on Śābarabhāṣya*) *by Prabhākara Miśra with the commentary Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra*. Ed. A. Chinnaswami Sastri. Benares: Vidya Vilas Press (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 391) 1929.

M = *Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra* (*on the Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin*) *with the Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha* (*Tarkapāda*). Ed. S.K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras: The University of Madras (Madras University Sanskrit Series 3.1) 1934.

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Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra: see *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*.

Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa (= *Āpadevī*) of Āpadeva:[103] see Edgerton 1986.

Mīmāṃsāsūtra, attributed to Jaimini: see *Śābarabhāṣya*.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari:[104]

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Vākyārthamātṛkā [VAM] and *Vākyārthamātṛkāvṛtti* [VAMV] of Śālikanātha Miśra:

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S = Stern 1988.

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Śābarabhāṣya (= *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*) of Śabarasvāmin:

F = Frauwallner 1968.

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[103] Paragraphs are indicated as in Edgerton 1986.

[104] Unless specified, all references to the *Vākyapadīya* and *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* are to part 1 of Iyer's edition.

A_2 = *Mīmāṃsādarśan*[*am*], *śrīmajjaiminipraṇīt*[*am*]. Vol. 2. Ed. Subbaśāstrī (revised by P. Gaṇeśaśāstrī Jośī). Pune: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya (Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvali 97,2) 1981.

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The authority of the Buddha, the omniscience of the Jina and the truth of Jainism

Piotr Balcerowicz

1. It would seem that an attempt to justify truth claims of the teachings of the founder of one's religion should be one of the most important philosophical tasks of any religious-philosophical grouping in India, including the Jainas. The Buddhists, surprisingly, engaged in the enterprise of justifying (which involves an appeal to rational, intersubjectively verifiable argumentation) the truth and reliability of the Buddha's word in a *serious* way relatively late, i.e. after Diṅnāga. Similarly, there are very few genuine arguments, i.e. either full-fledged and more or less complete in their logical structure, to justify the Jaina claims of the authoritativeness of the Jina's teaching. The advent of such attempts may reflect a certain historical change from the phase when various philosophical and religious systems of India engaged in debates at which primarily concrete theses (e.g. whether the world is transient or permanent, etc.) were discussed to a phase when also the credibility and veracity of the debaters' teachers and founders of respective systems of religion and philosophy were both rationally questioned and justified (which involved a debate on the criteria of the authoritative character [*āptatva*] of the original teachers or of the scripture), and not merely rejected or approved on the basis of one's systemic affiliation and one's belief. Such a change would mark the transition from a phase when the acceptance of reliability of the original teachers was based primarily on belief to a phase when the belief was either replaced or accompanied by the work of reason.

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 319–374.

The present paper analyses some of the stratagems applied by the Jainas to justify the reliability and truth of their system, which also entailed – as we shall see – the claim of the omniscience of the Jinas, the founders of their system. The paper also indicates some parallels between Jainism and Buddhism, especially post-Diṅnāga's tradition, in this respect. I will also point out a range of flaws and serious and insurmountable inconsistencies in the Jainas' approach.

2. What once Kumārila Bhaṭṭa formulated very succinctly is what seems most relevant in this context and what some Jainas took quite seriously:

> [The authority of a liberated teacher] cannot be established without [taking recourse to] his scripture, but the scripture cannot [be established] without [taking recourse to] his [existence].[1]

That passage, occasionally quoted and discussed by some Jaina authors, reveals a serious paradox and logical flaw in any attempt to justify the authority and reliability of such a teacher. Kumārila neatly demonstrates the mutual dependence (**anyonyâśraya*) of the scripture, considered authoritative, and its author, likewise considered authoritative, each of these two relata deriving its reliability and veracity from the other relatum: a typical case of vicious circle.

Hemacandra-sūri (1088–1172) is one of such Jaina thinkers who were well aware of the logical flaw in any argument to prove the authority of the scripture from the authority of the teacher and *vice versa*, for he himself quotes Kumārila's passage referred to above in his auto-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* (PMīV 1.15, § 54). He was certainly not the only Jaina philosopher wary of the self-abortive nature of such an argument. That is probably why we do not normally find a simple circular argument of the sort that the authority of the Jina, the Victor, is founded on the Jaina scriptures, and the truth of the Jaina scriptures is founded on the authority, or omniscience, of the Jina, with some notable exceptions though.

Such a surprising case of a circular argument, the argument from scripture, is Haribhadra-sūri's *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya*, contained

[1] *na rte tad-āgamāt sidhyen na ca tenâgamo vinā* | MŚV 2.142ab

in a lengthy passage out of which I just highlight the following two verses, although the ideas are mentioned on a few other occasions there:

> [594] The proof of [the existence / authority of] an [omniscient being] is through the scripture, because [the idea of] such [a person] is a result of scriptural injunction. Further, the scripture (the omniscient?)[2] is both intrinsically valid and eternal like [Vedic] revelation.
>
> [626] To conclude, it is logically correct to establish as distinct righteousness and unrighteousness in this way on the basis of the scripture, the contents of which is everything, which has been revealed by the omniscient, not in any other way whatsoever.[3]

What reverberates in the whole passage and argument is the Mīmāṃsā concept of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of cognition, developed especially in order to justify the authority of the *Veda*s, texts without an author (*apauruṣeya*), being a vital concept to establish the authority of the *Veda*s for Mīmāṃsā, completely lacking in Jainism though. The context for the query, however, is how to distinguish between good and evil, or right and wrong ('righteousness and unrighteousness,' *dharmâdharma*), which are the fundamental guidelines in human life. The guiding principle Haribhadra advocates to distinguish between good and evil is the scripture itself. But how much are the Jainas justified in their reliance on the scripture in his opinion, in other words, what endows the scripture with authority? Haribhadra's reply is quite straightforward: It is the Jina, the omniscient (*sarva-jña*), whose all-embracing scope of knowledge is reflected in the all-encompassing character (*sarvârtha*) of the scripture. But how do we know that such an omniscient being exists *at all* and that that *particular* being is the Jina? It is simple: 'The proof of the existence / authority of an [omniscient being] is through the scripture.' What we have is a perfect *circulus vitiosus*:

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[2] SVK, vol. 7, p. 44.7 takes *tasya* to be *sarva-jñasya*.

[3] *āgamād api tat-siddhir yad asau codanā-phalam |*
prāmāṇyaṃ ca svatas tasya nityatvaṃ ca śruter iva || ŚVS 594
sarva-jñena hy abhivyaktāt sarvārthād āgamāt parā |
dharmâdharma-vyavasthêyaṃ yujyate nānyataḥ kvacit || ŚVS 626

The Jina is authoritative (P), because of the scripture (Q).

The scripture is authoritative (Q), because of the Jina (P).

The situation is represented in the following diagram (fig. 1):




Fig. 1

This line of reasoning, however, in its *explicit* formulation is luckily rather rare in Jaina philosophical literature, but not necessarily in Jaina religious literary output.

We do find it, though, quite often as taken for granted or in an implied form, also with authors who are generally wary of the risks of circularity. For instance, Hemacandra-sūri, referred to above, in the first step of his argument, asserts that the Jina's omniscience can be established through scripture:

> Furthermore, the scripture itself the contents of which is proved through perception and inference is the proof (lit. cognitive criterion) of the existence of an agent who perceives extra-sensory [things]. ... Scriptural testimony, by demonstrating the doctrine of the [seven-fold] modal description proved through cognitive criteria in such a way, also demonstrates that the Arhat is omniscient;[4]

and a few lines later, he plainly assumes that the source of the scripture is the omniscient being himself (*sarva-jñôpajñaś câgamaḥ*):

> Neither scriptural testimony could disprove [the existence of the omniscient being], because it is not possible that the scripture is without author (*apauruṣeya*), and if [the scripture] were [without author, there

[4] PMīV 1.16 § 57 (p. 14): *kiṃca pratyakṣânumāna-siddha-saṃvādaṃ śāstram evâtīndriya-darśi-sadbhāve pramāṇam. ... iti diśā pramāṇa-siddhaṃ syād-vādaṃ pratipādayann āgamo 'rhatas sarvajñatām api pratipādayati.*

would be no problem], because no scripture can be presented which disproves [the existence of the omniscient being]. Moreover, how could *the scripture which is revealed by the omniscient* disprove his existence?[5]

Besides this argument from the scripture of patently circular character, we find other kinds of arguments which Jaina philosophers devised. Of all such arguments which serve to justify the truth of Jainism, or the authoritativeness of the Jina's teaching, I have come across, I would generally distinguish the following kinds: the argument from scripture, the argument from efficacy of the teaching, the argument from progression and the argument from potentiality, there being some more varieties though.

3. One of the earliest formulations of the argument from efficacy of the teaching is the opening verses of Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra* (*Pravacana-sāra*, ca. 4th–5th century). Worth mentioning in passing is the fact that Kundakunda's argument in a eulogy to the Jina strikes a close resemblance to Diṅnāga's opening verse of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. It is difficult at this stage, however, to derive any conclusions of historical import, e.g. relative chronology of these two authors, from such parallelism. The verses read:

[1] Here, I render homage to Vardhamāna, the maker of the passage to moral law,[6] who is venerated by the gods and demons, by humans and sovereigns, who has washed away the dirt of the destructive *karman*. [2] And [I render homage to] all the remaining ford-makers (*tīrthaṃ-kara*) along with all the perfected beings of pure nature, and to the ascetics whose actions [are regulated by correct] knowledge, conation,

[5] PMīV 1.17 § 62 (p. 17): *nâpy āgamas tad-bādhakas tasyâpauruṣeyasyâ-sambhavāt, sambhave vā tad-bādhakasya tasyâdarśanāt. sarva-jñôpajñaś câgamaḥ kathaṃ tad-bādhakaḥ?*

[6] Compare the expression *dharma-tīrtha-kara* ('the makers of the passage to moral law') in LT 1:

dharma-tīrtha-karebhyo 'stu syād-vādibhyo namo-namaḥ |
ṛṣabhâdi-mahāvīrântebhyaḥ svâtmôpalabdhaye ||

[I pay] earnest homage to those who are the makers of the passage to moral law, propounders of modal description, from Ṛṣabha to Mahāvīra – for the sake of the apprehension of [my] own self.

> conduct, penance and energy. [3] I venerate all of them in their entirety as well as each of them individually, but also [I venerate] current saints [living] in the human region. [4–5] Having paid homage to the saints (sc. liberated souls), the perfected beings as well as to congregation leaders (direct disciples of the Jina), to classes of community instructors and to all monks with no exception, [and] having taken up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation, I embrace equilibrium whereby one attains liberation.[7]

Let us examine the structure of the reasoning behind the eulogy and pinpoint the crucial constituent elements present in the verses which not only were meant to reflect highly pious attitude and reverence on the part of Kundakunda but seem, as we will see, to have been employed in order to enunciate a hidden argument. The most conspicuous structural elements of the eulogy are the following:

(1) Vardhamāna is the source ('the maker') of the teaching ('is a passage to') of moral law (*titthaṃ dhammassa kattāraṃ*) – Verse 1d.

(2) The moral law revealed by Vardhamāna demonstrates the proper conduct for the humans – a general assumption (it is the very nature of *dharma* to indicate the proper behaviour according to most Indian thinkers).

(3) Vardhamāna is unique inasmuch as his inner self is immaculate, because he removed all the destructive karmic matter (*dhoda-ghāi-kamma-malaṃ*), i.e. he practically applied the principles of his own teaching – Verse 1b.

(4) Through his own life and complete removal of all the destructive karmic matter, Vardhamāna demonstrated the efficacy of his own teaching.

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[7] *esa surâsura-maṇus-iṃda-vaṃdidaṃ dhoda-ghāi-kamma-malaṃ |*
paṇāmi vaḍḍhamāṇaṃ titthaṃ dhammassa kattāraṃ || PSā 1. 1

sese puṇa titthakare sasavva-siddhe visuddha-sabbhāve |
samaṇe ya ṇāṇa-daṃsaṇa-caritta-tava-vīriyâyāre || PSā 1.2

te te savve samagaṃ samagaṃ pattegam eva pattegaṃ |
vaṃdāmi ya vaṭṭaṃte arahaṃte māṇuse khette || PSā 1.3

kiccā arahaṃtāṇaṃ siddhāṇaṃ taha ṇamo gaṇa-harāṇaṃ |
ajjhāvaya-vaggāṇaṃ sāhūṇaṃ cêva ssavvesiṃ || PSā 1.4

tesiṃ visuddha-daṃsaṇa-ṇāṇa-pahāṇâsamaṃ samāsejja |
uvasaṃpayāmi sammaṃ jatto ṇivvāṇa-saṃpattī || PSā 1.5

(5) There are other beings who are perfected (*sasavva-siddhe*) and of pure nature (*visuddha-sabbhāve*) who, just like Vardhamāna, are the paragons and set the example of correct conduct to ordinary humans (*ṇāṇa-daṃsaṇa-caritta-tava-vīriyâyāre*) – Verse 2.

(6) The proper conduct based on moral law (*dharma*) is the lifestyle (*āśrama*) the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation (*visuddha-daṃsaṇa-ṇāṇa-pahāṇâsamaṃ*) – Verse 5a.

(7) This lifestyle, characterised by equilibrium, leads to liberation (*sammaṃ … ṇivvāṇa-saṃpattī*).

But there is something more to these verses than just a devout expression of Kundakunda's homage paid to the founders and promulgators of his religious tradition. If we analyse the structural links we will discover that they are internally logically organised to form an argument the overall structure of which turns out to be approximately as follows:

1. The authority of the Jina (*āptatva*), i.e. the cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the knowledge transmitted through his statements, establishes his teaching (**jina-vacana*).

2. The essence of the teaching constitutes its instrumentality in establishing a path to moral law (*dharma-tīrtha-karatva*).

3. The path establishes (reveals the essence of) the moral law (*dharma*).

4. The moral law establishes (sets as the human goal, *puruṣârtha*) liberation (*nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*).

5. The liberation establishes (determines) a particular salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) to achieve the desired goal (*puruṣârtha-siddhi*).

6. The salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) establishes (leads to) purified knowledge and conation (*viśuddha-darśana-jñāna*).

7. The purified knowledge and conation establishes (leads to) equilibrium, or inner restraint (*sāmya*).

9. The efficacy (**sāmarthya* / *puruṣârtha-siddhi*) of the equilibrium – expressed through 'equilibrium *whereby* one attains liberation' (*sammaṃ jatto ṇivvāṇa-saṃpattī*; Skt.: *sāmyaṃ yato nirvāṇa-samprāptiḥ*) – establishes (sc. determines) the authority of the Jina (*āptatva*) inasmuch as it successfully leads to liberation.

Interestingly, Kundakunda's argument neither *directly* nor *explicitly* appeals to credibility or infallibility (*avisaṃvāditva*) of the Jina, something we would probably expect, and the term '*avisaṃvāditva*,' or any of its synonyms for that matter, does not directly feature in the passage. However, such an idea has to be assumed as an element of the argument to account for the reliability of the religious practice which the Jina advances. In fact, infallibility is intimately related to the idea of authority (*āptatva*) and is the latter's logical or semantic corollary: it is hardly possible to have *āptatva* (authoritative status) without *avisaṃvāditva* (infallibility). Therefore, we should add one more explicit link:

8. Infallibility (**avisaṃvāditva*) of the Jina both (1) is established by the efficacy of the religious practice and (2) itself establishes the authority of the Jina (*āptatva*).




Fig. 2

A complete argumentative structure, including minor intervening constitutive elements, can be depicted as in fig. 2 (the asterisk * marks expressions absent in the text, but logically necessarily implied). It is quite obvious from the above analysis that the argument cannot but be circular, either straightforwardly (as a true circle) or indirectly and implicitly (as an incomplete circle with some elements presupposed).

3. Let us now turn to the Buddhist tradition and compare Kundakunda's line of reasoning to an argument formulated within Buddhist circles by Dharmakīrti, an argument based, in his opinion, on a reasoning embedded in – or rather: inspired by – the five epithets of the Buddha ('the one who is (is like) a cognitive criterion' (*pramāṇabhūta*), 'the one who seeks the benefit for the world' (*jagad-dhitaiṣin*), 'a teacher' (*śāstṛ*), 'a protector' (*tāyin*)) occurring in the salutatory verse (*maṅgala*) of Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*,[8] and laid out in the *Pramāṇa-siddhi* ('Establishment of the cognitive criterion') chapter of the *Pramāṇa-vārttika*. As Ernst Steinkellner (2003: esp. 326–330)[9] noted, these five epithets constitute a conceptual background for an argument developed by Dharmakīrti to prove the authority or infallibility (*avisaṃvāditva*) of the Buddha, an argument which presupposes a kind of 'meta-systematic circle,' albeit with a logical lacuna or gap not closed by Dharmakīrti. This 'meta-systematic circle' present in Dharmakīrti's work, as Steinkellner (2003: 328–329) phrases it, runs as follows, implicitly incorporating five building blocks:

> [T]he "validity" (and, as implied, the "correctness") of cognitions consists of their "reliability" (*avisaṃvāditva*). Reliability depends on meaningful, i.e. successful human activity. "Success" (*siddhi*), meaningfulness, can-

[8] On the analysis of the passage with respect to its links to Jaina tradition, see Balcerowicz (2008).

[9] In his paper, Steinkellner also gives a brief résumé of a longer debate on the (alleged) circularity in Dharmakīrti's attempt to establish the authority of the Buddha between those who subscribed to the presence of such circular reasoning, i.e. Vetter (1964: 27), Nagatomi (1980), Steinkellner (1982), and Hayes (1984), and those who rejected it, i.e. Tillemans (1993) and Franco (1999: 63–67).

not be determined without recourse to the "ultimate goal" (*puruṣârtha*) of all activity. Only the Buddha indicates this "ultimate goal," and his authority in this regard is established through his teaching, which can be ascertained as authoritative in other respects by our own judgement. The main links of this "true circle," therefore, are the following:

1. our ordinary valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) establish the authority of the Buddha's teaching (*buddha-vacana*),

2. the validity of our cognitions (*prāmāṇya*) is understood as their reliability (*avisaṃvāditva*),

3. reliability depends on successful activity (*puruṣârtha-siddhi*),

4. all human goals are determined by the "ultimate goal" (*nirvāṇa*),

5. the "ultimate goal" is indicated in the Buddha's teaching (*buddha-vacana*);

and can be represented in the fig. 3, where the arrow connecting *puruṣârtha-siddhi* and *nirvāṇa* contains a gap (marked):




Fig. 3

The above does not necessarily have to imply that both arguments, laid down by Kundakunda and Dharmakīrti, were employed by their authors with full awareness of their either partial and implied or full circularity.

Interestingly, both of these arguments appear to have a similar basic structure, although Kundakunda's argument seems to contain or entail more structural elements and has a slightly different order (each column begins and ends with the same step to indicate a circular linkage):

Kundakunda	**Dharmakīrti**
	1. ordinary valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) [establish…]
1. the Jina's authority (*āptatva*) / cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*) [establishes…]	
2. the Jina's teaching (**jina-vacana*) [, which establishes…]	2. the authority of the Buddha's teaching (*buddha-vacana*) [, which establishes…]
3. its instrumentality in establishing a path to moral law (*dharma-tīrtha-karatva*) [, which establishes…]	
4. the moral law (*dharma*) [, which establishes…]	
5. liberation (*nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*) as the human goal (*puruṣârtha*) [, which establishes…]	3. liberation (*nirvāṇa*) [, which establishes…]
6. a particular salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) [, which establishes…]	
7. purified knowledge and conation (*viśuddha-darśana-jñāna*) [, which establish…]	
8. equilibrium, or inner restraint (*sāmya*) [, which establishes…]	
9. *the efficacy (**sāmarthya* / *puruṣârtha-siddhi*) [, which establishes…]	4. successful activity (*puruṣârtha-siddhi*) [, which establishes…]
10. *infallibility / reliability (**avisaṃvāditva*) [, which establishes…]	5. infallibility / reliability (*avisaṃvāditva*) [, which establishes…]
1. the Jina's authority (*āptatva*) / cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*) [, which establishes…]	6. the validity of our cognitions (*prāmāṇya*) [, which establishes…]
	1. ordinary valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) [, which establish…]

Another difference is that Dharmakīrti's argument, the way it is presented by Steinkellner (2003), takes recourse to the validity of ordinary human perceptions, which moves the circularity embedded in the argument to a kind of meta-level, whereas Kundakunda's argument, under the current interpretation, seems to take recourse to the validity of Jina's words themselves, although it remains an open question in view of the simple fact that the above reconstruction is based on quite laconic verses.

It is possible though, due to the ambiguity of the phrasing, to construe Kundakunda's argument in such a way that his argument may take recourse to the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of ordinary observations and experiences of all those people who 'have taken up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation,' and such a reconstruction would assume more or less the following form:

> The Jina's authority (*āptatva*), which entails cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*), is the basis for his teaching (**jina-vacana*), which is, in turn, instrumental in establishing a path to moral law (*dharma-tīrtha-karatva*). The moral law (*dharma*) sets liberation (*nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*) as the human goal (*puruṣârtha*) and a particular salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) to achieve it (*puruṣârtha-siddhi*). The pursuance of the path leads to purified knowledge and conation (*viśuddha-darśana-jñāna*), corollaries of equilibrium, or inner restraint (*sāmya*). This efficacy to achieve the human goal can be, at least partially, tested and verified directly in human experience: the living proof of the efficacy of the Jina's teaching is 'current saints [living] in the human region' (verse 3) and 'congregation leaders (direct disciples of the Jina), classes of community instructors and all monks with no exception' (verses 4–5) who manage to partially achieve the goals. The application of the path, i.e. the salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) indicated through the Jina's teaching, in the lives of the religious leaders, teachers, instructors and monks can be directly seen, observed and verified by the ordinary people through their ordinary valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*). And this establishes the efficacy (**sāmarthya* / *puruṣârtha-siddhi*) and infallibility or reliability (**avisaṃvāditva*) of the Jina and his authority (*āptatva*).

Such a reconstruction would enhance the structural similarities between Kundakunda's and Dharmakīrti's arguments, and shift the

circularity of Kundakunda to meta-level. Probably we will never be able to unravel the exact structure of the argument underlying Kundakunda's verses, and the question whether he himself was well aware of the circular structure is also problematic. In any case, the second interpretation of Kundakunda's argument would enhance the vital role of the monastic community, which was the focal point of the religious thinking in Jainism. The monks, whether religious leaders, teachers, instructors or ordinary monks, not only set the religious example and rendered the religious practices of the Jainas meaningful, but they could also be taken recourse to as a paragon and criterion (*pramāṇa*) to measure the truth and reliability of the Jina's statements of salvific import, inasmuch as they were also believed to be the living proof of the successfulness of the path laid down by the Jinas, at least within certain limits.

Irrespective of the exact actual argumentative structure of Kundakunda's reasoning, Dharmakīrti's argument to prove the truth claim of the teachings of the founder of his religious tradition was therefore neither the first of its kind nor unique.

In fact, Kundakunda's above argument rests on two separate arguments, the first one taking recourse to the efficacy (first formulation) or to the empirical verifiability through ascetic lifestyle (second formulation), whereas the second argument, in a concealed form, is based on a gradation of asceticism and its success from mediocre performance of monks of the lowest rank via increasing achievements of more and more advanced monks up to the perfection of the Jina. Such a gradation or progression of certain quality is a typical element of another argument, as will be demonstrated below.

4. In fact, especially the second reading of Kundakunda's argument highlights another sub-argument embedded in it in a concealed form. This argument, at least in its full-fledged form, would make up the second kind of the justification of the truth of Jainism, or of the authoritativeness of the Jina's teaching. I would call it 'the argument from progression.' It is found in the opening verses of Samantabha-

dra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, a post-Dharmakīrtian[10] text. The full passage reads as follows, although crucial for our purposes are verses 4 and 5:

> [1] Such superhuman powers as the adoration [on the part] of divine beings, moving in the sky, fly-whisk service [as a symbol of royal power], etc., are found also in magicians. It is not because of these that you [, the Jina,] are great in our [eyes]. [2] The divine excellence of the individual form, etc., be it internal or external, is something real [found] also in heavenly beings; [however] that [excellence] is found [also] in beings possessed of desire, etc. [3] And none of all main doctrinal points [taught] by [various] makers of the passage (sc. religious teachers) possesses authority because they are mutually contradictory. [Therefore] none [of them] could be a [true] preceptor.[11]
>
> [4] A complete destruction of defects and karmic veils is possible, because a completion [of gradual purification process] is [possible], just as a [complete] annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes.[12]
>
> [5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant are [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire, etc., [is inferable from visible smoke] – such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].
>
> [6] Only you, being faultless, are such [an omniscient person], whose statements are contradicted neither by reasoning nor by scriptural testimony.[13] There is no contradiction, [because] what is accepted by you [as a tenet of your teaching] is not sublated by what is well-proven.
>
> [7] In the case of those who are alien to the nectar of your thought, who are advocates of the absolutist stand in every respect [and] who

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[10] See the brief remarks on assigning Samantabhadra to the turn of the 6th/7th centuries in Balcerowicz (2008: 52) and (2011: 19–20).

[11] Here, we should construe *nâsti* in accordance with 'the maxim of a crow's eyeball' (*kākâkṣi-golaka-nyāya*), i.e. as operating in two statements: (1) *sarveṣām āptatā nâsti*, and (2) *nâsti kaścid eva bhaved guruḥ*. Such is also the way Akalaṅka takes it, see $AṣŚ_2$: *ata eva na kaścit sarvajña ity uktam*.

[12] For the analysis of the verse, being a formulation of a proof of liberation, and its soteriological implications see Balcerowicz (2005).

[13] That is a feature of a cognitive criterion, cf. NA 1ab: *pramāṇaṃ svaparâbhāsi jñānaṃ bādha-vivarjitam* /

> are consumed by the self-conceit of [their being] authoritative persons, what is accepted by them [only] is sublated by visible facts.[14]

In fact, verses 4 and 5 are formulations of two separate arguments, and I will first deal with the first of them, mentioned in verse 4.

On what basis can we trust the Jina and accept his teaching? The answer is: because he is omniscient. And how do we know that there is an omniscient being? The reply is provided precisely by the argument which I here call the argument from progression. The general structure of the line of reasoning to prove the authority of the Jina with the help of the argument from progression looks as follows:

(1) The authority of the Jina rests on his omniscience.

(2) Omniscience rests on the soul's essence which is by nature pure cognition, although it is temporarily tainted with karmic impurities.

(3) Complete purification (i.e. omniscience) is possible.

(4) Empirically we observe a progression: we can determine that cognitions can be gradated: some cognitions are purer than others.

(5) The gradation reaches its completion in perfectly purified cognition, i.e. omniscience.

Steps 3–5 of this line of reasoning contain the argument from progression, and its formulation in verse 4 is rather straightforward:

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[14] *devâgama-nabho-yāna-cāmarâdi-vibhūtayaḥ |*
māyāviṣv api dṛśyante nâtas tvam asi no mahān || ĀMī 1
adhyātmaṃ bahir apy eṣa vigrahâdi-mahodayaḥ |
divyaḥ satyo divaukasu apy asti rāgâdimatsu saḥ || ĀMī 2
tīrtha-kṛt-samayānāṃ ca paraspara-virodhataḥ |
sarveṣām āptatā nâsti kaścid eva bhaved guruḥ || ĀMī 3
doṣâvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣâsty atiśāyanāt |
kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ || ĀMī 4
sūkṣmântarita-dūrârthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā |
anumeyatvato 'gny-ādir iti sarva-jña-saṃsthitiḥ || ĀMī 5
sa tvam evâsi nirdoṣo yukti-śāstrâvirodhi-vāk |
avirodho yad iṣṭaṃ te prasiddhena na bādhyate || ĀMī 6
tvan-matâmṛta-bāhyānāṃ sarvathâikānta-vādinām |
āptâbhimāna-dagdhānāṃ svêṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭena bādhyate || ĀMī 7

> Thesis (*pratijñā*): There exists complete destruction of defects and karmic veils (*doṣâvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣâsti*),
>
> Logical reason (*hetu*): Because there is a completion of progression, i.e. the end of the gradual purification process (*atiśāyanāt*),
>
> Example (*dṛṣṭānta*): Like a complete annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes (*kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ*).

Its structure, to be closer analysed further on, can be described as follows:

> An invisible perfect condition *x* of a particular faculty F (e.g. liberation, omniscience, extra-sensory perception) is possible, because there can be a gradation of the respective faculty.

This is not a unique instance of the argument from progression, of which there are numerous examples, most focusing on the issue of proving the existence of omniscience or omniscient beings, who are necessarily authoritative. (Clearly, the argument as such could be used in other contexts too.) An example of this is provided in Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

> The proof of this [supernatural perception (sc. omniscience) follows] from the argument that there is completion of the culmination of understanding, and other [proofs].[15]

The term *atiśaya* (excellence, progression) is usually understood in this context in the sense of growth (e.g. SViṬ 539.21: *atiśayād vṛddheḥ*). The expression *prajñâtiśaya-viśrānti*, lit. 'the termination of excellence (sc. progression) of understanding' or 'the limit of gradation of understanding,' refers to a situation in which a chain of entities, of which each subsequent entity has a higher volume than the one preceding it, finds its limit through reaching the understanding (knowledge) of unlimited scale. In other words, this is the level of understanding that is the climax of the progression of the quality of understanding, which is tantamount to perfection (perfect understanding). In his auto-commentary, Hemacandra supplies a brief elucidation in the same spirit:

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[15] PMī 1.16: *prajñâtiśaya-viśrānty-ādi-siddhes tat-siddhiḥ*.

> Progression [must have] its completion somewhere, because of culmination, just like the culmination of magnitude.[16] Because of this argument, since it is proved that there is understanding with no higher limit, [we have] the proof of this absolute knowledge; because the proof of [the existence of] absolute knowledge depends on the same structure (*rūpa*) as the proof such [understanding with no higher limit].[17]

This can be expressed as follows: For every magnitude m_1 we can find a magnitude m_2 larger by one unit such that $m_2 = m_1 + 1$, until we reach magnitude m_i when no such progression is possible any more, viz. m_i can no longer be augmented by any degree or unit. In other words, just as the magnitude progresses from the smallest possible *aṇutva* size of atoms (*paramâṇu*) until it reaches the infinite expanse of the whole universe space (*loka*) as highest limit, similarly understanding can be augmented again and again until it reaches its absolute infinite expansion.

Hemacandra, by way of analogy, applies the argument from progression to the scope of our knowledge in the case of astronomy in order to demonstrate that such a progressive development of a natural faculty is a phenomenon routinely observed:

> [Omniscience] is also established because otherwise the reliability of knowledge of astronomy would be inexplicable, as it has been demonstrated [by Akalaṅka in *The Determination of Correctness*]:
>
> "If the cognition of absolutely imperceptible objects is not possible for humans, how can then the reliability of the knowledge of astronomy be accounted for? If it is accounted for by appeal to scripture, then [the scripture] becomes one more proof [for omniscience]."[18]

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[16] Viz. things progress from smallest atoms (*paramâṇu*) as the lowest limit to the space of the universe (*loka*) as highest limit.

[17] PMīV 1.16 § 55 (p. 13): *tāratamyaṃ kvacid viśrāntam, atiśayatvāt, parimāṇâtiśayavad ity anumānena niratiśaya-prajñā-siddhyā tasya kevala-jñānasya siddhiḥ, tat-siddhi-rūpatvāt kevala-jñāna-siddheḥ*.

[18] PMīV 1.16 § 55 (p. 14): *jyotir-jñānâvisaṃvādânyathânupapatteś ca tat-siddhiḥ, yad āha*

> *dhīr atyanta-parokṣe 'rthe na cet puṃsāṃ kutaḥ punaḥ /*
> *jyotir-jñānâvisaṃvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanântaram //* [SVi 8.2, p. 526]

Knowledge of astronomy, which reaches out to most distant stellar objects, etc., features here as a most superior cognition which tops a series of ordinary cognitions of spatially limited range humans commonly possess, and is taken to visibly demonstrate that progressions exist which culminate in an allegedly complete realisation of a particular quality.

These two arguments, both having the same structure, one from gradual purification process and the other from culmination of understanding, were combined in one verse already by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (ca 720–780), from whom Hemacandra-sūri apparently draws his inspiration:

> One can prove the omnipresence (absolute extension) [of knowledge] by appeal to the progression of knowledge, like in the case of magnitude (from the smallest possible size of atoms to infinity). [One can prove] the clarity (purity) [of knowledge] by appeal to the destruction of defects and blemishes, as in the case of an eye with ophthalmic disorder (which can see again after the disease is eliminated).[19]

The argumentative structure was well-known among the Jainas, even prior to the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda, a good example being Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra* and his proof of liberation in which he applies the same argument from progression, that rests on the idea of progressive development of a quality which eventually reaches a perfectly pure condition tantamount to liberation:[20]

> [45] Perfected souls (saints) [achieve their condition] as a result of merit (or: auspicious *karman*). Their activity is, however, a natural development, which is free from [inauspicious *karman* such as] confusion, etc., and therefore it is known as "resulting from the destruction [of karman]" (*kṣāyika*).'[21] [46] If the soul itself could not become either good or

[19] *jñānasyâtiśayāt sidhyed vibhutvaṃ parimāṇavat |*
vaiśadyaṃ kvacid doṣa-mala-hānes timirâkṣavat || SVi 8.8, p. 539

[20] Kundakunda also makes use of what we could call a reverse gradual development argument in his *Samaya-sāra* 222–223, in which the development towards perfection of the soul is compared to a conch which is step by step turning into black until it becomes completely black and dirty.

[21] Cf. TSū 10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanâvaraṇântarāya-kṣayāc ca keva-*

> bad by virtue of its own essential nature alone, there would be no mundane world (transmigration) for all the bodies endowed with a soul.[22]

This argument from the removal of impurities, which is a version of the argument from progression, is extremely popular in Jaina writings. Often it is compounded with the metaphor of a gem, as in the following passage from Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭa-śatī*:

> And in this way the complete destruction of defects, etc., is somehow capable of annihilating all [karmic] blemishes. Thus, why should a proof of a blemish-free condition not be possible? The expunction of dirt, etc., [in the case of a jewel] does not entail the destruction of the jewel, [and similarly the annihilation of *karman* does not destroy the soul], because it does not stand to reason that something really existent [such as the soul] could be totally annihilated.[23]

If some particles of dirt or impurity can be removed from, say, a gem, the process can be continued until it reaches its consummation in a gem perfectly purified from all external impurities that have enveloped it so far. Similarly a soul, which is enveloped by karmic matter in analogous manner, can gradually remove these taints until a state of perfection, i.e. complete annihilation of the *karman*, is achieved.

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lam. – 'Absolute knowledge [arises] from the destruction of [the *karman* called] confusion and from the destruction of the *karman*s obstructing and veiling [innate] cognition and perception/conation.'

[22] *puṇṇa-phalā arahaṃtā tesiṃ kiriyā puṇo hi odaiyā |*
mohâdīhiṃ virahiyā tamhā sā khāiga tti madā || PSā 1.45

jadi so suho va asuho ṇa havadi ādā sayaṃ sahāveṇa |
saṃsāro vi ṇa vijjadi savvesiṃ jīva-kāyāṇaṃ || PSā 1.46

Comp. also SSā 204 below.

[23] AṣŚ$_1$ 53.9–16 = AṣŚ$_2$ 4.7–9 (ad ĀMī 4): *tathā ca doṣâder hānir atiśayavatī kutaścin nivartayitum arhati sakalaṃ kalaṅkam iti katham akalaṅka-siddhir na bhavet? na*[†] *maṇer malâder vyāvṛttiḥ kṣayaḥ, sato 'tyanta-vināśânupapatteḥ*.

[†] Both editions [Nagin Shah follows AṣŚ$_1$] read no *na* (viz. *na bhavet? maṇeḥ*…), although the commentary makes it explicit that one should read the negation, see AṣS 53.15ff.: *pradhvaṃsâbhāvo hi* ***kṣayo*** *hānir ihâbhipretā. sā ca vyāvṛttir eva maṇeḥ kanaka-pāṣāṇād vā* (recte: *pāṣāṇāder vā*) *malasya kiṭṭâder vā.* ***na*** *punar atyanta-vināśaḥ. sa hi dravyasya vā syāt paryāyasya vā? na tāvad dravyasya nityatvāt*…

In other words, for every degree d_1 of impurity removal we can find degree d_2 of impurity removal such that the impurity removal is higher by one unit: $d_2 = d_1 + 1$, until we reach degree d_i when no higher degree of impurity removal is possible, viz. d_i can no longer be augmented, viz. the state of $d_i + 1$ is not possible: $\neg\exists j\ (d_j = d_i + 1)$. Such a state is taken to be a perfect state consisting in a complete removal of all impurities. However, granted that its inner logical structure remains intact (but it does not!), the argument hinges on an assumption that such a condition of perfect removal of all dirts is at all possible, which is in itself problematic and would require a separate proof.

Interestingly, one and the same argument can be developed, or phrased, either by way of augmentation of purity or by way of diminution of impurities:

> (1) from the state of robust impurity one progresses, through stages of increasingly more purified states, to the state of complete purity, or
>
> (2) from the state of robust impurity one progresses, through the stages of increasingly larger removals of defiled states, to the state of complete annihilation of dirt.

6. Another good instantiation of an attempt to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and his teachings by resorting, at least to certain extent, to the argument from progression, is provided in a concealed form by Vādideva-sūri in his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvâlokâlaṅkāra*. The latter's line of reasoning resembles that of the argument from efficacy of the teaching, in which the cognition of an authoritative person, the Jina, is compared to a summit of jewels inferable from the presence of empirically observable instances of jewels:

> [1] The scripture consists in immediate knowledge of things manifested through the statements of an authoritative person. [2] By way of metaphorical transference [the scripture] is statements of an authoritative person [*per se*]. [3] [It is demonstrated by the analogy:] There is indeed a deposit of jewels in this district, [so] there must be summits of jewels, etc., [somewhere].[24] [4] An authoritative person is the one who

[24] Cf. RĀV ad loc.: *vakṣyamāṇa-laukika-janakâdi-lokôttara-tīrtha-karâdy-*

> knows the matter under discussion as it is and who describes it in accordance with his [correct] cognition. [5] For his statements are infallible. … [12] To reveal objects is its (sc. the word's) nature, just like the lamp. [The word's] accuracy or inaccuracy follows the virtue or the vice of the person respectively.[25]

It would be rather difficult to make heads and tails of the reason why the seemingly irrelevant insertion mentioning the deposit of jewels was at all introduced into the passage if we didn't know the argumentative role of the analogy. Interestingly, Vādideva-sūri equates the scripture, i.e. a collection of statements, with the authoritative person's knowledge acquired directly, without any mediation of senses or mind, which is intimated by 'immediate knowledge.' This whole argument seems to be straightforwardly circular, too, its main constitutive steps being the following:

> (1) A person is authoritative because he knows the matter and describes it in accordance with his knowledge.
>
> (2) To know the matter means to know it in accordance with truth.
>
> (3) He describes the matter in accordance with truth because his statements are infallible.
>
> (4) To use the statements which are infallible means to be an authoritative person.

The obvious problem of this and all the remaining arguments of this sort is the following: How do we know that a particular person is authoritative and knows the truth? The reply is: because of his statements which are infallible. But how do we know that his state-

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apekṣayā krameṇôdāharaṇôbhayī. 'This is a pair of examples to [demonstrate] gradation by way of reference to ordinary ancestors, etc., as we know them (lit. "under discussion") and to ford-makers, etc., who are superior to the mundane world.'

[25] PNTĀA 4.1–5, 12: [1] *āpta-vacanād āvir-bhūtam artha-saṃvedanam āgama iti*. [2] *upacārād āpta-vacanaṃ ca*. [3] *samasty atra pradeśe ratna-vidhānaṃ santi ratna-sānu-prabhṛtaya iti*. [4] *abhidheyaṃ vastu yathâvasthitaṃ yo jānīte yathā-jñānaṃ câbhidhatte sa āpta iti*. [5] *tasya hi vacanam avisaṃvādi bhavatîti*. [12] *artha-prakāśanatvam asya* (*śabdasya*) *svābhāvikaṃ pradīpavad yathârthâyathârthatve punaḥ puruṣaguṇa-doṣāv anusarataḥ*.

ments are infallible? The reply again is: because he is authoritative. However, the closing remark of the whole passage seems to present a way out of the circularity by taking recourse to an external factor. This is indeed an interesting shift to be noted at the end of the argument towards a practically verifiable reliability of an authoritative person based on his virtue or vice (*puruṣa-guṇa-doṣa*): whether the statement is true or not depends on the qualification of the speaker, which could be taken either in the sense of moral virtue or dexterity to aptly communicate the truths one knows. Vādideva-sūri's gloss on the expression *puruṣa-guṇa-doṣa*[26] suggests, however, that the virtue or vice is to be taken primarily in the moral sense: the reliability and veracity of the teaching is rooted in the moral disposition of the teacher, and that can be socially observed and verified. To take the speaker's virtue (*puruṣa-guṇa*) in any other sense, especially in the sense of his dexterity to aptly communicate the truths he knows, would open an undesirable possibility that anyone arguing skilfully and rhetorically persuasively, albeit not necessarily in accordance with truth, would automatically be considered apt and claimed to possess the required virtue.

As long as the term *puruṣa-guṇa-doṣa* is therefore taken in the former sense of moral virtue, the risk of circularity is avoided, the problem of the validity of such an argument far from being solved though. What remains problematic in such a case is not the circularity of the argument itself but the question of the verifiability of the moral status of the speaker, viz. how can we know that a particular person is morally advanced to a maximum degree so that he is absolutely reliable and all his statements are true?

The above line of reasoning, coalesced here with the argument from progression, resembles the argument from efficacy of the teach-

[26] SVR ad PNTĀA 4.12, p. 71615–17: *tatra yadi puruṣa-guṇānāṃ prāmāṇya-hetutvaṃ nâbhimanyate jaiminīyaiḥ, tarhi doṣāṇām apy aprāmāṇya-nimittā mā bhūt.* – 'As for the [validity of the authoritative person], if it is not recognised by the Mīmāṃsakas that the virtues of the person are not the cause of the cognitive validity [of his speech], then likewise his vices cannot be the causative factors of the cognitive invalidity [of his speech].'

ing, but is in fact neither. The efficacy lies here not in the teaching of the Jina himself but in the moral virtue displayed by the teacher.

7. One of the flaws in this particular argument, the argument from progression, to prove omniscience and authoritative status of the spiritual teacher is that if it can prove anything at all it can only be that such an omniscient being is *in theory* possible. It does not prove that a *particular* person, let's say the Jina, is such an omniscient being who founds his authority on his omniscience.

The *structure* of the argument from progression closely resembles a number of proofs of god's existence, based on progression which terminates at a given point, which we find in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*[27] and a range of similar arguments, being in

[27] Aquinas (1947: 25ff.): 'The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. … If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.' … 'The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. … Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.' … 'The third way is taken from possibility and necessity … every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some be-

fact versions of the cosmological argument, moulded on two basic proofs of god's existence (from the prime mover and from the efficient cause) formulated by Aristotle in his *Physics* 254b–260a (VIII 4–6) and *Metaphysics* 1062a–1072a (XII 1–6), which served as inspiration for Christian and Muslim thinkers.

There are a few points of coincidence to mention, three being most conspicuous. First, both the argument from progression and all versions of the cosmological argument, such as from the prime mover or from the first cause (either temporally or logically prior), etc.,, rely on at least one empirical premise. In all versions of the cosmological arguments, on the one hand, as Everitt (2004: 59) notices, "it might be, for example, simply the fact that the universe exists, or that it contains some things which depend on other things, or that it contains change, or that it displays orderliness. Other arguments … invoke much more specific empirical premises, for example, concerned with the existence of religious experience or of morality. But cosmological arguments are arguments from the universe (or cosmos) in general," and, henceforth, from empirical observation. In Jaina arguments from progression, on the other hand, the empirical premise is the fact that things or qualities can be gradated, from lower to higher, from less to more, from weaker to stronger, from less intense to more intense, etc. In other words, we empirically observe progressions, for instance we can apparently arrange cognitions and

ing having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.' … 'The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in *Metaphysics* ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.'

acts of understanding in grades or ranks from less to more and more pure or from narrower to wider or from shallower to deeper; in the same manner, the power or range of sight (or the range of other senses) can be seen to be less or more extensive; similarly, a process of purification or removal of physical impurities proceeds gradually and leads to things cleaner and cleaner; likewise the destruction of *karman*, or of defects and karmic veils, can purportedly be observed to proceed in steps, etc. On the basis of such empirical or allegedly empirical observations of progressions, we conclude – wholly arbitrarily and a priori – that they must terminate somewhere.

The second point of coincidence lies in the reasoning structure consisting of two steps: the first being the actual argument making use of a progressively ordered series that terminates at a maximum which either can no longer be augmented or is of a qualitatively different and unique character not comparable to any members of the series preceding/following it (e.g. 'each effect in a causally ordered structure must be preceded by its cause, which leads to the first cause' or 'in a series of cognitions there is one purer than the one preceding it, which leads to a perfectly purified cognition'), whereas the second step proceeds wholly a priori and does arguably not have any argumentative structure at all, viz. it merely equates the 'maximum' of the first step with a desired concept, be it god or omniscience (e.g. 'the first cause is god' or 'the perfectly purified cognition is omniscience'). The a priori and unwarranted element in the equation is that the final element of the series, or the maximum, is tacitly accepted as endowed with or entailing additional qualities that do not feature in the first step of the argument at all, e.g. the first cause is endowed with eternality, omnipresence, omnipotence, infinite knowledge, omnibenevolence, love, personality, etc., or the perfectly purified cognition must necessarily involve the grasp of everything in all three times and in all possible aspects. Even if one could prove that there is a first cause of all world phenomena or that a state of a perfectly purified cognition exists, it is far from established that such a first cause is eternal, omnipresent, etc., or that such a cognition grasps absolutely everything in all aspects and in all three times. Why should it not be, respectively, a one-time material event

or a cognition which perfectly 'mirrors' just one particular thing in one particular point of time?

The third point of coincidence, perhaps the most striking, between the Jaina arguments for omniscience from progression and the cosmological arguments of the Aristotelian or Christian and Muslim traditions is the quantifier-shift fallacy.[28] The line of reasoning which expresses the fear of the idea of progression to infinity is well phrased in the following passage of the *Metaphysics* (994ab), and becomes paradigmatic:

> [994a] But evidently there is a first principle, and the causes of things are neither an infinite series nor infinitely various in kind. For neither can one thing proceed from another, as from matter, ad infinitum (e.g. flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire, and so on without stopping), nor can the sources of movement form an endless series (man for instance being acted on by air, air by the sun, the sun by Strife, and so on without limit). Similarly the final causes cannot go on ad infinitum, – walking being for the sake of health, this for the sake of happiness, happiness for the sake of something else, and so one thing always for the sake of another. And the case of the essence is similar. For in the case of intermediates, which have a last term and a term prior to them, the prior must be the cause of the later terms. For if we had to say which of the three is the cause, we should say the first; surely not the last, for the final term is the cause of none; nor even the intermediate, for it is the cause only of one. (It makes no difference whether there is one intermediate or more, nor whether they are infinite or finite in number.) But of series which are infinite in this way, and of the infinite in general, all the parts down to that now present are alike intermediates; so that if there is no first there is no cause at all. Nor can there be an infinite process downwards … [994b] … Further, the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is; so that if there is to be a last term of this sort, the process will not be infinite; but if there is no such term, there will be no final cause, but those who maintain the infinite series eliminate the Good without knowing it (yet no one would try to do anything if

[28] Cf. the criticisms taken from different angles in, e.g.: Plantinga (1967: 3ff.), Mackie (1982: 87ff.), Everitt (2004: 59ff.). Comp. the exposition of the cosmological argument in Hick (1971).

> he were not going to come to a limit); nor would there be reason in the world; the reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose, and this is a limit; for the end is a limit. … (transl. Ross 1908).

As indicated above, the structure of the proof, i.e. of the argument from progression, is fundamentally logically flawed. Let the symbol $\rightarrow$ stand for any kind of precedence (hierarchical, temporal, causal, etc.) so that '$x \rightarrow y$' means 'x is superior in degree to y.'

Suppose we have a sequence of ordered pairs $x \rightarrow y$ such that

$$\forall y \exists x \, (x \rightarrow y),$$

viz. for any thing y there exists some other thing x such that x is superior in degree to y (or 'y is subordinate to x').

Further, we assume that there is culmination, or highest possible degree of the quality:

$$\exists x \forall y \, (x \rightarrow y),$$

viz. 'there exists one thing x which is superior in degree to all y-s.'

In other words, we can order, for instance, a set of all possible white things from least white to most white in such a way that through the gradation we can reach the most perfect white (absolutely white), or we can find the most perfect being in the hierarchy of all entities in the world which is god, or we can order all acts of perception so that it will culminate in the most perfect perception (*sarva-jñāna*).

However, it is logically not permissible to interchange the places of the qualifiers, viz. the following shift is fallacious:

$$\forall y \exists x \, (x \rightarrow y) \Rightarrow \exists x \forall y \, (x \rightarrow y) \, .$$

Clearly, such a move constitutes a logical fallacy. Further, supposing that – even though there is nothing logically binding that would force us to accept a termination of a succession of elements (say, natural numbers) $x_1 \rightarrow x_2 \rightarrow x_3 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow x_n$ and concede that no further augmentation of it is possible, viz. that no x_{n+1} is possible – a series of phenomena or events does have its end, it does not follow that the culmination of a series is necessarily somehow qualitatively different from all the elements that precede it (for instance, that at the end of the series of white things there exists a thing the whiteness

of which is qualitatively different from all the preceding whitnesses, not only quantitatively). To apply this refutation to the case of the Jaina argument from progression (for instance, a gradation of purer and purer cognitions which terminate in omniscience), one can *logically* admit a gradual quantitative augmentation (progression) of clearness of perception without necessarily any *qualitative* change of the final member of the series.

The argument from progression is logically flawed, although it is not circular like the previous argument, i.e. the argument from efficacy of the teaching.

Incidentally, there is an interesting difference to be noted in view of *necessity* either entailed or not entailed by the arguments. In the versions of the cosmological argument the antecedent (first cause, prime mover, etc.) to be inferred is of necessary character: in the argument from contingency, the range of contingent entities require the existence of a non-contingent being, which is necessary; in a causal chain or in the world of things undergoing movement, the first cause (which is not itself dependent on any other cause) or the unmoved mover (which is not itself dependent on any other mover), respectively, etc., is necessary in itself (*a se*).[29] The consequent can also be taken to be necessary also in another sense: without it the causal series or the series of things possessed of movement, or the range of contingent beings, etc., could possibly not exist, hence it turns out to be a required condition for all things in a given series (not necessarily for all the things in the world) to exist. However, no such necessity is ever involved in Jaina arguments from progression: omniscience is merely *possible*, not necessary, and the world can and does exist without any omniscient being, a belief that finds its expression in Jaina cosmology of the universe only occasionally inhabited by Tīrthaṅkaras (only 24 in each era).

8. Similar structure based on the idea of gradation of attributes or progression, albeit not phrased explicitly as an argument, can be

[29] See the discussion on necessity understood either as necessity *a se* or necessity *ab aliter* in Plantinga (1967: 8ff.).

found also in Buddhist works, e.g. with Dharmakīrti, at least with reference to the unique character of supernatural perception accomplished through meditation. It is intimated in the following *sūtra*:

> *Yogin*'s cognition is produced by culmination of the intensity of contemplation of existing objects.[30]

In short, uninterrupted spiritual practice and meditation on real entities, which are understood by the commentators primarily as the four noble truths,[31] leads to their culmination in the form of supernatural perception.

What at first seems like an innocuous definition of supernatural perception achievable to an adept of *yoga* does have a hidden argumentative structure and serves to prove that such a perception of a *yogin*, i.e. supernatural perception, is a case of genuine perception, viz. it is valid, because it is a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*). Clearly, one might rise a doubt as to how could possibly a cognition which does not depend on sense organs, etc., i.e. which does not possess basic features of perception proper, be a genuine kind of perception, *ergo* fulfil the criteria of a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), the question being extremely relevant when it comes to the nature of the cognition of an adept of meditative practice who contemplates the four basic truths of Buddhism. If it were not a genuine kind of perception, all the resultant cognitions gained through meditation would be invalid, as explicitly expressed by Vinītadeva: 'And that is why, it is regarded as an instrument of valid perception.'[32] In his gloss on the

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[30] NB 1.11: *bhūtârtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ yogi-jñānaṃ cêti*.

[31] See (1) NBṬ(Dh) 1.11, p. 67.3–4: ***bhūtaḥ*** *sadbhūto 'rthaḥ. pramāṇena dṛṣṭaś ca sadbhūtaḥ. yathā catvāry āryasatyāni*; (2) DhPr 1.11, p. 67.11–12: *anena* ***bhūtârtha****-śabdenâtra satya-catuṣṭayaṃ vivakṣitam iti darśitam*; and (3) NBṬ(V)$_1$ 1.10, p. 108, in the translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya: '[The expression *bhūtārtha* means literally], objects as they are in reality, i.e. "not opposite to what is their actual nature" (*aviparīta*) – [in other words], the four "noble truths" (*āryasatya*)'; NBṬ(V)$_1$ 1.10, p. 11: *bhūto 'viparīto 'rtha* [*iti bhutârthaḥ*]. *catvāry āryasatyāni*; NBṬ(V)$_2$: *yang dag pa ni phyin ci ma log pa'i don te, 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi po dag go*.

[32] Translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, NBṬ(V)$_1$ 1.10, p. 108;

Nyāya-bindu passage, he further provides an explicit argument to prove the 'pramāṇic' status of supernatural perception a *yogin* can attain:

> Here is the inferential form [of the argument]: the knowledge of the great *yogin*-s having their minds fixed, which relates to the past and the future objects is an instrument of valid cognition, because it is the cause of rightly indicating the nature of the innumerable past and future objects, as for instance, the knowledge of one possessed by a demon or a spirit. Whatever knowledge is not a real instrument of valid cognition is not the cause of rightly indicating the nature of innumerable past and future objects, as for instance, the knowledge of an insane person.[33]

Such a manifestly argumentative vein transpires also from Durvekamiśra's comment:

> Just like one kind of cognition of one kind of [an object such as], say, a pot or cloth ,etc., which has not been meditated upon but is placed in the proximity is perception which grasps a very clear form [of the

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NBṬ(V)$_1$ 1.10, p. 11: *tasmāt pratyakṣa-pramāṇatvam iṣyate.* NBṬ(V)$_2$: *de lta bas na mngon sum gyi tshad mar ʾdod do*.

[33] Translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, NBṬ(V)$_1$, p. 108–109; NBṬ(V)$_1$, p. 11: *atra prayogaḥ – yogêśvarāṇām ekâgracittānāṃ jñānaṃ bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-viṣayakaṃ pramāṇam ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-jātasya abhrāntôpadarśana-hetutvāt, bhūta-graha-viśeṣâviṣṭa-jñānavat. yan na prāmāṇikaṃ tan nâmeya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-jātasyâbhrāntôpadarśana-hetuḥ, yathônmatta-jñānam. aprāpakasyâpy ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-jātasyâbhrāntôpadarśana-hetutve ʾyogyam apakārakam [api] pramāṇaṃ syāt. dambha-mātrenâmeyasya [padārthasya] abhrāntôpadarśanaṃ hi na sambhavati*. NBṬ(V)$_2$: *ʾdir sbyor ba ni sems rtse gcig pa lhag pa med pa thob pa rnal ʾbyor baʾi dbang phyug rnams kyi shes pas dngos po byung ba dang ʾbyung bar ʾgyur baʾi yul dang ldan pa ni byung ba dang ʾbyung bar ʾgyur baʾi dngos po dpag tu med pa dag ma nor bar ston paʾi rgyu yin paʾi phyir tshad ma yin te ʾbyung po dang gdon khyad par can babs paʾi shes pa bzhin no. gang dag tshad mar mi rung ba bzhin byung ba dang ʾbyung bar ʾgyur baʾi dngos po dpag tu med pa dag ma nor bar ston paʾi rgyur yang mi ʾgyur te, dper na smyon paʾi shes pa bzhin no. thob par byed pa med na byung ba dang ʾbyung bar ʾgyur baʾi dngos po dpag tu med pa dag ma nor bar ston paʾi rgyu nyid du mi ʾthad pa ni gnod par byed paʾi tshad maʾi don yin no. ʾdod rgyal gyis ni bdag tu med pa ma nor bar ston mi srid do*.

> object], in the same manner the cognition which grasps a very clear form of an object which is being meditated upon is *yogin*'s [supernatural] perception.[34]

The passage of the *Nyāya-bindu*, which at first glance does not look like an argument *sensu stricto*, reveals however the same inner structure as the argument from progression and supplies the nucleus of a proof of the validity of the *yogi-pratyakṣa*, which in its crudest form would assume the following formulation:

> Supernatural perception is possible (or: is a genuine case of valid perception as cognitive criterion), because it can be achieved by completion (perfection) of practice (meditation).

Dharmottara explains that 'contemplation of (meditation on) an entity is a recurrent (lit. again and again) reflection on it,'[35] and emphasises progression that finally leads to supernatural perception, by emphatically dividing the process into three stages:[36] the completion (intensity) of contemplation (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*), the apogee of the intensity (*prakarṣa-paryantâvasthā*) and, ultimately, *yogin*'s perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) as the final stage:

> The intensity of contemplation is the beginning of [the process in which] cognition [the contents of which is] the image of the object being contemplated represents [this object] in a clear way. The culmination of the intensity [in such a contemplation] is when the representation of [the object] in a clear way with ultimate intensity is almost complete. For as long as the representation of [the object] in a clear way is not absolutely complete, there is a progression of the intensity of such a

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[34] DhPr 1.11, p. 68.16–18: *yathânyasyâbhāvitasya nikaṭasthasya ghaṭa-gha(pa)ṭâda(de)r anya-jñānaṃ sphuṭatarâkāra-grāhi pratyakṣaṃ tad-vad bhāvyamānârtha-sphuṭatarâkāra-grāhi* ***yaj jñānaṃ*** *tad* ***yoginaḥ pratyakṣam***.

[35] NBṬ 1.11, p. 67.5: *bhūtasya bhāvanā punaḥ punaś cetasi viniveśanam*.

[36] Cf. Nagasaki (1988: 349–350). For further description of the three stages see NBṬ(Dh) 1.11, pp. 68.4–69.2. However, Vinītadeva in his *Ṭīkā* distinguishes four stages: NBṬ(V)$_1$ 1.10, p. 10: *smṛty-upasthānôṣmagata-mūrdha-kṣantayaḥ;* NBṬ(V)$_2$: *dran pa nye bar gzhag pa dang, dro bar gyur pa dang, rtze mo dang, bzod pa'i gnas skabs so*; cf. Stcherbatsky (1930 II: 31, n. 2) and Nagasaki (1988: 350–354).

> [contemplation, i.e. the intensity can progress]. But when [it is] complete, then there is no progression of intensity [any more]. Therefore, the state prior to the state of complete [representation] is called the culmination of the intensity of the representation of [the object] in a clear way. Such a cognition which is produced by this culmination [of intensity and] which grasps a very clear form of the object that is being contemplated as if it were immediately present [in front of the contemplator] is *yogin*'s perception.[37]

Of particular interest in the present context is the description of the growth of intensity (*prakarṣa-gamana*) which advances by progression, i.e. in a sequence of states which are more and more intense: $x_1 \rightarrow x_2 \rightarrow x_3 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow x_n$, until the intensity reaches its culmination. When this culmination point is fully completed (*saṃpūrṇa*), the progression is exhausted (*nâsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ*), viz. no x_{n+1} is possible any more. Such a condition, achieved through the culmination of progression, is qualitatively different from all the preceding stages. The adept achieves a novel cognitive state, in which he perceives 'all kinds of objects meditated upon – past, future, distant, obstructed (*sāntara*) and of an atomic magnitude.' And, as Vinītadeva argues, such a novel cognitive state, in being 'the cause of rightly indicating the nature of the innumerable past and future objects,' is comparable to the ultimate realisation of truth:

> Or, for example, in the instructions of Lord Buddha, we find various prophecies – which are not contradicted – regarding the ten future signs (*bhāvidaśanimitta*), the attainment of truth (*satyopalabdhi*), Mātṛceṭa, Kālakṣaya, King Aśoka and countries like Āśāvana, Kashmir, etc.[38]

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[37] NBṬ(Dh) 1.11, p. 67.5–68.3: *bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣo bhāvyamānârthâbhāsasya jñānasya sphuṭâbhatvârambhaḥ. prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭâbhatvam īṣad asaṃpūrṇaṃ bhavati. yāvad dhi sphuṭâbhatvam aparipūrṇaṃ tāvat tasya prakarṣa-gamanam. sampūrṇaṃ tu yadā tadā nâsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ. tataḥ sampūrṇâvasthāyāḥ prāktany avasthā sphuṭâbhatva-prakarṣa-paryanta ucyate. tasmāt paryantād yaj jātaṃ bhāvyamānasyârthasya sannihitasyêva sphuṭatarâkāra-grāhi jñānaṃ yoginaḥ pratyakṣam*.

[38] Translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, NBṬ(V)$_1$, p. 109; NBṬ(V)$_1$, p. 12: *yathā vā bhagavataḥ śākya-siddher upadeśe bhāvi-daśa-nimitta-satyôpalabdhi-mātṛceṭa-kāla-kṣaya-rājâśokâdy-āśāvana-kaśmīrâdi-*

Of course, the above argument, encapsulated in the definition of supernatural perception, did not, in the Buddhist context, lead one to accept the existence of a divine being endowed with perfect qualities, like it was the case with the Jaina argument from progression, but merely to accept the possibility of the existence of supernatural perception, a preliminary step towards ultimate Buddhahood.

9. Among the verses from Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* quoted above, we come across a more interesting line of reasoning to prove the *necessity* of an omniscient being:

> Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant are [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire, etc. [is inferable from perceived smoke] – such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].[39]

The argument is in fact enthymematic, inasmuch as one more premise is missing: everything which is inferable (*anumeya*) is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*). It hinges on an assumption, fundamental among Indian thinkers, that inference relates the logical subject P (*pakṣa*) to a quality S (*sādhya*) which is not directly perceived at a given moment on the basis of a quality H (*hetu*) which *is* directly perceived at a given moment and a relation (*vyāpti*) which is known to obtain between S and H. Clearly, the converse of the relation ('everything which is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) is inferable (*anumeya*)') does not necessarily hold, i.e. there can be things which can be directly seen but one cannot establish any invariable connection between them and other things on the basis of which we could refer to them, whereas to have any valid inference both S and H have to be observed at least once either simultaneously or in a sequence and

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deśâgamā aviparītā upalabhyante. NBṬ(V)$_2$: *yang dper na bcom ldan 'das shā kya thub pa'i bstan pa la ma 'ongs pa'i ltas bcu lung bstan pa bden par dmigs pa dang ma la sogs lung bstan pa dang dus 'gring bar lung bstan pa dang rgyal po mya ngan med la sogs pa lung bstan pa dang re ba'i tshal dang kha che la sogs pa'i yul phyin ci ma log par lung bstan pa dam bcas pa dmigs pa lta bu'o*.

39 *sūkṣmântarita-dūrârthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā |*
anumeyatvato 'gny-ādir iti sarva-jña-saṃsthitiḥ // ĀMī 5

their (simultaneous or consecutive) co-occurrence cannot be coincidental.

Since the existence of objects which are subtle, concealed from our sight and are distant from us either in space or time (being past or future), *can* be inferred, and since everything which *can* be inferred *can* be perceived, these objects *must* be perceived by someone, ergo there *must* be someone who perceives them. I would call this line of reasoning the 'argument from potentiality,' or the argument from the potentiality of being perceived, to be exact.

This argument from potentiality finds its other formulations with certain modifications in the centuries to follow. Hemacandra, whose *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* alongside the auto-commentary hardly contains any new argument but recycles the ingenuity of his predecessors, makes use of the same idea, albeit with one significant difference:

> Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are cognisable in a valid way (*prameya*), like a pot.[40]

He may have been aware of the enthymematic character of the original formulation (the transition from *anumeya* to *pratyakṣa*), or at least may have felt a bit uncomfortable about it, and that might be why he replaced 'inferable' with 'cognisable' (*prameya*), which comprises both 'perceptible' and 'inferable.'

Interestingly, the argument (in both formulations) mixes up two modalities: (1) possibility, potentiality or probability and (2) necessity, or determination. The essential terms in the reasoning are the gerundives *anumeya* (Samantabhadra) / *prameya* (Hemacandra), on the one hand, and, on the other, *pratyakṣa*. Further, the crucial step in the line of reasoning is the equation 'x *can* be perceived' with 'x *must* be perceived.' Clearly, from 'x *can* be perceived' as such it is not necessity or actuality ('x is actually perceived') which follows but rather mere possibility or absence of necessity.

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[40] PMīV 1.16 § 55 (p. 14): *sūkṣmântarita-dūrârthāḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ prameyatvād ghaṭavad iti*.

Such a step from possibility to actuality or necessity in this case could be accounted for by a common confusion of modalities in India. There are two basic grammatical structures in Sanskrit which express the modalities, and these are the gerundive (future passive participle), formed with the *kṛtya* affixes, and optative (potential) mode formed with *liṅ* suffixes; and their meanings basically overlap.[41]

The gerundive expresses necessity and possibility, but also obligation, since Vedic times and, as J.S. Speijer (1886: 277–278) rightly remarked long ago, the gerundives 'signify not only that which one is *obliged* to do or what is *prescribed* to be done, but also what must happen *by necessity* or that which is *fit*, *expected*, *likely* to happen.' Their meanings are roughly grouped in the following classes by Pāṇini:

(a) command, i.e. instruction, ordinance, direction, urging, ordering (*praiṣa*, *preṣaṇa*; A 3.3.164 and Kāś ad loc.),

(b) permission, consent / approval to follow desired action (*atisarga* / *kāmacārâbhyanujñāna*; A 3.3.164 and Kāś ad loc.),

(c) temporal appropriateness, i.e. proper time [for something] / the point of time which is the ground [to do something] (*prāpta-kāla* / *nimitta-bhūtasya kālasyâvasaraḥ*; A 3.3.164 and Kāś ad loc.),

(d) respect, i.e. '[action carried out] with respect to a worthy, deserving [agent]' / propriety, 'fitness with regard to a worthy [person]' (*arhe* / *arhatîty arhas tad-yogyaḥ*; A 3.3.169 and Kāś ad loc.),

(e) necessity, i.e. action of necessity, something necessary, inevitable / necessary state, compulsion (*āvaśyaka* / *avaśyaṃ bhāvaḥ*; A 3.1.125 and A 3.3.170–171 and Kāś ad loc.),

(f) being indebted, indebtedness (*ādhamarṇya*; A 3.3.170–171 and Kāś ad loc.),

(g) possibility, i.e. in the sense of the verb 'to be able' (*śak*; A 3.3.171–172 and Kāś ad loc.).

[41] See e.g. Hock (1985–86: 82–84).

Further, as it has been noted now and again, the gerundives are optatives (potentials) by default.[42] Their meanings do not only overlap with those of the optatives but their functions present passive-like alternatives to the imperative and subjunctive modes, to the construction of the verb root *arh* with infinitive and to the future.[43]

The optative mood formed with the *liṅ* suffixes of the *sarvadhātuka* type (as distinguished from *ardhadhātuka* type, i.e. benedictive or precative), carries the following meanings:

(a) command, i.e. injunction, ordinance, direction (*vidhi*; A 3.3.161),

(b) possibility, or an action which is qualified with the verb 'to be able,' 'to be capable to do something' (*śak*; A 3.3.172),

(c) expectation or hope (*āśaṃsā*; A 3.3.134),

(d) probability, possibility (*sambhāvana*; A 3.3.155).

No doubt, when one and the same grammatical device can express both possibility and necessity, ambiguity may follow as long as the exact context is not determined.

Precisely such ambiguity plays a crucial role in the argument from potentiality, which runs through the following steps:

Premise: Objects which are subtle, concealed from sight and distant are inferable (*anumeya*; possibility: 'can be inferred'; Samantabhadra), or cognisable (*prameya*; possibility: 'can be cognised'; Hemacandra).

Step 2: Everything which is inferable (*anumeya*; possibility: 'can be inferred') or cognisable (*prameya*; possibility: 'can be cognised') is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*; possibility: 'can be perceived').

Step 3: These objects are perceived by someone (*pratyakṣa*; necessity: 'must be perceived' or actuality: 'are').

Conclusion: There must (actuality: 'is,' or necessity: 'must be') someone who perceives them, and that person is omniscient, the Jina.

A similar kind of argument is found also with Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa, albeit styled rather as a kind of *reductio*:

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[42] Jamison (1984), Kiparsky (2005: 30–31); cf. Walle (1993: 389ff.).

[43] Walle (1993: 390).

> If the cognition of a thing which is absolutely imperceptible is not possible, how is it possible that there is unanimity among people about, say, astronomy? If it is said: because of testimony, that furnishes another proof [of the existence of an omniscient being].[44]

The *reductio* based on the argument from potentiality runs as follows:

> Premise 1: Things which are absolutely imperceptible (e.g. subtle or distant) cannot be cognised.
>
> Premise 2: People (e.g. astronomers) know of some things (e.g. celestial bodies, etc.) which are absolutely imperceptible to humans.
>
> Premise 3: They have this knowledge supplied by someone or from the scripture.
>
> Conclusion 1: Premise 1 has to be abandoned.
>
> Conclusion 2: That 'someone' who provides the knowledge of imperceptible things must be omniscient.

Despite the fact that the *reductio* does contain the argument from potentiality explicitly, it is hidden in the transition from 'absolutely imperceptible' (*atyanta-parokṣa*) to the assumption that people do have knowledge about such seemingly imperceptible things (*jñānâvisaṃvāda*), namely they either infer their existence or obtain it through testimony, viz. they have access to it via another cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) which requires the existence of someone who *must* have a direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) of the imperceptibles, which are in fact perceptible to those who are capable of perceiving them.

As we have seen, the argument from potentiality is a clear case of equivocation, in which one and the same term *pratyakṣa* ('perceivable') is used in two different meanings which convey two different modalities: possibility ('can be perceived') and necessity ('must be perceived'), *ergo* the argument presents a logical fallacy.

Was such a confusion of modalities in the argument intentional? The reply could hardly be conclusive, but the very fact that the ge-

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[44] *dhīr atyanta-parokṣe 'rthe na cet puṃsāṃ kutaḥ punaḥ /*
jyotir-jñānâvisaṃvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanântaram // SVi 8.2, p. 526

rundives and optatives functioned in an ambivalent manner could provide a fertile ground for such ambiguity.

There is one more problem with this argument, namely circularity. How do we know that there exist objects which are so subtle that we cannot perceive them (e.g. atoms or karmic matter), or are permanently concealed from *our* sight or are so distant that we can never see them, and we will never be able to know them directly, i.e. we will never have any 'direct cognitive access' to them? The answer would be, as Akalaṅka maintains: because we know of them from the statements of the omniscient, i.e. from scriptural testimony (*śruta*). How do the omniscients know these objects? Because they perceive them directly. How do we know that the omniscient perceive these things directly? Because they tell us.

It is difficult to say when such an argument was phrased for the first time, but its forerunner may be the following verse by Kundakunda:

> All objects, along with their various qualities and modes, are established through the scripture. So, the ascetics know them all (*api*) with the help of the scripture, having seen them directly.[45]

In other words, among all objects there are some which are perceptible to humans and others which are not. Since knowledge of them is possible they must be perceptible to someone, namely to an omniscient being who is the author of the scripture. Ascetics who follow the Jina's path first know of these objects from the scripture but then, with the growth of their spiritual practice, they can also perceive some of them directly.

The argument from potentiality presents an interesting parallel to George Berkeley's principle: *esse est percipi aut percipere*, albeit not based on extreme idealism. For Berkeley, the ultimate perceiver is the guarantor of the existence of entities whose existence depended on someone perceiving them: since 'to be is to be perceived or to perceive,' things exist as long as they are perceived, their existence

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[45] *savve āgama-siddhā atthā guṇa-pajjaehiṃ cittehiṃ |*
jāṇaṃti āgameṇa hi pecchittā te vi te samaṇā || PSā 3.35

being contingent on someone observing them; since they are not always perceived by humans, they would cease to exist once nobody perceives them, which is not the case inasmuch as they are perennially perceived by god. For the Jainas, however, the omniscient is the guarantor of the truth of human knowledge of things whose existence is beyond human perception, inasmuch as knowledge of things depends on their being perceived.

10. An interesting variant of the argument from potentiality, beside a number of other arguments, is formulated by Haribhadra-sūri (ca 740–800) in his *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya*. In a sequence of verses he retorts to an objection, apparently made by a Mīmāṃsaka, that the existence of an omniscient being, and consequently the validity of Jaina teachings, cannot be proved by any of the existing six cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*). In a passage that is a good summary of the present discussion on rational attempts to justify the truth claims of the Jaina teachings, he presents five consecutive arguments,[46] each appealing to a different cognitive criterion. The first of them is precisely the variant of the argument from potentiality:

> [593] Both righteousness, etc. (i.e. unrighteousness), are directly perceptible because they are cognisable objects, like [material things] such as pots, etc. It is not the case that there is no inference [to prove an omniscient being]: there must be someone for whom all this is [cognisable].[47]

In previously analysed formulations of the argument the omniscient Jina allegedly was the guarantor of our knowledge of objects which are extremely subtle, permanently concealed from our sight and beyond our reach, because *he* can perceive them directly and convey his knowledge to us through, say, the scripture. To the catalogue of the entities which are essentially imperceptible to humans, Haribhadra adds two more items: righteousness (*dharma*) and unrigh-

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[46] One of them encapsulated in verse 594 has already been discussed above § 2.

[47] *dharmâdayo 'pi câdhyakṣā jñeya-bhāvād ghaṭâdivat |*
kasyacit sarva evêti nânumānaṃ na vidyate || ŚVS 593

teousness (*adharma*), in this context understood in the pan-Indian way: as the moral law and its opposite, not in the uniquely Jaina way of the principles of movement and rest. Haribhadra's interpretation adds a completely new dimension to the argument: the omniscient being who directly perceives two moral principles also directly knows what is good and what is wrong, and conveys his knowledge to humans through the scripture. In this sense, directly knowing good and wrong, he becomes in addition both the source and guarantor of all the morality and the ultimate moral instance without which humans would have no moral criteria to judge their conduct and the happenings in the world.

A variant which combines a few approaches is supposed to exemplify how presumption (*arthâpatti*) can be used to prove the existence of an omniscient being and, by implication, his authority:

> [597] One accepts [the existence of an omniscient being] also through presumption based on the scripture which [provides] the knowledge of extra-sensory things [such as righteousness and unrighteousness, etc.][48] [which would not be possible without an omniscient being]. Otherwise no confidence in extra-sensory things [such as righteousness, etc.] would arise for a person in the state of bondage.[49]

In brief, the idea of presumption[50] is that we have to postulate the existence of an *x* without which *y* would not be possible; in this case:

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[48] After SVK, vol. 7, p. 78.3: ***atīndriya-gater*** *dharmâdharmâdi-paricchedāt*. Yaśovijaya takes *atīndriya-gateḥ* as an adjectival attributive compound (*bahu-vrīhi*), characterising *śāstrāt*, both in the ablative. However, *atīndriya-gateḥ* could be the genitive, and in such case we could translate: 'through presumption concerning the knowledge of extra-sensory things [such as righteousness and unrighteousness, etc.] derived from the scripture [which would not be possible without an omniscient being].'

[49] *śāstrād atīndriya-gater arthâpattyâpi gamyate |*
anyathā tatra nâśvāsaś chadma-sthasyôpajāyate || ŚVS 596

[50] For its definition see, e.g., MŚV 5.7 (*arthâpatti-pariccheda*) 1 (p. 320):

pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto yatrârtho nânyathā bhavet |
adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayed anyaṃ sârthâpattir udāhṛtā ||

A case [of reasoning] in which an object, which [is already] known

one has to postulate the existence of an omniscient being as an author of the scripture because the scripture that teaches about extra-sensory things (or alternatively: the knowledge of extra-sensory things derived from the scripture), especially – as Haribhadra believes – of righteousness (moral law), would not be possible without the existence of a being who knows these extra-sensory things (and such a being has to be, of course, omniscient); and it is an accepted fact that the scripture does provide full knowledge of extra-sensory things.

It is quite surprising to find yet another straightforwardly circular argument, this time based on analogy (*upamāna*):

> [595] When one recognises an [omniscient being in one case] due to complete settlement of doubts in one's own heart, reasoning by analogy [can take place] as regards the recognition of other persons as such (i.e. omniscient), not as regards anything else and not in any other way.[51]

Once we could find all the answers to our questions and doubts cleared by a person who apparently knows all the answers, *ergo* an omniscient being, we can easily conclude on any similar occasion that such a person must also be omniscient. The problem, however, remains how to determine omniscience in the first case.

The sequence of Haribhadra's arguments for the existence of an omniscient being, and by implication his authority, concludes with an argument based on the negative proof (*abhāva*), or absence as negative proof:

> [597] Therefore, [the thesis] of the inapplicability of the quintuplet of the cognitive criteria to [prove the existence of] an [omniscient being] does not make sense.[52] To say, "nevertheless [one should apply] a proof

through [any of] the six cognitive criteria, could not occur otherwise, [and on the basis of it] another unseen [object] is assumed, is called presumption.

[51] *hṛd-gatâśeṣa-saṃśīti-nirṇayāt tad-grahe punaḥ |*
upamânya-grahe tatra na cânyatrâpi cânyathā || ŚVS 595

[52] In other words, one cannot justifiably claim that it is not possible to prove the existence of an omniscient being with the help of the five cognitive criteria.

> based on (lit. the validity of) absence [as negative proof as regards the existence of an omniscient being]," reveals the blindness of one's thoughts.[53]

In other words, the omniscient being is there to see, and if the opponent reasons that if there were an omniscient being we could see him, he demonstrates his blindness.

What links all of the arguments found in Haribhadra's *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya* 593–597 and 626, i.e. those discussed just above as well as the one described in § 2, is that they primarily intent to prove the existence of an omniscient being and generally take it for granted that if someone is omniscient, he must by definition be authoritative.

11. There is still another peculiar argument based on presumption (*arthâpatti*) to be discussed. It is introduced by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa in his *Siddhi-viniścaya*, and we could call it the argument from the impossibility of inference:

> Therefore, such a being who is a conscious subject, a knower and whose essence is apprehension, is – inasmuch as his impediments [to absolute knowledge] are dissolved – omniscient at every moment, a knower of all objects, because how else could the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) be grasped, inasmuch as it is cognised without one coming into direct contact with it?[54]

In other words, there must be an omniscient being, because otherwise the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) could never be grasped and, implicitly, we would never be able to infer anything. Clearly, to know the relation of invariable concomitance, one would be required to know all the cases when it holds and all the cases when it does not, other solutions such as the models based on the relation of causality (*tad-utpatti*) and the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*), etc., being unsatisfactory. However, suggests Akalaṅka,

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53 *pramāṇa-pañcakâvṛttir evaṃ tatra na yujyate |*
tathâpy abhāva-prāmāṇyam iti dhy-āndhya-vijṛmbhitam || ŚVS 597

54 *tad ayaṃ cetano jñātā saṃvedanâtmā pratikṣaṇam |*
tat-pratibandha-viśleṣe sarva-jñaḥ sarvârtha-dṛk || SVi 8.37
anyathâprāpya-kāritvāt kuto vyāpti-graho yataḥ | SVi 8.38ab, p. 580

it is a solid fact that we do use *valid* invariable concomitances in our reasoning all the time, even though we grasp them without coming into direct contact with it. This means apparently that we derive our knowledge of invariable concomitances from a reliable source, and that source must be an omniscient being. Further, such an omniscient being is, incidentally, also capable of efficiently sharing his knowledge with humans and he is reliable.

There is more than one problem with this argument, but it suffices to mention three. The first is the circularity involved: The omniscient being knows all relations of invariable concomitance in a valid way. He is a source of our knowledge of relations of invariable concomitance on the basis of which we are capable of drawing inferences. Further, we can draw an inference to the effect that an omniscient being exists because we rely on an invariable concomitance that 'whoever is omniscient knows all relations.' We can reliably know of this invariable concomitance from… the omniscient being. The second is the assumption that all, or at least most of the inferences we draw are based on absolutely valid invariable concomitances. The third difficulty is that Akalaṅka's reasoning would subordinate inference (*anumāna*) to, or subsume it under verbal cognition or scripture (*śabda*), because all invariable concomitances which play vital role in our reasoning would have to be derived from scripture. At first it would, perhaps, resemble the situation in which Diṅnāga, in the fifth chapter of his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, treats testimony (*śabda*) as a variety of inference:

> Verbal cognition is not an additional cognitive criterion, different from inference, because it names its object through [the procedure known as] "exclusion of the other" in the same way as [the inference: "*x* is impermanent, because it is produced", determines its object to have the quality of "impermanence" on the basis of the already known quality of] "being produced," etc.[55]

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[55] *na pramāṇântaraṃ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat |*
kṛtakatvâdivat svârtham anyâpohena bhāṣate || PS 5.1

The original acc. to *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (ed. Shastri 1981) 539.22–23. Cf. the translation in: Hayes (1988: 300), Herzberger (1986: 145–146) and Pind (2009: 76).

That would not be such a surprising move in view of the fact that Akalaṅka treated inference (*anumāna*), verbal cognition, etc., as sub-varieties of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), essentially different from direct cognition, or perception (*pratyakṣa*):

> Perception is clear cognition, [divided] into primary and conventional, [whereas] indirect cognition [comprises all] remaining [types of] cognition. Thus, by way of summary, there are two cognitive criteria.[56]

However, Akalaṅka's move would imply that ultimately all inferences have to be derived from scripture, and there could be no inference which is scripturally not attested: we could not validly infer anything unless we have already gathered that knowledge from a valid testimonial source: both an absurdity and a clear overlap of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*).

12. Let me return to the argument from progression, perhaps the type most uniquely Jain. It is not a coincidence, as I shall argue, that the Jainas employed this argumentative structure to prove the omniscience of the Jina and the infallibility of his teachings, whereas it has never been the case to my knowledge that the Buddhist argued in a similar vein to prove the wisdom (*prajñā*) of the Buddha and the truth of his Dharma.

As we know, the Jainas traditionally distinguished five kinds of cognition:[57] sensuous cognition (*mati*), testimonial cognition (*śruta*), clairvoyance (*avadhi*), telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya*), absolute knowledge (*kevala*). On numerous occasions, e.g. in the case of Umāsvāmin's *Tattvârtha-sūtra*, we can also see that these cognitions were traditionally arranged vertically according to their increasing purity. The most basic of all is sensuous cognition (*mati*), on which testimonial cognition (*śruta*) rests.[58] These two are cases of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). Clairvoyance (*avadhi*), or non-sensory

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[56] *pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānaṃ mukhya-saṃvyavahārataḥ | parokṣaṃ śeṣa-vijñānaṃ pramāṇa iti saṅgrahaḥ* || LT 3

[57] *Locus classicus* is TSū 1.9.

[58] TSū 1.20: *śrutaṃ mati-pūrvam.*

perception of distant objects is superior to them, at the same time being the lowest kind of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). Still superior is telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya*), or reading in other people's minds: 'The difference between clairvoyance and telepathy lies in purity, range, possessor and scope.'[59] Further, there are two sub-varieties of telepathy arranged according to their purity: simple (*ṛju-mati*) and extensive (*vipula-mati*),[60] and even these are arranged hierarchically: 'The difference between these [two kinds of telepathy] is due to their purity and incessant character.'[61] The culmination of this cognitive sequence is absolute knowledge (*kevala*), which apprehends all substances and all modes of all things, present, past and future.[62] To say that absolute knowledge grasps all substances and modes not only indicates the range of this cognition but also implies its highest level of subtlety, because it must, by necessity, apprehend even the subtlest objects which cannot be perceived with the help of clairvoyance or telepathy. The hierarchy is explicitly and repeatedly indicated in numerous works, from early ones such as Kundakunda's *Samaya-sāra*:

> Sensuous cognition, testimonial cognition, clairvoyance, telepathy, absolute knowledge are one and the same state. When that which is the ultimate is attained, there arises liberation;[63]

and the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*:

> Monks have scripture for eyes, all beings have their sense organs for eyes, whereas the divine beings have clairvoyance for eyes. However the liberated beings have eyes that see everything;[64]

to much later ones, such as Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

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[59] TSū 1.26: *viśuddhi-kṣetra-svāmi-viṣayebhyo 'vadhi-manaḥ-paryāyayoḥ*.

[60] TSū 1.24: *ṛju-vipula-matī manaḥ-paryāyaḥ.*

[61] TSū 1.25: *viśuddhy-apratipātābhyāṃ tad-viśeṣaḥ*.

[62] TSū 1.30: *sarva-dravya-paryāyeṣu kevalasya.*

[63] *abhiṇi-sudôhi-maṇa-kevalaṃ ca taṃ hodi ekkam eva padaṃ |*
so eso paramaṭṭho jaṃ lahiduṃ ṇivvudiṃ jādi || SSā 204

[64] *āgama-cakkhū sāhū iṃdiya-cakkhūṇi savva-bhūdāṇi |*
devā ya ohi-cakkhū siddhā puṇa savvado-cakkhū || PSā 3.34

> Clairvoyance and telepathy are the gradations (sc. varieties of lower degrees) of the [absolute knowledge (*kevala*)].
>
> [Commentary:] Absolute knowledge occurs when all karmic veils are dissolved completely. When there are gradations in the degree of such a dissolution of karmic veils, the dissolution being characterised by different kinds of destruction-cum-subsidence[65] of karmic veils, occasioned by this [process] there occurs clairvoyance, or clairvoyant cognition, and telepathy, or telepathic cognition, i.e. [two kinds of] primary, extra-sensory perception.[66]

The hierarchical arrangement of five cognitions in Jainism reflects the idea of progression: the purity increases in the subsequent stages until it reaches its consummation in a cognitive state of absolute purity. Interestingly, the fivefold hierarchical classification of cognitions is one of the most ancient elements of Jaina epistemology, which means that the *idea* or main constituents of the argument from progression were somehow dormant right from the moment the classification was adopted by the Jainas.

As I have remarked elsewhere,[67] the fivefold classification of all cognitions into these five types was probably the earliest development in Jaina epistemological tradition preserved to us. These varieties, it seems, were accepted in Jainism from a very early point and the classification was there already at a relatively early canonical stage. Since the background for the classification was not epistemological but religious and doctrinal, the classification lacked consistence. What was important, however, in the vertical scheme of cognitions was that the increasing purity and subtlety of cognitions reflected the growing inner purity of the soul (*jīva*, *ātman*), which was understood not only as the cognitive subject proper but as the perceiving organ *per se*, or the 'living eye' (*akṣa*). Jaina litera-

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[65] One of five karmic states.

[66] PMī 1.18 and PMīV 1.18 § 64 (p. 17): ***tat-tāratamye 'vadhi-manaḥ-paryāyau ca****. sarvathâvaraṇa-vilaye kevalam, tasyâvaraṇa-vilayasya* ***tāratamya*** *āvaraṇa-kṣayôpaśama-viśeṣe tan-nimittako* ***'vadhir*** *avadhi-jñānaṃ* ***manaḥ-paryāyo*** *manaḥ-paryāya-jñānaṃ ca mukhyam indriyânapekṣaṃ pratyakṣam*.

[67] Balcerowicz (forthcoming, § 2).

ture abounds in statements to that effect, and it suffices to mention here just a few examples that the soul is 'made of cognition,'[68] 'is co-extensive with cognition'[69] and is 'a being who is a conscious subject, a knower and whose essence is apprehension,'[70] for 'the one who cognises is cognition; the soul does not become a cogniser through cognition.'[71] The soul played a pivotal role in Jaina ethics and soteriology: all actions, including cognitive activity, were ultimately performed by it, whereas the mind, speech and body alongside the sense organs were treated only as the soul's instruments. The emphasis on soul being the perceiving organ was reflected in the terminology which the Jainas employed and which went against all Indian tradition, especially in using the term *parokṣa* to denote *sensory* perception, *pratyakṣa* being reserved for all cognitive activities performed by the soul directly without the mediation of senses and the mind.

Since the rudiments of the argument from progression for omniscience and for the authority of the omniscient being are also present in the early strata of *philosophical* writings of the Jainas, this cannot be a mere coincidence. Jaina thinkers either were inspired by the hierarchy of cognitions which had already been there in their system, or, which is less probable, while devising the fivefold hierarchy of cognitions, they accomplished it with the purpose to indicate that these five culminate in perfection. What was originally merely a religious image and a corollary of soteriological beliefs (the spiritual path is to culminate in perfection, including epistemic perfection) was later adopted and phrased as a formal argument.

It seems that for the Jainas, or generally for the majority of thinkers in India, the termination of a quality's progression in order to avoid infinite sequence was at the same time an expression of the fear of infinity, both in terms of infinite cycle of rebirths in the mundane world (*saṃsāra*) and in terms of limited knowledge which

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[68] PSā 1.26c: *ṇāṇa-mayādo*.

[69] PSā 1.23a: *āḍā ṇāṇa-pamāṇaṃ*.

[70] SVi 8.37a, p. 580: *ayaṃ cetano jñātā saṃvedanâtmā pratikṣaṇam*.

[71] PSā 1.35ab: *jo jāṇadi so ṇāṇaṃ ṇa havadi ṇāṇeṇa jaṇago ādā |*

could expand infinitely without ever becoming conclusive, viz. without reaching its ultimate fulfilment or its final definitive shape. This resonates well with the idea of the impossibility of infinity and the problems it yields to the cognisability of the world enunciated by Aristotle:

> Further, those who speak thus destroy scientific knowledge, inasmuch as it is not possible to have such scientific knowledge until one has reached what cannot be further analysed (lit. what is further indivisible). Also [ordinary] knowledge becomes impossible, for how is it possible to know things which are infinite in this way? … Moreover, there can be nothing which is infinite, but if there could be, then at least the idea of something infinite is not infinite (sc. infinity can be comprehended). But if the kinds of causes were infinite in number, then it would not be possible to have knowledge; because we think we know [something] only when we have known the causes; but one cannot go through what is infinite by addition (i.e. can be infinitely augmented) cannot be gone through within [temporal] limits (i.e. in a finite time).[72]

To know something means to know its essence as well as the causes and circumstances which determine the course of a particular thing. If things along with their causes and conditions bearing on their existence were infinite, they could never be fully known, our knowledge of them always being bound to be fragmentary and liable to continual process of verification and renewed correction, *ergo* never absolutely and finitely true. This led Aristotle to conclude that the world, being created by its prime cause and being put in motion by the first unmoved mover, must have a beginning and therefore can be satisfactorily investigated and fully known.

By not accepting that the world has a beginning and is therefore limited, the Jainas took a different path starting from the same prem-

[72] Met 994b, 20–22, 26–31, p. 32: ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες, ού γὰρ οἷόν τε εἰδέναι πρὶν εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν· καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν ούκ ἔστιν, τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν; … καὶ ἀπείρῳ ούδενὶ ἔστιν εἶναι· εί δὲ μή, ούκ ἄπειρόν γ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ ἄπειρά γ' ἦσαν πλήθει τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰτίων, ούκ ἂν ἦν ούδ' οὕτω τὸ γιγνώσκειν· τότε γὰρ εἰδέναι οἰόμεθα ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν ούκ ἔστιν ἐν πεπερασμένῳ διεξελθεῖν.

ise. They do agree that one reaches definite knowledge once one has analysed the objects of one's knowledge; if the causal background and underpinnings of objects as well interrelations that obtain between the objects extend in an infinite sequence, also the knowledge has to be infinite. What may seem to be a paradox or undesirable consequence to us is not one in Jaina eyes. This is precisely the stance they take: things are indeed intricately interrelated through their modes and in their causal backgrounds, and by knowing one thing one should know everything, for without knowing all existents one could not even know one thing in detail:

> [48] The one who does not know simultaneously [all] objects in their three temporal dimensions and in three worlds, cannot even know one thing along with its modes. [49] [Every single] substance is endowed with infinite modes, and there are innate kinds of substances. If one does not know [one single substance] simultaneously, how can one know them all? [50] The luminescent one (i.e. the Jina) simultaneously knows all the diversified reality, existing in three times, eternal and differentiated and everywhere. Indeed great indeed is [his] knowledge![73]

Thus, for the Jainas the infinite progression of causes, movements and relations does not culminate in the unmoved mover and prime cause in order to safeguard the possibility of definite knowledge of things. Instead, since the world is temporally infinite and neither caused nor moved, the infinite progression does not culminate in the ontological level of things, causes, movements and relations, but in the epistemic level with absolute perfect cognition, or omniscience, which terminates the progression of partial and limited cognitions which merely comprehend fragments of reality. Indeed, 'it is not possible to have knowledge until one has reached what cannot be further analysed,' provided knowledge is limited. When knowledge is

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[73] *jo ṇa vijāṇadi juhavaṃ atthe tikkālige ti-huvaṇatthe |*
ṇāduṃ tassa ṇa sakkaṃ sapajjayaṃ davvam egaṃ || PSā 1.48
davvaṃ aṇaṃta-pajjayam egam aṇaṃtāṇi davva-jādāṇi |
ṇa vijāṇadi jadi jugavaṃ kidha do savvāṇi jāṇadi || PSā 1.49
tikkāla-nicca-visamaṃ sayalaṃ savvattha saṃbhavaṃ cittaṃ |
jugavaṃ jāṇadi joṇhaṃ aho hi ṇāṇassa māhappaṃ || PSā 1.50

believed to be without any limitation in its scope, the problem seems to disappear.

13. I would conclude that the idea of omniscience in Jainism was not only a vital component of Jaina soteriological enterprise, but it was from the outset an important theoretical device the role of which was to render Jaina teaching meaningful in debates with other schools. Without the Jina's claim to omniscience Jaina soteriology would argumentatively lose much of its convincing force and the Jainas would have found it much more difficult to validate truth claims of their religion. However, at the same time the demonstrative force of all these arguments was next to nil inasmuch as they all functioned as a post hoc justification for what the Jainas already believed: they could probably convince almost no one and anybody won by them was probably already convinced.

As it is usually the case in apologetic and religious literature, all the arguments to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and the Jina's teaching were logically not quite sound. Despite a range of logical flaws, such as circularity, quantifier-shift fallacy, equivocation or confusion of modalities (possibility and necessity), from which the argument from efficacy of the teaching, the argument from progression and the argument from potentiality suffered, they were repeated over the centuries in order to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and the Jina's teaching. The argument from efficacy of the teaching found its parallel in Buddhist literature; however two other arguments, from progression and from potentiality, remained uniquely Jaina.

Abbreviations and literature

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On reason and scripture in the Pratyabhijñā*

Isabelle Ratié

Introduction – the paradoxical supremacy of *āgama* as a means of knowledge in a system that claims to be a rational path towards liberation

It has often been noticed that the Kashmiri Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) and his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025) have introduced significant novelties in the nondualistic Śaivism to which they adhered by putting aside scriptural authority and engaging in a systematic rational dialogue with other Indian philosophical schools, both Buddhist and Brahmanical.[1] The Pratyabhijñā treatise,[2]

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[1] See Frauwallner 1962: 22, Sanderson 1985: 203, Sanderson 1988: 694, Torella 2002: xiii; see also e.g. Bronkhorst 1996: 603–604, Watson 2006: 88–89, and Ratié 2011a: 6–14.

[2] I.e., Utpaladeva's ĪPK, on which Utpaladeva himself has written two commentaries: a short *Vṛtti* and a more detailed *Vivṛti* (unfortunately, only a few fragments of the latter are known to date; see Torella 1988, 2007a, b, c and d, Kawajiri forthcoming and Ratié forthcoming b and

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 375–454.

which aims at showing that reality is nothing but Śiva conceived as a single, omniscient and omnipotent consciousness, primarily consists in a phenomenological analysis of conscious events and in polemical discussions with various Indian schools of thought regarding the way these events should be interpreted. As Raffaele Torella has emphasized, in this treatise Utpaladeva only has recourse to the Śaiva scriptures (*āgama*)[3] a posteriori, as a mere confirmation of that which has already been demonstrated through the independent means of experience (*anubhava*) and reason (*yukti*).[4]

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c). Abhinavagupta has written two commentaries on Utpaladeva's Pratyabhijñā works: the ĪPV and the much more detailed ĪPVV. Unless otherwise stated, the texts mentioned are that of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies edition; the variants encountered in the *Bhāskarī* edition and in the consulted manuscripts of the ĪPV and ĪPVV are mentioned only when an emendation is proposed.

[3] In fact, as noted in Eltschinger 2007: 18–19, the translation of *āgama* as scripture is inadequate insofar as "le mot sanskrit *āgama* ne comporte aucune connotation liée à l'écrit (sanskrit *likh-*)" and mostly designates a category of texts that have *come down* (*āgata*) to us through tradition (see also Oberhammer 1974a: 17–18). However, the term is very often used to denote a text that is authoritative by principle from the point of view of a given religious tradition (even though as will be seen below, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta for instance present this meaning of the word as only secondary), and in this sense it can be considered more or less equivalent to the word "scripture."

[4] See Torella 2002: xxx, and Torella 2008: 517. It is worth noting that according to Abhinavagupta, even in the Āgama section of the treatise (which only comes after two much longer sections where Utpaladeva uses "the sole force of argumentation," Torella 2002: xxx), Utpaladeva deals with matters that are not only taught in Śaiva scriptures but also supported by reason. See e.g. the introductions to the first chapter of this section: ĪPV II 187–188: … *taṃ parameśvarāgamasiddhaṃ yuktyāpy anugataṃ pratyekatas*(1) *tattvagrāmaṃ darśayatīty āhnikatātparyam.* [(1) *pratyekatas* J, L, S2, SOAS, *Bhāskarī* : *pratīkatas* KSTS, S1; p.n.p. P] "Here is the gist of the chapter: [Utpaladeva] expounds [here] one by one all the ontological categories (*tattva*) that are established by the scriptures (*āgama*) of the Highest Lord [and] confirmed by reason (*yukti*) as well." ĪPVV III 256: … *śivādidharaṇyantānāṃ tattvānāṃ pārameśvarāgamasiddhaṃ yuktyāpy anugṛhyamāṇaṃ pratyekataḥ svarūpaṃ*

Utpaladeva himself describes this innovative strategy within non-dualistic Śaivism as a "new path"[5] towards liberation, and its inferential nature is repeatedly asserted by Abhinavagupta.[6] It obviously stems from a "decision to emerge into the open, to escape from the dimension of a restricted circle of adepts [...] and to offer itself implicitly as an alternative to the dominant Śaiva Siddhānta."[7] At first sight though, this strategy seems somehow at odds with the hierarchy of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) presented by these philosophers: according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta – who rely, here as elsewhere, on Bhartṛhari's views[8] – scripture (*āgama*) as a means of knowledge is "as it were the life of perception and [inference];"[9] experience and reason are only secondary and less powerful means of knowledge the validity of which ultimately rests on *āgama.* How then can Utpaladeva consider that the inferential discourse of his treatise is a proper and independent means of liberation? How does he conciliate the claim of an autonomous rational inquiry with the statement that scripture is the very life of all means of knowledge? The present article aims at answering these questions while examining Utpaladeva's definition of the epistemic validity of scriptures as well as his conception of the treatise as a means of liberation.

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darśayati. "[In this chapter, Utpaladeva] expounds one by one the nature – which is established through the scriptures of the Highest Lord and also supported by reason – of [each] ontological category, beginning with Śiva and ending with Earth."

[5] *navo mārgaḥ*, ĪPK 4.16; cf. *Vṛtti* 80: *abhinavo mārgaḥ.*

[6] See Ratié 2009: 352, fn. 9, and below, fn. 111 and 112.

[7] Torella 2002: xiii.

[8] As regards Bhartṛhari's crucial influence on Utpaladeva's thought (and the discrepancy in this regard between Somānanda's ŚD and Utpaladeva's ĪPK and commentaries), see Torella 2008; on the importance of the grammarian-philosopher with respect to Utpaladeva's definition of *āgama* in particular, see R. Torella's contribution to the present volume.

[9] *pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaḥ* (ĪPV II 80).

Two meanings of the word *āgama*: realization (*vimarśa*) and the group of words (*śabdarāśi*) that expresses it

Most Brahmanical currents ascribe to *āgama*, understood as a text endowed with scriptural authority, an independent status as a (valid) means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).[10] While many among these currents consider that its validity as a means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) rests on the fact that it was stated by a trustworthy or authoritative person (*āpta*),[11] the Mīmāṃsakas contend that scriptural authority is guaranteed by the fact that scripture, far from being created by human beings (*pauruṣeya*), reveals itself naturally,[12] and in this respect at least Bhartṛhari seems to hold a rather similar position insofar as he emphasizes that revelation (*śruti*) is said to be authorless (*akartṛka*).[13] Many Buddhists adopt a much more critical attitude towards scriptural authority: Dharmakīrti for instance subjects scripture to the examination of reason, considering that it can be said to be valid only provided that its reliability (*avisaṃvāditva*) has been shown through rational arguments.[14]

In the Pratyabhijñā corpus, the question of the epistemic validity of scripture only appears in Abhinavagupta's commentaries on the two verses of the treatise that define the means of knowledge in general,[15] but from Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV it is obvious that Utpala-

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[10] On the exception of the Vaiśeṣika, which does not acknowledge verbal testimony as a means of knowledge distinct from inference, see e.g. Chemparathy 1983: 8 and 20, Lyssenko 1998: 111 and Eltschinger 2007: 69–70.

[11] On this notion, see e.g. Oberhammer 1974b, Chemparathy 1983, van Bijlert 1989: 17, Lyssenko 1998: 111 and Eltschinger 2007: 76, n. 28.

[12] See e.g. D'Sa 1980, Chemparathy 1983: 15–17 and Eltschinger 2007: 115 ff.

[13] See Aklujkar 1991: 11, n. 5 and Eltschinger 2007: 115–116, fn. 1 (quoting VP 1.136 and VPV 203, according to which the Veda's sentences are *apauruṣeya*).

[14] See e.g. Seyfort Ruegg 1994: 313–314 and Eltschinger 2007.

[15] ĪPK 2.3.1–2: *idam etādṛg ity evaṃ yadvaśād vyavatiṣṭhate / vastu pra-*

deva's almost entirely lost *Vivṛti* contained a detailed discussion on this topic.

According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, *āgama* is first and foremost a kind of realization (*vimarśa*). This key word in the Pratyabhijñā system designates the act through which consciousness, instead of passively reflecting its objects as a mirror, actively grasps itself *as being the consciousness of this or that*. This dynamic feature of consciousness is conceived as essentially verbal, since the Pratyabhijñā philosophers consider that any cognitive apprehension is of a linguistic nature (although in the case of immediate perception for instance it expresses itself in a sort of silent proto-language): being conscious of oneself, or being conscious of (being conscious of) an object, amounts to expressing oneself as being so and so, even in situations where consciousness seems devoid of any linguistic aspect.[16]

Far from being contingent, this ability of consciousness to grasp itself as being this or that constitutes its very essence and is fundamental to the system in its epistemological as well as metaphysical and cosmological aspects, since the Śaiva nondualists hold that

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māṇaṃ tat soʾpi svābhāsoʾbhinavodayaḥ // soʾntastathāvimarśātmā deśakālādyabhedini / ekābhidhānaviṣaye mitir vastuny abādhitā // "The means of knowledge is that thanks to which a thing is determined as existing thus: 'this, which is such;' it is the self-manifestation (*svābhāsa*) that arises [while being] new. This [manifestation,] which consists in such an internal realization (*vimarśa*), is the knowledge [resulting from the cognitive act] (*miti*) [provided it is] not contradicted; [this knowledge] regards a thing that is not differentiated by a [particular] place, time or [form and] is denoted by a single word."

[16] On *vimarśa* and other related words see e.g. Frauwallner 1962: 22, Padoux 1963: 145–151 (where their relationship with *parā vāk*, "the supreme speech," is examined), Alper 1987, Torella 2002: xxiv–xxv (mentioning Bhartṛhari's influence on Utpaladeva's understanding of *vimarśa* while noting in fn. 34 that this notion "may also be considered as a development in philosophical terms of the experience of the 'effervescence of all Powers' (*sarvaśaktivilolatā*)" derived by Somānanda from Śaiva scriptures), Ratié 2007: 337, fn. 51 and 339–340, and Ratié 2011a: 158–167 and 495–543.

there is nothing outside of Śiva understood as an all-encompassing consciousness, and that this unique consciousness creates the universe merely by grasping (*vimṛś-*) itself in the form of the universe.

In his commentaries, not only does Abhinavagupta present *āgama* as such a kind of grasp or realization: he explains that *āgama* is a particularly intense kind of *vimarśa* of which scriptures are only a secondary expression. Thus according to him, the word *āgama* has two different but related (and hierarchized) meanings: in a literal or primary (*mukhya*) sense, *āgama* denotes a particularly intense intuition, whereas in a figurative or secondary sense, it designates what we could translate as scripture, i.e., a speech or a text considered as authoritative by a certain religious tradition – and it is *āgama* understood in the first sense that gives it meaning and validity to *āgama* in the second sense:

> As for what is called *āgama*, it is the essential activity of the Lord whose nature is consciousness – [an activity] which is internal, which consists in speech, the essence of which is an extremely intense realization (*draḍhīyastamavimarśa*), and which is as it were the life of perception and [inference]. That which is realized through this [*āgama*] as being such is exactly such, as in 'this poison cannot kill me [for] I am Garuḍa himself.'[17] However, a group of words (*śabdarāśi*) which is in accordance with such a realization having speech as its essence is also a means of knowledge – for instance, the Veda, the [scriptures of the Śaiva]siddhānta, etc., or even other [texts] such as the scriptures of the Buddhists or [those of] the Jains, etc.[18]

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[17] Such formulas are presented in the Nyāya as analogous to *āgama*, their efficacy being invoked to demonstrate by analogy the authority of the Vedas, and they are more or less equated with *āgama* insofar as their validity is due to the fact that they are uttered by omniscient *āpta*-s (see e.g. Chemparathy 1983: 40–52). On the identification of *mantra*-s with the Veda in Bhartṛhari, see Aklujkar 1991: 1 and 12, n. 8 and Aklujkar 2009: 21 and 36–37. On the example given here of *mantra*-s meant to neutralize snake poison and on the notion of *gāruḍamantra*, see Eltschinger 2001: 16, 45, fn. 174 and 47–49.

[18] ĪPV II 80–81: *āgamas tu nāmāntaraḥ śabdanarūpo draḍhīyastamavimarśātmā citsvabhāvasyeśvarasyāntaraṅga eva vyāpāraḥ pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaḥ; tena yad yathāmṛṣṭaṃ*(1) *tat tathaiva, yathā naitad viṣaṃ*

Similarly, in the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta explains:

> [*Āgama*] consists in speech – [i.e., it] is a realization (*vimarśana*) that is the internal, essential form of that which consists in consciousness[, and it] is as it were the life of perception and [inference]; that which is realized through this [*āgama*] as being such is exactly such – in this regard [nobody] disagrees –, as in "I, who am Garuḍa himself, play with snakes [and] transform poison into nectar." And accordingly, they say that 'he who can [mentally] make himself such in this regard is indeed such,' and 'he [who] knows himself [as being] such, the gods know him as such.' Therefore [we] call *āgama* in a literal sense (*mukhyatayā*) this very realization; but in a figurative sense (*upacāreṇa*), [we] also [call *āgama*] a group of words that produces this [realization], because of its causal role (*upayogitva*) with respect to this [realization].[19]

The distinction is reminiscent of Bhartṛhari's twofold use of the word "Veda."[20] Equally worth noting is the fact that Abhinavagupta identifies *āgama* in the first, "literal" sense of the term with *prasiddhi*.[21] The latter term often designates a common, consensual or pub-

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māṃ mārayati garuḍa evāham iti. tatra tu tathāvidhe śabdanātmani vimarśe'nukūlyaṃ yo bhajate śabdarāśiḥ so'pi pramāṇaṃ yathā vedasiddhāntādir anyo'pi vā bauddhārhatāgamādiḥ. [(1)*yad yathāmṛṣṭaṃ* J, P, B, SOAS, *Bhāskarī* : *yad yad āmṛṣṭaṃ* KSTS, L, S1, S2, SOAS].

[19] ĪPVV III 84: *śabdanarūpatvaṃ vimarśanaṃ yad āntaraṃ citsvabhāvasyāntaraṅgaṃ rūpaṃ pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaṃ tena yad yathā*(1) *vimṛṣṭaṃ tat tathaiva bhavatīti nātra vivādo yathā garuḍa evāhaṃ krīḍāmi pannagair viṣam amṛtīkaromīti. tathā cāhur ātmānaṃ yādṛśaṃ yo'tra bhāvayet tādṛśo hy asāv ity ātmānaṃ yādṛśaṃ veda devā enaṃ tathā vidur iti ca. tataḥ sa eva vimarśa āgama ity ucyate mukhyatayā, tadupayogitayā tūpacāreṇa tajjanako'pi śabdarāśiḥ.* [(1)*yad yathā* conj. : *yad* KSTS, BL.]

[20] On the two meanings of Veda (as a subtle unitary form or as the texts that express it) in the VP, see e.g. Aklujkar 1991: 5 and 14, n. 33, and Aklujkar 2009: 54–55 (and note the use of the word *rāśi* with respect to the collection of Vedic texts as opposed to the unitary subtle form of the Veda).

[21] See e.g. TĀ 35.2ab: *prasiddhim anusandhāya saiva cāgama ucyate* / "One talks about *āgama* when having *prasiddhi* in mind." Cf. TĀV XII 356: *saiva ca prasiddhir āgama ucyate*. "And it is this *prasiddhi* that [we] call *āgama*."

lic knowledge or usage (*prasiddha* can mean "well known," "known of all"), and in some of the Pratyabhijñā texts where it appears, it could be understood as a knowledge inherited by hearsay from tradition. However, it also bears there other shades of meaning that prevent from simply equating it with a kind of traditional knowledge, so that finding an equivalent in European languages proves to be a particularly arduous task. *Prasiddhi* has to do with an intuitive knowledge and is related to *pratibhā*, "intuition."[22] Nonetheless this intuition, while being prediscursive in the sense that it appears before any kind of reasoning, is also essentially related to language as it is a kind of realization (*vimarśa*) through which consciousness expresses its own awareness. It also has to do with some sort of belief insofar as it rests neither on perception nor on inference.[23] However, it is not the result of the previous examination and acceptance of a statement that the knowing subject would first scrutinize before acknowledging its truth or at least its plausibility; nor is it a kind of awareness in which a doubt might remain.[24] In the Pratyabhijñā texts, the word *prasiddhi* therefore denotes some kind of a priori certainty,[25] provided that here we understand a priori to mean that this knowledge is anterior *both* to perception and reasoning, since it extends to the intuitive understanding that experts have of objects

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[22] On the relation between *prasiddhi* and *pratibhā*, and on Bhartṛhari's influence as regards the notion of *prasiddhi* in Pratyabhijñā texts, see R. Torella's contribution to the present volume. See also, on the meaning(s) of *pratibhā* in Bhartṛhari's works, Aklujkar 2010: 391.

[23] Thus Raniero Gnoli eventually chose to translate it as "credenza" in his translation of the TĀ (see Gnoli 1999: 628, n. 1).

[24] See, e.g., TĀ 35.19cd–20: *prasiddhiś cāvigānotthā pratītiḥ śabdanātmikā // mātuḥ svabhāvo yat tasyāṃ śaṅkate naiṣa jātucit / svakṛtatvavaśād eva sarvavit sa hi śaṅkaraḥ //* "And *prasiddhi*, which is a knowledge that arises without contradiction [and] has speech as its essence, is the [very] nature of the subject; with respect to it this [subject] never has any doubt, precisely because he himself has created [it]; for [this subject] is Śaṅkara [himself], who is omniscient."

[25] Cf. R. Gnoli's first translation as "certezza a priori" (see Gnoli 1999: 628, n. 1).

that belong to their field of expertise[26] as well as to what we would probably term the "instinct" of animals or children to behave in a particular way.[27]

The Pratyabhijñā's hierarchy of the means of knowledge: the superiority of *āgama* over perception and inference

From this point of view, at first sight the Pratyabhijñā's position is very close to that of the Brahmanical thinkers who consider in their vast majority that *āgama* need not and should not be subjected to a rational examination. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers present *āgama* not only as an independent means of knowledge, but as a means of knowledge *superior* to all the others, and Abhinavagupta himself insists on his agreement in this respect with Bhartṛhari or the Naiyāyikas.[28]

Thus Abhinavagupta argues that even immediate perception requires the a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*) in which *āgama* primarily consists. In these passages he seems to rely implicitly on the Buddhist epistemologists' definition of the means of knowledge insofar as he presupposes that a *pramāṇa* in general (and perception in particular) is that which enables to successfully reach an object endowed with a certain efficacy (*arthakriyā*).[29] But whereas Dharmakīrti con-

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[26] See e.g. VP 1.35 and TSā 195–196, quoted below, fn. 48.

[27] See e.g. TĀ 35.3cd ff., quoted below (fn. 33, 35 and 38). Here again, Bhartṛhari's influence is obvious; see e.g. Houben 1997: 326: "For Bhartṛhari intuition (including even instinct) and traditional knowledge are not contradictory, but rather the two sides of one coin, or the two extremes of a single continuum."

[28] See below, fn. 63.

[29] Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta know Dharmakīrti's famous definition of the means of knowledge in PV *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* 1ab and 5c: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam… ajñātārthaprakāśo vā.* "The means of knowledge is a cognition that does not deceive (*avisaṃvādin*) […] or the manifestation of an object that was not known [so far]." The second part of the definition (in fact borrowed from the Mīmāṃsakas, see Krasser 2001 and Kataoka 2003) is explicitly included in Utpala-

siders that perception occurs independently of *āgama*, according to

deva's own definition (see ĪPK 2.3.1, quoted above, fn. 15: the means of knowledge is a manifestation that "arises [while being] new"). As for the first part, Utpaladeva was explaining in his lost *Vivṛti* that it is also included in his own definition, although implicitly. See ĪPVV III 73–74: *nanv avisaṃvāditvaṃ pramāṇasya yal lakṣaṇaṃ kim iha tyaktam eva tat? na tyaktaṃ laukikatvād*(1) *iti darśayaty vastv iti. vastu vyavatiṣṭhata iti hy anena tad evoktam.* [(1) *laukikatvād* conj. : *lokikatvād* KSTS]. "[An objector:] But why is the characteristic of the means of knowledge that is the property of not deceiving (*avisaṃvāditva*) abandoned here[, in Utpaladeva's definition]? In [the sentence beginning with] 'The thing…,' [Utpaladeva] shows that [in fact] it is not abandoned, because of its having a mundane [value]; for this very [characteristic] has been stated [by Utpaladeva when saying in his verse that the means of knowledge is that thanks to which] 'a thing is determined' (*vastu vyavatiṣṭhate*)." The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus appropriate the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* but claim to give it its full meaning: according to Abhinavagupta, it would be empty if it were not inserted within Utpaladeva's more complete definition, because on its own it fails to express the essential property of the means of knowledge. See ĪPV II 84–85: *yas tv avisaṃvādakatvaṃ tasya lakṣaṇam āha tenāpi prāpakatvaṃ pravartakatvaṃ pravṛttiyogyaśakyaprāptikavastūpadarśakatvaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ bruvatā na kiṃcit pramāṇābhimatabodhaviśrāntaṃ svarūpam uktam, tac ced anena lakṣaṇena nirvāhyate tan nirvyūḍhaṃ bhavaty anyathā, mukhabhaṅgamūrdhakampāṅgulīmoṭanādimātratattvaṃ tad ity alaṃ vistareṇa.* "As for the [Buddhist opponent] who states that the characteristic of the [means of knowledge] is the fact that it does not deceive (*avisaṃvādakatva*), while saying that the characteristic of the means of knowledge is the fact that it enables to obtain [the object] (*prāpakatva*) [and] that it prompts towards the object (*pravartakatva*), [i.e.,] the fact that it shows an entity the obtainment of which is possible [and] which is fit for [being the object of] activity, he himself has defined no nature whatsoever that would rest on consciousness, [although it is consciousness] which is considered a means of knowledge. And if [a follower of Dharmakīrti answers] that this [definition by Dharmakīrti] enables to establish this [nature, we answer that] it is de facto established otherwise: this [argument] amounts to nothing but a grimace, a shaking of the head, a snap of the fingers and the like – so enough with this digression." The opponent targetted in this passage is probably Dharmottara (on Dharmottara's theory of knowledge and particularly on his use of the vocabulary employed here by Abhinavagupta, see Krasser 1995: 247–248). On the Buddhist epistemologists'

Abhinavagupta, this very definition of perception necessarily implies the *āgama*'s intervention. Thus in the ĪPVV, he notices:

> To explain: even that which is directly perceived (*pratyakṣadṛṣṭa*) necessarily requires an a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*) characterised as *āgama* [and] used by the learned with respect to the [various] efficacies (*arthakriyā*) [of perceived objects], [in the form] "this is a cow whose milk is wholesome and pure," and "this is a she-ass whose milk weakens the digestive faculty and is impure."[30]

In his TĀ, Abhinavagupta was already emphasizing that perception requires an a priori certainty considered as identical with *āgama*:

> Even perception – which arises thanks to particular [causes] such as a visual organ, a Self, a source of light, an object and so on – requires at [its] root an a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*) consisting thus [in *āgama*]. This very [requirement] is made obvious through [a reasoning based on] co-absence (*vyatireka*):[31] what would a child who was [just] born in a [place] surrounded from all sides [by various objects],[32] who is alone [and] hungry, do [without the a priori certainty]? What would he take? How would he see? Why would he move?[33]

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principle that the means of knowledge prompts to act (*pravartaka*) and enables to obtain (*prāpaka*) the object, see e.g. NBṬ 19: *adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ.* "When the object is known [through the means of knowledge], the individual is prompted to act (*pravartita*) [towards this object] and the object is made to be obtained (*prāpita*)." On Utpaladeva's strategy of systematic annexation of Buddhist epistemology, see Torella 1992.

[30] ĪPVV III 83: *tathā hi pratyakṣadṛṣṭam apy arthakriyāsu śiṣṭair yojyamānām āgamalakṣaṇāṃ prasiddhim apekṣata eva – iyaṃ sā gaur yasyāḥ kṣīraṃ pathyaṃ pavitraṃ ca, iyaṃ sā gardabhī yasyāḥ payo'gnisādanam apavitraṃ ceti.* On *agnisādana/agnisāda*, see Meulenbeld 1999: 440.

[31] I.e., by showing that perception could not occur in the absence of *prasiddhi.*

[32] Cf. TĀV *ad loc.* (*sarvato nānāvidhārthasārthasaṃvalite sthāne*), quoted below, fn. 34.

[33] TĀ 35.3cd–5ab: *pratyakṣam api netrātmadīpārthādiviśeṣajam // apekṣate tatra mūle prasiddhiṃ tāṃ tathātmikām / etad eva vyatirekadvāreṇa vyanakty abhitaḥsaṃvṛte jāta ekākī kṣudhitaḥ śiśuḥ // kiṃ karotu kim ādattāṃ kena paśyatu kiṃ vrajet /*

As Jayaratha explains,[34] a new-born child – who, by definition, has not received any teaching – is not capable of perceiving the objects that surround him because in order to perceive them as objects (and therefore, as possible means of fulfilling his needs), he must first grasp himself (as having particular needs, as being different from the objects surrounding him, etc.), but this grasp or realization (*avamarśa*) is not contained within the bare awareness of something's immediate presence in which perception consists. One could object that the knowledge thanks to which the child goes towards a particular object such as milk is in fact the mere product of repeated experiences that progressively endow the child with the knowledge of a co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*) through which he infers that milk for instance is good for him because whenever he drinks milk he feels good, whereas whenever he does not he wastes away.[35] However, according to Abhinavagupta, this thesis is not sound because the child does not desire just any object before realizing that one of them is more suitable than the others: his urge, far from being the result of a series of experiences driven by arbitrary intuitions, is determined from the beginning as an urge to drink milk (and not earth for instance), and the child's awareness that he

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[34] TĀV XII 358: *tadaharjāto hi bālaḥ sarvato nānāvidhārthasārthasaṃvalite sthāne kṣudhitaḥ sākāṅkṣoʾpy ekāky aprāptaparopadeśaḥ kiṃ karotu vinā svāvamarśātmikāṃ prasiddhiṃ niyataviṣayahānādānavyavahāro bālasya na syād ity arthaḥ.* "For although a new-born child who is in a place surrounded from all sides by a multitude of objects of all kinds [and] who is hungry has needs, [since] being alone, he has not received somebody else's teaching, what would he do without the a priori certainty that consists in the realization of himself (*svāvamarśa*)? [Abhinavagupta] means that [such a] child cannot have the behaviour (*vyavahāra*) consisting in rejecting and taking according to [each] particular object."

[35] This objection is stated in TĀ 35.5cd–6: *nanu vastuśatākīrṇe sthāneʾpy asya yad eva hi // paśyato jighrato vāpi spṛśataḥ saṃprasīdati / cetas tad evādāya drāk soʾnvayavyatirekabhāk //* "But even in [that] place full of innumerable things, the mind of this [child] who is seeing, smelling or touching experiences satisfaction; [and] having grasped precisely that [which he has seen, smelt or touched with pleasure], he quickly acquires [the knowledge of] co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*)."

is satisfied and that his satisfaction is caused by the particular entity that is milk has nothing to do with inference (since this awareness is of an immediate nature) or with perception (since perception is a means of knowing external objects and not internal states).

Indian philosophers often have recourse to the notion of impregnation (*vāsanā*) understood as a residual trace (*saṃskāra*) left by a former experience to explain some states of consciousness such as memory that are determined by past conscious events, and the child's awareness could be considered to be thus determined by a latent trace left by a knowledge acquired in a former life. In fact such an explanation is found in Bhartṛhari's VP (where it is used as an argument in favour of the linguistic nature of all perceptions)[36] but also in various works – whether Brahmanical or Buddhist – concerned with demonstrating transmigration.[37] Now, according to Abhinavagupta,

[36] See VP 1.113: *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā* / *yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo'pi pratipadyate* // "In this world, any [awareness] that [something] has to be done in this [or that] way (*itikartavyatā*) is grounded in speech; even a child reaches this [awareness insofar as] residual traces were left [in him] in previous [lives]."

[37] Regarding Brahmanical sources see e.g. NSū 3.1.21, which adduces the following reason for considering that the self transmigrates: *pretyāhārābhyāsakṛtāt stanyābhilāṣāt* // "Because of the [child's] desire for breast-milk, which is produced by the repeated practice of taking food [in a previous life and occurs in the child] after he has departed [from his previous body]." (On the meaning of *pretya* here see NBh 148: *sa khalv ayam ātmā pūrvaśarīrāt pretya śarīrāntaram āpannaḥ*… "Indeed, this very self, having departed from [its] previous body [and] being endowed with another body…"). As for the argument on the Buddhist side, see e.g. TS 1939–1941: *api ca stanapānādāv abhilāṣo pravartate* / *udvega upaghāte ca sadyojanmabhṛtām api* // *ruditastanapānādikāryeṇāsau ca gamyate* / *sa ca sarvo vikalpātmā sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgavān* // *na nāmarūpam abhyastam asmin janmani vidyate* / *teṣāṃ cānyabhavābhāve taducchedaḥ prasajyate* // "Moreover, even in new-born [children], a desire to drink milk for instance occurs, as well as a fear of injuries; and [we] know this from the [perceptible] effect [of this desire or fear, namely] the fact that [the child] cries, drinks milk, etc. Now, all these [desire and fear, etc., regarding particular objects] consist in conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*) and are associated with names; [but the child] cannot have acquired through practice (*abhyasta*) the nature of names [i.e.

admitting thus that the child's present state of consciousness stems from a knowledge that has come down (*āgata*) to him from the past and is neither perception nor inference amounts to acknowledging that his knowledge is of an āgamic nature: it is a kind of a priori certainty, which therefore has to be admitted to be "the fundamental means of knowledge as regards everything without exception;"[38] and this certainty itself is grounded in the self-awareness of the omniscient universal consciousness.[39]

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their power to express a particular meaning] in this [present] life. And if there were no other existences [besides the present one,] the absolute impossibility of these [desire, fear, etc.] would follow."

[38] TĀ 35.7–10cd: *hanta cetaḥprasādoʾpi yoʾsāv arthaviśeṣagaḥ / soʾpi prāgvāsanārūpavimarśaparikalpitaḥ // na pratyakṣānumānādibāhyamānaprasādajaḥ / prāgvāsanopajīvy etat pratibhāmātram eva na // na mṛdabhyavahārecchā puṃso bālasya jāyate / prāgvāsanopajīvī ced vimarśaḥ sā ca vāsanā // prācyā ced āgatā seyaṃ prasiddhiḥ paurvakālikī / na ca cetaḥprasattyaiva sarvo vyavahṛtikramaḥ // mūlaṃ prasiddhis tan mānaṃ sarvatraiveti gṛhyatām* / "But see: even this satisfaction in the mind [of the child] with respect to a particular object is built through a realization (*vimarśa*) consisting in a former impregnation (*vāsanā*); it does not stem from the satisfaction of an external means of knowledge such as perception or inference! It is definitely not a mere intuition [devoid of any cause, but] depends on a former impregnation: the desire to eat earth does not arise in a man's offspring! And if [the opponent answers] that this realization depends on a former impregnation and if [he concedes] that this impregnation belongs to the past, this [impregnation] is precisely the a priori certainty that belongs to the past and has come down (*āgata*) [to him]. And [therefore] the whole succession of mundane activities (*vyavahṛti*) does not come from the mere satisfaction of the mind [when encountering this or that object]: one must acknowledge that the a priori certainty is the fundamental (*mūla*) means of knowledge as regards everything without exception."

[39] See TĀ 35.14: *bhogāpavargataddhetuprasiddhiśataśobhitaḥ / tadvimarśasvabhāvoʾsau bhairavaḥ parameśvaraḥ //* "It is Bhairava, the Highest Lord, who consists in this realization (*vimarśa*) [and] is adorned with [all the] innumerable experiences, liberations, their causes and the a priori certainties." In TĀV XII 363, Jayaratha introduces the verse thus: *ataś caika eva pūrṇāhaṃparāmarśamayaḥ sarvajñaḥ parameśvaraḥ samastaprasiddhinibandhanabhūta ity āha*. "And as a consequence, [Abhinavagupta now] states that the ground (*nibandhana*) for all a pri-

Abhinavagupta also emphasizes that inference rests on the means of knowledge that is *āgama* thus understood as *prasiddhi*. Several justifications of this statement are found in the ĪPV, ĪPVV, TĀ and TSā.

According to these texts, it is the case first because inference is necessarily based on perception[40] (and from this point of view, inference is weaker than perception and *āgama*, since it is "further" from its object than the latter two, which reveal their objects in an immediate way and without having to depend on some other means of knowledge),[41] and it is therefore limited to the perceptible world

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ori certainties is the Highest Lord, who is absolutely one, consists in a full realization (*parāmarśa*) [of himself as] 'I' [and] is omniscient."

[40] Thus, while shortly describing perception and inference as he explains Utpaladeva's definition of the means of knowledge, Abhinavagupta states (ĪPV II 78–79): *tac caindriyake bodhe sukhādisaṃvedane yogijñāne cāvivādam eva, mukhyatayaiva prameyarūpa ābhāse sākṣād viśrānteḥ. anumānajā tu pratītir ābhāsāntarāt kāryarūpāt svabhāvabhūtād vābhāsāntare pratipattiḥ.* "And there is no dispute whatsoever as regards perceptual (*aindriyaka*) cognition, the awareness of pleasure, etc. and yogic cognition, because, since they are primary (*mukhya*), they rest directly (*sākṣāt*) on a manifestation (*ābhāsa*) having the form of an object of cognition. As for the knowledge produced by inference, it is the understanding of a [given] manifestation through another manifestation which is either an effect [of the inferred manifestation] or a nature [shared by the inferred manifestation]."

[41] See ĪPVV III 103–104: *pratyakṣāgamayor hi yat prakāśyaṃ ca vimṛśyaṃ ca, tad yathākramaṃ prakāśavimarśamukhenānyāpekṣāśūnyam. pratyakṣe hi prakāśadvāreṇa vimarśo'nyatra tu viparyayaḥ. anumāne tu nāntarīyakavastvantaraprakāśavimarśāpekṣānumeye prakāśavimarśayoga iti sāpekṣatvād dūreyaṃ pramitiḥ prameyāt.* "For that which is to be shown and realized in perception and *āgama* does not require (*apekṣā*) anything else, thanks respectively to the conscious manifestation (*prakāśa*) [in which perception consists] and to the realization (*vimarśa*) [in which *āgama* consists] – for in perception, the realization [occurs] through the conscious manifestation, and in any other case there is a [perceptual] error – whereas in an inference, the object of which requires the conscious manifestation and realization of something else that is invariably concomitant (*nāntarīyaka*) [with something that constitutes the cause of this other entity or has a common nature with

insofar as it rests on necessary relations (of identity or causality) between entities previously experienced as invariably concomitant,[42] whereas the domain of *āgama* extends to both the perceptible and the imperceptible.[43]

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it,] since, [as Utpaladeva puts it,] '[it] is associated with the conscious manifestation and realization [of something else],' [i.e.] since [inference] depends [on something else], the knowledge in which [it] results (*pramiti*) is further from the object of knowledge (*durā… prameyāt*)."

[42] See e.g. ĪPK 1.5.8a: *anumānam anābhātapūrve naiveṣṭam…* / "Inference is *not* admitted as regards that which has never been manifested previously." (For an examination of this verse and its commentaries, see Ratié 2011b). Cf. e.g. ĪPVV III 82: *pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyam aniścitaṃ cet tarhi pakṣadharmatvasapakṣasadbhāvavipakṣavyāvṛttiprāyaṃ svarūpaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva mūle niścetavyaṃ yasya liṅgasya, tad api na siddham apramāṇagṛhītatattvasyāliṅgatvād iti liṅgato'rthadṛg iti yad anumānaṃ tad api na kiñcid.* "If the validity of perception is not ascertained, then the inferential mark (*liṅga*) as well – the nature of which must be ascertained at [its] root through perception itself [and] which[, according to the Buddhist logicians,] amounts to [this threefold characteristic:] the fact that the property exists in the subject [of which it is to be predicated] (*pakṣadharmatva*), that it is present in similar instances (*sapakṣasadbhāva*) and that it is excluded from dissimilar instances (*vipakṣavyāvṛtti*) – is not established either, because a reality that has not been grasped through a [valid] means of knowledge is not an inferential mark. Therefore inference, 'which is the cognition of an object through the [threefold] inferential mark,' is nothing either [if perception is not a valid means of knowledge]." Abhinavagupta is alluding here to PVin 2.1b (*… svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato'rthadṛk* / "[Among the two sorts of inference, inference] for oneself is the cognition of an object through the threefold inferential mark.").

[43] See e.g. ĪPVV III 85: *nyāya ity anumānam. īśvarasadbhāve hi saṃniveśakāryādiliṅgajam anumānam asty eva, tattvabhuvanādīnāṃ tv iyattāyāṃ nāsty anumānam ity āgama eva tatra śaraṇam.* "[Utpaladeva says] 'reasoning' (*nyāya*), i.e., inference. For as regards the existence of the Lord, there is indeed an inference that comes from an inferential mark such as the effect [consisting in] the [particular] arrangement (*saṃniveśa*) [that is the universe]; but there is no inference as regards the fact that the ontological categories (*tattva*), the [various] worlds, etc. are as [they are] – therefore in that regard, [we can] only take refuge in scripture (*āgama*)." The inference proving the exis-

Abhinavagupta also considers that the co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*) on which any inference is necessarily based (such as the awarenesses that "wherever there is fire there is smoke" and "wherever there is no smoke there is no fire," through which we can infer a fire's presence from that of smoke) is itself grounded in *prasiddhi*, just as perception.[44] Thus in the TĀ, he argues that the

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tence of the Lord (*īśvara*) to which Abhinavagupta refers here is not the inference found in the first chapters of the Pratyabhijñā treatise but the classical Naiyāyika inference of *īśvara*'s existence (on this proof and the way it was criticized by the Buddhists see Krasser 2002); it appears in Utpaladeva's ĪS (see Taber 1986), a short treatise in which the Śaiva philosopher endeavours to prove the existence of *īśvara* merely from a Naiyāyika (and Saiddhāntika) point of view (see Torella 2002: xxi–xxii, Krasser 2002: 149–158, and Ratié forthcoming). On the idea that contrary to other means of knowledge, *āgama* is not limited in scope, see also Abhinavagupta's introductions to the *Āgamādhikāra*. In ĪPV II 213, he thus states: *na hi pratyakṣaṃ māyāpramātuḥ sarvatra kramate. anumānam apy evam, na hi yad yad asti tatra tatra liṅgavyāptyādigrahaṇasaṃbhavaḥ. āgamas tv apariccchinnaprakāśātmak amāheśvaravimarśaparamārthaḥ kiṃ na paśyet*? "For the perception of the māyic subject does not apply to everything; and the same goes for inference, for it is not possible to grasp the inferential mark, the pervasion, etc., with respect to everything that exists. On the other hand, what could *āgama* – the ultimate reality of which is a realization of the Great Lord who consists in an uninterrupted conscious manifestation – fail to see?" Cf. ĪPVV III 255: *tatrāsmadādipratyakṣaṃ nāśeṣasākṣātkāry anumānam apy evaṃ sarvasya liṅgavyāptyupalabdhisaṃbhavābhāvāt. asaṅkucitaprakāśātmakaparameśvaravimarśātmakaḥ punar āgamo viśvaṃ pramātuṃ samarthaḥ.* "In that regard, the perception of [limited subjects] such as we [are] does not give immediate access to everything; and inference too is such, since it is not possible to perceive the inferential mark and pervasion for everything. However, *āgama*, which consists in a realization of the Highest Lord who has as its essence a conscious manifestation that is not contracted, is capable of knowing everything."

[44] See e.g. TSā 195: *prasiddhis tāvad avaśyopagamyānvayavyatirekādhyakṣādīnāṃ tatprāmāṇyasya tanmūlatvāt.* "To begin with, one must necessarily acknowledge that co-presence and co-absence, perception, etc., involve an a priori certainty, because this [a priori certainty] is the root (*mūla*) of their validity."

understanding of such a concomitance cannot spring from the bare perception of particulars: in order to grasp the concomitance of fire and smoke, one must first realize that the various singular entities successively perceived are all instances of "fire" and "smoke," but in order to do so we need more than perception, which is the mere awareness of the manifestation of a singular entity. The gap between the perception of singulars and the conceptualization of generalities can only be bridged by some third kind of knowledge – i.e., again, *prasiddhi*.[45] At this point a Dharmakīrtian Buddhist could certainly reply that no such third means of knowledge is required, since a generality (*sāmānya*) such as "fire" can be considered to be mentally built through the exclusion of whatever has an efficacy (*arthakriyā*) that is different from that of "fire"[46] – but again, according to Abhinavagupta, the very awareness of *arthakriyā* cannot be brought about by perception and requires an a priori certainty,[47] and in the TSā too, familiar situations in which we learn something without having recourse either to mere perception or to the understanding of co-presence and co-absence are invoked so as to show that *prasiddhi* precedes perception and inference and makes them possible.[48]

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[45] TĀ 35.2cd–3ab: *anvayavyatirekau hi prasiddher upajīvakau // svāyattatve tayor vyaktipūge kiṃ syāt tayor gatiḥ /* "For co-presence and co-absence depend on a priori certainty (*prasiddhi*): if they were independent (*svāyatta*), within the mass of particulars, how could their understanding occur?"

[46] On the role of *arthakriyā* in Dharmakīrti's theory of exclusion (*apoha*), see e.g. Katsura 1991.

[47] See ĪPVV III 82, quoted above, fn. 30.

[48] See TSā 195–196: *satyaṃ rajataṃ paśyāmīti hi sauvarṇikādiparaprasiddhyaiva, prasiddhir evāgamaḥ sā kācid dṛṣṭaphalā bubhukṣito bhuṅkta iti bālasya prasiddhita eva. tatra*(1) *pravṛttir nānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tadā tayor abhāvāt, yauvanāvasthāyāṃ tadbhāvoʾpy akiṃcitkaraḥ, prasiddhiṃ tu mūlīkṛtya soʾstu kasmaicit kāryāyeti*(2)*.* [(1) *tatra* conj. : *tatra tatra* KSTS. (2) *kāryāyeti* conj. : *kāryāya* KSTS.] "For in [the realization] 'I see some genuine silver,' [which arises] through the mere a priori certainty of [someone] else who is a goldsmith for instance, it is the a priori certainty that is *āgama*. A certain such [a priori certainty] has visible results [– whereas other kinds of *prasiddhi* only have invisible

The ĪPVV similarly emphasizes that reasoning (*tarka*, *nyāya*) is incapable of attaining truth by itself since it depends on other means of knowledge without which it remains groundless: the belief that it constitutes an independent path towards truth or that it has a foundation (*pratiṣṭhā*) of its own is described as a mere intellectual arrogance by Abhinavagupta, according to whom reason, just as the necessary relations that it claims to reveal, is created by the Lord's free will (also termed his "power of necessity," *niyatiśakti*),[49] so that ultimately, reason's only ground is the aesthetic delight through which Śiva creates an infinitely varied universe:

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results –, for instance] in the [realization] 'he who is hungry eats' of a [new-born] child[, which arises] through a mere a priori certainty. In that case, the [subject's] activity does not occur thanks to co-presence and co-absence, since [the awareness of] this [co-presence and co-absence] does not exist at the time [of childhood, and] even the existence of this [awareness] in the state of adulthood would have to come from nowhere [if co-presence and co-absence were not known through an a priori certainty]. Rather, [the subject knows] that this [particular object] must lead to a particular effect while relying on an a priori certainty." The goldsmith's example is obviously an echo of VP 1.35, where Bhartṛhari also insists that such an expert's knowledge is not of an inferential nature: *pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate / maṇirūpyādivijñānaṃ tadvidāṃ nānumānikam //*. "The experts' knowledge of gems, silver, etc., which cannot be fully explained to others, arises from mere practice (*abhyāsa*); it is not inferential."

[49] Thus, immediately after giving the generic definition of inference (see above, fn. 40), Abhinavagupta adds (ĪPV II 79–80): *vastvantarasya ca tena sākaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvaniyamaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaniyamaś ceśvaraniyatiśaktyupajīvana evāvadhāryo bhavati nānyathā. tena yāvati niyatir jñātā tāvati deśe kāle vānumānaṃ pramāṇam.* "And the necessity (*niyama*) for another thing of having a relation of cause and effect with the [perceived entity], as well as the necessity [for another thing] of having a common substrate (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) [with the perceived entity], can be determined only insofar as it depends on the power of necessity (*niyatiśakti*) of the Lord, and not otherwise. Therefore inference is a [valid] means of knowledge only in a place or time where this necessity is known." On *niyatiśakti*, see below, fn. 52. On the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in Śaiva nondualism and its connection with *svabhāvahetu* inferences, see e.g. Torella 2002: 179–180, fn. 17.

Reasoning (*tarka*) is absolutely devoid of foundation (*apratiṣṭha*) [by itself]; for it is created by the Highest Lord exactly in the same way [as the rest of the universe]. For this very reason, in this [world, although a given individual subject enjoys] a cycle of existences [pervaded by] reasoning (*tarkasaṃsāra*) through the progressive growth of [his] power, [i.e.] through extending the internally contracted power of [his] realization – which is equally useful with respect to mundane experience and liberation –, this [existence pervaded by reasonings] is necessarily inferior (*apara*) [insofar as it is] created by the Highest Lord, just as a cycle of existences [pervaded by] poetry (*kāvyasaṃsāra*); for these cycles of existence are varied.[50] But although [according to us], reasoning is [in itself] devoid of foundation, this is in no way harmful for our system; for in [our] doctrine [according to which] reality is [what is] manifest, the necessity [through which] phenomena [are determined to appear in this or that particular way] is due to the Highest Lord's will, and this [will] conforms to a principle that only amounts to this much: [it is constantly] engaged in making phenomena arise in various ways; [it is constantly] engaged in making the knowing subjects varied through the variety [due to] the synthesis and separation of these [phenomena perceived and conceptualized by the different subjects; and it] cannot be put into question. Therefore reasoning shines [in the universe] without having any firm ground; whereas he who sees a foundation in this [reasoning] because of his intellect's arrogance (*svabuddhigarva*), just as [someone who] imagines that the [only] firm ground on the entire globe of the Earth is in the courtyard of his house, is either deluded, or strikingly ressembling an idiot – so enough with this: inference cannot be trusted at all; rather, only *āgama* [can].[51]

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[50] I.e., as far as I understand: reasonings are useful insofar as they increase the individual subject's power of realization, but they are ultimately groundless, since they are "created" by the absolute consciousness – i.e., they are only various limited aspects of reality that consciousness playfully takes on while manifesting an infinite variety of objects and subjects. Reasonings thus contribute to the differentiation of the individual subjects as they differ from one individual to another (and are therefore bound to contradict each other). Nonetheless, as Abhinavagupta immediately adds in the following sentences, this variety in reasonings is not to be criticized since just as any phenomenal variety, it is a manifestation of consciousness' unlimited creative power.

[51] ĪPVV III 95–96: *sarvathā tarko'pratiṣṭha eva. tathaiva hi parameśva-*

Inference is grounded on a necessity that entirely depends on the universal consciousness' will: the only reason why there can be no smoke without fire is that at every single moment, this all-encompassing consciousness creates the universe as being determined by innumerable necessary relations which include that of fire and smoke.[52] But because it freely chooses to subject the created world to

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reṇa sa sṛṣṭaḥ. tata eveha śaktisaṃvardhanakrameṇāntaḥsaṅkucitavimarśaśaktisamākarṣaṇena tathaiva bhogāpavargopayoginopayujyamānaḥ parameśvareṇa sṛṣṭas tarkasaṃsāraḥ kāvyasaṃsāravad apara eva. vicitrā hy amī saṃsārāḥ. apratiṣṭhitatveʾpi tu tarkasya nāsmaddarśanasya khaṇḍanā kācit. ābhāsamānavastuvāde hi parameśvarecchayāyam ābhāsaniyamaḥ, sā ca vaicitryeṇābhāsān utthāpayantī tatsaṃyojanaviyojanavaicitryeṇa ca pramātṝn vicitrīkurvāṇā aparyanuyojyā ity etāvad eva nyāyam avatiṣṭhate. tad ayam alabdhagādha eva tarkaḥ śobhate. atra tu svabuddhigarveṇa pratiṣṭhāṃ paśyan svagṛhaprāṅgaṇamadhyakalpitaniḥśeṣabhūgolakamadhyadhruvakasthānavan mūḍho vā ḍimbaviḍambako vety āstām. sarvathānumāne nāśvasitavyam, api tv āgama eva.

[52] See e.g. ĪPV II 102 (*ad* ĪPK 2.3.8), which explains that any necessary relation between two entities (including the conventional relation between a word and what it denotes) is an effect of consciousness' "power of necessity": *etad uktaṃ bhavati*: *yat kiṃcit kṛtrimam itarad vā bhāvābhāsasyābhāsāntareṇa nāntarīyakatvaṃ pratibhāti tatra niyatiśaktimātram eva paraṃ vijṛmbhate. tat tu niyatiśaktirūpaṃ pūrvāparavitatakālam indhanakāryatve dhūmakāraṇatva uṣṇasvabhāvatve cābhāsamāne, anaticirakālaṃ tu vahnyādiśabdavācyatvābhāsādāv iti viśeṣaḥ. tataś ca niyatiśaktyupajīvanena dhūmābhāsoʾpy agnyābhāsāvyabhicārī.* "This what [Utpaladeva] means [here]: in any invariable concomitance (*nāntarīyakatva*) – whether conventional (*kṛtrima*) or not – that is manifest between the phenomenon [constituted by a given] entity and another phenomenon, it is absolutely nothing but the power of necessity that unfolds. The [only] difference is that the form [that] the power of necessity [takes on] extends to the past and the future when it is the fact that [fire] is the effect of fuel, the fact that [it] is the cause of smoke, and the fact that [its] nature is to be hot that are manifest; whereas the [form that the power of necessity takes on] does not last indefinitely (*anaticirakāla*) in the case of the manifestation of the fact that [fire] can be expressed by the term 'fire,' etc. And as a consequence, the phenomenon of smoke too is invariably concomitant (*avyabhicārin*) with the phenomenon of fire because it depends on the

this necessity, it can also transgress a rule that it has playfully edicted; and so can anybody who has realized his or her identity with the universal consciousness.[53] Thus according to the Śaivas, some *yogin*s are capable of transgressing the invariable concomitance at the core of the relation of cause and effect by producing a variety of material objects (such as whole cities or armies) without any kind of material cause, out of their mere free will –[54] which means that for instance they are capable of creating smoke without fire. Utpaladeva

power of necessity." As for why the conventional invariable concomitance "does not last indefinitely," see *Bhāskarī* II 111: *anaticirakālaṃ bhavaty asya samayasya madhye kalpitatvenānāditvābhāvād anyathā puruṣakṛtatvāyogāt.* "[It] 'does not last indefinitely,' because it is not beginningless (*anādi*) since it is constructed (*kalpita*) through convention (*samaya*); otherwise it could not have been produced by men."

[53] See e.g. ĪPV II 153: *cetana eva tu tathā tathā bhavati bhagavān bhūribhargo mahādevo niyatyanuvartanollaṅghanaghanatarasvātantrya ity atra pakṣe niyatyanuvartini laukike prasiddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve svātantryam, tadullaṅghanam ādriyamāṇasya tu yogiprāyaprasiddhe lokottara iti na kaścid virodhaḥ.* "But in our system, according to which it is what is conscious (*cetana*) – [whether it be called] 'the Venerable,' 'He whose rays are innummerable' [or] 'the Great Lord' – that exists in this or that form, possessing the absolute freedom (*ghanatarasvātantrya*) to conform (*anuvartana*) to necessity (*niyati*) or to transgress it (*ullaṅghana*), there is freedom as regards the well-known ordinary (*laukika*) relation of cause and effect that conforms to necessity, but [also,] for he who concentrates on the transgression of this [necessity], as regards a supramundane (*lokottara*) [relation of cause and effect] that is mostly well known of *yogin*-s – therefore there is no contradiction."

[54] See ĪPK 2.4.10: *yoginām api mṛdbīje vinaivecchāvaśena tat / ghaṭādi jāyate tat tat sthirasvārthakriyākaram //* "There is also a [production] through the free will (*icchā*) of *yogin*-s, without any [material cause such as] clay [for a pot] or a seed [for a sprout]: various [objects], such as a pot, etc., arise [thus] while having an efficacy (*arthakriyā*) of their own and while lasting (*sthira*)." See also ĪPK 1.5.7: *cidātmaiva hi devo'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ / yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet //* "For just as a *yogin*, the Lord, who consists in nothing but consciousness, must manifest externally all the objects that are internal to him, by virtue of his [free] will, without any material cause (*nirupādāna*)." For an examination of Abhinavagupta's commentaries on these verses see Ratié 2010b: 460–464 and Ratié 2011a: 403–442.

and Abhinavagupta are fully aware that accepting the possibility of such a creation endangers the very foundations of reasoning, since it reduces to naught the so-called invariable concomitance between a cause and its effect, and even between an object and its nature.[55]

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[55] See the objection stated in ĪPV II 153–155 (in the following argument Abhinavagupta's imaginary interlocutor alludes to the fact that according to the Buddhist logicians, ultimately an inference based on a nature can be reduced to an inference based on an effect: see e.g. Iwata 1991; cf. below, fn. 56, for more Śaiva allusions to this theory): *nanu yadi prasiddhakāraṇollaṅghanenāpi tatkāraṇajanyakāryaviśeṣatulyavṛttāny eva kāryāṇi jāyante, bhagnās tarhy anumānakathāḥ. tathā hi katham anyad anyatra niyamavad bhaved ity āśaṅkya prāmāṇikataraṃmanyais tādātmyatadutpattī niyamanidānam upagate. na hi niḥsvabhāvaṃ vastu bhavati, nāpi bhinnasvabhāvaṃ svabhāvabhedena bhedāt, paryāyaśas tatsvabhāvadvayabhāve*(1) *ca niḥsvabhāvatāprasaṅgāt. evaṃ nirhetuke bhinnahetuke ca kārye vācyam. ubhayatrāpi ca hetukṛtaiva vyavasthā. svahetuta eva hi śiṃśapā vṛkṣasvabhāvāvyabhicāriṇī jātā, svahetutaś ca hutabhugdhūmajananasvabhāvaḥ, tad idānīṃ niyatyullaṅghini kāryakāraṇabhāve sarvam idaṃ vighaṭeta. yogīcchayā hi śiṃśapāpy avṛkṣasvabhāvā bhavet, dhūme tu dviguṇaṃ codyam; agnyādisāmagrī yogīcchodbhūtā dhūmaṃ na janayet, yogīcchā vānagnikaṃ dhūmam, iti na syād anumānam, asti ca tal loke.* [(1) *tatsvabhāvadvayabhāve* conj. Eltschinger : *tatsvabhāvadvayābhāve* KSTS, *Bhāskarī*, J, L, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. P] "But if some effects arise even through a transgression (*ullaṅghana*) of the [necessary relation with their] well-known cause, while behaving exactly as the particular effect born of this [well-known] cause, then the so-called inferences are reduced to naught! To explain: anticipating the objection '[since all things are self-confined,] how can a thing have a necessity that restricts it (*niyama*) with respect to something else?', some [Buddhist logicians] who see themselves as great epistemologists (*prāmāṇikataraṃmanya*) have acknowledged that identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*) are the cause of this restricting necessity. For a thing cannot be devoid of nature (*svabhāva*) nor have different natures, since the difference [between different things] is due to the difference in the nature [of these things], and since if a [thing] had two natures successively, as a consequence [it] would be devoid of any nature. And one must consider that the same goes for the effect (*kārya*), [which similarly can neither be] devoid of cause [nor have] different causes. And in both cases, [i.e., whether the object is considered from the point of view of its nature or as an effect,] it is only [the object's] cause that leads to establishing [the object's] existence (*vyavasthā*);

Utpaladeva solves the problem constituted by this transgression (*atikrama*, *ullaṅghana*) of the necessity on which inference depends by specifying that a nature (*svabhāva*) or an effect (*kārya*) can be considered valid reasons for an inference only "provided that they have been established through another means of knowledge not to be the creation of a *yogin*."[56] However, this other means of knowledge cannot be another inference (which would lead to a *regressio ad infi-*

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for it is thanks to its own cause[, i.e. the seed,] that [the tree] called '*śiṃśapā*' arises while invariably possessing the nature of a tree; and it is thanks to its own cause, [i.e. the fuel,] that the nature [consisting in] producing smoke belongs to fire. Therefore if, from now on, the relation of cause and effect transgresses (*ullaṅghin*) necessity (*niyati*), all of this must be reduced to naught! For by virtue of a *yogin*'s will, even a *śiṃśapā* may have a nature that may not be [that of] the tree; and as regards smoke, this raises even twice more problems: the [causal] complex [required in order to produce smoke] – such as fire, etc. – that has risen thanks to a *yogin*'s will may not produce smoke; or a *yogin*'s will [may produce] smoke without fire. Therefore inference cannot occur [if this transgression of necessity is accepted]; and yet [inference] exists in this world!"

[56] ĪPK 2.4.11: *yoginirmāṇatābhāve pramāṇāntaraniścite / kāryaṃ hetuḥ svabhāvo vāta evotpattimūlajaḥ //* "Precisely for this reason, an effect or a nature – which [both] arise from the root that is the production (*utpatti*) [by a particular cause] – are a [valid inferential] reason (*hetu*) provided that they have been established through another means of knowledge not to be the creation of a *yogin*." Utpaladeva specifies that both an effect and a nature have production as their "root" because according to the Buddhist logicians, both the invariable concomitance between an object and its nature and that of an effect and its cause have as their origin the cause that produces the object. See above, fn. 55, and ĪPV II 157–158: *nanu svabhāvahetau kim anayā cintayā*? *āha*: *vṛkṣatvāvyabhicāriṇyāḥ śiṃśapāyā utpatter yan mūlaṃ kāraṇaṃ tata eva sa tanmātrānubandhī svabhāvo jāyata iti.* "[Utpaladeva] answers the question 'But what is the point of thus pondering over the [inferential] reason [constituted by] a nature (*svabhāvahetu*)?' [by saying]: 'It is due to the 'root,' [i.e.], due to the cause of the production of the *śiṃśapā*, which is invariably concomitant with with [the property of] being a tree, that the nature (*svabhāva*) [of the *śiṃśapā*] arises while conforming only to this [fact of being a tree] (*tanmātrānubandhin*)." (On *tanmātrānubandhin*, see below, fn. 129).

nitum) nor the perception of the object in question, since the *yogin*'s creation is supposedly similar in every respect (including that of its duration and efficacy) to an object produced by an ordinary cause.[57] It is therefore once again a variety of *prasiddhi* that guarantees that an inferential reason is valid.[58] And it is no coincidence if the topic of the *yogin*'s creation is examined at length in the passages of the ĪPVV that deal with the definition of the three means of knowledge and endeavour to show the weakness of inference when it operates without the help of *āgama*:[59] reasons (*hetu*) or inferential marks (*liṅga*), whether defined by Buddhist or Brahmanical logicians, are impossible to determine[60] not only because some objects are by nature

[57] See ĪPK 2.4.10, quoted above, fn. 54, and below, fn. 58.

[58] See ĪPV II 155–156: *yogīcchāpi sarvathā tādṛśam eva na tu vṛścikagomayādisaṃbhūtavṛścikādinyāyena kathaṃcid rasavīryādinā bhinnaṃ kāryaṃ janayatīti yat kathitam ata evāsmād eva hetoḥ kāryaṃ vā dhūmādy agnyanumāne, śiṃśapātvādisvabhāvo vā vṛkṣatvādyanumāna evaṃ hetur bhavati yadi pramāṇāntareṇa lokaprasiddhyā yoginirmāṇatvasyābhāvo niścito bhavati nānyathā. ata evānumāne janmāntarābhyāsalokaprasiddhyādikam avaśyopajīvyam.* "A *yogin*'s will too produces an effect that is exactly similar [to the effect produced by an ordinary cause] in every respect, and not different [from the latter effect] from any point of view, contrary to the case of a scorpio produced [by spontaneous generation] in cow dung for instance, [which differs] from a scorpio [produced in the ordinary way] as regards its bodily fluid, sperm, etc. Precisely for the reason expounded [in the previous verse], an effect such as smoke is the reason of the inference of fire, or a nature (*svabhāva*) such as being a *śiṃśapā* is the reason of the inference of being a tree, if [they] have been established not to be [the result of] the creation of a *yogin* 'through another means of knowledge,' [i.e.] through general certainty (*lokaprasiddhi*); and [a nature or an effect] cannot [be an inferential reason] if it is not the case. This is the reason why as regards inference, one must necessarily rely on the practice [acquired in] former lifes, general certainty and so on."

[59] See e.g. the long passage in the ĪPVV III 86 ff., beginning with *yoginirmitaṃ vedaṃ syāt, itarad vā laukikam ity api nāvadhārayituṃ śakyam*, "One cannot determine either whether this [perceived thing on which the inference is based] was created by a *yogin* (*yoginirmita*) or [if it is] 'otherwise,' [i.e.], if it is ordinary (*laukika*)…"

[60] See e.g. ĪPVV III 86: *nanu yuktir anumānaṃ yadi, tathāpi katham iyam*

imperceptible, but more importantly, because inference cannot determine by itself whether they are indeed inferential reasons or not.

This is why, just as Bhartṛhari, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that the means of knowledge do not operate separately but together:[61] inference is valid provided that it is helped by per-

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amukhyā? āha tac cety anumānam. kāryādīti kāryasvabhāvadvayarūpam, kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi samavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam iti vā pañcakarūpam. idam asya kāryam asya svabhāvoʾsya kāraṇam asya saṃyogy asya samavāyy asya virodhi niyamenety evambhūto yaḥ kāryādibhāvaḥ, sa durlakṣaḥ sann apy avadhārayitum aśakyo yasya, tathābhūtaṃ liṅgam. "[An objector having asked] 'But if inference is reasoning (*yukti*), how [can you say that reasoning] is not fundamental [among means of knowledge]?', [Utpaladeva] answers [in the sentence beginning with] 'And this…', [i.e.], 'And inference…'. [Inference has as its reason] 'the effect, etc.,' [i.e., according to the Buddhists,] it has the two forms [consisting respectively in the inference resting on a reason that is] an effect [and the inference resting on a reason that is] a nature; alternatively, [according to the Vaiśeṣikas,] it has five forms since [Kaṇāda says that] '[knowledge] has an inferential mark [that is] an effect [or] a cause [of what is inferred, or that] has a [relation of] contact, inherence or contradiction [with what is inferred].' [But] the inferential mark is such that its nature as an effect, etc. – [expressed] in such [forms] as 'this is necessarily the effect of that, the nature of that, the cause of that, that which is in contact with that, that which is inherent in that' is 'impossible to determine' (*durlakṣa*) [according to Utpaladeva, i.e.,], it cannot be determined, even though it exists." While mentioning the Vaiśeṣika's conception of inferential mark, Abhinavagupta quotes VSū 9.18 (*asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam*) with a few variants (see Kellner 2010: 92 and fn. 14, on the probable "earliest form" of the *sūtra*). The whole passage of the ĪPVV is reminiscent of VPV 88–89 *ad* VP 1.32 (quoted below, fn. 66), according to which the *prasiddhi* of an unobserved object is difficult/impossible to determine (*duravasāna*) through an inferential cognition, because the awareness of the similarity between the inferential mark and the unperceived possessor of the mark ultimately depends on *āgama* (see Akamatsu 2010).

[61] Thus, after explaining in ĪPVV III 83 (see above, fn. 30) that even direct perception requires *prasiddhi* as regards the object's efficacy, Abhinavagupta adds: *tata eva pramāṇasamūhād eva pravṛttir iti vakṣyate sā tu deśādiketi. sa caikāntarmukhasvatantraparāmarśasaṃyojitaviyojitābhā-*

ception and *āgama*. But even though the means of knowledge are

sasvasaṃvedanarūpaparameśvarasvātantryavāda eva yujyata ity etad apy agre bhaviṣyati. ihāstāṃ tāvat. "This is why [Utpaladeva] will state that activity arises from the association of means of knowledge in [ĪPK 2.3.9 which begins with the words] '*sā tu deśādikā'.* And [he] will [make clear] later [in the treatise] that this [association] is possible only in [our] doctrine [according to which] the freedom of the Highest Lord consists in self-consciousness with respect to the phenomena that are synthesized and separated by a unique, introverted and free realization (*parāmarśa*) – but at this point [of the treatise], let us leave this matter aside for the time being." According to ĪPK 2.3.9 (to which Abhinavagupta alludes here), "as for the activity that starts at the moment [when a particular entity is perceived] for the subject who aims at a particular object, [it occurs] with respect to the singular [object] differentiated by various distinct perceptions of place, etc., and also because of inference" (*sā tu deśādikādhyakṣāntarabhinne svalakṣaṇe / tātkālikī pravṛttiḥ syād arthino'py anumānataḥ //* For the meanings of the compound *deśādikādhyakṣāntarabhinne* according to Abhinavagupta, see Torella 2002: 169, fn. 22). Abhinavagupta explains (ĪPV II 105–106): *naikaikataḥ pramāṇāt sā pravṛttir api tu pramāṇasamūhād eva. samūhatā ca parasya nopapannā, asmākaṃ tv ekasvasaṃvedanaviśrāntimayī sā yujyate.* "This activity does not [arise] from each means of knowledge taken separately, but rather, from an association of means of knowledge (*pramāṇasamūha*); and the existence of this association is not possible for [our] opponent, whereas from our point of view, it is possible insofar as it consists in the fact that [the various means of knowledge] rest on a single self-awareness." The opponent mentioned here is a Buddhist who considers that perception is restricted to the knowledge of the particular, whereas concept (*vikalpa*) regards only generalities (*sāmānya*). In contrast, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that the various means of knowledge cooperate – a cooperation made possible by the fact that the various cognitions are in fact nothing but a single consciousness taking at will the various forms of perception or concept, whereas according to their Buddhist opponent, cognitions, whether perceptual or conceptual, are purely momentary and irreducibly distinct from each other. In this regard, Utpaladeva is once again borrowing from Bhartṛhari's thought: as noted in Aklujkar 1989: 151, "whereas most other traditions of Indian philosophy […] emphasized the separability of the means of cognition […], the Grammarian-philosophers like Bhartṛhari […] played down the separability of the means and looked upon them as functioning conjointly," and (*ibid.*, fn. 1) while "thinkers like Dignāga avoid such overlapping of *pramāṇas* by restrict-

said to operate jointly, *āgama* is repeatedly designated as the fundamental means of knowledge that the two others can at best "strengthen."[62] Thus, while inference cannot cancel by contradicting it a knowledge gained through *āgama*, inference is cancelled by perception as well as *āgama*, and Abhinavagupta insists in the ĪPV[63] that in this regard he is in agreement with Bhartṛhari[64]

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ing the object of *pratyakṣa* (to *svalakṣaṇa* […]), the Grammarians accept the overlapping as an unavoidable fact of life and view the operations of (so-called separate) *pramāṇas* as basically complex." See also Houben 1997: 322 and Aklujkar 2010: 388–389.

[62] Thus in ĪPVV III 255, after explaining that contrary to perception and inference, *āgama* is "capable of knowing everything" (see above, fn. 43), Abhinavagupta adds: *tata eva vivṛtāv avatāryate padārthatattvopapādanārtham iti pārameśvarāgama eva tattvam upapādayituṃ śaktaḥ, yuktis tu tadupabṛṃhaṇāya.* "For this very reason, in the *Vivṛti*, [Utpaladeva] introduces [this new section, the *Āgamādhikāra*,] with [the words] 'in order to explain the real nature of things…': only the Highest Lord's *āgama* is capable of accounting for this nature, whereas reason (*yukti*) has to strengthen (*upabṛṃhaṇa*) this [account]." In the same passage (*ibid.*: 256), Abhinavagupta quotes a verse according to which "the means of knowledge is one; its speech, which is truthful, is uttered by the Lord [himself]; the human means of knowledge, which are gross (*sthūla*), cannot invalidate its statement." (*pramāṇam ekaṃ tadvākyaṃ tathyam īśvarabhāṣitam / tasyoktiḥ pauruṣaiḥ sthūlaiḥ pramāṇair na prabādhyate //*). See also e.g. ĪPVV III 98: *prasiddhir eva ekā pramāṇam.* "The means of knowledge is nothing but *prasiddhi* alone."

[63] ĪPV II 84: *tena pratyakṣāgamau bādhakāv anumānasyeti tatrabhavadbhartṛharinyāyabhāṣyakṛtprabhṛtayaḥ.* "This is why the master Bhartṛhari and the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* for instance [say] that perception and *āgama* can invalidate (*bādhaka*) inference."

[64] See e.g. VP 1.31: *dharmasya cāvyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ / na tāṃl lokaprasiddhatvāt kaścit tarkeṇa bādhate //* "And these paths of merit, which have been determined without interruption, no one can invalidate them through reasoning (*tarka*), because they belong to general certainty (*lokaprasiddha*)." See also VP 1.38: *atīndriyān asaṃvedyān paśyanty arṣeṇa cakṣuṣā / ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādhyate //* "The speech of those who see with the eye of a Seer things that are beyond the range of senses [and] that are not [usually] experienced cannot be invalidated by an inference." See also VPV 97 *ad* VP 1.40

or the Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana.[65]

In the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta gives an even more critical appraisal of the role of reasoning, emphasizing once again its weakness as compared to *āgama* (while once again explicitly referring to Bhartṛhari's VP)[66] and insisting that it is incapable of leading humanity to

(although modern scholars have been wondering whether the VPV is Bhartṛhari's, Abhinavagupta has no doubt concerning its authorship, as noticed in Iyer 1969: 22: thus in ĪPVV II 226, he quotes VPV 214–215, and introduces it with the words *tad āha tatrabhavān bhartṛhariḥ*, "this is what the master Bhartṛhari has said [in…]"): *tasmāt pratyakṣam ārṣaṃ ca jñānaṃ saty api virodhe bādhakam anumānasya.* "For this reason, perception and the knowledge of Seers invalidate inference even when there is a contradiction [between them]." Cf. also VP 1.41: *caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate / āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate //* "He who relies on *āgama*, which, just as consciousness, exists without interruption, is not refuted (*bādhyate*) by reasonings (*hetuvāda*)."

[65] See NBh 3 ad NSū 1.1.1; after specifying that inference "rests on perception and *āgama*" (*pratyakṣāgamāśrita*) and after defining *nyāya* as an inquiry through valid means of knowledge, Vātsyāyana adds: *yat punar anumānaṃ pratyakṣāgamaviruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti.* "But an inference that is contradicted (*viruddha*) by perception and *āgama* is a pseudo rational inquiry (*nyāyābhāsa*)." On this passage and Vātsyāyana/Pakṣilasvāmin's attempt to "accommodate" his philosophical tradition "with the established religious tradition," see Preisendanz 2000: 229–230.

[66] Immediately after the passage of the ĪPVV quoted below (fn. 68), Abhinavagupta quotes in part VP 1.34 (*yatnenānumito'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate //* "Even something that has been inferred with [great] efforts by some skillful experts in inferences is demonstrated [to be] otherwise by others who are more skilful") and VP 1.132: *sarvo'dṛṣṭaphalān arthān āgamāt pratipadyate / viparītaṃ ca sarvatra śakyate vaktum āgame //* "Everybody knows the things the results of which are imperceptible through *āgama*; and in all cases, the contrary can be stated in an *āgama*." (The ĪPVV edition and the BL manuscript bear the reading *phalocitān* "that are appropriate for [a particular] result" instead of *adṛṣṭaphalān*, "the results of which are imperceptible." One could consider that the ĪPVV's reading is a corruption, or that Abhinavagupta's memory is betraying him here – or that he is slightly distorting the quotation so

a final consensual conclusion, since the most powerful reasonings

as to have Bhartṛhari say that *āgama* enables us to know more than just entities that have imperceptible results). VPV 212 explains that VP 1.132 answers the objection according to which *āgama*-s can lead to merit as well as demerit and adds: *etasmin paryanuyoge prativihīyate*: *sarveṣv āgameṣu dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaphalāsu pratipattiṣu viparītaphalaprāptiḥ śakyate prasaṅktum, tasmād āgamaṃ kañcit pramāṇīkṛtya vyavasthite tasmin yā kācid upapattir ucyamānā pratipattāv upodbalakatvaṃ labhate.* "This objection is answered [here in the following way]: since all *āgama*-s [enjoin] the practice of [actions] whether they have visible or invisible results, there follows the possibility that one may obtain [from them] contrary results; therefore, once a certain *āgama* has been set apart [from the others] by taking it as a means of knowledge, the logical explanation (*upapatti*) stated [as regards this particular *āgama*] becomes a means to strengthen (*upodbalaka*) the practice [enjoined in the chosen *āgama*]." I am not sure why Abhinavagupta associates this verse with VP 1.34 (which regards the weakness of inference as a means of knowledge); I assume that here he takes *āgama* in the second, "figurative" sense of the term, i.e. as meaning "scripture" rather than an intense realization, and considers that Bhartṛhari is emphasizing that each religious tradition, while relying on its own scriptures, builds various rational justifications of these scriptures that are contradictory with each other. On the weakness of inferential knowledge according to Bhartṛhari, see e.g. Iyer 1969: 83–85, and Houben 1997: 323–324 and 350, n. 21 (specifying that Bhartṛhari does not "simply reject inference" as was suggested in Frauwallner 1959: 94, "but points out its limitations, if it is used in isolation, without reference to traditional knowledge (*āgama*)."). See also VP 1.30: *na cāgamād*(1) *ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate / ṛṣīnām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam* // [(1) *na cāgamād* Biardeau 1964 : *nāgamād* VP]. "And without *āgama*, reasoning (*tarka*) cannot determine merit; even the Seers' knowledge presupposes *āgama*." Cf. VPV 86 *ad loc.*: *sarve hi vādino dūram api gatvā svabhāvaṃ na vyativartante. adṛṣṭārthānāṃ ca karmaṇāṃ phalaniyame svabhāvasaṃvid āgamapratibaddhā. ko hy anavasthitasādharmyavaidharmyeṣu nityam alabdhaniścayeṣu puruṣatarkeṣu viśvāsaḥ*? "For no philosopher, however far he may venture, goes beyond the nature [of things]; and as regards determining the results of [ritual] acts the objects of which are imperceptible, the knowledge of this nature depends on *āgama* – for what faith [could we have] in human reasonings, which never achieve certainty since the properties of containing merit and demerit remain undetermined in them?" Cf. also VP 1.32 (*avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā* //

always appear weaker when seen from the perspective of a different doctrinal system:

> To begin with, reasoning cannot apply to everything; and even in the cases where it applies, it is weak (*durbala*), according to the view that [Utpaladeva] has already expounded, because of the difficulty to know the nature of the effect, etc. [And] even a reasoning that is strong in its own house becomes weaker from the point of view of another reasoning developed by somebody who holds a different thesis. And yet, one can find no final conclusion whatsoever to the reasonings that flow from the beginning of *saṃsāra* up to date and are being developed by the six speculative doctrines[67] and their countless differences.[68]

From this point of view, the Pratyabhijñā's subordination of reason to revelation seems to reflect the Brahmanical contention that reason must be supported by scripture, and it can be compared not only to the positions of Bhartṛhari or Vātsyāyana, but also to those of Advaitavedāntins such as Śaṅkara, Sureśvara or Padmapāda, who also state that reasoning is groundless by itself and that it can only function properly with the help of *āgama*.[69]

"Since things can have different powers due to the differences regarding their conditions, places and times, their knowledge (*prasiddhi*) is extremely difficult to obtain through inference.") and VP 1.42 (*hastasparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā / anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ* // "Just as the fall of a blind man who runs on a path [that has an] uneven [ground] by groping around, [that] of [someone] who relies primarily on inference is not unlikely.").

[67] On the *tarkaṣaṭka* / *ṣaṭtarkī*, see e.g. Gerschheimer 2007.

[68] ĪPVV III 95: *na tāvat sarvatra nyāyo nirvahati; yatrāpi nirvahati, tatrāpi pūrvoktadṛṣṭyā kāryādirūpasya durjñānatvād durbalaḥ, svagṛhe balavān api vādyantarotthāpitanyāyāntaradṛśi durbalatarībhavati. tathāpi cādyāpi yāvad āsaṃsāraṃ pravahatāṃ tarkaṣaṭkatadbhedasahasrotthāpyamānānāṃ nyāyānāṃ na paryavasānaṃ kiñcid api labhyate.*

[69] See e.g. Halbfass 1983: 40–41 (quoting in particular BSū 2.1.11 on which Śaṅkara comments and which mentions *tarkāpratiṣṭhāna*, "the groundlessness of reasoning"), 45–57 (on Śaṅkara's criticism of inference) and 65–67 (on Sureśvara's and Padmapāda's statements that reason is groundless without revelation).

The paradoxical consequences of Utpaladeva's definition of *āgama*: a scripture only has authority for its followers, and yet all scriptures can be considered valid

However, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers do not content themselves with downplaying the role of reason and emphasizing the importance of *āgama.* To begin with, their definition of *āgama* – which distinguishes between *āgama* as a strong, nonperceptual and noninferential realization (*vimarśa*) and scriptures as a "mass of words" (*śabdarāśi*) expressing more or less adequately this realization – has somewhat paradoxical consequences that are worth mentioning regarding the authority of scripture.

Thus, as Abhinavagupta's commentaries make clear, according to Utpaladeva, on the one hand, a scripture only has authority for someone who believes in it, whereas for someone who does not, it is no *pramāṇa* at all; and on the other hand, *any* text considered as having scriptural authority in any given religious current is perfectly valid. Thus, in the ĪPV, immediately after stating that a text that is "in accordance" with the strong realization primarily denoted by the word *āgama* is also a kind of *āgama*, and after mentioning as such "the Vedas, the [scriptures of the Śaiva-]siddhānta, etc., or even another [text] such as the scriptures of the Buddhists or [those of] the Jains, etc,"[70] Abhinavagupta adds:

> For in the speech arising from this [strong realization], such as "I, who am performing the *jyotiṣṭoma* [sacrifice], will go to heaven," "I, who am initiated [in the Śaivasiddhānta doctrine], will not be born again," "I, who am compassionate, will attain buddhahood," "I, who am bearing intense pains, will attain the state of a [Jain] saint" – in [such a speech] no error (*viparyaya*) can arise, because only he who has faith in it (*tadāśvasta*) may successfully put into practice [that which is prescribed] in this [scripture], whereas for [anybody] else, because [this speech] does not consist in an intense understanding (*dṛḍhapratipatti*), this speech is not at all a means of knowledge (*apramāṇam eva*), [i.e.] it does not have as its essence such a [strong] realization (*vimarśa*).[71]

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[70] See above, fn. 18.

[71] ĪPV II 81–82: *tena hi yac chabdanam utpāditaṃ jyotiṣṭomakāry ahaṃ*

Abhinavagupta's position is quite puzzling at first sight. On the one hand, he states that all scriptures (including those of the Buddhists or Jains) are valid means of knowledge insofar as they express the strong realization that is *āgama* in the literal sense of the term; on the other hand, he considers that a scripture is a valid means of knowledge (insofar as it adequately expresses the realization that gives it its validity) *only for someone who has faith in it*: for a Buddhist, the Vedas are no means of knowledge at all, just as the Buddhist *sūtra*-s are no means of knowledge at all for someone who belongs to the Brahmanical tradition. And yet, both Buddhist and Vedic scriptures are means of knowledge insofar as they are considered by some to convey this strong realization.

Such a statement entails obvious problems which Abhinavagupta himself mentions in the form of objections: how can a scripture be a means of knowledge for some only?[72] For a means of knowledge is supposed to be universal or "impartial" (*apakṣapātin*),[73] just as it is

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svargaṃ ganteti dīkṣito'ham apunarāvṛttibhāgīti, kāruṇiko'haṃ buddhapadaṃ ganteti, gāḍhakleśasahiṣṇur aham arhatpadaṃ prapatteti, tatra na viparyaya udeti, tadāśvastasyaiva tatrānuṣṭhānayogyatvāt, anyasya tu dṛḍhapratipattirūpatvābhāvād apramāṇam eva tathāvimarśānātmakaṃ(1) *śabdanam.* [(1) *tathāvimarśānātmakaṃ* conj. : *tathāvimarśanātmakaṃ* KSTS, *Bhāskarī*, J, L, P, B, S1, S2, SOAS]

[72] ĪPV II 82: *nanv evaṃ tad eva śāstraṃ kaṃcit prati pramāṇaṃ kaṃcit prati neti syāt, na caitad yuktam apakṣapātitvāt pramāṇasyeti.* "[An objector:] But if it is the case, [then] the same treatise should be a means of knowledge for some [people] and not for others; and this is not possible, because of the [rule] according to which the means of knowledge is impartial (*apakṣapātin*)."

[73] This principle occurs, albeit in a different context, in the works of Kashmiri Naiyāyikas such as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa or Bhāsarvajña (Abhinavagupta knows and occasionally quotes or paraphrases these works; for an explicit reference to the NBhūṣ, see e.g. ĪPVV I 134–135, and Ratié 2011a: 88–91; for a probable paraphrase of the NM, see e.g. ĪPV I 167–168, and Ratié 2010b: 460, fn. 66). Thus in NM I 264–266, Jayanta argues that a Mīmāṃsaka cannot rightly criticize yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*), because his refutation rests on a knowledge of yogic perception that is either a valid means of knowledge (but then, "since the means of knowledge is impartial," *pramāṇasyāpakṣapātitvāt*, the

supposed to be devoid of internal contradictions – but how can all scriptures be means of knowledge, since they contain teachings that are "mutually contradictory"?[74] By acknowledging that scripture is not universally valid, the Pratyabhijñā treatise seems to undermine its authority; by acknowledging that however different, scriptures are all valid, it seems to doom them to contradiction.

Here is Abhinvagupta's answer in the ĪPV:

> Although you are ignorant of the way knowledge really occurs, [I] will not neglect you [by overlooking your question]. [Now,] what is the meaning of this sentence: "the means of knowledge is impartial"? Does the cognition of blue that is a perception [and] belongs to one [particular subject] make the blue manifest to all? Or does the cognition of smoke [that belongs to one subject make] fire [manifest to all through inference]? And is the *āgama* consisting in the prediction of a *siddha* – [such as] "in the morning you will obtain a treasure thanks to this rite" – a means of knowlege for all[, or just for the individual to whom the *siddha* predicts this]? If [you answer] that [in all these cases, there is] a particular [means of knowledge] for anybody[, but only] in some particular [circumstance, then] in the same way, in the case at hand as well, the speech consisting in an intense realization – which is called *ā-gama*

Mīmāṃsaka must share this *pramāṇa* and acknowledge that his opponent's understanding of yogic perception is right) or not (but then his very demonstration lacks any ground since it rests on something that is not a means of knowledge). Similarly, in a discussion on the notion of generality (*sāmānya*) that occurs in NBhūṣ 232, an argument showing that a thesis to be refuted leads to an unwanted consequence is rejected on the grounds that either the thesis in question is a knowledge obtained through a *pramāṇa* (but then, "because the means of knowledge is impartial," *pramāṇasyāpakṣapātitvāt*, the validity of this very thesis must be acknowledged) or not (but then one cannot draw any consequence from an invalid knowledge). Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña may have borrowed this principle from a common source that is unknown to me.

[74] See e.g. the objection stated in ĪPVV III 84: *parasparaviruddhopadeśino hy āgamāḥ, na ca ya ekasyāgamaḥ, so'nyasyānāgama iti yuktaṃ pramāṇasyāpakṣapātitvād iti.* "For scriptures (*āgama*) teach mutually contradicting doctrines; and it is not possible that what is *āgama* for one [person] may not be *āgama* for another, on account of [the rule] according to which the means of knowledge is impartial!"

because it "makes the object known" (*-gama* = *arthaṃ gamayati*) "completely" (*ā- = samantāt*) – is for sure a means of knowledge for all. In that regard, just as light, a sense organ and so on, insofar as they contribute to the production of an erroneous cognition, contribute to invalidity (*apramāṇatā*), [so that from this point of view they] are not a means of knowledge, and [yet] for all of that, perception, which has the nature of a correct cognition, is absolutely not partial; in the same way, although for a *śūdra* for instance, a speech concerning the *jyotiṣṭoma* [sacrifice], etc., contributes to a pseudo *āgama* (*āgamābhāsa*) whose nature is not an intense realization, [and although] for this very reason, it is not a means of knowledge, [nevertheless] insofar as [with respect to other individuals who are not *śūdra*-s] the same [speech] has the status of a means of knowledge since it is useful [as] a means of knowledge characterized as a speech consisting in an authentic *āgama* that has as its essence an intense realization, it cannot be rejected on account of the defect of being impartial. For every *āgama* without exception, whether it consists in injunctions or prohibitions, produces a realization that is necessarily restricted (*niyantrita*) to specific (*niyata*) persons who are qualified [for it] (*adhikārin*) [as well as to a specific] place and time, [specific] auxiliary causes, etc. [75]

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[75] ĪPV II 82–83: *atattvajño'si pratītivṛttasya, tathāpi nopekṣyase. apakṣapāti pramāṇam iti ko'sya vacanasyārthaḥ? yad*(1) *ekasya nīlajñānaṃ pratyakṣarūpaṃ tat kiṃ sarvasya nīlaṃ bhāsayati dhūmajñānaṃ vāgnim? tvaṃ prātar nidhim anena vidhinā labdhāsa iti ca yaḥ siddhādeśarūpa āgamaḥ sa kiṃ sarvān prati pramāṇam? atha kasyāpi kadācit kiṃcit, tathehāpi dṛḍhavimarśarūpaṃ*(2) *śabdanam ā samantād arthaṃ gamayatīty āgamasaṃjñakaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarvasya tāvad bhavati. tatra yathā mithyājñāne sahāyatāṃ bhajamānam ālokendriyādikam apramāṇatāsacivam apramāṇam, na caitāvatā samyagjñānasvarūpasya pratyakṣasya kācit pakṣapātitā, tathā sa eva jyotiṣṭomādiśabdaḥ śūdrāder adṛḍhavimarśātmany ata evāpramāṇa āgamābhāse sācivyaṃ vidadhad api dṛḍhavimarśātmakasatyāgamarūpaśabdanalakṣaṇapramāṇopayogitāyāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ bhajan na pakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ*(3)*. sarva eva hy āgamo niyatādhikārideśakālasahakāryādiniyantritam eva vimarśaṃ vidhatte, vidhirūpo niṣedhātmā vā.* [(1) *yad* B : *kiṃ yad* J, L, P, S1, S2, SOAS, KSTS, *Bhāskarī*. (2) *dṛḍhavimarśarūpaṃ* J, L, B, P, S1, S2, SOAS : *dṛḍhavimarśanarūpaṃ* KSTS, *Bhāskarī*. (3) *pakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ* conj. : *pakṣapātāpakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ* L, P, S1, S2, SOAS, KSTS, *Bhāskarī* : *pratipakṣapātadoṣapratikṣepayogyaḥ* J. I am conjecturing the latter because I do not understand the reading found

The means of knowledge that is *āgama* is as universal as perception and inference since generally speaking everybody *may* use it, but just as perception and inference, it is not de facto applied by all subjects in all situations. In the ĪPVV, Abhinavagupta also argues that all means of knowledge, including perception and inference, only lead to knowledge in some specific circumstances and for some specific individuals: the fact that a certain individual perceives a given object or grasps through inference the presence of a currently imperceptible object does not entail that all subjects should ipso facto be endowed with his knowledge, and the same holds good for *āgama*, which produces a realization only in some particular circumstances and for those who happen to be qualified (*adhikārin*) for it.[76]

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in the editions and most of the consulted manuscripts (I cannot see how impartiality, *apakṣapāta*, could be mentioned as a defect along with partiality), although according to the KSTS edition and the BL manuscript, the parallel passage of the ĪPVV says that *āgama* "cannot be accused of being partial *for instance*" (*na pakṣapātādivācyatārhaḥ*, see below, fn. 76), which might be taken to indicate that *apakṣapāta* is implied as another kind of defect.]

[76] See ĪPVV III 84–85: *tathā hy apakṣapātitvaṃ kīdṛk pramāṇasya*? *kiṃ nu khalu bhoḥ pratyakṣānumāne caitrīye maitrasya nīlavahnyādikam avabhāsayato yenāpakṣapātinī syātām. caitraṃ prati vā yaḥ siddhādeśaḥ prāptas te nidhilābho bhaviteti, sa kiṃ maitrasyāgamaḥ*? *atha tathājātīye pratyakṣānumāne maitrasyāpi kadācid bhavata ity apakṣapātitā, sā tarhy āgamasyāpy aviśiṣṭā. avaśyaṃ hi saugatacārvākāder api kvacana pratyayitapuruṣavacasi pratītinirūḍhir bhaved eva. tathā hi dṛḍhavimarśarūpaṃ śabdanam āgama ā samantād arthaṃ gamayatīti tatra yathaivāpramāṇabhūtadvicandrasaṃvedana upayogam upagacchad ālokendriyādikam apramāṇam, na ceyatā samyakpratyakṣasya pakṣapātitā prasajyate kācit, tathā jyotiṣṭomādivākye śūdrādīnām anadhikāriṇām adṛḍhavimarśarūpa āgamābhāsa upayogaṃ vrajann apramāṇabhūtoʾpi śraddhādaravati dvije dṛḍhavimarśātmakasamyagāgamarūpaśabdanopayoge prāmāṇyam āsādayan na pakṣapātādivācyatārhaḥ. sarva eva hy āgamo niyatādhikārideśakāladaśāsahakāriprabhṛtīn āmṛśya vidhiniṣedhādivimarśamayaḥ.* "To explain: in what does the impartiality (*apakṣapātitva*) of the means of knowledge consist? Now, could it be that the perception and inference belonging to Caitra make the blue, or fire, etc., manifest for Maitra [as well], so that [one could say] that [these means of knowledge are] impartial? Or

Abhinavagupta further explains that this qualification is once again the result of the Lord's free will, which creates each individual as capable of a particular realization that in turn can be produced only through hearing a particular authoritative source.[77] He also presents this feature of the system as the reason why scriptures cannot be

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[in the same way], is the prediction of a *siddha* given to Caitra, [such as] 'you are going to find a treasure,' an *āgama* for Maitra [as well]? If [you answer] that impartiality [means] that perception and inference, because they are of the same kind [for Caitra and for Maitra], can also arise in Maitra in some circumstances, then the same [impartiality] belongs to *āgama* too; for necessarily, even a Buddhist or a Cārvāka for instance, in some circumstances, must [experience] the intensity of a realization (*pratītinirūḍhi*) with respect to the speech of a trustworthy man. To elaborate – *āgama* is a speech consisting in a strong realization; [it is called *ā-gama* because] it 'makes the object known' (*-gama = arthaṃ gamayati*) 'completely' (*ā- = samantāt*). In this regard, just as light, the sense organs, etc., when contributing in the production of the [illusory] cognition of two moons that is not a means of knowledge, are not means of knowledge [themselves], and yet no partiality ensues for a correct perception; in the same way, in the sentence [enjoining] the *jyotiṣṭoma* [sacrifice] for instance, although [scripture] is not a means of knowledge insofar as for *śūdra*-s for instance, who are not qualified (*adhikārin*) [for it], it contributes to producing a pseudo *āgama* (*āgamābhāsa*) that does not consist in a strong realization, [nevertheless], insofar as it reaches the status of a means of knowldege in a twice-born who is full of faith and respect, since [it] is useful [in him] as a speech consisting in a correct *āgama* the nature of which is a strong realization, it cannot be accused of being partial for instance. For every *āgama* without exception consists in a realization – be it an injunction, a prohibition, etc. –, with respect to a specific qualified person (*adhikārin*), a [specific] place, time, condition, [specific] auxiliary causes, etc."

[77] See ĪPVV III 85: *tataś ca kaścit puruṣaḥ kaṃcid eva devasiddhādyanyatamakaraṇīyocitavimarśaṃ svātmasaṃyojanena vimṛśan bhagavatā sṛṣṭaḥ, anyas tv anyaṃ vimarśam.* "And therefore, by associating [a particular realization] with the self [of a particular man,] the Lord creates a particular man [as] realizing a certain realization only, [one] that is fit to be produced by one among many [possible sources] such as a [particular] god or *siddha*; whereas [he creates] another [particular individual as capable of] another realization [fit to be produced through someone else's speech]."

said to contradict themselves: all scriptures are in fact expressions of the same self-realization of the (Śaiva) universal consciousness, and they only seem to contradict themselves because this unique consciousness determines them as being means of knowledge only in particular, different circumstances, with respect to particular, different objects and for particular, different individuals.[78]

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[78] See e.g. TĀ 35.25 (thus introduced in TĀV XII 369: *nanv evam ekakartṛkatveʾsya vicitroʾyam upadeśaḥ kiṃ na parasparasya virudhyed ity āśaṅkyāha*… "Having anticipated the objection: 'But since thus [according to you, *āgama*-s] have a single author[, namely Śambhu], how could this diverse (*vicitra*) teaching avoid self-contradiction?', [Abhinavagupta] answers…"): *tasmin viṣayavaiviktyād vicitraphaladāyini / citropāyopadeśoʾpi na virodhāvaho bhavet //* "In this [*āgama*] which brings diverse fruits because [it] has distinct objects, even the teaching of diverse paths cannot produce any contradiction." Cf. TĀV XII 370 *ad loc.*: *tasminn ekenaiva śambhunā praṇīteʾpy āgame vicitrāṇāṃ dharmādīnām upāyānām upadeśo deśakālādhikāryādiviṣayabhedam āśritya vicitraphaladātṛtvān na virodhāvaho bhaved aprāmāṇyakāraṇatāṃ na yāyād ity arthaḥ.* "In this *āgama*, the teaching of the paths of merit, etc. – which are diverse although [this *āgama*] is given by Śambhu, who is absolutely one – cannot produce any contradiction; that is, it cannot become a cause of invalidity, since it provides fruits that are diverse with respect to the differences concerning e.g. the [particular] place, time and qualified person [of this or that particular teaching]." See also TĀ 35.35ab: *tad eka evāgamoʾyaṃ citraś citreʾdhikāriṇi /* "Therefore this *āgama* is in fact one [and yet] diverse (*citra*) since the qualified person (*adhikārin*) [as regards its teaching] is diverse." Cf. TSā 193: *tatra saṃvinmātramaye viśvasmin saṃvidi ca vimarśātmikāyām, vimarśasya ca śabdanātmakatāyāṃ siddhāyāṃ, sakalajaganniṣṭhavastunas tadgatasya ca karmaphalasaṃbandhavaicitryasya yad vimarśanaṃ tad eva śāstram iti parameśvarasvabhāvābhinna eva samastaḥ śāstrasaṃdarbho vastuta ekaphalaprāpaka ekādhikāryuddeśenaiva, tatra tu parameśvaraniyatiśaktimahimnaiva bhāge bhāge rūḍhir lokānām iti*. "As regards [the validity of *āgama*,] since the universe consists in nothing but consciousness, since consciousness in turn consists in realization, and since the fact that [it] consists in speech has [already] been established, the realization of the reality that pervades the whole universe and of the variety [that arises] within this [reality due to] the relation between acts and [their] fruits is precisely [what we call] a treatise (*śāstra*). As a consequence, in fact no treatise at all is in any way distinct from the nature of the Highest Lord [and all of them] lead to a single result, since [in fact]

The Pratyabhijñā's inclusivistic strategy and the distinction between "the" *āgama* and *āgama*-s

Western readers have often been struck by the fact that a number of Indian philosophers avoid purely and simply discarding other religious currents and their beliefs, and Paul Hacker has shown that this attitude is not a mere display of tolerance but rather an "inclusivism"[79] – i.e., a tendency to present other religious doctrines as included within one's own instead of openly fighting them – that is in fact a "peculiar mixture of doctrinal tolerance and intolerance,"[80] since while tolerating the other religious currents, it aims at subordinating them by presenting them as inferior or partial expressions of its own doctrines.[81] However, just as one can rightly question Paul Hacker's contention that this inclusivism is a purely Indian phenomenon,[82] it should be pointed out that inclusivism is far from being a pan-Indian phenomenon, and while some religious currents simply reject the others' scriptures,[83] some scholars have attempted

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they address a single qualified person. However, by virtue of the very greatness of the power of necessity (*niyatiśakti*) of the Highest Lord, people [only] rest on this or that part of this [single treatise]."

79 "Inklusivismus" – for a summary, short bibliography and critical analysis of P. Hacker's works on inclusivism, see Halbfass 1988: 403–418; see also Houben 1997: 47, n. 11.

80 Hacker 1957: 386: "diese eigentümliche Mischung von doktrinärer Toleranz und Intoleranz"

81 Cf. Halbfass 1988: 411, where inclusivism is defined as "a subordinating identification of the other, the foreign with parts or preliminary stages of one's own sphere. It is not considered to be a process of additive annexation; nor is it a form of syncretism or eclecticism. The other, the foreign is not seen as something that could be added to, or combined with, one's own system; instead, it is something a priori contained in it."

82 See e.g. Halbfass 1988: 415–418.

83 Cf. e.g. Kumārila's rejection of non-Brahmanical traditions (even though he endeavours to absorb for instance the Jains' and Buddhists' notion of *ahiṃsā* within the Vedic revelation by stating that the Jains and Buddhists have in fact derived their *ahiṃsā* from the Veda: see Halbfass 1983: 8 and 94–95), Dharmakīrti's sometimes violent criticism of the

to distinguish from these inclusivistic or exclusivistic attitudes a "perspectivism" that fully acknowledges the validity of different perspectives instead of discarding them as inadequate views ultimately superseded by one's own.[84] In this respect, does Utpaladeva's definition of *āgama* betray an inclusivistic or a perspectivistic attitude?

At least some elements in the Pratyabhijñā's position can be seen as perspectivistic. Thus Abhinavagupta insists that *any* scripture (including the Vaiṣṇavas,' Buddhists' or Jains', and not only the Vedic or the Śaiva scriptures) is to be considered a fully valid means of knowledge in which "there can be no error":[85] his commentaries emphasize that any scripture is valid for anybody who has faith in it, and he adds for instance that the Buddha or Kapila (the founder of the Sāṃkhya) are endowed with divine grace and impart it to others.[86] However, this perspectivistic aspect of the Pratyabhijñā's

Vedas or Śaṅkara's "conservative and restrictive" approach to "the problem of religious plurality (Halbfass 1983: 92). These strategical choices are obviously determined by their historical, social and religious context (on the context of Kumārila's hostility towards heterodox trends and of Dharmakīrti's reaction to it, see Eltschinger 2007, chapitre 1; cf. Halbfass 1988: 405, which mentions P. Hacker's opinion that the inclusivistic method "was employed especially by such religious groups as felt themselves inferior to their environment").

84 See e.g. Houben 1995: 16–18 and Houben 1997, where Bhartṛhari's perspectivism is described thus (317–318): "In a very fundamental way, the validity of different perspectives is accepted. Throughout the *Vākyapadīya*, different viewpoints are discussed in their mutual opposition and complementariness [...]. This would mean that it is beforehand assumed that things appear differently from different points of view, or in different conceptual frameworks. This may be contrasted with the assumption that it is possible to make complete and universally true statements about a thing."

85 In this respect the Pratyabhijñā system appears more "perspectivistic" than Bhartṛhari's, since the grammarian-philosopher never explicitly acknowledges the validity of Buddhist or Jain scriptures for instance (see below, fn. 105).

86 See e.g. ĪPVV III 98: *parameśvarecchāvaśāc ca sugatakapilādayoʾpi tatprasiddhyanupraviṣṭāḥ kṛtā anugrāhyās tān evānyāṃś cānugrahītum.* "And even the Buddha or Kapila for instance, [since they are] pervaded

definition of *āgama* is obviously grounded in a particularly strong inclusivistic attitude:[87] the statement according to which all scriptures are means of knowledge, far from expressing a relativistic view,[88] is to be understood in connection with the assertions that the various scriptures are included within an Ur-*āgama* as higher and lower (*ūrdhvādhara*) levels of expression of it, that this hierarchy culminates in the Śaiva nondualistic all-encompassing scriptures,[89] that these hierarchized scriptures express hierarchized (i.e., more and more thorough) realizations,[90] and that their fruits are hier-

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by this a priori certainty [that is *āgama*] thanks to the will of the Highest Lord, are made fit for receiving grace (*anugrāhya*) so that they and others may receive it."

87 Cf. Hanneder 1998: 6, mentioning "the inclusivist hierarchy of Abhinavagupta's school."

88 Cf. Lawrence 2003, §44, noticing that "although Abhinavagupta grants validity to disparate scriptural traditions, he is not a relativist."

89 See e.g. TĀ 35.30–32: *eka evāgamas tasmāt tatra laukikaśāstrataḥ / prabhṛty ā vaiṣṇavād bauddhāc chaivāt sarvaṃ hi niṣṭhitam // tasya yat tat paraṃ prāpyaṃ dhāma tat trikaśabditam / sarvāvibhedānucchedāt tad eva kulam ucyate // yathordhvādharatābhāksu dehāṅgeṣu vibhediṣu / ekaṃ prāṇitam evaṃ syāt trikaṃ sarveṣu śāstrataḥ //* "In fact *āgama* is one; therefore everything is included in it, from the mundane treatises to the Vaiṣṇava, Buddhist [and] Śaiva [treatises]. The highest [level] attainable among them is the domain called Trika; this same [domain] is called Kula because it is entirely devoid of divisions and interruptions. Just as there is a single life in the limbs of a body [although] they are different [insofar as] they are higher or lower (*ūrdhvādara*), in the same way, the Trika must be in all [treatises, as is confirmed] by scripture." Abhinavagupta thus quotes the *Kālīkulatantra*, which states e.g. (TĀ 35.34): *puṣpe gandhas tile tailaṃ dehe jīvo jale'mṛtam / yathā tathaiva śāstrāṇāṃ kulam antaḥ pratiṣṭhitam //* "Just as perfume in a flower, just as sesame oil in sesame, just as life in a body, just as nectar in water – just in the same way, Kula resides within [all] treatises."

90 See e.g. TSā 193–194 (immediately after Abhinavagupta's statement that all treatises are expressions of the universal consciousness' realization but are differentiated according to the persons that they address, see above, fn. 78): *kecin māyocitabhedaparāmarśātmani vedāgamādiśāstre rūḍhāḥ, anye tathāvidha eva mokṣābhimānena sāṃkhya-*

archized insofar as higher scriptures lead to fruits that lower ones cannot provide.[91] The scriptures' variety (*vicitratā*) is in fact a hierarchy (*ūrdhvādharatāsthiti*) that must necessarily be acknowledged because it constitutes the only guarantee that scriptures do

vaiṣṇavaśāstrādau, pare tu viviktaśivasvabhāvāmarśanasāre śaivasiddhāntādau, anye sarvamayaparameśvaratāmarśanasāre mataṅgādiśāstre, kecit tu viralaviralāḥ samastāvacchedabandhyasvātantryānandaparamārthasaṃvinmayaparameśvarasvarūpāmarśanātmani śrītrikaśāstrakrame, kecit tu pūrvapūrvatyāgakrameṇa laṅghanena vety evam ekaphalasiddhir ekasmād evāgamāt. "Some rest on treatises such as the scripture of the Veda, which consists in the realization of differences that are appropriate in [the domain of] *māyā*; others, for instance, on the treatises of the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiṣṇavas, which are of the same sort because of their [similar erroneous] conviction regarding liberation; others [rest] for instance on the Śaivasiddhānta, the essence of which is a realization of Śiva's nature as distinct (*vivikta*) [from the universe and other subjects]; others, on the treatise of the *Mataṅga* for instance, the essence of which is a realization that the nature of the Highest Lord pervades everything; whereas others, particularly rare, [rest] on the method (*krama*) of the treatise of the venerable Trika, the essence of which is a realization of the Highest Lord's nature as consisting in a consciousness whose ultimate reality is a freedom and bliss devoid of any interruption; and some [attain this highest stage] either by progressively abandoning each inferior [step] or by jumping [directly to it] – thus [in fact people] obtain a single fruit from one single *āgama*."

[91] See e.g. TĀ 35.29 (which, according to TĀV XII 372, answers the following objection: *nanv evam api śivād eva yady akhilam idaṃ śāstram uditam, tac chaivavat*(1) *pāñcarātrādibhyo'pi kasmān na śivātmakatvam evodiyād iti.* [(1) *tac chaivavat* conj. : *tac chaiva-* KSTS] "But even if this is the case, if all this treatise has come down from Śiva only, then what is the reason why the very identity with Śiva [which constitutes the ultimate liberation] cannot arise from the Pāñcarātra [treatises] and so on as well as from the Śaiva [scriptures]?"): *yathā ca tatra pūrvasminn āśrame nottarāśramāt / phalam eti tathā pāñcarātrādau na śivātmatām //* "And just as in the [Veda, although it is one,] no result comes from a superior stage of life (*āśrama*) in a stage of life that is inferior, in the same way, there is no identity with Śiva in the Pāñcaratra and so on." Cf. ĪPVV III 101, which explains that although a superior *āgama* can yield the fruits of inferior *āgama*-s, "nevertheless a lower [*āgama*] is not capable of providing the fruits of higher [*āgama*-s]" (*na tv adhara ūrdhvaphaladānasamarthaḥ*).

not contradict themselves and therefore have a validity.[92] Hierarchy ensures non-contradiction because lower scriptures can be seen as more partial or incomplete aspects of the ultimate *āgama*, so that any statement of these lower scriptures that may seem contradictory with the Śaiva nondualistic doctrine can be explained away as resulting from the incompleteness of the lower scriptures. And yet the validity of lower scriptures cannot be questioned insofar as they are aspects of the ultimate *āgama*. The Pratyabhijñā's strategy therefore consists in avoiding direct confrontation with all other religious trends while claiming to encompass and surpass them:[93] the

[92] See e.g. TĀ 35.38–39ab: *anekāgamapakṣe'pi vācyā viṣayabheditā / avaśyam ūrdhvādharatāsthityā prāmāṇyasiddhaye // anyathā naiva kasyāpi prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyati dhruvam /* "Even [if one prefers to acknowledge] the thesis [according to which] *āgama*-s are multiple, in order to establish their validity as means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), one must necessarily admit that they are different with respect to their objects according to their hierarchy (*ūrdhvādharatāsthiti*); [for] otherwise, surely, no validity at all can be established for any of them." Cf. TĀV XII 377: *ānaikye'py āgamānāṃ prāmāṇyasiddhyartham ūrdhvādharatāsthityā viṣayabheditvam avaśyavācyam, no cet kasyāpy āgamasya parasparapratighātāt prāmāṇyaṃ na siddhyed eveti niścayaḥ. tena kaṃcit kvacin niyuṅkta ity ādidṛśā kasyacid evādhikāriṇo niyatopāyopadeśakaṃ śāstraṃ pramāṇam iti bhāvaḥ.* "Even if *āgama*-s are [considered to be] multiple [and not one as we claim], in order to establish their validity as means of knowledge, one must necessarily admit that they are different with respect to their objects according to their hierarchy, [for] if one does not [accept this], no validity can be established for any *āgama*, because they contradict each other – this is certain. One should supply: therefore, according to the view [stated] at first, [which consists in saying] that [scripture] addresses a particular [person] in a particular [circumstance only], a treatise is a means of knowledge only for a particular qualified person (*adhikārin*) [and] while teaching [only] a particular path."

[93] See e.g. the introductory verse to chapter 3.1 of the ĪPK in ĪPV II 195: *yaṃ prāpya sarvāgamasindhusaṅghaḥ pūrṇatvam abhyeti kṛtārthatāṃ ca / taṃ naumy ahaṃ śāmbhavatattvacintāratnaughasāraṃ paramāgamābdhim //* "I praise this ocean of the supreme *āgama* who has as its essence the multitude of wish-fulfilling gems that is the reality of Śambhu [and in which] the convergent rivers that are all the *āgama*-s, when attaining it, become complete (*pūrṇa*) and reach their goal

Buddha and Kapila are to be considered as endowed with grace and capable of endowing the others with it because in fact they are mere expressions of Śiva's self-realization,[94] and in general, the non-Śaiva scriptures must be respected *because they are ultimately Śaiva*.[95]

(*kṛtārtha*)." Cf. Halbfass 1988: 414, mentioning "among the familiar inclusivistic images [...] the metaphor of the many rivers which are united in the one ocean."

[94] See ĪPVV III 97: *na hi buddho nāma niyataḥ kaścit, api tu bhāvanābalapratilabdhakṣaṇikādidṛḍhavimarśaḥ. tasya kṣaṇikādibhāvanopadeśī guruḥ pūrvabuddhas tasyāpy anya iti krameṇāniyatavaktṛkatvāt pārameśvaravimarśamayataiva vastutaḥ. evaṃ caturviṃśatitattvabhāvanābhāvitaḥ kapilo mantavyaḥ.* "For what [we call] 'the Buddha' is no one in particular; rather, it is the intense realization of that which is momentary for instance, [a realization] obtained through the strength of [mental] cultivation (*bhāvanā*). The master who taught him this [mental] cultivation of what is momentary, etc., is a previous Buddha, and [the master] of the latter is yet another [Buddha]: in this succession, because there is no particular speaking subject, in reality [the Buddha] consists in nothing but the realization of the Highest Lord. [And] Kapila, who has got through [mental] cultivation the [Sāṃkhya's] twenty-four ontological categories (*tattva*), must be considered in the same way [as a mere realization of the Highest Lord rather than as a particular individual]." Ironically, this inclusivistic strategy with respect to Buddhism and Sāṃkhya sounds like an echo of Kumārila's famous argument for the authorlessness of the Vedas. Cf. ŚV *Vākya*. 365cd–366: *saṅghātatvasya vaktavyam īdṛśaṃ pratisādhanam // vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyanyanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā //* "One must answer the [objection according to which a sentence] is a [human] collection [of words] with the following counterargument: any recitation of the Veda is preceded by the recitation of a master, because just as today's [Vedic] recitation, this [previous recitation] is called a 'recitation of the Veda'." On this argument see Eltschinger 2007, 148–150.

[95] See e.g. TĀ 35.36: *sāṃkhyaṃ yogaṃ pāñcarātraṃ vedāṃś caiva na nindayet / yataḥ śivodbhavāḥ sarva iti svacchandaśāsane //* "[It has been said] in the teachings of the *Svacchanda*[*tantra*] that one should not despise Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and even the Vedas, since they all come from Śiva." Cf. also the description (unfortunately too long to be quoted here) of the hierarchy of systems according to the scale of ontological levels (*tattva*) given by Kṣemarāja in his PH while he

Thus Abhinavagupta states that all *āgama*-s are valid means of knowledge, and yet not only does he contend that the dissemination of the Ur-*āgama* into a multiplicity of scriptures is the reason why people "go astray" and are "deluded;"[96] he also specifies that the Veda for instance is wrong and that, as Jürgen Hanneder has put it, "all that goes against it will lead one beyond delusion":[97]

> And since [the lower scriptures], although [they] have seen a part of the reality [expressed] in the higher teachings, have rejected it, it is [only] the state of *māyā* that is found in the lower treatises, because [they only] protect the created universe. And in the venerable treatise of the *Ānanda*[*tantra*] for instance, the Highest Lord has proclaimed that the [Vedic] Seers' speech is full of evils (*kleśa*), has uncertain and meagre results [and] is limited. The wise should never take [it] as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇayet*): he must take refuge in the *āgama* that is exclusively Śaiva. That which causes sins according to the [Vedic] Seers' [speech] leads to a quick realization (*siddhi*) in the teachings of the Left,[98] since all this [speech] of the Seers is circumscribed to the domain of *māyā.*[99]

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explains PH 8: *tadbhūmikāḥ sarvadarśanasthitayaḥ.* "The positions of all systems are theatrical roles (*bhūmikā*) that this [unique Self] takes on."

[96] See e.g. TĀ 35.37: *ekasmād āgamāc caite khaṇḍakhaṇḍā vyapoddhṛtāḥ / loke syur āgamās taiś ca jano bhramyati mohitaḥ //* "And from a unique *āgama*, these *āgama*-s must be scattered into various fragments in the world; and it is because of them that people go astray, deluded (*mohita*)."

[97] Hanneder 1998: 24.

[98] On the meaning of *vāmaśāsana* here (that Abhinavagupta might want to extend to the whole Śaiva revelation but that might originally have designated more narrowly the Vāmasrotas to which the *Ānandatantra* belongs), see Sanderson 1995: 86, fn. 251, and Hanneder 1998: 24–25.

[99] TĀ 37.9–12ab: *ūrdhvaśāsanavastvaṃśe dṛṣṭvāpi ca samujjhite / adhaḥśāstreṣu māyātvaṃ lakṣyate sargarakṣaṇāt // śrīmadānandaśāstrādau proktaṃ ca parameśinā / ṛṣivākyaṃ bahukleśam adhruvālpaphalaṃ mitam // naiva pramāṇayed vidvān śaivam evāgamaṃ śrayet / yad ārṣe pātahetukaṃ tad asmin vāmaśāsane // āśusiddhyai yataḥ sarvam ārṣaṃ māyodarasthitam /*

All scriptures can be considered valid means of knowledge – and yet all scriptures but the Śaivas' are ultimately erroneous because they are only partial aspects of Śiva's self-awareness: the Veda for instance only concerns the universal consciousness' realization of the domain of *māyā*, where objects and subjects appear as fundamentally distinct from each other instead of being grasped as a mere manifestation of consciousness. This scripture is valid insofar as objects and subjects are indeed manifest: the domain of *māyā* is real insofar as it really occurs as a phenomenon; but it is erroneous insofar as it does not include the awareness that objects and subjects have no ontological nature of their own and are mere appearances taken on by Śiva. This distinction as regards the validity of a scripture finds its epistemological background in Utpaladeva's theory of error (*bhrama*, *bhrānti*), which is said to consist in an incomplete manifestation (*apūrṇakhyāti*):[100] error reveals, but incompletely, and the fact that a knowledge is erroneous becomes manifest when a given realization (e.g. "this is silver") is cancelled by a subsequent, fuller realization (e.g. "this is not silver but nacre"). According to the Pratyabhijñā, as long as no such subsequent realization cancels a given cognition, this cognition is to be considered as valid: the validity of a realization is ensured by its continuity (*anuvṛtti*).[101] This means that, just as a

[100] See e.g. Rastogi 1986, Ratié 2011a: 644–650 and Nemec 2011.

[101] See e.g. ĪPV II 77–78, where Abhinavagupta sums up Utpaladeva's position regarding the definition of the means of knowledge while emphasizing that any cognition which remains uncontradicted (*abādhita*) is to be considered as valid: *ata eva vibhāgaviśeṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣādibhir iha nāyāsito lokaḥ. yad yad abādhitasthairyam ata evāpratihatānuvṛttikaṃ vimarśaphalaṃ vidhatte, tat tad bodharūpaṃ bodhyaniṣṭhaṃ pramātṛsvarūpaviśrāntaṃ pramāṇam iti.* "For this very reason, in this [treatise, we] have not exhausted people with [useless digressions] such as the examination of the characteristics [of the various means of knowledge] according to their particular distinctions: whatever has a lasting state (*sthairya*) that is not cancelled (*abādhita*), [and that] for this very reason, has as its result a realization (*vimarśa*) the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of which is not impeded, is a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) consisting in a cognition (*bodha*), regarding an object of cognition (*bodhya*) [and] resting on the nature of the knowing subject (*pramātṛ*)." On the relation between this position and that of Kumārila's "intrinsic valid-

dreamer has no reason to consider that his perceptions are erroneous until a cancelling realization arises as he wakes up,[102] in the same

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ity" (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*), see Ratié 2011a: 650–656. On the notion of *anuvṛtti*, see Torella 2002: 171, n. 28.

[102] See e.g. ĪPV II 240: *yat tu tatra bāhyendriyaviṣayatvaṃ pramātrantarasādhāraṇyaṃ cakāsti, tad yady api yāvad bhāti tāvat tathaiva, tathāpy uttarakālaṃ prabuddhasya na tatheti parāmarśena tad rūpaṃ nirmūlatvenāvabhātīti bhrāntam. yāni hi pramātrantarāṇi svapne svendriyāṇi ca bhānty etāni prabodhakālabhāvibhir eva tair abhinnānīti niścayaḥ, prabodhakāle ca na tatheti niścayānuvṛttir apahṛtaiva. tenobhayam api bhrāntam ucyate; bhrāntatvam eva cāsthairyam.* "But although in a [dream, perceived things] appear as being the objects of external sense organs [and] as being common to other subjects [as well, and although] as long as [they] are [thus] manifest, [one considers that they] indeed exist exactly in this way, nonetheless, for someone who has awakened later, thanks to the realization (*parāmarśa*) '[they] are not so!', this form [of things] appears as being eradicated (*nirmūla*), [and it is] therefore erroneous (*bhrānta*). For in a dream, [one has] the certainty that the other subjects and the sense organs of the [subject] himself that are manifest are identical with those that will exist when awakening; but when awakening, it is not the case. Therefore the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of certainty is necessarily destroyed. For this reason, the two [properties attributed to dream objects, that of being perceived through the external sense organs and that of being shared with other subjects,] are said to be erroneous; and lacking permanence (*asthairya*) is nothing but being erroneous." See also *ibid.*: 241: *yāvac cānuvṛttisthairyaṃ niścayasya cakāsti tāvaj jāgaraḥ. tanmadhya eva ca niścayānuvṛttinirmūlanāt svapna ity avabhāsasāratvād vastūnāṃ svapneʾpi dīrghe yatra svapnāntaraṃ sa tadapekṣayā jāgrad eva; jāgradabhimatam api vā dīrghadīrghaṃ kālāntare niścayānuvṛttinirodhāj jāgradantarāpekṣayā svapna eveti mantavyam.* "And as long as the permanence (*sthairya*), [i.e.] the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of certainty, is manifest, [the state experienced by a given subject is called] the waking state; and because of the eradication (*nirmūlana*) of the continuity of certainty right in the middle of this [state, it is called] a dream. Thus because things have manifestation as their essence, even a long dream in which another[, shorter dream occurs] is nothing but the waking state with respect to this [shorter dream]; or again, a [state] that lasts longer [than these two dreams and is therefore] considered as the waking state [with respect to them] must be acknowledged as a dream with respect to [yet] another waking state, because later the continuity of certainty [regarding this state]

way, as long as someone has faith in a given scripture and as long as his or her faith is not cancelled by a contradicting realization, this scripture must be considered a means of knowledge – but as soon as a contradicting realization arises and is strong enough to cancel it, the former looses any kind of validity because its incompleteness is ipso facto realized:

> But in a [case] where, due to the encounter with another *āgama*, the conviction "previously, I was not acting properly" arises in a knowing subject, the [scripture in which so far he had faith] is no *āgama* at all.[103]

A scripture is a valid means of knowledge *only for someone who has faith in it*, and *only as long as he or she has faith in it*: as soon as this faith vanishes, cancelled by a higher realization (*vimarśa*), the follower of a scripture realizes that in fact this scripture was no means of knowledge at all, just as someone who first believes that he sees silver and then realizes that it is nacre understands in hindsight that he never saw silver.[104]

One should therefore understand the Pratyabhijñā's assertions that *āgama* is the strongest means of knowledge and that all *āgama*-s are means of knowledge while keeping in mind that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta constantly play with several meanings of the word *āgama*: not only do they distinguish between *āgama* as realization (*vimarśa*) and *āgama* as a mass of words (*śabdarāśi*) claiming to express this realization; they also distinguish between the unique *āgama* that is Śiva's self-realization and the multiple *āgama*-s or realizations that are more or less partial aspects of it. This double dis-

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is broken." On the ontological implications of this definition, see Ratié 2011a: 650–656.

[103] ĪPVV III 97: *yatra tv anyāgamasaṃvalanayā pramātuḥ pūrvam evāham ayuktakāry abhavam iti pratyayo jāyate, tatra nāgamatvam eva.*

[104] ĪPV II 113: *tatraiva kāle nedaṃ rajatam abhūd*(1) *iti hy uttaraḥ parāmarśo na tūditapratyastamitāyāṃ śatahradāyām ivedānīm evedaṃ neti vimarśaḥ.*[(1) *abhūd* B, SOAS, *Bhāskarī* : *hy abhūd* KSTS, J, L, S1, S2; p.n.p. P]. "For the realization that occurs after [the thought 'this is silver'], far from taking the form '*now* only, this is not [silver]' as in the case of a lightning disappearing as soon as it has arisen, takes this form: 'at the very moment [when I thought that this was silver], it was not silver'."

tinction (that could be described as both "vertical" and "horizontal," following the depiction by Ashok Aklujkar of Bhartṛhari's use of the word "Veda")[105] enables the Pratyabhijñā philosophers to absorb the

[105] See Aklujkar 1991: 3–5, distinguishing "two related but different senses" in which Bhartṛhari uses the term Veda and adding that "this is true in a horizontal as well as a vertical way of looking at things" (cf. Aklujkar 2009: 55 and 63–68). While the "vertical double reference" concerns both the "subtle, original form of the texts we know as Veda" and "the texts themselves" (on this first distinction see above, fn. 20), the "horizontal or synchronic [...] double reference" concerns an understanding either "wide" or "narrow" of the word Veda as denoting scriptural texts. According to A. Aklujkar, the narrow meaning only includes *śruti*, *mantra*-s and Brāhmaṇas (to which Upaniṣads may or may not be added), whereas the wider meaning is virtually all-encompassing, since "all *vidyā-bhedas* or lores are Veda, because they consist of words and meanings and because all words and meanings are ultimately reducible to *praṇava*." A. Aklujkar therefore considers that Bhartṛhari subsumes all scriptures (including non-Brahmanical scriptures) within the category "Veda" in its widest sense (see Aklujkar 1991: 2: Bhartṛhari "does not exclude even the *nāstika āgamas* from the Vedic pail"). However, this interpretation apparently rests on passages of the VP(V) that hardly seem decisive. Thus VP 1.10 does state that the *vidyābheda*-s proceed from the *praṇava* and rest on its main limbs (*aṅga*) and secondary limbs (*upāṅga*), but it gives no clue as to what these "various knowledges" are, and VPV 39 *ad loc.* explains them in a way that does not seem to support A. Aklujkar's interpretation: *vedākhyasya prasiddhasya brahmaṇo'ṅgebhyo jyautiṣādibhyaḥ śakunajñānādaya upāṅgebhyaś ca svapnavipākayonijñānādayo vidyābhedāḥ prasiddhā loke.* "[These] various knowledges are well known in the world: for instance, the knowledge of omens, which comes from astrology and so on – [i.e.] from a [main] limb of the Brahman well known under the name of Veda –, and for instance, the knowledge of the matrix where dreams mature, which comes from a secondary limb [of the Veda]." The other passage invoked is VP 1.124: *na jātv akartṛkaṃ kaścid āgamaṃ pratipadyate / bījaṃ sarvāgamāpāye trayy evāto vyavasthitā //* "Indeed, nobody considers a traditional treatise (*āgama*) to be authorless; therefore the seed [that remains] once all *āgama*-s have been destroyed is established to be the Triple [Veda] itself." Here Bhartṛhari might mean that all treatises (including those of the Buddhists and Jains) originally stem from the Veda; however, neither the verse nor VPV 203 specify what these *āgama*-s consist of and whether they include non-

authority of other scriptures within that of the Śaiva nondualistic scriptures, but also to explain why the authority of the Śaiva nondualistic scriptures is far from being unanimously acknowledged: even though they constitute the ultimate means of knowledge, they are not so for most people, because a scripture is a *pramāṇa* only for someone who "has faith in it" (*tadāśvasta*), i.e., who either assumes its authority or understands it as expressing something of which he or she can experience an intense realization (and only as long as this realization lasts), but most people are not capable of this realization – however strong, the means of knowledge that is *āgama* is by no means universal, or rather, universally used. And this is where, in spite of Abhinavagupta's overt subordination of reason to scripture, the soteriological role of rational inquiry comes into play.

Brahmanical traditions. A. Aklujkar concedes (Aklujkar 1991: 2) that Bhartṛhari "does not refer explicitly to the *nāstika āgama*-s" but argues that this idea would fit well with the grammarian-philosopher's system (cf. Houben 1995: 306: "Aklujkar does not *prove* that Bhartṛhari understood *āgama* as including non-Brahmanical texts but gives several indications why this seems rather natural."). One of the indications put forward by A. Aklujkar is the fact that Brahmanical authors such as Kumārila and Jayanta consider that some of the non-Brahmanical scriptures originally stemmed from lost parts of the Veda (Aklujkar 1991: 2). However, it should be noted that contrary to Bhartṛhari, Kumārila or Jayanta *explicitly* state this idea, and what seems striking about Bhartṛhari is rather the fact that even though it often seems implied in the VP, it remains implicit (see e.g. Halbfass 1983: 97: "The universalistic potential of Bhartṛhari's statements is obvious. Nevertheless, his system remains a closed, thoroughly Veda-oriented system. There is no empirical openness for extra-Vedic viewpoints"). By way of contrast, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers repeatedly and explicitly state that the Buddhist and Jain scriptures are *āgama*-s; and in fact their position in this regard appears much bolder than Kumārila's or Jayanta's. Thus according to Kumārila, the Buddhists have ungratefully appropriated and distorted their Brahmanical heritage (see e.g. Halbfass 1983: 94–95), and Jayanta is careful to deny the authority of a number of scriptures that are not widely acknowledged and overtly go against the Brahmanical order (see Wezler 1976 or Hanneder 1998: 9–10), whereas Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta insist that *all* scriptures are valid provided that one has faith in them.

The soteriological role of rational inquiry in the Pratyabhijñā and its relationship to *āgama*

As we have seen, Abhinavagupta often emphasizes the weakness of reasoning, its dependency on the two other means of knowledge and the superiority of *āgama* over it. However, it would be a mistake to consider his position as an irrationalism:[106] the Pratyabhijñā texts present themselves as a path (*mārga*) capable of leading to ultimate liberation, and one that relies only on experience and a critical examination of other philosophical theses. Abhinavagupta considers these two aspects as essential to the Pratyabhijñā method; thus, as regards the first, he states:

> What is taught in this [treatise] is [how to] obtain the real subject merely through an examination (*anveṣaṇā*) of the knowledges [resulting of cognitive acts,] such as "blue," "pleasure" and so on, which are manifest in the most vivid way.[107]

But he also insists that Utpaladeva's new path is a dialectical one:

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[106] Cf. Lawrence, §29: "Abhinavagupta's subordination of reason along with perception to scripture should not be understood as a species of 'fundamentalism' or 'irrationalism' which precludes the value of philosophical discourse." In this regard, Abhinavagupta's interpretation of the MVT's statement (17.18) according to which "reasoning" (*tarka*) is higher (*uttara*) than the five other members of Tantric *yoga* is revealing: Abhinavagupta considers that *tarka* is not only the highest member of *yoga*, but also the only one. See TĀ 4.86: *evaṃ yogāṅgam iyati tarke eva na cāparam / antarantaḥparāmarśapāṭavātiśayāya saḥ //* "Thus the members of *yoga* amount to this reasoning alone, and they are nothing else; this [reasoning] induces the extreme vividness of a realization (*parāmarśa*) that is ever more internal." Jayaratha equates this realization obtained through *tarka* with pure knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*; see TĀV III 93: *śuddhavidyātmanaḥ parāmarśasya*…). On Abhinavagupta's interpretation of the MVT passage and its frequent departure from the actual meaning of this text, see Vasudeva 2004: 419–421, and A. Padoux's remarks in Goodall & Rastelli (eds.) forthcoming, s.v. *tarka.*

[107] ĪPV I 18: *sphuṭatarabhāsamānanīlasukhādipramānveṣaṇādvāreṇaiva pāramārthikapramātṛlābha ihopadiśyate.*

> In the [path in which this treatise consists,[108] it is] the refutation (*pratikṣepa*) of the opponents' theses [first] considered as possible objections [that] makes clear in the best [possible] way the nature of ultimate reality that [Utpaladeva] is going to explain.[109]

Utpaladeva's treatise shows ultimate reality by expounding and critically examining other, apparently valid theses, just as, according to Abhinavagupta, Śiva dialectically unfolds the universe's manifestation.[110] Abhinavagupta also emphasizes that the Pratyabhijñā treatise – as all treatises (*śāstra*) that are not scriptures (*āgama*) –[111] is in fact a long "inference for others" as defined in the Nyāya.[112]

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[108] Cf. *Bhāskarī* I 82: *iha – asmiñ śāstramārge.*

[109] ĪPV I 51: *iha yat paramārtharūpaṃ tad āśaṅkyamānapratipakṣapratikṣepeṇa nirūpayiṣyamāṇaṃ suṣṭhutamāṃ spaṣṭīkṛtaṃ bhavati.*

[110] See e.g. the ĪPV's introductory verse to chapter 1.2 of the ĪPK (ĪPV I 51): *pūrvapakṣatayā yena viśvam ābhāsya bhedataḥ / abhedottarapakṣāntar nīyate taṃ stumaḥ śivam //* "We praise Śiva, who, after manifesting the universe as the prima facie view (*pūrvapakṣa*) through differentiation, leads [it] to the ultimate thesis (*uttarapakṣa*) that is non-difference (*abheda*)."

[111] See ĪPV II 127: *tad dhi parasya pratipattyai, sā ca parārthānumānāt, tatra ca pratijñāder upayoga iti. tat paripūrṇaparapratipattikāri paramārthataḥ sakalam eva śāstraṃ parārthānumānam āgamavyatiriktaṃ nyāyanirmāṇavedhasākṣapādena nirūpitam.* "For the [treatise] is meant for the others' understanding, and this [understanding arises] from an inference for others; and the [five members of the inference, i.e.] the thesis to be proven, etc., contribute to it. Akṣapāda, the founder of Nyāya, has explained that except for scriptures, any treatise (*śāstra*) without exception is in fact an inference for others that leads the others to a complete understanding."

[112] See e.g. ĪPV I 25: *evaṃ pratijñātavyasamastavastusaṃgrahaṇenedaṃ vākyam uddeśarūpaṃ pratijñāpiṇḍātmakaṃ ca, madhyagranthas tu hetvādinirūpaka iti prakaṭito mayeti cāntyaśloko nigamanagrantha ity evaṃ pañcāvayavātmakam idaṃ śāstraṃ paravyutpattiphalam.* "Thus, since this sentence [in the first verse] contains all the things to be proven [in the treatise], it takes the form of the statement of the themes [developed in the treatise] and consists in the summary of the thesis to be proven (*pratijñā*) [that constitutes the first member of a five-membered inference]; whereas between [this introductory sentence and the last sen-

From the very beginning of the treatise though, Utpaladeva specifies that the Self (understood as the unique, all-encompassing consciousness that manifests the universe and that the Śaiva *āgama*-s call Śiva) cannot be either proved or refuted, precisely because it is "always already established" (*ādisiddha*):[113] because individuals are in fact nothing but this universal Self choosing to apprehend itself in the various forms of individuals, the treatise's goal is not to

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tence,] the treatise expounds the [inference's] reason (*hetu*) as well as the [example (*udāharaṇa*) and the application to the case at hand (*upanaya*)]; and the last verse – which begins with 'thus I have explained…' is the [inference's] conclusion (*nigamana*). Thus, this five-membered treatise (*pañcāvayava*) has as its benefit the instruction of others." On the five-membered inference as described in the Nyāya, see NSū 1.1.32 (*pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ.* "The members are the thesis to be proven, the reason, the example, the application to the case at hand [and] the conclusion") and its interpretation e.g. in NM I 18: *parārthānumānavākyaikadeśabhūtāḥ pratijñādayoʾvayavāḥ*. "The members that are the thesis to be proven and so on are gathered in a sentence [that constitutes] the inference for others." On the Pratyabhijñā treatise as a long "inference for others," see also ĪPV II 126: *parārthānumānātmakaṃ hi śāstram, tatra ca pramāṇādiṣoḍaśapadārthatattvamayatvam eva paramārthaḥ.* "For the treatise consists in an inference for others, and its ultimate nature is nothing but its consisting in [the examination of] the real nature of the sixteen categories (*padārtha*) that are the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), etc., [mentioned in the first *Nyāya* aphorism]." Cf. ĪPVV III 182: *tatprakaṭanāyedaṃ pūrṇaparārthānumānarūpaṃ pramāṇādinigrahasthānaparyantapadārthaṣoḍaśakanibandhanena samyakparavyutpattisaṃpādanasamarthaṃ śāstram.* "This treatise, which consists in a complete inference for others [and] the goal of which is to make this [identity between oneself and the Lord] manifest, has the power to provide the others with a complete instruction by relying on the sixteen categories [mentioned at the beginning of the *Nyāyasūtra*,] from the means of knowledge to the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)."

[113] ĪPK 1.1.2: *kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare / ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṃ vā siddhiṃ vā vidadhīta kaḥ //* "What sentient self could produce either the refutation or the demonstration [of the existence of] the agent, the knowing subject, the Self that is always already established, the Great Lord?" See Ratié 2007: 361–362, fn. 98 and Ratié 2011a: 23–31.

prove the existence of the Self, since whoever is conscious is aware of this existence in the most immediate way, i.e., through self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Nonetheless, because individuals are somehow distracted from their own experience by virtue of consciousness' power of freely concealing from itself what it knows,[114] they must be led to recognize themselves as this very Self, and such a recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) can be brought about by making obvious (*āviṣkaraṇa*) the powers (*śakti*) of this omnipotent consciousness within the individual subject.[115] Although the treatise cannot prove the existence of the Self, it can trigger recognition because it is not an inference resting on a "reason that is an effect" (*kāryahetu*)[116] but on a "reason that is a nature" (*svabhāvahetu*):[117] it aims at showing that the individual is the Lord by making obvious that the very nature (*svabhāva*) of the individual self implies its identity with the Lord, just as the very nature of a *śiṃśapā* implies its being a tree. According to the Buddhist logicians from whom Utpaladeva borrows this terminology, such an inference does not establish the existence of the thing itself (*vastu*) but only a particular usage (*vyavahāra*). The inference "this is a tree because this is a *śiṃśapā*" only justifies the use of the word "tree" with respect to the object called *śiṃśapā* by relying on some properties that the tree and the *śiṃśapā* share (such as having branches).[118]

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[114] See e.g. Ratié 2010a on what TĀ 4.10–11 for instance describes as consciousness' ability to "play at dissimulating oneself" (*svātmapracchādanakrīḍā*) while its own nature remains manifest.

[115] See ĪPK, 1.1.3: *kiṃtu mohavaśād asmin dṛṣṭe'py anupalakṣite / śaktyāviṣkaraṇeneyaṃ pratyabhijñopadarśyate //* "However, since the [Self], although perceived (*dṛṣṭa*), is not noticed (*anupalakṣita*) because of a delusion (*moha*), this recognition is shown through making [its] powers obvious (*śaktyāviṣkaraṇa*)."

[116] I.e., the ĪPK do not attempt to prove the existence of the Self as one would prove the existence of fire through that of smoke (contrary to the Naiyāyikas for instance, who ground their inference of *īśvara* on a *kāryahetu* inference – see above, fn. 43).

[117] See Torella 2002: 173, fn. 33.

[118] See e.g. NBṬ 106–107: *yatra pracuraśiṃśape deśe'viditaśiṃśapāvyavahāro jaḍo yadā kenacid uccāṃ śiṃśapām upādarśyocyate'yaṃ vṛkṣa iti*

Thus, anticipating the objection according to which the treatise has no point if no means of knowledge can establish the Self,[119] Utpaladeva explains that the rational enquiry in which the treatise consists only establishes a certain usage:

> It is only that manifesting (*prakāśa*) the powers [of the Self through the treatise] makes possible the usage [of the terms] "Lord," etc., which were not used before with respect to this [Self] because of delusion.[120]

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tad āsau jāḍyāc chiṃśapāyā uccatvam api vṛkṣavyavahārasya nimittam avasyati tadā yām evānuccāṃ paśyati śiṃśapāṃ tām evāvṛkṣam avasyati. sa mūḍhaḥ śiṃśapāmātranimitte vṛkṣavyavahāre pravartyate. noccatvādi nimittāntaram iha vṛkṣavyavahārasya. api tu śiṃśapātvamātraṃ nimittam; śiṃśapāgataśākhādimattvam nimittam ity arthaḥ. "When, in an area where *śiṃśapā*-s abound, someone says to an idiot who does not know the usage (*vyavahāra*) [of the word] *śiṃśapā*, while showing him a big *śiṃśapā*, 'this is a tree,' this [person], out of stupidity, will judge that the cause of this usage of the [word] 'tree' is the *śiṃśapā*'s height, so that upon seeing a small *śiṃśapā*, he will judge that it is not a tree. This confused [mind] must be led to understand that the usage [of the word] 'tree' has no cause but the *śiṃśapā* [itself]. [For] in this case, there is no other cause – such as height for instance – of the usage [of the word] 'tree;' rather, this cause is nothing but the fact of being a *śiṃśapā* – i.e., this cause is the fact that [the properties] such as having branches, etc., [which are the causes for calling something 'a tree'], are found in the *śiṃśapā*." Cf. e.g. ĪPVV I 87: *nanu ca siddhe vastuni yat pramāṇaṃ, tat kila vyavahārasādhanam iti prasiddham.* "But it is well known that surely, the means of knowledge with respect to an entity [the existence of which is already] established only establishes a usage."

[119] This is the way Abhinavagupta presents ĪPK 2.3.17. See ĪPV II 126: *nanv evaṃ yadi bhagavati pramāṇam anupayogy anupapatti ca kimarthaṃ tadviṣayaṃ śāstram*? *tad dhi pramāṇam eva.* "[An objector:] But if thus a means of knowledge plays no role and is not even possible with respect to the Lord, what is a point of a treatise having this [Lord] as its object? For the treatise is nothing but a means of knowledge!" Cf. ĪPVV III 165: *yadi na sarvātmanā bhagavati pramāṇasyopapattyupayogau, kiṃ tarhi śāstreṇeti śaṅkāśāntyai sūtram.* "The [next] verse aims at answering this question: 'If there is absolutely no possibility nor usefulness of the means of knowledge with respect to the Lord, then what is the point of the treatise?"

[120] ĪPK 2.3.17: *apravartitapūrvoʾtra kevalaṃ mūḍhatāvaśāt / śaktiprakāśeneśādivyavahāraḥ pravartyate //*

The aim of the treatise is a recognition, which is not a new knowledge, but the realization that one already possesses a knowledge[121] – a goal that the *svabhāvahetu* inference can achieve precisely because it establishes no new knowledge but a mere usage; and according to Abhinavagupta, this type of inference merely leads the subject who hears it to pay attention to his or her own experience. Thus when explaining to someone that the object which he or she sees is a pot, we only incite him or her to pay attention to the fact that this perceived entity can rightly be called a pot since it possesses properties (being a container, having this particular form, etc.) included in the definition of a pot that he or she already knows. Accordingly, the treatise's inference just prompts the subject to focus on his or her own experience by pointing out what he or she already knows in the most immediate way without paying attention to this knowledge.[122] Utpaladeva's elaborate phenomenological analyses of memory, imagination, perception, intentionality, etc., all point out the boundless creative freedom (*svātantrya*) of the individual's consciousness – a freedom which is the essence of the Lord described by the Śaiva scriptures – so as to enable the deluded individual, who no longer pays attention to his or her own experience and therefore sees him-

[121] See e.g. ĪPV I 20, where Abhinavagupta explains that the goal of the treatise is not a cognition but a re-cognition (*praty-abhijñā*, where *praty-* stands for *pratīpam*, "again") for the following reason: *pratīpam iti svātmāvabhāso hi nābhūtapūrvo*[(1)]*'vicchinnaprakāśatvāt tasya*. [[(1)] *nābhūtapūrvo* J, L, S1, S2, SOAS: *nānanubhūtapūrvo* Bhāskarī, KSTS : p.n.p. P]. "[It is a] *re*-[cognition] because the Self's manifestation is not [something] that did not exist before, because its manifestation is never interrupted."

[122] ĪPVV I 87: *loke jaḍaviṣaye yad vyavahāramātrasya sādhanaṃ tad apīhājaḍe kriyamāṇaṃ pradarśanena samam avikalaṃ pradarśanamātrāvaśeṣaṃ pradarśanena ca paśya paśyety avadhānadāpanārūpeṇa tulyam.* "When the establishment of a mere usage, which is performed in the world with respect to an insentient object, is [performed] with respect to the sentient [Self], it is 'entirely similar to [the act of] pointing out (*pradarśana*)' – [i.e.], it amounts to nothing but [an act of] pointing out, and it is equivalent to the act of showing that consists in making [someone] pay attention (*avadhānadāpānā*) [to something by saying] 'See! See!'."

or herself as limited and passive, to recognize him- or herself in this all-powerful Lord.[123]

[123] See e.g. ĪPVV III 181: *so'nenecchādiśaktiprabhāvaprakhyāpakena pūrṇaparārthānumānarūpeṇa vyavahārasādhanena pratyabhijñākhyena śāstreṇāvabodhyate. yathā hi bhautaḥ kaścin mohād apahāritaṃmanya evaṃ bodhyate*: *kaḥ khalu bhavān yasyedṛṅmukham īdṛgvastram iti cet, paśya svātmany etad iti punaḥ punar abhidadhatā na cāpūrvam asyotpāditaṃ kiṃcit, tathaiva paśuloko bhāsamāna eva svātmani nāham īśvara ityādi mohād abhimanyamāno vibodhyate. yatra khalu jñānādiśaktayaḥ sa īśvara iti vyavahriyate tanmātranimittakatvāt tadvyavahārasya yathā purāṇādiprasiddhaḥ; tvayy api ca tāḥ santīti. athavā yatra yad āyattaṃ sa tatreśvaro rājeva nije rājye; tathā ca tvayi viśvam. yallagnaṃ yad bhāti tat tena pūrṇaṃ nidhānakumbha iva ratnaiḥ; tvayi ca lagnaṃ viśvaṃ bhātīti. yasya yad antarvarti bhāti sa tāvati vyāpako ratneṣv iva maṇibhāvaḥ śiṃśapādiṣv iva vṛkṣatvam; tvayi ca saṃvidrūpe dharādisadāśivāntaṃ śāstraprakriyādyavagataṃ viśvam antarvarti bhāti. yasmin sati yad udeti līyate ca tat tatpūrvāparabhāgavyāpi bhūmāv ivāṅkuraḥ; tathā ca tvayi prakāśarūpe viśvam iti. evam īśvaratvavyāpitvanityatvadharmā vyavaharaṇīyāḥ, anye'py āgamoktāḥ sahasraśaḥ śaktiśabdavācyā dharmāḥ.* "The [deluded subject] is awakened by this treatise called Pratyabhijñā, which makes obvious his might (*prabhāva*)[, i.e. his] powers (*śakti*) of will, [knowledge and action,] which consists in a complete inference for others[, and] which establishes a [mere] usage. For one wakes up alienated people (*paśuloka*) who, because of a delusion (*moha*), believe such [things] as 'I am not the Lord' whereas their Self is perfectly manifest, just as one awakens someone who is possessed (*bhauta*), [i.e., someone] who, because of a delusion, believes that he has been taken away [from his own body – i.e., by telling him:] 'Now, who are you?' and if [he answers:] '[someone] who has such a face, such a garment,' by telling [him] again and again 'See! This is in yourself!' – and [such a speech] produces no new [knowledge] in this [individual, but a mere recognition. Accordingly, alienated people can be awakened by telling them this:] 'Now, the [word] 'Lord' is used to denote (*vyavahriyate*) that in which the powers (*śakti*) of knowledge, [memory and exclusion are found], because the usage (*vyavahāra*) of this [word] has as its sole cause the [possession of powers], as [in the case of the Lord] who is well known (*prasiddha*) through the Purāṇas and so on; and these [powers] are [found] in you too.' Or [one might say: 'That on which [a thing] depends is the lord of that [thing], as a king is [the lord] of his kingdom [because his kingdom depends on him]; and in the same way, the universe depends on you. That in which a [thing] that is manifest rests is full of this [manifest thing], just as a pot containing a treasure

The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus present reason's power as merely cathartic: reason can only *eliminate* wrong opinions that distract the individual from his or her own most inner and undeniable experience,[124] and it can do so by *purifying* experience from the wrong philosophical theses (developed by non-Śaiva opponents) that cover or "soil" it while claiming to interpret it,[125] as Utpaladeva

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[is full] of jewels; and it is while resting in you that the universe is manifest. That inside of which [a thing] is manifest pervades this [thing], just as the [property] of being a gem [pervades] the jewels, [or] just as the [property] of being a tree pervades the *śiṃśapā* and [other varieties of trees]; and the universe, apprehended for instance according to the cosmic order [described by the Śaiva] treatises [as unfolding] from the [ontological category of] the earth up to [that of] Sadāśiva, is manifest inside of you whose nature is consciousness. That which keeps existing while [a thing] arises and dissolves in it pervades the prior and posterior aspects of this [thing], just as a sprout [arises and dissolves] in the earth; and in the same way, the universe [arises and dissolves] in you whose nature is a manifesting consciousness (*prakāśa*). Thus the properties that are sovereignty (*īśvaratva*), omnipresence (*vyāpitva*) and permanence (*nityatva*) can be used (*vyavaharaṇīya*) [with respect to you,] as well as innumerable other properties that are called powers and described in the scriptures (*āgama*-s)."

[124] See e.g. ĪPV II 129, where Abhinavagupta explains *kevalam* ("It is only that…," see fn. 120 above) in ĪPK 2.3.17: *kevalam iti na tu kiṃcid apūrvaṃ kriyate, nāpi tattvato'prakāśamānaṃ prakāśyate, prakāśamāna eva yan na prakāśata ity abhimananaṃ tad apasāryate.* " 'It is only that' [means]: it is certainly not that [the treatise] would produce some new [knowledge]; it is not either that [it] would make manifest [something] that is not manifest by nature; it is [only that the treatise] removes the opinion according to which [something] is not manifest whereas [in fact this thing] *is* manifest."

[125] From this point of view, the position adopted by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta is not without affinities with that of their Buddhist opponents. See e.g. Krasser 2004: 134 and 145–146, which sums up how Dignāga, Dharmakīrti or Dharmottara conceive the aim of their epistemology in the following way: "1/ The addressees of epistemological works are primarily non-Buddhists. 2/ The aim of these works is not to introduce the opponents to the teaching of Buddha, but to turn the adherents of heretical views away from these views by revealing the faults in the *pramāṇa* theories of the heretics and by revealing the good qualities of

insists while concluding his lost *Vivṛti*:[126]

> Having thus reduced to silence those who, denying their [own] self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*), hold this or that thesis, I have made obvious through clear reasonings (*yukti*) the true nature of the subject [so far] soiled (*kaluṣīkṛta*) by them.[127]

In this respect, it is worth noting that the two entities to be recognized as having the same nature through the *svabhāvahetu* inference are on the one hand one's own subjectivity (which is always already experienced through a self-awareness that qualifies as *āgama* in the primary sense of the term, i.e., as an intense and undeniable realization, *vimarśa*), and on the other hand, the Lord who is well known (*prasiddha*) through such texts as Purāṇas and *āgama*-s:[128] the trea-

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one's own *pramāṇas*. 3/ Although the Buddhist *dharma* is not subject to a critical analysis by means of conventional valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*), it has to be examined as long as confused opponents lead the world astray." See also Eltschinger 2008: 525: "Il est remarquable que l'un et l'autre textes [bouddhiques] tiennent les méprises adverses pour la seule raison d'être de l'entreprise logico-épistémologique. En d'autres termes, ce en quoi nous sommes disposés à reconnaître de la philosophie […] n'a pas tant vocation sotériologique que vocation réfutative, défensive et apologétique, conformément au programme traditionnellement assigné à la *hetuvidyā*. N'étaient les erreurs des hérétiques en matière de logique et de théorie de la connaissance, nos auteurs se seraient dispensés de composer des traités de ce type."

[126] The verse is quoted in full in ĪPV I 130 (*ad* ĪPK 1.4.3), and in all probability it was the first of a series of verses concluding the lost *Vivṛti*. See ĪPVV III 404, which seems to briefly gloss a part of it: *vivṛtikāraḥ saṃkṣipya sarvam āhettham ity ādiślokaiḥ. anenāsmadukteneśvaratāprakāreṇa yā svasaṃvittiḥ*(1) *sthitā tām.* [(1) *svasaṃvittiḥ* conj. : *susaṃvittiḥ* KSTS]. "The author of the *Vivṛti* says everything in a nutshell with the verses beginning with 'Thus…' (*ittham*). '[Their] self-awareness (*yā svasaṃvittiḥ… tām*)' [means the self-awareness] that occurs in the way that we have described, [i.e., the awareness of oneself] as identical with the Lord."

[127] *itthaṃ svasaṃvittim apahnuvānair yat tad vadadbhiḥ kaluṣīkṛtaṃ yat / pramātṛtattvaṃ sphuṭayuktibhis tān mūkān vidhāya prakaṭīkṛtaṃ tat //.*

[128] See e.g. ĪPVV III 181 (quoted above, fn. 123), which defines the term "Lord" while using the example of the Lord "well known (*prasiddha*) through the Purāṇas and so on" and explains that the treatise's infe-

tise's inference is thus aimed at bringing about the awareness of the

rence must show that the powers (*śakti*) "described in the scriptures" (*āgamokta*) can be attributed to the individual subject. See also ĪPV I 43–44: *tad ayaṃ pramātā jñānakriyāśaktiyogād īśvara iti vyavahartavyaḥ purāṇāgamādiprasiddheśvaravat.* "Therefore one must use (*vyavahartavya*) [the word] 'Lord' with respect to this subject, because [he] possesses the powers of knowledge and action, just as in the case of the Lord well known (*prasiddha*) through the Purāṇas, the *āgama*-s and so on." Cf. ĪPVV I 32: *yat yaj jñānakriyāsvatantraṃ tad īśvaraḥ purāṇāgamasiddha iva.* "Whatever is free as regards knowledge and action is a Lord, just as [the Lord] known (*siddha*) through Purāṇas and *āgama*-s." See also ĪPV I 20: *pratyabhijñā ca bhātabhāsamānarūpānusaṃdhānātmikā, sa evāyaṃ caitra iti pratisaṃdhānenābhimukhībhūte vastuni jñānam; loke'py etatputra evaṃguṇa evaṃrūpaka ity evaṃ vā, antato'pi sāmānyātmanā vā jñātasya punar abhimukhībhāvāvasare pratisaṃdhi*(1)*prāṇitam eva jñānaṃ pratyabhijñeti vyavahriyate; nṛpatiṃ*(2) *pratyabhijñāpito'yam ity ādau. ihāpi prasiddhe*(3) *purāṇasiddhāntāgamānumānādividitapūrṇaśaktisvabhāva īśvare sati svātmany abhimukhībhūte tatpratisaṃdhānena jñānam udeti, nūnaṃ sa eva īśvaro'ham iti.* [(1) *pratisaṃdhi- Bhāskarī*, J : *pratisaṃdhita-* KSTS, L, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. P. (2) *nṛpatiṃ* conj. Sanderson, S1 : *nṛpatiṃ prati* KSTS, J, L, S2, SOAS : *nṛpaṃ prati Bhāskarī*; p.n.p. P. (3) *prasiddhe* conj. : *prasiddha-* J, L, S1, S2, SOAS, KSTS, *Bhāskarī*; p.n.p. P.] "And recognition, which consists in the synthesis of a form that has been manifested and of a form that is being manifest, is the knowledge [that arises] with respect to a thing that is present, through a synthesis [thus expressed]: 'But this is Caitra!'. In the world too, when [one says for instance] 'this [man] has been made to recognize the king,' the word 'recognition' is used to denote a knowledge that exclusively rests on the synthesis [occurring] when one is again in the presence of [somebody] who is [already] known either in this way: 'this is the son of that [particular man], he has these [particular qualities], he has this [particular] appearance' – or [only] in part, in a general way [and not as a particular individual]. In the [case of the Recognition of the Lord] as well, since the Lord is [already] well known (*prasiddha*), [as] the nature of his full power is [already] known through the Purāṇas, the *āgama*-s of the [Śaiva]siddhānta, inference, etc., [and] since the Self is [ever] present [to the subject], a knowledge arises through the synthesis of these two [knowledges] in this form: 'indeed I am this Lord!'." My understanding of this famous but difficult passage has changed over the years (the translation in Ratié 2006: 97, should be corrected accordingly), although I still have many doubts. Bhāskarakaṇṭha for instance justifies at length the reading *nṛpaṃ prati pratyabhijñāpito'yam*, "this [man]

identity of *āgama* in the secondary sense of the term (i.e., the Śaiva scriptures) with *āgama* in the first sense of term (i.e., the subject's constant self-realization). However, Abhinavagupta adds that even if there is no *prasiddhi* of the Lord through any kind of religious text, the mere understanding of the term "lord" in a strictly worldly context is enough to make the inference possible.[129] The path of the

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has been made to be recognized in front of the king" (see Ratié 2011a: 239, fn. 139, on this passage of the *Bhāskarī* I 37); however, the reading *nṛpatiṃ pratyabhijñāpito'yam* ("this [man] has been made to recognize the king") seems much more likely, among other reasons because the Pratyabhijñā's goal is to make people recognize the Lord (as being themselves). The compound *prasiddhapurāṇasiddhāntāgamānumānādividitapūrṇaśaktisvabhāve* is particularly problematic, both because of *prasiddha-* (which seems redundant with *-vidita*; A. Sanderson had conjectured *prasiddhi-*: see Ratié 2006: 97, but the mention of *prasiddhi* as distinct from Purāṇas and *āgama*-s is somewhat puzzling) and because of the surprising mention of inference as one of the sources of our a priori certainty regarding the Lord's full power. One might suspect a corruption here, all the more since in ĪPVV I 32 (quoted above), only Purāṇas and *āgama*-s are mentioned, and in ĪPV I 43–44 (also quoted above), the *-ādi* in *purāṇāgamādi-* is omitted in L, S1 and S2. However, I hesitate to emend since Abhinavagupta might have in mind the well-known *kāryahetu* inference of the Lord put forward by the Naiyāyikas (see above, fn. 43).

[129] See ĪPV I 44: *tadaprasiddhāv api sarvaviṣayajñānakriyāśaktimattvasvabhāvam evaiśvaryaṃ tanmātrānubandhitvād eva siddham; tad api ca kalpiteśvare rājādau tathā vyāptigrahaṇāt, yo yāvati jñātā kartā ca sa tāvatīśvaro rājevānīśvarasya jñātṛtvakartṛtve svabhāvaviruddhe yataḥ, ātmā ca viśvatra jñātā kartā ceti siddhā pratyabhijñā.* "Even if there is no a priori certainty of this [Lord through the Purāṇas and *āgama*-s,] sovereignty is established to have as its only nature the possession of the powers of knowledge and action with respect to all objects from the mere fact that [sovereignty's nature] depends on nothing more than these [powers] (*tanmātrānubandhin*); moreover, it is the same in the case of a created lord such as a king, because one grasps this invariable concomitance: whoever is the knower and agent of [something], however extended [that thing is,] is its lord, since being a knower and an agent are contradictory with the nature of someone who is not a lord, and the Self is the knower and agent with respect to everything – therefore recognition is established." Abhinavagupta is relying here on

Pratyabhijñā is open to those who are perfectly alien to the Śaiva tradition and who do not know or at least do not acknowledge[130] the Śaiva scriptures; and whereas the various scriptures are said to be fit for particular qualified persons (*adhikārin*), "anybody who was born" is qualified to hear or read Utpaladeva's treatise,[131] since it is primarily meant to convince those who do not belong to a Śaiva nondualistic current by giving them the realization (*vimarśa*) that they cannot get through the mere reading or hearing of the Śaiva scriptures as they do not "have faith in it" (*tadāśvasta*). Thus, while explaining in what way the treatise is a "new" (*nava*, *abhinava*) path, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta insist that this path was in fact already contained in "all the esoteric treatises," but that it was so far *aprasiddha*, "not well known" – or "not known through an a priori certainty" – because it was "hidden" in them.[132] However, they do not rest content with

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Dharmakīrti's terminology: on Dharmakīrti's use of the compound *tanmātrānubandhin*, "depending on nothing more than that" in connection with the notion of nature (*svabhāva*), see e.g. PVSV 19 (ll. 20–21).

[130] See e.g. ĪPVV I 32: *purāṇādisiddheʾpīśvareʾnaṅgīkriyamāne gṛhagrāmamaṇḍaleśvaraprasiddhau tadviṣayāpratihatajñānakaraṇa evaiśvaryasya lakṣaṇam, te ca pramātṛtattve sarvaviṣayeʾpratihata eveti.* "Even if [someone] does not acknowledge [the existence of] the Lord although it is known through the Purāṇas and so on, since [this person has at least] the a priori certainty of the Lord [as master] of the house, the village or the State, [he knows that] unlimited knowledge and action with respect to these objects constitute the definition of sovereignty; and within the reality that is the subject, these are absolutely unlimited with respect to every object."

[131] See Ratié 2009: 351, fn. 8.

[132] See ĪPV II 271: *abhinavaḥ – sarvarahasyaśāstrāntargataḥ saṃnigūḍhatvād aprasiddhaḥ.* "[This] new (*abhinava*) [path, i.e. this path] that was contained in all the esoteric treatises (*rahasyaśāstra*) but that was not well known (*aprasiddha*), because [so far] it was hidden (*saṃnigūḍha*) [in them]…" Utpaladeva himself seems to have developed this idea in his lost *Vivṛti.* See e.g. the fragmentary quote in ĪPVV III 401: *aspaṣṭatvād iti*…, "because it was not obvious…," and the commentary that follows, e.g.: *yad api rahasyāgameṣu nirūpitaṃ tathā vispaṣṭatvena noktaṃ garbhīkṛtya tu nirūpitam*… "This too, which had been explained in the esoteric scriptures (*rahasyāgama*) – [i.e.,] which had not been expounded

providing a scriptural exegesis that would *presuppose* the authority of the commented texts. On the contrary, they only have recourse to the authority of scriptures a posteriori, as a mere confirmation of their rational inquiry. It is by purifying the minds of its readers from the opponents' theses superimposed onto their own experience that the inference constituted by the Pratyabhijñā treatise is supposedly able to transform the content of the Śaiva scriptures into the most concrete, vivid, personal and yet universal experience: the goal of Utpaladeva's rational inquiry is to lead those who engage in its examination to identify themselves with the Lord of the Śaiva *āgama*-s, and therefore to *realize* the full meaning of these scriptures. In other words, although Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta present *āgama* as a means of knowledge superior to reason, they also assign to reason the task of transforming scriptures, understood as a mere "mass of words" (*śabdarāśi*), into a means of knowledge expressing a strong realization (*dṛḍhavimarśa*), since someone who has gained Recognition through Utpaladeva's inference recognizes by the same token the Śaiva *āgama*-s' validity, i.e., the fact that they express the fullness of a subjectivity that he or she now fully experiences through mere self-awareness: the inferential path of the Pratyabhijñā has the power of making scripture an *āgama* in the full sense of the term.

Of course, reason's power is ultimately limited by the fact that Recognition is in no way *guaranteed* by its use: the most elaborate demonstrations do not necessarily produce the realization of one's identity with Śiva,[133] because in a system that defines consciousness as an absolute freedom (*svātantrya*), reason's necessity can only be compelling if consciousness agrees to be compelled, and an individ-

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thus in an explicit way, but the explanation of which was contained in embryonic form [in these esoteric scriptures]…"

[133] See e.g. ĪPVV III 167: *nanu vyavahārasādhanaśatair apy ātmano maheśvaratāyām anāśvāsavanto jantavaḥ satatam upalabhyante. satyam ity āha.* "[An objector:] But [we] see that even through innumerable demonstrations [of the validity] of the usage (*vyavahāra*) [of the term 'Lord' with respect to oneself,] some people remain devoid of any faith (*āśvāsa*) in their own identity with the Great Lord! [Utpaladeva] answers: 'this is true…'."

ual can only achieve liberation if the universal consciousness that plays at being deluded in the form of this individual chooses to recover its full self-awereness in him or her, so that ultimately Recognition only depends on the grace (*anugraha*) of the Lord.[134] However, this grace – which is just as necessary for the *āgama*-s to function as valid means of knowledge – is not to be understood as the arbitrary decision of a distant God, but once again, as an aspect of consciousness' game (*krīḍā*) of self-concealment and self-manifestation: it is the same consciousness that playfully chooses both to delude itself and to recover its full self-awareness, so that Śiva's grace is not ultimately different from its recipient's will.[135]

[134] See e.g. ĪPVV III 183: *īśvaravaśād eva tu kasyacit prayatnaśatair api pratyabhijñānaṃ notpadyate.* "But it is only due to the Lord that Recognition does not arise in someone despite his innumerable efforts."

[135] See e.g. TSā 118, where Abhinavagupta, after criticizing the dualistic view of the Śaivasiddhānta regarding grace, adds: *svatantraparameśādvayavāde tūpapadyata etat. yathā hi parameśvaraḥ svarūpāc chādanakrīḍayā paśuḥ pudgaloʾṇuḥ saṃpannaḥ, na ca tasya deśakālasvarūpabhedavirodhaḥ, tadvat svarūpasthaganavinivṛttyā svarūpapratyāpattiṃ jhaṭiti vā krameṇa vā samāśrayañś chaktipātapātram aṇur ucyate, svātantryamātrasāraś cāsau paramaśivaḥ śakteḥ pātayitā.* "On the other hand, in [our] doctrine of the nonduality with the free (*svatantra*) Highest Lord, [grace] is possible. For just as the Highest Lord becomes the alienated individual (*paśu*), [i.e. what various religious schools call] the person (*pudgala*) or the individual (*aṇu*), and [yet] he is not afflicted by any contradiction due to the differences between the [various] places, times and natures [in which he manifests himself], exactly in the same way, when he chooses to return – either instantly or gradually – to his [real] nature by putting an end to the concealment of his nature, he is said to be an individual who is a fit vessel for the descent of power (*śaktipāta*) [that characterizes grace]; and [yet] he is the Highest Lord, whose essence is nothing but freedom (*svātantrya*) [and] who is the agent of this descent of power." Abhinavagupta insists that thus considering the individual as both the agent and the object of grace solves the problem of grace's apparent arbitrariness (TSā 119): *na ca vācyaṃ kasmāt kasmiṃścid eva puṃsi śaktipāta iti, sa eva parameśvaras tathā bhātīti satattve koʾsau pumān nāma yaduddeśena viṣayakṛtā codaneyam.* "And one should not ask why the descent of power [occurs] in a particular individual only [and not in all of them, for] it is the Highest Lord himself who is manifest thus [as

Conclusion – Reason as a means of transforming scripture into *āgama*: on apologetics, scriptural authority and philosophy

As we have seen, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta keep emphasizing the supremacy of *āgama* as a means of knowledge and downplaying

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this or that particular individual]; therefore, since [the individual] has as his [sole] reality [the Highest Lord], who is this so-called individual with respect to whom this objection is made an issue?" See also Wallis 2008: 275: "Only here in Abhinavagupta's theology does *śaktipāta* appear as a religious experience which the recipient draws to himself, as opposed to something that happens *to* him." Abhinavagupta also emphasizes that this nondualistic notion of grace does not lead to quietism: because grace is nothing but the knowing subject's freedom, intellectual activity should not be despised, nor should liberation be left to the arbitrary will of a God distinct from the knowing subject. See PTV 126–127: *avikalā bhagavadicchā na vicārapadavīm adhiśeta iti ced alaṃ granthadhāraṇavācanavyākhyānavicāraṇādimithyāyāsena, parityājya evāyaṃ gurubhāraḥ, tūṣṇīṃbhāvaśaraṇair eva stheyam, bhagavadicchaivottāraṇīyam uttārayet, tadicchaivānugrahātmaivaṃ vicāraṇāyāṃ paryavasāyayati, na khalu pādaprasārikayaiva sukhaṃ śayānair bhuñjānaiś ca svayam avimṛśadbhiḥ svāpekṣatīvratarādiparameśvarānugrahotpannādhikādhikasūkṣmatamavimarśakuśaladhiṣaṇāpariśīlanaparāṅmukhair vā sthātavyam iti.* "If [one objects]: 'The will of the Lord, which is absolute (*avikala*), cannot be subjected to critical examination (*vicāra*), [so] enough of vain efforts such as concentrating on books, discussing, explaining or critically examining [them]! This heavy burden must necessarily be abandoned: [people] should remain silent, only the Lord's will may save [whoever] is to be saved!', [we answer that] it is precisely the [Lord's] will, i.e. grace, which thus makes [us] endeavour critical examination: [people] should certainly not remain at ease while just stretching their legs and enjoying [existence] without realizing [what] they themselves [are] or while avoiding to cultivate a refined intelligence [so as to obtain] the subtlest realization (*vimarśa*) – [a realization] which gets ever more subtle as one receives the grace of the Highest Lord, which [in turn] is more [or less] intense according to oneself (*svāpekṣa*)." On grace in nondualistic Śaivism see e.g. Bäumer 2007, Wallis 2008 and Fürlinger 2009: 79 ff.

in contrast the epistemic validity of reason. In this regard they side with the Brahmanical currents according to which scriptures stand beyond the critical power of reason as their authority is a priori established either through its authoritative (*āpta*) human source or from the fact that they cannot have been made by man (*apauruṣeyatā*). According to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, scriptures are expressions of Śiva's self-realization, whereas reason, which is incapable of attaining truth independently (i.e. without resting on perception and *āgama*), is weak (*durbala*) and therefore unable to put scriptures to the test by evaluating their reliability (*avisaṃvāditva*), contrary to what Dharmakīrti for instance claims.

However, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, adapting Bhartṛhari's complex understanding of the Veda, distinguish various meanings of the word *āgama* (i.e., *āgama* as an intense realization versus *āgama* as a text claiming to express it, but also *āgama* as the full self-awareness of the absolute consciousness versus *āgama*-s as the more or less complete expressions of it found in the various scriptures, whether Śaiva or not). Thanks to these distinctions, they do not only justify a hierarchized inclusivism that absorbs the authority of all rival scriptures within the Śaiva fold: they also subtly subvert the hierarchical relationship that they themselves proclaim to exist between *āgama* and *yukti*. For if scripture is only the secondary expression of an intense, pre-perceptive and pre-inferential intuition, and if a scripture is only a means of knowledge (i.e., an authentic *āgama*) for someone who has faith in it (*tadāśvasta*) insofar as he or she realizes – or at least assumes – that this scripture expresses such an intense intuition, its authority cannot be presupposed when addressing those who do not have faith in it. Reason, on the other hand, can lead to the realization that the Śaiva scriptures express because this realization is contained within any conscious being's self-awareness and because reason has the ability to eliminate the theses that alienate the individuals from this self-awareness. In this regard, the power of rational inquiry does not only end up being (at least implicitly) equated with that of *āgama*-s,[136] in contrast with the

[136] Thus according to Lawrence 2003, §29, "as engendering a 'purification of conceptualization' (*vikalpasaṃskāra*) which leads the student to

Advaitavedāntins' attitude towards reason for instance;[137] it is also presented as capable of making obvious what is present but "hidden" (*saṃnigūḍha*) in the Śaiva scriptures and of thus transforming into an authentic *āgama* the mere "mass of words" in which they consist for those who do not have faith in them. Utpaladeva can therefore present his rational path as progressing independently of scriptural authority, but also as capable of *making the Śaiva scriptures authori-*

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realize identity with Śiva, rigorously philosophical discourse becomes in essence identical with *āgama.*"

[137] The Pratyabhijñā's position sometimes appears very close to that of the Vedāntins (it is the case for example regarding the idea that reasoning is by itself groundless: see above, fn. 69; or regarding the statement in ĪPK 1.1.2, quoted above, fn. 113, that *pramāṇa*-s are unable to function with respect to the absolute: cf. e.g. Halbfass 1983: 45). However, according to Śaṅkara, Sureśvara or Padmapāda, reasoning is only a kind of propaedeutics that helps prepare to the understanding of the Great Sayings (*mahāvākya*), but "it does not anticipate that insight which can only result from the 'hearing' of the Upaniṣadic statements" (Halbfass 1983: 58). Thus according to Sureśvara, the method of *anvayavyatireka* enables to separate the Self from what is not the Self, and this method is part of the qualification (*adhikāra*) for understanding scriptures, but it cannot by itself bring about the liberating knowledge which only comes from the Veda (ibid.: 65: "In a sense, reasoning in terms of *anvayavyatireka* produces only an openness which has to be filled, or perhaps even a confusion which has to be eliminated, by the Vedic revelation. To him who has freed himself from false superimpositions by reasoning in this way, […] who asks in bewilderment (*vīkṣāpanna*) 'who am I?' (*koʾsmi*), who may even think that he himself has been discarded (*tyaktoʾham*) in this process – to him the Veda speaks in a meaningful and soteriologically effective manner when it says: *tat tvam asi*." See also ibid.: 66–67, and 69: "revelation, the Veda, is the indispensable source of liberating knowledge; it is the condition of its possibility.") If Utpaladeva also considers that reason merely has the power to eliminate wrong notions superimposed onto the Self, nonetheless, by way of contrast he presents this power as capable of making someone fit for understanding the Śaivāgamas precisely because it is capable of bringing about the very realization (*vimarśa*) of which the Śaiva scriptures are an expression, and he asserts that even someone who does not acknowledge these scriptures can be led to this realization through the treatise's rational inquiry.

tative: if *āgama* is said to be the strongest means of knowledge, only reason can make it available to those who do not have faith in it beforehand.

It is thus an apologetic concern (the very concern that makes Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta assert the supremacy of *āgama* as a means of knowledge and that of Śaiva *āgama*-s within the various scriptures) that leads the author of the ĪPK to invent a path which departs from mere scriptural exegesis and progresses with the sole help of reason and experience: while Dharmakīrti subjects scriptures to the critical examination of reason, Utpaladeva claims that such an endeavour is impossible but acknowledges that the authority of scriptures must be set aside when addressing those who do not recognize it, and subjects experience to the critical examination of reason so as to reveal the Śaiva scriptures' authority instead of presupposing it.

Admittedly, the Śaiva *āgama*-s remain present in the Pratyabhijñā system not only as its horizon (since rational inquiry ultimately leads to a truth already contained in them) but also as its point of departure and its very foundation, since perception itself is said to be grounded in *āgama* and since any individual's self-awareness, however limited and inadequate, is considered an aspect of *āgama* conceived as the universal consciousness' realization of itself. However, the distinction between the primary sense of the term *āgama* (as *vimarśa*) and its secondary sense (as scripture) enables Utpaladeva to absorb as it were the religious understanding of *āgama* into the much more neutral notion of *vimarśa*: to say that perception requires *āgama* does not amount to saying that immediate experience would require scriptural authority in order to be valid, but only that any conscious manifestation (*prakāśa*) contains at its core a realization (*vimarśa*) in which consciousness actively becomes aware of itself by grasping itself as being such and such.[138] Thus *āgama* can

[138] While distinguishing the various means of knowledge, Abhinavagupta equates direct perception with manifestation (*prakāśa*) and *āgama* with realization (*vimarśa*) (see above, fn. 41), and this distinction should be understood in connection with chapter 1.5 of the ĪPK (devoted to the examination of perception) where *vimarśa*, defined as the power

be said to be "as it were the very life of perception and inference" insofar as *āgama* and *vimarśa* are equated, and the word *āgama* ends up being partly stripped of its religious meaning and clothed into a sect-neutral epistemological discourse: it can be understood as being nothing more than the dynamic awareness at the heart of any experience (and yet Utpaladeva can claim that the Śaiva scriptures express this dynamic awareness).

Modern scholars have often wondered whether and in what sense Indian thought qualifies as philosophy. Many indologists now consider this question superfluous (or at least too awkwardly formulated to be worth pondering over) among other reasons because it is most often formulated as an exclusive alternative (Indian thought has to be either religious or philosophical) resting on the assumption that Western philosophy is in essence distinct from and independent of religious matters. Obviously though, the history of Western philosophy is fundamentally intertwined with that of Western religions, and the relationship between reason and scriptural authority in particular has constituted one of the major points of tension – and therefore one of the major motors of creativity – within Western philosophy. Similarly, Buddhist epistemology for instance has often been seen as a purely theoretical effort disconnected from any religious concern,[139] and recent studies have shown that in fact it comes within the scope of a properly Buddhist strategy and strongly relates to the religious tradition on the background of which it builds a philosophical discourse while making a reflective effort to define its relationship with scriptures.[140] The study of the Pratyabhijñā sys-

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of consciousness to apprehend itself, is described as the very essence of perceptual manifestation (*prakāśa*). On *vimarśa* as the essence of *prakāśa*, see e.g. Alper 1987, Ratié 2007: 337 (fn. 51) and 339–340, and Ratié 2011a: 162–167 and 495–543.

[139] See e.g. Stcherbatsky 1930: 2: "In the intention of its promoters the system [of Buddhist logic] had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation."

[140] See e.g. Krasser 2004, Eltschinger 2007, Franco 2007, Eltschinger 2010 and 2011.

tem seems to suffer from the opposite short-range perspective: so far, with the notable exception of Raffaele Torella's works, it has mostly been presented as a purely religious exegetical attempt to interpret scriptural texts.[141] Utpaladeva's path is surely the product of Śaiva apologetics, but far from being a theology exclusively preoccupied of understanding its own scriptures, it endeavours to defend them by setting aside their authority, precisely because it cannot afford to presuppose an authority that it must reveal. This strategy requires the elaboration of an original and complex definition of *āgama* that both justifies the authority and supremacy of the Śaiva scriptures *and* grants reason the power to seek and find truth autonomously: it is by defending the Śaiva scriptures that Utpaladeva ends up leaving the plane of theology to become a philosopher.

[141] See e.g. Alper 1987: 178, n. 1, where the author insists that Utpaladeva's thought is not "philosophy" but "theology" (on the view that the Pratyabhijñā treatise is purely theological, see Ratié 2011a: 13, fn. 26).

Abbreviations and references

General abbreviations

ATBS	Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien
conj.	conjecture
p.n.p.	passage not preserved in
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
VÖAW	Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
WSTB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde
WZKS(O)	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-* (*und Ost*)*asiens*

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B – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Baroda, Central Library, no. 1828 [birch-bark, *śāradā* script]

BL – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, London, British Library, Oriental Manuscripts no. 6760 A [birch-bark, *śāradā* script]

J – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Jammu, Sri Ranbir Institute, Raghunath mandir, no.19 [birch-bark, *śāradā* script]

L – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Lucknow, Akhila Bhāratīya Saṃskṛta Pariṣad, no. 3366 ["*Pratyabhijñāsūtravimarśinī laghvī*," [Saptarṣi]saṃvat [49]42, Vikramasaṃvat 1823 (=1766 AD), paper, *śāradā* script]

P – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute (BORI), no. 466 of 1875–76 ["*Īśvarapratyabhijñāsūtravimarśinī*," birch-bark, *śāradā* script]

S1 – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 816 = DSO 00001 5659 [paper, *śāradā* script]

S2 – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, no. 1035 = DSO 00001 8219 [Vikramādityasaṃ. 1830 (=1773 AD); paper, *śāradā* script]

SOAS] *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, London, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library, no. 207 in R.C Dogra's 1978 catalogue / MS no. 44255 ["*Pratyabhijñāsūtra* with Abhinavagupta's *Sūtrārthavimarśinī*," paper, *śāradā* script]

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BSū – *Brahmasūtra*, *Śaṅkarabhāṣya, with the commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala*, edited by K. L. Joshi, 2 vol., Parimal Publications, Parimal Sanskrit Series 1, Delhi, third edition, 1996

ĪPK – *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*: see Torella 2002

ĪPV – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, edited with notes by M.R. Śāstrī/M.K. Śāstrī, KSTS 22 & 33, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 2 vol., Srinagar, 1918–1921

ĪPVV – *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta*, edited by M. K. Shāstrī, KSTS 60, 62 & 65, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 3 vol., Bombay, 1938–1943

ĪS = *Īśvarasiddhi*, in – *Siddhitrayī and Pratyabhijñā-kārikā-vṛtti of Rajaka Utpala Deva*, edited with notes by Pandit M. K. Shastri, KSTS 34, Srinagar, 1921

MVT – *Mālinivijayottara Tantram*, edited by M. K. Shāstrī, KSTS 37, Bombay, 1922

NBh = *Nyāyabhāṣya* – see NSū

NBhūṣ – *Śrīmadācāryabhāsarvajñapraṇītasya nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ nyāyabhūṣaṇam*, edited by Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśagranthamālā, Varanasi, 1968

NBṬ = *Nyāyabinduṭīkā – Dharmottarapradīpa* (*being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*), edited by D. Malvania, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955

NM – *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, with Ṭippaṇī – Nyāyasaurabha by the editor*, edited by K. S. Varadacharya, 2 vol., Oriental Research Institute Series 116 & 139, Mysore, 1969–1983

NSū = *Nyāyasūtra – Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*, *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*, vol. I, edited by A. Thakur, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1997

PTV = *Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa – Parātrimshikā with commentary, the latter by Abhinavagupta*, edited with notes by Paṇḍit M. R. Shāstrī, KSTS 18, Bombay, 1918

PV – *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan), edited by Y. Miyasaka, *Acta Indologica* 2, 1971–1972, pp. 1–206

PVin – *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *Chapters 1 and 2*, Critically edited by E. Steinkellner, China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, Beijing-Vienna, 2007

PVSV = *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti – The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, text and critical notes by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Roma, 1960

ŚD – *Śivadṛṣṭi of Śrīsomānandanātha with the Vṛtti by Utpaladeva*, edited by M. K. Shastri, KSTS 54, Srinagar, 1934

ŚV – *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathimiśra*, edited by G. S. Rāy, Ratnā Publications, Vārāṇasī, 1993

TĀ – *Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with commentary by Rājānaka Jayaratha*, edited with notes by M. K. Shāstrī, KSTS 23, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 47, 52, 57, 58 & 59, 12 vol., Allahabad Srinagar Bombay, 1918–1938

TĀV = *Tantrālokaviveka* – see TĀ

TS – *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary "Pañjikā" of Shri Kamalshīla*, edited by D. Shastri, 2 vols., Bauddha Bharati Series 1, Varanasi, 1968

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VPV = *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* – see VP I

VSū – *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the commentary of Candrānanda*, critically edited by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, Gaekwad Oriental Series 136, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961

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Inherited cognitions: *prasiddhi*, *āgama*, *pratibhā*, *śabdana*

Bhartṛhari, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti in dialogue

Raffaele Torella

Every now and then, even the Olympian Abhinavagupta loses his temper. We are at p. 36 of the first volume of his *magnum opus*, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (ĪPVV):

> *"riktasya jantor jātasya" iti riktā vācoyuktiḥ / prasiddhiśatapūrṇe jīvaloke kasyacit kācid eva prasiddhiḥ "līneva pratibimbiteva likhitevāntarnikhāteva ca" iti nyāyena hṛdayabhittau utpāṭanaśatair api hṛdayam anunmūlya nāpasarpati* (pp. 36.24–37.6)
>
> The phrase "in a new-born creature that [as such] is empty (*riktasya*)" is indeed empty (*riktā*)! The world of living beings is full of numberless inherited cognitions, so everyone does have some inherited cognitions embedded in his heart that cannot possibly be removed, even by hundreds of eradicating efforts, unless one eradicates the heart itself. As [the *Mālatīmādhava*] says: "They are, as it were, absorbed, mirrored, inscribed, dug into it."

The addressee of Abhinavagupta's outburst is his most prestigious adversary, or, as I said elsewhere, his most intimate enemy, the great Dharmakīrti. In fact, Dharmakīrti's statement had already been questioned by Utpaladeva in his *Vivṛti*, and now Abhinavagupta is simply commenting on it. The passage comes from the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV), *kārikā*s 53–54:

> *riktasya jantor jātasya guṇadoṣam apaśyataḥ /*
> *vilabdhā bata kenāmī siddhāntaviṣamagrahāḥ* // 54 //

Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser (eds.), *Scriptural authority, reason and action.* Proceedings of a panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, Sept. 1–5, 2009. Wien 2013, pp. 455–480.

> "In a new-born creature that [as such] is empty [i.e. devoid of philosophical tenets], and does not see [their] virtues and faults, then alas, who bestowed [upon him] these wicked demons of philosophical tenets!"[1]

The import of the *kārikā* can only be grasped in the light of the preceding one:

> *keneyaṃ sarvacintāsu śāstraṃ grāhyam iti sthitiḥ /*
> *kṛtedānīm asiddhāntair grāhyo dhūmena nānalaḥ* // 53 //
>
> "Who made this rule that a treatise must be held in every deliberation? Now [if that were so], then people who had no philosophical tenets could not understand fire by means of smoke."[2]

Dharmakīrti's argument is about the possibility of inference based on the force of the real thing itself (*vastubalapravṛtta*) to act without recourse to scriptural authority – whose special domain is restricted to *atyantaparokṣa* matters[3] – with regard to objects that also have

[1] Transl. Tillemans 2000: 84 (slightly modified; following Jayaratha, vol. 12 p. 358.6, on *Tantrāloka* (TĀ) XXXV.4c, I take *jāta* in the sense of *aharjāta*). The *kārikā* is also quoted, this time in full, by Jayaratha (on TĀ IV.18) with a significant variant: 54b *kāryākāryam apaśyataḥ*.

[2] Transl. Tillemans 2000: 83.

[3] PV IV.48ab *uktaṃ ca nāgamāpekṣam anumānaṃ svagocare* "Now it has [already] been said that an inference [which functions by the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttanumāna*)] does not depend upon scripture with regard to its object [i.e. what is to be proved] (*sādhya*)" (transl. Tillemans 2000: 78). See also IV.50 *tathā viśuddhe viṣayadvaye śāstraparigraham / cikīrṣoḥ sa hi kālaḥ syāt tadā śāstreṇa bādhanam* // "When two [types of] objects [viz., those which are perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and those which are imperceptible (*parokṣa*) are [ascertained as] faultless in this manner [i.e., by means of direct perception and inference], then for one who wishes to adopt the treatise, this would indeed be the occasion [to accept it]. It is at this time that there [can] be invalidation (*bādhana*) on account of a treatise" (transl. Tillemans 2000: 80). It is to be noted, incidentally, that here the two terms *āgama* and *śāstra* (translated above as 'scripture' and 'treatise' respectively) are basically interchangeable, as is clearly shown by the commentators Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin (with the only possible difference that the former may be taken in a broader sense than the latter; cf. e.g. *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* p. 504.16 *svāgamaviṣayaśāstravirodhaparihāra eva*). Pra-

some aspects only knowable through scriptural authority. When Dharmakīrti vindicates the fact that rational demonstration of *parokṣa* objects is not dependent on *śāstra*, his opponent points out that any correct reasoning or debate does presuppose a pre-existing theoretical frame of reference (*siddhānta* or, more broadly, *śāstra*) without which the *vāda* '[correct] philosophical debate' would be degraded to *vitaṇḍā* 'cavilling.'[4] Dharmakīrti, as explained by his commentators, replies that connection with the theoretical frame of reference assumed by his opponent should be either innate or dependent on contingent conditions, but neither of these qualifications is admissible: the mind of the new-born human being is empty, and subsequent acquisitions require his conscious intellectual effort, that is, critical evaluation of the various *siddhānta*s in the light of the *pramāṇa*s.[5]

jñākaragupta and Manorathanandin's interpretations of PV IV.50 are radically different. For Prajñākaragupta, the knower turns to *śāstra* (also) when he is not fully satisfied with the knowledge of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* objects reached through perception and inference, respectively, although such knowledge is 'correct' (p. 505.3–4 *anumānena pratyakṣeṇa ca viṣayadvayasya pratyakṣaparokṣasya viśuddhatāyāṃ yadi tavatā na paritoṣas tadā śāstraparigrahacikīrṣāyāṃ sa hi kālaḥ syād abhyupagamasya*). For Manorathanandin, one has to turn to *śāstra* only when the third class of objects (*atīndriya*, *atyantaparokṣa*) is concerned. The *pratyakṣa* class includes objects that can be known through direct perception, such as form and so on; the *parokṣa* class includes objects that can be known only indirectly through inference, such as impermanence or absence of self; lastly, come the *atyantaparokṣa* objects, which are beyond the reach of human knowledge, such as the functioning of karma, etc.), accessible only through inference based on scriptural authority; cf. Tillemans 1986: 44.

[4] The objection is made explicit by PV's commentators (Prajñākaragupta p. 505.21 *nanu śāstram anabhyupagamyāpi vāde vaitaṇḍikaḥ syāt*; Manorathanandin: p. 381.21–22 *nanu śāstram anapekṣya na vādaḥ kartavyaḥ iti vastubalapravṛttānumāne 'pi śāstrāpekṣā*).

[5] Cf. Prajñākaragupta p. 506.8–9: *sambandhāt sahajāteś ca parityak*[*t*]*uṃ na śakyate / riktasya jantor jātasya tadyogaḥ sahajaḥ katham // guṇadoṣaviveko 'pi pramāṇaṃ tyajataḥ kutaḥ*; very appropriate are Manorathanandin's comments: p. 382.10–12 *riktasya tucchasya siddhāntarahitasya jantor jātasyānena sahajasambandhābhāvanimittam uktam /*

We can provisionally leave the ĪPVV and continue the thread of Abhinavagupta's discourse shifting to the TĀ.

> *abhitaḥsaṃvṛte jāta ekākī kṣudhitaḥ śiśuḥ //*
> *kiṃ karotu kim ādattāṃ kena paśyatu kiṃ vrajet* / (XXXV.4cd–5ab)
>
> In a place replete with all kinds of things, what could a new-born baby – being alone, hungry – do, what could he take, by what could he see, where could he go?

The response is given at the very outset of *āhnika* XXXV:

> *iha tāvat samasto 'yaṃ vyavahāraḥ purātanaḥ* [read: *purātanīm*] *//*
> *prasiddhim anusandhāya saiva cāgama ucyate* / (1cd–2ab)
>
> In this world, all human activities hold in that they have as reference point an ancient complex of innate cognitions and beliefs (*prasiddhi*): this is what is called *āgama.*

If somebody argues that, more plainly, the criterion of agreement and difference would suffice to find one's bearings in the human world, we reply (Abhinavagupta goes on) that agreement and difference are also nourished by *prasiddhi*.[6] If they were self-dependent, that is, if they had to act each time on the immense range of particular objects autonomously, how could we establish their necessity?[7] But not only is inference based on previous *prasiddhi*s: even perception, which arises from the specific complex of eyes, self, light, object, depends at its root on *prasiddhi*. But the opponent insists: The behaviour of the

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guṇadoṣaṃ prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyanibandhanam apaśyataḥ / anenaupādhikasambandhanimittābhāva uktaḥ. The *siddhānta*s, concludes Manorathanandin (p. 382.14–15), are not like ears, which the living being is endowed with already at his birth.

[6] In the PV passage quoted above, the opponent put forward essentially the same argument to claim that the knower must possess *siddhānta*s prior to embarking on any cognitive process. The distance between Dharmakīrti and Utpaladeva/Abhinavagupta can be measured by the fact that the former takes them as specific cognitions to be progressively acquired by the single knower, while for the latter this complex of cognitions/beliefs is already part and parcel of the individual subjects.

[7] 2cd–4ab *anvayavyatirekau hi prasiddher upajīvakau // svāyattatve tayor vyaktipūge kiṃ syāt tayor gatiḥ / pratyakṣam api netrātmadīpārthādiviśeṣajam // apekṣate tatra mūle prasiddhiṃ tāṃ tathātmikām /.*

baby can be determined simply by his sense of satisfaction (ibid. 6bc *saṃprasīdati cetaḥ*): he has experience of the various things, selects those which give pleasure to his mind and discards the others.[8] Not even *cetaḥprasāda* can be taken as a primary source of orientation and evaluation,[9] says Abhinavagupta, since this satisfaction does not derive from external means of knowledge, like perception and inference, but is formed by an awareness made by previous mental impregnations; it is not a case of generic and unpredictable intuitive knowledge (*pratibhāmātram eva na*; Jayaratha: *na punar ākasmikaṃ pratibhāmātram*).[10] In the same vein, but in a different context (aesthetical speculation on the basic emotions, *sthāyibhāva*), Abhinavagupta says that living beings are born already impregnated by such basic emotions which may affect them in various degrees but can never be altogether absent:

> *sthāyitvaṃ caitāvatām eva / jāta eva hi jantur iyatībhiḥ saṃvidbhiḥ parīto bhavati /* [...] *na hy etaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāṇī bhavati / kevalaṃ kasyacit kācid adhikā cittavṛttiḥ kācid ūnā / kasyacid ucitaviṣayani-*

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[8] 5cd–6 *nanu vastuśatākīrṇe sthāne 'py asya yad eva hi // paśyato jighrato vāpi spṛśataḥ saṃprasīdati / cetas tad evādāya drāk so 'nvayavyatirekabhāk //.*

[9] Abhinavagupta may have in mind the endless debate in Dharmaśāstra literature on *ātmatuṣṭi* as one of the sources of *dharma*, starting from *Mānavadharmaśāstra* II.6: *vedo khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām / ācāraś caiva sādhūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca //* "The root of *dharma* is the entire Veda, the tradition and practice of those who know it, the conduct of good people, and what pleases oneself (*ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ*);" cf. Davies 2007: 282. *Ātmatuṣṭi* is glossed by the commentators with *ātmaparitoṣa*, *manaḥprasāda*, *cetaḥprasāda*. This subjective and emotional feeling, however, must have something else at its basis in order to be allowed to aspire to any sort of normativeness. As Medhātithi says, *ātmatuṣṭi* as an admitted normative principle can only arise in a person whose entire being is imbued with the Veda and who cannot possibly deviate from its spirit (Davies 2007: 288). Abhinavagupta's position, *mutatis mutandis*, is not different.

[10] Ibid. 7–8 *hanta cetaḥprasādo 'pi yo 'sāv arthaviśeṣagaḥ / so 'pi prāgvāsanārūpavimarśaparikalpitaḥ // na pratyakṣānumānādibāhyamānaprasādajaḥ / prāgvāsanopajīvy etat pratibhāmātram eva na //.*

yantritā kasyacid anyathā (*Abhinavabhāratī* ad NŚ 6, prose portion after 31, rasasūtra, vol. 1, p. 281).

"These [nine] are indeed the only Stable States. Every creature, in fact, possesses such forms of consciousness since its birth. [...] There is no creature that is devoid of the latent impressions of these consciousness modes. Only [one might maintain] that some are predominant in someone, others in someone else, and for some people they are determined by appropriate objects, for others it is quite the opposite."[11]

We are progressively arriving at a definition of *prasiddhi*: so far, we can say that we are dealing with a reflective awareness depending on previous mental impregnations. These previous impregnations coming to us from the past constitute this ancient *prasiddhi*, which animates our present. It has come down to us (TĀ XXXV.10a: *āgatā*), it is to be identified with *āgama*. Unlike the Buddhists (and the Mīmāṃsakas), our Śaiva thinkers, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, are not willing to relegate *āgama* to the sphere of *atyantaparokṣa* or *dharma*; on the contrary, the entire *vyavahāra* is impregnated and made possible by it. If I say "Utpaladeva," it is because in order to refine the portrait of *prasiddhi–āgama* we must refer to a couple of *śloka*s, first quoted (and commented on) in his lost *Vivṛti* and carefully glossed by Abhinavagupta in the ĪPVV[12] (we might even surmise Utpaladeva's authorship of them[13]). The *śloka*s are quoted with significant differences (particularly in the last line) in ĪPVV, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (ĪPV), *Mālinīvijayavārttika* (MVV), Bhāskarakaṇṭha's *Ṭīkā* on ĪPV. What follows is my own hypothetical (but highly probable, I believe) restoration.

prasiddhir āgamo loke yuktimān athavetaraḥ /
vidyāyām apy avidyāyāṃ pramāṇam avigānataḥ //
prasiddhir avigītā hi satyā vāg aiśvarī matā /
tayā yatra yadā siddhaṃ yat tad grāhyam aśaṅkitaiḥ //

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[11] Transl. Cuneo 2008–09: I, 295.

[12] ĪPVV I, p. 36.2–21; III, pp. 84.15–85.19; ĪPV II, pp. 83.12–84.1–2, MVV I.805–806.

[13] While introducing a slightly modified quotation of this passage in MVV, Abhinavagupta simply says: *dhīdhanair uktam* I.805bc.

> *Prasiddhi* is what we commonly call *āgama*, which may be either congruent with reason or not; it is a source of valid knowledge in the domain both of *vidyā* and *avidyā*, provided that it is not contradicted. For the non-contradicted *prasiddhi* is to be considered the true Voice of the Lord. What is established by virtue of this Voice, within a certain spatial/temporal condition, is to be accepted by those who are trustful.

Understood in the light of Abhinavagupta's glosses, the passage comes to mean more or less as follows: 'congruent with reason' means 'supported by logical reasoning,' like the tradition of non-dual Śaivism and others (ĪPVV I, p. 36.2–3 *nyāyadattahastāvalambo yathā īśvarādvayādyāgamaḥ*). Apparently, the *āgama* 'supported by logical reasoning' includes matters that can also be accessed through ordinary inference (like the existence of Īśvara etc.), while the *āgama* unsupported by logical reasoning (*itara*) deals with *atyantaparokṣa* matters, like cosmology, the efficacy of mantras, about which there is no other source than the *āgama*.[14] Another possible interpretation of *itara-niryuktika* could refer to its containing mutually contradictory or absurd teachings.[15] Such *yuktimān āgama* can direct men engaged on the path of liberation (*vidyā*) and on the path of fruition (*avidyā*) as well (ĪPVV I, p. 36.6–8). A *prasiddhi* (and the *vimarśa* connected with it) is valid on condition that it is not subsequently contradicted by another *vimarśa* (ĪPVV I, p. 36.12–13 '*avigānataḥ*' *prāmāṇye hetuḥ, viruddhaṃ gānaṃ tadvimarśonmūlanena vimarśāntarasya abhāvāt prāmāṇyam*).[16] In fact, *prasiddhi* is defined as 'deep rooting,

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[14] ĪPVV I, p. 36.3–6 '*itaraḥ*' *iti nyāyānanugṛhītaḥ / iyanti tattvabhuvanānīty ādita ārabhya teṣām etair mantrair etāvatībhir āhutibhiḥ śuddhir apunarbandhakatvalakṣaṇā bhavati, tata evaṃ śivayojanetyādinā*; III, p. 85.17–19 '*nyāyaḥ*' *iti anumānam / īśvarasadbhāve hi sanniveśakāryādiliṅgajam anumānam asty eva, tattvabhuvanādīnāṃ tu iyattayāyāṃ nāsti anumānam iti āgama eva tatra śaraṇam*. The term *atyantaparokṣa* as such is not used by Abhinavagupta; I take it from the Buddhist *pramāṇavādins* (cf. above n. 3).

[15] ĪPVV I, p. 36.8–12 *yuktimān dānād dharmo hiṃsātas tu adharma iti / upakārāpakāracittāt hi nirmalasamalarūpāt tādṛk phalam iti saṃbhāvanānumānam / niryuktikaḥ* '*snānāt dharmo dīkṣitasyādharmo dānāt*' *iti*.

[16] This is how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta interpret *avigānataḥ* and

firmness of a cognition or belief' (ĪPVV III, p. 84.1 *pratīter nirūḍhir dṛḍhatā*); analogously, *āgama* consists of extremely firm reflective awareness (ĪPV II, p. 80.3–4 *āgamas tu nāmāntaraḥ*[17] *śabdanarūpo draḍhīyastamavimarśātmā*). The next feature of *prasiddhi/āgama*, listed in the two *śloka*s commented on by Abhinavagupta, is its verbal structure (*vāc*): a verbalization having a deeply rooted reflective awareness as its form (ĪPV II p. 82 *dṛḍhavimarśanarūpaṃ śabdanam*). The last two *pāda*s add one more feature: *prasiddhi/āgama* is an open structure, which, though having an ideal unity and totality at the highest level of universal consciousness, can only act in an individualized environment. In fact, it is not a static content of the human being (or of any living creature), given once for ever, but is conditioned by the level of subjectivity reached by the individual, by his beginningless history (*vāsanā* and *saṃskāra*), by his living in a certain place, by his belonging to a certain caste and *āśrama*, and, finally, by his intellectual and emotional commitment. In other words, the 'static' content of the individually inherited *prasiddhi/āgama* is to be enacted by the personal adhesion of the subject, his confidence, faith.[18] Only the subject who trusts in a certain tradition can have his

avigītā in the *śloka*. Interestingly, a few centuries later Bhāskarakaṇṭha comments on *avigītā* in a totally different way: *avigītā* means 'not conflicting with the Veda.' *Prasiddhi* is a body of teachings that have come down to us through an unbroken tradition and whose author is unknown, but being *prasiddha* in this sense does not suffice to constitute a *pramāṇa* if this is in contradiction with the Veda (vol. II, p. 89.7–8 *avigītā – vedāviruddhā, tathā ca prasiddham api vedaviruddhaṃ cet tyajyam eva / prasiddhir ity anenāviditakartṛkaṃ paraṃparāgātam upadeśajātaṃ gṛhītam*). The 'vedicization' process of Pratyabhijñā has indeed been completed. In positing the condition of 'not being invalidated by a subsequent cognition,' Abhinavagupta follows ĪPK II.3.1–2 (cf. Torella 2002: 161–162).

[17] Bhāskarakaṇṭha reads *āntaraśabdana*° (but cf. ĪPVV III, p. 84.1–2 *śabdanarūpatvaṃ vimarśanaṃ yad āntaram…*).

[18] We might even say that the inner core of *prasiddhi* is not so much its content as its 'trust' component. An *āgama* can be authoritative only within a definite environment, just as direct perception can lose its inherent status of *pramāṇa* owing to the imperfections of its factors (ĪPVV III p. 85.2–5 *tatra yathaiva apramāṇabhūtadvicandrasaṃve-*

behaviour guided by it, whilst, to another subject who does not have the same *dṛḍhapratipatti*, the precepts imparted by that tradition are not authoritative.[19] As the TĀ says: "As long as the individual subject has not attained the Śiva state he does not distrust the limited *prasiddhi* that is in accordance with his own present nature. He distrusts any other *prasiddhi*, and strictly clings to his own."[20] If the will of the Lord is ultimately responsible for the firm rooting of *śabdana* – or, in other words, of *āgama* – in the individual subject, then what is the ground for the arrogance of epistemologists? Wicked epistemologists! – thus Abhinavagupta replies to his own question – it is the Lord himself and none else who manifests himself in this way, is reflectively aware and is the agent of reflective awareness in individual subjects. But then for mankind is there no room for any investigation, teaching and learning of *śāstra*? Does only silence remain? Abhinavagupta's conclusion is rich in insight, and also humour: yes, indeed, we might say that only silence remains for us, but are we sure that it is silence and immobility that are the Lord's preferred modes of being?[21]

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dana upayogam upagacchad ālokendriyādikam apramāṇam, na ca iyatā saṃyak pratyakṣasya pakṣapātitā prasajyate kācit, tathā [...]; p. 96.20–21 '*yat yadā yathā yatra' ity anena krameṇa sarvāgamānāṃ prāmāṇyam;* ĪPV II pp. 82.16–83.11 *tatra yathā mithyājñāne sahāyatāṃ bhajamānam ālokendriyādikam apramāṇatāsacivam apramāṇam* [...] *sarva eva hi āgamo niyatādhikārideśakālasahakāryādiniyantritam eva vimarśaṃ vidhatte*; TĀ XXXV.35ab *tad eka evāgamo 'yaṃ citraś citre 'dhikāriṇi*).

[19] ĪPV II, p. 82.1–3 [...] *tadāśvastasyaiva tatra anuṣṭhānayogyatvāt, anyasya tu dṛḍhapratipattirūpatvābhāvāt apramāṇam eva tathāvimarśanātmakaṃ śabdanam*.

[20] TĀ XXXV.21–22ab *yāvat tu śivatā nāsya tāvat svātmānusāriṇīm / tāvatīm eva tām eṣa prasiddhiṃ nābhiśaṅkate // anyasyām abhiśaṅkī syād bhūyas tāṃ bahu manyate /*.

[21] ĪPVV III p. 94.12–17 *nanu īśvarecchayaiva yat yasya nirūḍhaṃ śabdanam, sa eva tasya āgama iti ka idānīṃ prāmāṇikānāṃ protkarṣaḥ / āḥ ke varākāḥ prāmāṇikāḥ / īśvara eva hi tathā bhāti vimṛśati vimarśayati ca / nanu evaṃ tūṣṇīm avasthīyatām, kiṃ śāstrapraṇayanopadeśaśravaṇānuṣṭhānaiḥ / satyam avasthīyate yadi sa tathā avatiṣṭhāsīta parameśvaraḥ /*.

There are two forms of *prasiddhi*: one is structured into normative texts (*nibaddhā*) and takes the form of an arrangement of definite words and sentences (ĪPVV III, p. 102.11 *viśiṣṭavākyaracanā*), while the other (*anibaddhā*) is based on traditional behaviours of people (p. 85.20 *lokapāraṃparyapratiṣṭhitāyām*; p. 101.16–17 *mahājanānuṣṭhānaśeṣatayaiva sthitā*). Beyond them lies the highest form of *prasiddhi*, coinciding with *pratibhā*; these are the three forms in which *āgama* manifests itself (p. 102.12–13 *evaṃ pratibhārūpeṇa nibaddhānibaddhaprasiddhidvayātmanā ca trividham āgamaṃ pradarśya*).[22]

Among the main characters of the *prasiddhi/āgama* play, only one has not yet come to the foreground, albeit implicitly present from the very beginning: *pratibhā* 'intuition.' "Its name is *pratibhā*," says a fragment of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti*, which Abhinavagupta glosses: "This [divine Voice] is characterized by 'intuitive shining' (*pratibhāna*), it is indeed the *āgama*, that is, the subliminal impulse toward language (*śabdabhāvanā*)."[23]

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[22] In fact, a fourth variety (pp. 102.21–103.5) may be added: 'the word of an authoritative person' (*āptavāda*). Contrary to the above three forms of *prasiddhi*, which do not require any external proof, the reliability of *āptavāda* can be put to question, if a doubt arises as to the *pramāṇa* which is its source. Interestingly, if such doubt does not arise in the recipient of the teaching, the cognition which derives from *āptavāda* is placed at the same level as *prasiddhi*, is equated to direct perception itself and cannot be invalidated even by hundreds of reasonings. Such knowledge can be put into practice and even be imparted to others (pp. 102.23–103.5 *tam upadeśyaṃ tathābhūtāptavākyopadiṣṭavastusaṃvedanād anuṣṭhānaparopadeśaparyantāt nivartayituṃ na kenacit prakāreṇa anyo bhavati śaktaḥ / yato 'sāv upadeśyas tatra āptasambandhini jñāne pratyakṣapakṣāśrayeṇa sthitaḥ / yad āptena uktaṃ – mayā sākṣād etat jñātam iti, tatra asāv upadeśyo 'bhimanyate – mayaiva etat sākṣātkṛtam iti / na ca bālo 'pi sākṣātkṛtāt yuktiśatair api śakyanivartanaḥ*). This is additional evidence of the fact that the main character of *prasiddhi* is indeed 'trust.'

[23] ĪPVV III p. 93.14–15 '*pratibhāsaṃjñā' iti pratibhānalakṣaṇā iyaṃ śabdabhāvanākhya āgama eveti yāvat.*

What we can state so far is that the doctrine of *prasiddhi*, developed by Abhinavagupta in the TĀ, MVV, ĪPVV and ĪPV, was first formulated by Utpaladeva; though not found in ĪPK and *Vṛtti*, it is present in the *Vivṛti*, from which Abhinavagupta derives it.[24] But what, in turn, could Utpaladeva's source have been? Once again we trace back to the great mentor of Utpaladeva, Bhartṛhari. As is well known, the constellation *āgama–vāc–śabdabhāvanā–pratibhā* is at the centre of the Bhartṛharian sky. What Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta say of *prasiddhi* easily refers us to Bhartṛhari's *pratibhā*.

> "It cannot be explained to others as such and such. It is experienced by everyone within himself and even the subject (of the experience) is not able to render an account of it to himself. It is something indefinable and it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of individual words, covering the whole sentence as it were, it becomes its object. None can avoid in one's activities that (flash of understanding) [*pratibhā*] produced either through words or through the working of one's predispositions [*bhāvanā*]. The whole world considers that to be the authority [*pramāṇa*]. Even the activities of animals develop because of that. Just as some substances acquire the power to intoxicate and the like by mere maturity, without the help of a special effort, in the same way are intuitions produced in those who possess them. Who transforms the voice of the male cuckoo in spring? Who teaches living beings to build nests, etc.? Who goads beasts and birds on to actions like eating, loving, hating, swimming etc. associated with particular species and pedigrees? This Intuition is the result of Tradition (*āgama*), accompanied by *bhāvanā*." (*Vākyapadīya* [VP] II.144–151, transl. Iyer 1977: 61–62).

This famous passage from the Vākyakāṇḍa evokes another equally famous passage from the Brahmakāṇḍa:

> All procedures of practical activities in this world depend upon the word. Even the child, thanks to the impressions left from previous births (*Vṛtti*: *pūrvaśabdāveśabhāvanāsaṃkārādhānāt*), knows them. The first disposition of the vocal organs, the emitting of the air up-

[24] The doctrine of *prasiddhi*, as expounded in the 35th chapter of TĀ, is part of a special teaching on the 'meeting of the scriptures' by one of the main Abhinavagupta gurus, Śambunātha (44cd *itthaṃ śrīśambunāthena mamoktaṃ śāstramelanam*).

> wards and the striking of the places of articulation would not take place without the subliminal predisposition to language. (VP I.129–130).

So *pratibhā*, just like *prasiddhi* in the TĀ passage quoted at the very outset of this paper, is a *pramāṇa*, or even the *pramāṇa* par excellence on which all the other *pramāṇa*s ultimately rest. "*Āgama* is indeed formed by *prasiddhi*," says Abhinavagupta, and goes on: "And precisely to strengthen the *pramāṇa* status of *āgama*, Bhartṛhari has referred to the statement by the Muni (i.e. Vyāsa): 'In order to decide what is good [and what is bad, all men, starting from the lowest, have very little use for normative treatises (*śāstra*)]'."[25] Incidentally, we may add a very welcome clarification, coming from the MVV, just after quoting the same sentence:

> *tathā ca munir āhedaṃ puṇyaṃ pāpam iti dvaye //*
>
> *śāstraprayojanaṃ svalpaṃ nāgamasya prayojanam /*
> *āgamo hi na nāmaiṣa pustakagranthasaṃcayaḥ //*
>
> *kevalaṃ prathitābhikhyo 'nādir vedādikaḥ khila /*
> *kiṃ tu prasiddhir evāsau sā ca śabdasvarūpiṇī //*
>
> [...] There is very little use for *śāstra*, but not for *āgama*, since for sure *āgama* is not only the collection of written texts whose fame is widespread,[26] without beginning, like the Veda etc., but it is nothing else than *prasiddhi* – *prasiddhi*, which has language as its own form.[27]

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[25] ĪPVV III 102.3–10 *prasiddhirūpa eva āgamaḥ* [...] *idaṃ puṇyam ityādi-munivacanaṃ bhartṛhariṇā āgamaprāmāṇyadārḍhyāya upanyastam*. Abhinavagupta refers to VP I.40: *idaṃ pāpaṃ ity etasmin padadvaye / ācaṇḍalamānuṣyāṇām alpaṃ śāstraprayojanam*.

[26] I connect *na* with the following *kevalam*. *Prathitābhikhyaḥ* could refer to the 'manifested' nature of the *āgama* as distinguished from its subtle dimension. This might also be the meaning of *prasiddhasya* in the passage from the *Vṛtti* on VP I.10 (p. 39.6–7: *vedākhyasya prasiddhasya brahmaṇaḥ*).

[27] The conclusion of the passage (I.805–806) refers once again to the couple of *ślokas* quoted above, this time partly paraphrased: *ittham āgama evāyaṃ pramāṇam iti dhīdhanaiḥ / uktaṃ satyaiva vāg aiśī prasiddhir avigānataḥ // prasiddha* [read: *prasiddhir*] *āgamo loke yuktimān athavetaraḥ / vidyāyām apy avidyāyāṃ pramāṇam iti tat sthitam //*.

(MVV I.799cd–801)

But, of course, not everyone would subscribe to this bold statement, certainly, for one, not Kumārila. In fact, when, at the beginning of the *autpattika* section of the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV), he presents as a *pūrvapakṣa* the eligibility of *lokaprasiddhi* to establish by itself alone what is *dharma* and what is *adharma*, he quotes precisely the same statement of Vyāsa as a possible support (vṛttikāragrantha, v. 3). Needless to say, he quickly dismisses it with a few impatient words. Any *prasiddhi* is not a *pramāṇa* by itself, but is valid only if it is based on a *śāstra* of indisputable authority: only what is firmly established on a root can lay claim to authority, so *prasiddhi* itself needs to be investigated through valid means of knowledge (vṛttikāragrantha, v. 4ab *nirmūlāsambhavād atra pramāṇaiḥ saiva* [*prasiddhiḥ*] *mṛgyate*-).[28] In fact, the first presentation of the *prasiddhi* doctrine in ĪPVV (I, p. 35) starts with a *pūrvapakṣa* of a Mīmāṃsā flavour (*nanu prasiddhir nāma na kiṃcana pramāṇam*; cf. also PV I-*svavṛtti* p. 171.7

The whole doctrine is ascribed to the followers of Śrīmatbhūtaja (?), who attribute the status of *pramāṇa* to *niyati* 'necessity.' In fact, the passage starts with the equation between beginningless behaviours and necessity 'which sets everything into motion;' this is nothing but *āgama*, consisting of the behaviours of the ancients, which is the only authority with regard to *dharma* (in this respect, perception and inference being mostly misleading): *anye tv āhur anādir yo vyavahāraḥ kriyātmakaḥ // niyatiḥ saiva viśvasya pravartakatayā sthitā / sa eva cāgamo nāma vṛddhavyavahṛtikramaḥ // tataḥ samagra evāyaṃ dharmādipariniścayaḥ / na pratyakṣān nānumānād bhūyasā vipralambhakam* (read: °*kāt*) // (I.794cd–796). In ĪPVV III p. 92, Abhinavagupta gives a detailed explanation of the primacy of *āgama* over *pratyakṣa*: *ekapramātṛrūpasaṅkucitaprakāśāveśinīlādyavabhāsavimarśanarūpāt pratyakṣāt samastāvigītavimarśanarūpaparicchedaśūnyāsaṅkucitaprakāśaviśrāntabhāvatattvāvabhāsavimarśanasvabhāva āgamo balavān*. On the insufficiency of *pratyakṣa*, cf. also VP II.141 *tasmāt pratyakṣam apy arthaṃ vidvān īkṣeta yuktitaḥ / na darśanasya prāmāṇyāt dṛśyam arthaṃ prakalpayet //*.

[28] Sucaritamiśra (vol. II, p. 3) comments: *na svatantrāyāḥ prasiddher eva prāmāṇyaṃ sidhyati*. Cf. the analogous remark by Bhāskarakaṇṭha (above, n. 16).

prasiddhim apramāṇayataḥ, to which Karṇakagomin p. 602.16 adds: *mīmāṃsakasya*).

The possible identification of Mīmāṃsā, and particularly of his most illustrious exponent, as the actual target of the two Śaiva masters may help us answer some crucial questions which we have so far left in the background. Why have Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta elaborated their *prasiddhi* theory, for whom and against whom? And, furthermore, why, though heavily borrowing from Bhartṛhari, have they introduced this relatively new term, which is not found in the VP (at least, in this very specific sense)? In a sense, we could view *prasiddhi* doctrine as a posthumous defence of Bhartṛhari from the unspoken attack on him by Kumārila. Kumārila must have seen the 'universalistic' approach to revealed scripture as upheld by Bhartṛhari as being very dangerous. It is true that Bhartṛhari focuses on the Veda, but, apart from the corpus of texts in which the Veda is embodied, he envisages a higher level, a kind of subtle Veda made of *pratibhā* and *śabdatattva* which lies in the depths of all men, or even of all living creatures.[29] Apparently, *āgama*/Veda is not just a

[29] The Veda proper is only an image or reflection (*anukāra*) of the one Brahman, a means of reaching it; however, this Veda is not yet the Veda in the text-form we know, but so to speak its undivided prototype (VP I.5ab). According to the explanation given by the *Vṛtti* (cf. Aklujkar 2009: 24–26), the great *ṛṣi*s 'saw' the subtle, eternal, sense-transcending Voice, and transmitted an image of it to others, those who are incapable of any direct experience of *dharma* (p. 24.2–3 *yāṃ sūkṣmāṃ nityām atīndriyāṃ vācam ṛṣayaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇo mantradṛśaḥ paśyanti, tām asākṣātkṛtadharmebhyo 'parebhyaḥ pravedayiṣyamāṇā bilmaṃ samāmananti*); this image, still unitary and undifferentiated (*brahmarāśi*), is the root of Vedic corpus as it has been handed down to us (p. 26.5 *tathāyam apy aparimāṇamārgaśaktibhedo vedo brahmarāśir iti*). The Veda is the form in which the supreme Light comes to manifestation (*Vṛtti* on I.1, p. 12.5, *trayīrūpeṇa taj jyotiḥ paramaṃ parivartate*). This triple level of the Veda/*āgama* can also be seen in the Śaiva context: *Stavacintāmaṇi* v. 69 *stumas tvām ṛgyajuḥsāmnāṃ śukrataḥ parataḥ param* / (Kṣemarāja's gloss, p. 77.14–16: *ṛgādivedatrayasya yat paraṃ śukraṃ, tadabhedavimarśamayaṃ – bodhādityapratibhātmakapraṇavatejorūpaṃ, tato 'pi paraṃ – bodhādityarūpaṃ tvāṃ stumaḥ*; see also Abhinavagupta's slightly different interpretation in ĪPVV III, p.

content of the consciousness of living beings, but something more: on two occasions and in slightly different contexts, Bhartṛhari likens it to *caitanya* itself (I.41 *caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate / āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate*; *Vṛtti* on I.148, p. 203.7–8, *vedavākyāni tu caitanyavad apauruṣeyāṇi*).[30] Mīmāṃsā moves on the other hand along diametrically opposed lines: distancing the Veda from mankind as far as possible in order to vindicate its indispensable role as mediator. All kinds of *prasiddhi* (*bahujanaprasiddhi*, *mahājanaprasiddhi*) are equally dismissed. Even being *ārya* is not enough. The *prasiddhi*s of the *ārya*s are not to be preferred to the *mlecchas*' unless they too are supported by the *śāstra*, represented by the Veda (and its interpreter, Mīmāṃsā).[31] The very fact that the *prasiddhi*s of the *ārya*s and *mlecchas* are at variance with each other proves the unreliability of *prasiddhi* as a means of establishing *dharma*.[32]

What lies at the basis of the Śaiva approach is the very denial that any gap exists between human and non-human knowledge. In so doing, Utpaladeva pushes Bhartṛhari's position to the extreme. Not only do inexplicable cognitions or instinctual behaviours reveal the inner presence of *pratibhā*, but all cognitions without distinction are made possible by *prasiddhi*, the 'extremist' version of *pratibhā*. When Bhartṛhari says:

> "None can avoid in one's activities that (flash of understanding

99.5–10).

[30] Analogously, *vāc* is equated to *saṃjñā* and *caitanya*: I.126 *saiṣā saṃsāriṇāṃ saṃjñā bahir antaś ca vartate / tanmātrām apy atikrāntaṃ caitanyaṃ sarvajātiṣu //*.

[31] ŚV, vṛttikāragrantha v. 7ab *na cāryāṇāṃ viśeṣo 'sti yāvac chāstram anāśritam*. Bhaṭṭa Umbeka's *Ṭikā* p. 184.17–18: *śabdamūlatvenāryaprasiddhir anāryaprasiddher viśiṣyate; sā kathamiva śabdaprāmāṇyānaṅgīkareṇa dharmaṃ prati pramāṇaṃ syāt*.

[32] 6b–d *vigānataḥ / mlecchāryāṇāṃ prasiddhatvaṃ na dharmasyopapadyate*. The opponent had also put forward another generally accepted criterion for determining what is *dhārmika* or *adhārmika*: the former produces relief, the latter affliction (vṛttikāragrantha, v. 2). Needless to say, this too is immediately rejected by Kumārila.

> [*pratibhā*]) produced either through words or through the working of one's predispositions. The whole world considers that to be the authority [*pramāṇa*]. Even the activities of animals develop because of that " (VP II.146–147, transl. Iyer 1977: 61),

Puṇyarāja (p. 66.20) quotes as an example the mysterious impulse that drives Duṣyanta towards Śakuntalā as an acceptable wife as far as caste is concerned.[33] Bhartṛhari sees the presence of *pratibhā* within pragmatic activities, which are epistemologically complex in that they presuppose various *pramāṇa*s simultaneously at work. Abhinavagupta does not limit himself to saying that, on the one hand, there are fields in which *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are unable to operate by themselves alone and where only *prasiddhi*/*āgama* can,[34] and, on the other, that only *prasiddhi* makes possible the use in practical reality of the object of direct perception,[35] but also straightforwardly says that *prasiddhi* is, so to speak, the very life of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.[36] By saying so, he implicitly dismisses the naifs' (Naiyāyika etc.) belief in single *pramāṇa*s working in isolation in the course of cognitive experience; in this, too, Abhinavagupta's[37] predecessor is Bhartṛhari.

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[33] *Abhijñānaśākuntala* I.19 *asaṃśayaṃ kṣatraparigrahakṣamā yad āryam asyām abhilāṣi me manaḥ / satāṃ hi saṃdehapadeṣu vastuṣu pramāṇam antaḥkaraṇapravṛttayaḥ* (only the latter hemistich is quoted by Puṇyarāja) "Without a doubt, if my noble heart pines for her, then she is fit to be wed to a Kṣatriya. For when doubtful matters arise good people trust their internal feelings as an authority" (Davies 2007: 288, where Kumārila and other authors' positions on the matter are presented).

[34] Cf. e.g. ĪPVV III p. 255.9–12 *tatra asmadādipratyakṣaṃ na aśeṣasākṣātkāri, anumānam api evaṃ sarvasya liṅgavyāptyupalabdhisambhavābhāvāt / asaṅkucitaprakāśātmakaparameśvaravimarśātmakaḥ punar āgamo viśvaṃ pramātuṃ samarthaḥ.*

[35] Ibid. p. 83.15–16 *pratyakṣadṛṣṭam api arthakriyāsu śiṣṭair yojyamānām āgamalakṣaṇāṃ prasiddhim apekṣate*.

[36] TĀ XXXV.18cd *tatprasiddhyaiva nādhyakṣān nānumānād asambhavāt* (Jayaratha thereon: *tayoś ca prasiddhir eva nibandanam ity uktam*); ĪPV vol. II p. 80.3–6, *āgamas tu* [...] *pratyakṣāder api jīvitakalpaḥ*.

[37] That practical activities clearly presuppose the simultaneous working of a multiplicity of *pramāṇa*s had already been established in ĪPK

In order to express such a concept, Utpaladeva needed a broader term than *pratibhā* and less connoted than *pratibhā* by typically 'mysterious' overtones: *prasiddhi*, perhaps also because it furnished the occasion for critically addressing the Mīmāṃsā, was indeed the ideal candidate. A continuous line runs from the individually oriented *prasiddhi*s which are at work in the everyday experience of living beings and the progressively higher *prasiddhi*s, which give shape to the various world views, that is, the various *āgama*s – from the Veda to the Bauddha, the Pañcarātra, the Śaiva – culminating in the all-encompassing *eka āgama* (TĀ XXXV.24a, 30a, 35a, 37a). This, however, opens the door to two major objections: We have a multiplicity of *prasiddhi*s, with various, even human!, provenances; then, these *prasiddhi*s are not stable, but often fluctuate in a somewhat unpredictable way. It is true, Abhinavagupta replies to the second objection, that *prasiddhi*s are in themselves eternal, but every now and then some of them emerge, some (provisionally) disappear.[38] The first question is even more arduous. As the scriptures tell us, "The *śāstra*, extremely hard to acquire, emerges in the form of 'resonance' (*nāda*) from Śiva, whose body is not seen, who is quiescent, the supreme cause," or "Just as a great sound comes out of the im-

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II.3.9 and *Vṛtti*: *sā tu deśādikādhyakṣāntarabhinne svalakṣaṇe / tātkālikī pravṛttiḥ syād arthino 'py anumānataḥ // Vṛtti* thereon*: kāyapravṛttiḥ punar deśakālādipratyakṣabhedasāhityena svalakṣaṇa eva tadarthitayā pramāṇasamūhād eva / anumānād api dharmipratyakṣaviśiṣṭād eva pravṛttiḥ*. "On the contrary, it happens differently in the case of the activity that starts at that moment in the subject who aims at producing certain effects, as regards a particular, individual object, differentiated by various specific sensations of place etc., and also [in the case of the activity promoted] by inference." *Vṛtti*: On the contrary, the bodily activity of a person, that may concern only the particular object in association with a whole variety of perceptions (of place, time, etc.), in that it aims at producing certain effects , necessarily depends on the concourse of several cognitive acts. This activity may also be promoted by inference, qualified, of course, by the direct perception of the property-possessor (transl. Torella 2002: 168–169). On Bhartṛhari's position cf. Biardeau 1964: 351, Aklujkar 1988–89: 20.

[38] ĪPVV III p. 99.17–18 *anādikālabhāvinyo hi sarvāḥ prasiddhayaḥ / tatra tu kācid kadācid unmajjati, kācit nimajjati*.

material sky, so the *śāstra* called 'word' comes out of the quiescent [Śiva], made of consciousness."[39] If this is how things stand, then how do we account for 'historical' traditions having a specific human being as their founder, such as, for example, Buddhism? Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do not even for a moment take into account the possibility that these traditions do not deserve the status of *prasiddhi*s. Rather, they contest that their founders are anything but definite historical persons (p. 97.21 *na hi buddho nāma niyataḥ kaścit*): the Buddha was one who reached firm conviction about instantaneity, etc. by force of his mental cultivation (*bhāvanā*), but he received the teaching of such mental cultivation from a previous Buddha, who in turn received it from another Buddha, and so on and so forth. By being just a link in a beginningless chain, the Buddha loses the status of 'definite expounder' (*niyatavaktṛ*)[40] and, because of this, even the Buddhist *prasiddhi* ultimately comes to be absorbed in and derive from the eternal Lord's reflective awareness.[41]

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[39] Ibid. p. 97.14–18 *adṛṣṭavigrahāc chāntāc chivāt paramakāraṇāt / nādarūpaṃ viniṣkrāntaṃ śāstraṃ paramadurlabham // iti / amūrtād gaganād yadvan nirghāto jāyate mahān / śāntāt saṃvinmayāt tadvac chabdākhyaṃ śāstram //*.

[40] Abhinavagupta has probably in mind one of the arguments used by Mīmāṃsā to prove the eternality of the Veda: the study of the Veda presupposes a teacher, which in turn must have learnt it from another teacher (ŚV vākya v. 366 *vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā //*; the same argument can already be found in *Śābarabhāṣya*, vol. I p. 122.2–3). The next step for Mīmāṃsā is to affirm that, as a consequence, the Veda is not the work of human beings. On this, however, Dharmakīrti (of course, unaware that this argument would have later been used precisely to 'save' Buddhist tradition at Brahmanical eyes) strongly disagrees, arguing that such a criterion would lead to accepting also the sinful behaviours of *mlecchas* or the statements of the *nāstikas* PV I.244–245 *sarvathānāditā sidhyed evaṃ nāpuruṣāśrayaḥ / tasmād apauruṣeyatve syād anyo 'py anarāśrayaḥ / / mlecchādivyavahārāṇāṃ nāstikyavacasām api / anāditvāt tathābhāvaḥ pūrvasaṃskārasaṃtateḥ //*.

[41] Ibid. p. 97.21–24 *na hi buddho nāma niyataḥ kaścit, api tu bhāvanābalapratilabdhakṣaṇikādidṛḍhavimarśaḥ / tasya kṣaṇikādibhāvanopadeśī guruḥ pūrvabuddhaḥ, tasyāpi anyaḥ, iti krameṇa aniyatavaktṛkatvāt*

Human experience is the outcome of the interplay between what is already given in the individual subject and his personal cognitive and pragmatic efforts. To do justice to the complexity of the position of our authors, we should in parallel bear in mind that the epistemological primacy of *prasiddhi*/*pratibhā*/*āgama* does not result in the unilateral praise of a sapiential/instinctual behaviour at the expense of human empiricism and rationality: for Bhartṛhari, e.g., there are spheres of human experience in which one cannot do without *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*; after all, reasoning, provided that it is not in contradiction with the Veda, is dignified as 'the eye of those who cannot see' (VP I.135ab *vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām*). However, one must be keenly aware of the central role that inherited cognitions play in the apparently autonomous working of perception and inference. The role and meaning of the instinctual component also needs to be carefully determined. A *kārikā* of the VP provides a clue for this. When Bhartṛhari says: "If knowledge were spontaneous, there would be no purpose in the composition of the *śāstra*s. If spiritual merit is the cause of knowledge, the Veda is the cause of the former" (VP I.150; transl. Iyer 1965: 120), we are indirectly warned that spontaneity itself is not a mere elemental property of our individual consciousness but the outcome of a timeless process.[42] Even the intuitive knowledge of the *ṛṣi*s is imbued with *āgama* (VP I.30cd *ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam*).

Abhinavagupta agrees with a hypothetical objector saying that, if the *vyavahāra* is conceived of as based on increasingly older *prasiddhi*s, there would be the risk of a *regressus ad infinitum* and a cognitive chaos, unless, Abhinavagupta says, we recognize a single ultimate source for all *prasiddhi*s. In the Śaiva conception of the Absolute, such

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pārameśvaravimarśamayataiva vastutaḥ. On the status of the *āgama*s of *mlecchas*, see ibid. p. 96. *tad āha " prasiddhaṃ tu" iti yat yadā yathā yatra ity anena krameṇa sarvāgamānāṃ prāmāṇyam / mlecchādyāgamo hi tāvati pramāṇaṃ bhavann api anāryasaṃparkasaṃbhāvyamānamlānir āgamābhāsaḥ*.

[42] See also VP I.30 *Vṛtti* (p. 87.1–2) *svābhāvike hi tasmin prayatnaḥ phalād vyatiricyeta, svabhāvataś ca pratyavāyo 'pi tathābhūtaḥ sa prasajyeta.*

a standpoint is an all-knowing personal being[43] in which the totality of the *prasiddhi*s are contained: this is Parameśvara, Bhairava,[44] who also constitutes the inmost essence of all creatures. Or, to revert to our starting point – the two *śloka*s quoted by Utpaladeva – *prasiddhi* coincides with the very voice of the Lord. In fact, *prasiddhi*, as such, is just one, and one is the *āgama*; however, it is undeniable that we are confronted with a multiplicity of *prasiddhis*/*āgamas*. To solve this, Abhinavagupta would have two possibilities at hand: either making their multiplicity merely illusory or establishing a sharp distinction between 'true' and 'false' *prasiddhis*/*āgamas*. His position is, instead, more subtle: the *āgama* is 'variegated' (*citra*).[45] All *prasiddhi*s are equally authoritative (*sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*), which does not amount to saying that they are on the same plane. Out of the totality of *prasiddhi*s that are contained in the creature, those that gradually appear or 'emerge' match the spiritual level reached by the individual subject, or, in other words, are in accordance with its specific ends. When the individual is close to reaching *śivatā*, he has to cling only to the Śaiva *āgama*, because only the Śaiva *āgama* is able to realise the highest end; if, on the contrary, he is still far from *śivatā*, he 'has' to

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[43] Cf. Kṣemarāja's remarks on *Stavacintāmaṇi* v. 69: "We bow to You whose command, consisting of the Veda […] (*stumas tvām* […] *yasya vedātmikājñeyam*): the verse means that by itself the command (*ājñā*) would be altogether ineffective were it not for the presence behind it of the 'commander' (*ājñātṛ*), whose agency alone is able to rescue the 'words' of the Veda from their intrinsic inertness (p.78.5–8 *yat niyogarūpājñātmā ayaṃ vedārthaḥ sa niyoktari – ājñātari sati upapadyate, anyathā kathamiva jaḍasya śabdasya saṃghaṭanārthavattvaṃ niyoktṛtvaṃ vā syāt*).

[44] TĀ XXXV.11cd–14 *pūrvapūrvopajīvitvamārgaṇe sā kvacit svayam // sarvajñarūpe hy ekasmin niḥśaṅkaṃ bhāsate purā / vyavahāro hi naikatra samastaḥ ko 'pi mātari // tenāsarvajñapūrvatvamātreṇaiṣā na siddhyati / bahusarvajñapūrvatve na mānaṃ cāsti kiñcana // bhogāpavargataddhetuprasiddhiśataśobhitaḥ / tadvimarśasvabhāvo 'sau bhairavaḥ parameśvaraḥ //*.

[45] Ibid. 35ab *tad eka evāgamo 'yaṃ citraś citre 'dhikāriṇi /*. Then, Jayaratha remarks that even among the individual *āgama*s there is none which, though being unitary, is not variegated itself owing to the different qualifications of the adepts (vol. 12 p. 375.11–13, on 35cd), *na hi evaṃ kaścit tv eva bauddhādir āgamo ya ekatve 'pi adhikāribhedāt na citra iti*).

cling to other *āgama*s, more suitable to bestow the limited fruits he is seeking.[46] The subsequent passage of the TĀ gives voice to and then answers possible objections: But if all *āgama*s come forth from Śiva, why can the condition of Śiva not be achieved but through the Śaiva *āgama*? (Reply:) Just as one who is at a certain stage of life (*āśrama*) cannot achieve the results proper to another (superior) stage of life, so a follower of Pañcarātra cannot attain *śivatā*.[47] But if all *āgama*s come forth from Śiva, then why not call all of them 'Śaivas'? (Reply:) Because they are extracted/abstracted by their respective founders from the one *āgama* as single fragments; the result is that mankind is confused by their being mutually contradictory.[48] Among the *āgama*s, the Śaiva one stands in the highest place. If *prasiddhi* manifests in multiple forms, such as Śaiva, Buddhist, etc., why must the adept close to *śivatā* have to honour only the Śaiva? (Reply:) Because this prime *āgama* has been shown by the omniscient Lord himself; it covers both the path of action and renunciation; it is the only one able to act as a means to obtain all kind of fruits, whether higher or lower, belonging to all the four aims of existence (*dharma*, etc.).[49]

This hierarchization of the various *āgama*s should not make us forget that *prasiddhi*/*āgama* is in itself one: "The *āgama* is in fact one: the single *śāstra*s, from the mundane to the Viṣṇuite, the Buddhist, up to the Śaiva, all rest on it."[50] But is it not contradictory to

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[46] Ibid. 16–17 *tayaivāśaiśavāt sarve vyavahāradharājuṣaḥ / santaḥ samupajīvanti śaivam evādyam āgamam // apūrṇās tu pare tena na mokṣaphalabhāginaḥ / upajīvanti yāvat tu tāvat tatphalabhāginaḥ //.*

[47] Ibid. 29 *yathā ca tatra pūrvasminn āśrame nottarāśramāt / phalam eti tathā pāñcarātrādau na śivātmatām //.*

[48] Ibid. 37 *ekasmād āgamāc caite khaṇḍakhaṇḍā vyapoddhṛtāḥ / loke syur āgamās taiś ca jano bhrāmyati mohitaḥ //.*

[49] Ibid. 22cd–24 *evaṃ bhāviśivatvo 'mūṃ prasiddhiṃ manyate dhruvam // eka evāgamaś cāyaṃ vibhunā sarvadarśinā / darśito yaḥ pravṛtte ca nivṛtte ca pathi sthitaḥ // dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu pūrṇāpūrṇādibhedataḥ / vicitreṣu phaleṣv eka upāyaḥ śāmbhavāgamaḥ //.*

[50] Ibid. 30 *eka evāgamas tasmāt tatra laukikaśāstrataḥ / prabhṛtyā vaiṣṇavād bauddhāc chaivāt sarvaṃ hi niṣṭhitam //.*

posit an *āgama* covering such variegated domains? (Reply:) [51]In the end, hierarchisation is a way of saving the authority of the single *āgama*s, within their own limited domains: putting them on same plane would amount to creating a babelian tower, where conflicting *prasiddhi*s would neutralize each other, and, as we have seen, men cannot do without them.[52]

Conclusion

After presenting and discussing the relevant textual material, we can proceed to an overall assessment of this constellation of strictly related concepts: *prasiddhi–āgama–pratibhā–śabdana*. To begin with, *prasiddhi* is the paradox of something both coming from outside (*ā-gama*) and abiding in the depths of men's interiority. It is a content of our individuality for which we are not responsible, for it is already present in the new-born creature. It is not a fixed content, but a varying one, due to its interaction with the other factors of individuality. In a sense, then, *prasiddhi* is not even a content, being, rather, more like in its essence to a 'container.' At the same time, rather than belonging to the 'cognition' side it belongs to the 'action' side; it is the object of belief and the belief itself. Again, it is not bound to remain an inner belief, but enacts specific practical behaviours (TĀ XXXV.15cd *lokān vyavahārayet*). In the background lies the common Indian awareness that cognition alone is insufficient to set humans in motion. As Abhinavagupta insightfully says, even what has been directly perceived depends on *prasiddhi*, characterized by *āgama*, as applied by the *śiṣṭa*s (learned and spiritually advanced men) to the various practical activities (cf. above n. 35).[53]

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[51] Ibid. 38–39ab *anekāgamapakṣe 'pi vācyā viṣayabheditā / avaśyam ūrdhvādharatāsthityā prāmāṇyasiddhaye // anyathā naiva kasyāpi prāmāṇyaṃ sidhyati dhruvam /*.

[52] See the analogous remark by the Buddhist Dharmakīrti: "Man is incapable of existing without the authoritative support of revealed scripture" (PV I-*svavṛtti* p. 108.1–2 *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṃ samarthaḥ*).

[53] In this connection, I like to quote some passages from the *Zibaldone* by

Prasiddhi is belief in something, adhesion to something; its most recurrent qualifications are *dṛḍha* 'firm,' *nirūḍha* 'deeply rooted.' However, this 'firmness' does not derive from a conscious effort, but is innate, spontaneous, just as spontaneous as the insightful intuition (*pratibhā*) that plays such a great part in driving most of our actions. However, even this spontaneity does not belong to the creature individually, but to its shared background. Such a 'background' of the creature is its being ultimately rooted in universal consciousness, Śiva. This active divine presence is what may also be called *āgama*, and has the form of the innate language principle which imbues all cognitions and actions. It is the divine Voice (*vāc*) of the Lord that speaks in living beings.

From Utpaladeva/Abhinavagupta's conception of *āgama*, any parochial bias is banned as it comprises all the existing *āgama*s, from the Vaiṣṇava to the Buddhist (the Śaiva included). The immensely distant and undecipherable *āgama* of Mīmāṃsā, the Veda, leaves here the place to the internal and variegated *āgama*s of the Śaivas. Along with *advaitācāra* 'non-dual behaviour,' such a far-reaching universalistic approach to revelation constitutes the most insidious attack by Śaiva tantrism to Brahmanical hegemony.

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the great XIX century Italian poet and philosopher, Giacomo Leopardi, which is just about finally to come out in an English translation. They sound in perfect consonance with the ideas just outlined: "[414] That is why reason could not lead to happiness without revelation. Truth was not necessary to man as truth, but as firm believability. Now only truth is firmly believable in the state of reason and knowing. And man with no firm belief has no firm ground on which to decide, therefore to act, therefore to live. [416] And the perfection of reason does not consist in knowing these truths, because it does not consist in knowing truth as truth, but as a firm basis for beliefs that are necessary or useful to life. [438] But I am talking about beliefs, not knowledge. The object of cognition is truth. The object of belief is a credible proposition, and I mean credible in relation wholly and utterly to the general or individual, essential or accidental qualities of the believing being, because something can be credible to one species or genus and not to another; to an individual in that species or genus and not to another; to this same individual today and not tomorrow" (Leopardi, forthcoming).

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